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Off balance sheet financing (OBF) is either not visible or only partially visible in 
financial reporting for a number of reasons. It has attracted controversy in the light of 
its employment in a number of major corporate scandals. Previous investigations 
dominated by short works and consultancy papers have focused mainly on the 
financial aspects of OBF. This academic cross-country research on the use of OBF in 
the UK and US capital markets was undertaken to extend the published analyses to 
include a legal perspective by studying its legal implications for directors, financial 
advisers, auditors and financial regulators. The study’s legal focus prompted relying 
primarily on the doctrinal approach, which was in turn completed by the use of a 
modified case study in order to help address the how and why issues of the research 
phenomenon. 
The study found that OBF instruments are double-edge financial instruments with 
good and bad consequences. When corporations used OBF for liquidity enhancement 
or to realise financial savings, they result in positive outcomes. In contrast, when used 
for aggressive window-dressing or in the manipulation of financial reporting for 
fraudulent ends, OBF mechanisms generated serious legal liabilities for directors, 
auditors, and financial advisers in terms of compensation suits or even criminal 
sanctions. Financial regulators were nonetheless found to be less likely to face legal 
consequences as a result of current judicial attitudes on the tort of public misfeasance. 
However, the extensive applications of OBF in conjunction with other forms of 
creative accounting have resulted in various regulatory responses. On a comparative 
note, litigation and enforcement actions were found to be relatively more extensive in 
the US because of the higher incidence of large corporate frauds and the work of 
regulatory champions especially in New York using deferred prosecution agreements. 
 3
                                                                Contents 
Dedication 
Acknowledgements 
Introduction                                                                                                   9-10 
 
Chapter One: Research Approach, Scope, and Limitations       
 
Introduction                                                                                                     11 
The Research Aims                                                                                         11-14 
The Research Context                                                                                     14-19 
 
Significance of the Study                                                                                19-26 
 
Prior Research and Theoretical Background                                                  27-34 
 
The Research Question                                                                                   34-35 
 
Research Approach                                                                                         35-41 
 
Research Scope and Limitations                                                                     41-42 
 
 
Chapter Two: Corporate Financial Reporting and Financial  
                         Governance 
 
Introduction                                                                                                     43 
 
The Role of Financial Information                                                                  43-45 
 
Financial Information and the Capital Market                                                45-47 
 
Financial Information and Firm Valuation                                                      47-51 
 
Auditing and the Quality Assurance Function                                                 51-52 
 
Audit Function in the UK and US                                                                    52-57 
 
Regulation of Financial Reports                                                                      57 
 
Parliamentary (UK) and Congressional (US) Acts                                          57-68 
 
The ‘True and Fair View and ‘Present Fairly’ Rules                                       68-70 
 
Comparative Analysis of UK and US Financial Regulations                          70-72 
 
 4
International Accounting Standards                                                                 72-74 
 




UK: FSA                                                                                                          78-82 
 
US: SEC                                                                                                           82-85 
 
Comparative Analysis of UK and US Financial Regulators                            85-93 
 
 
Chapter Three: OBF Reporting Practices: Making Debts Less  
 
                            Visible or Invisible and Earnings Exaggeration 
 
Introduction                                                                                                    94 
 
OBF Instruments                                                                                            94-96 
 
International Finance Reporting Standard’s (IFRS) Treatment of OBF        96-97 
       
UK Response to IFRS                                                                                    97-98 
 
US Position to IFRS                                                                                       98-99 
 
OBF Reporting Practices: 
 
US Position: Earnings Exaggeration via Consignment Reporting  
 
                     and Others                                                                                 100                                           
 
                     Investment Reporting Manipulation                                         100-103 
 
                     Pension Financial Reporting                                                     103-106 
 
                     Lease Financing                                                                        106-110 
 
                     Factoring                                                                                   110-111 
 
                     Securitisation and USE of Special Purpose Vehicles/ 
 
                     Enterprises (SPVs)                                                                    111-114 
 
                     Financial Derivatives                                                                114-121 
 
                     Management Options Backdating                                            122 
 
UK Position: Earnings Exaggeration via Consignment Reporting  
 5
                       
                      and Others                                                                               123-124                                     
 
                      Redeemable Preference Shares and SPVs                               124-126 
 
                      Lease Financing                                                                       126 
 
                      Factoring                                                                                  127 
 
                      Pension Financial Reporting                                                    127-129 
 
                       
Comparative Analysis of OBF Applications in the UK and US                    129-134 
 
 
Chapter Four: Financial and Legal Implications of OBF 
 
Introduction                                                                                                    135 
 
The Nature of Financial Risk and Risk Management                                    135-138 
 
Financial Risk in OBF                                                                                    138-140 
 
Legal Implications of OBF 
  
UK Position: Directors                                                                                   140-152 
 
                     Auditors                                                                                     152-159 
 
                     Financial Advisors and Other Gatekeepers                               160-165 
 
                     Compliance Risks in Financial Services Sector                        166-168 
 
                     Financial Regulators                                                                  168-176 
                                                                                    
US Position: Directors                                                                                    176-183 
  
                     Financial Advisors and Other Gatekeepers                               183-185 
  
                     Auditors                                                                                     185-190 
 
                     Aggressive Enforcements                                                          190-191 
                                         




Introduction                                                                                                    199 
                                                                                                    
US Cross-Case Analysis: 
 6
Manipulative Use Cases                                                                                 200-206 
 
Financial Window-Dressing Cases                                                                206-210 
 
Financial Benefit Cases                                                                                  210-212 
 
UK Cross-Case Analysis: 
 
Manipulative Use Cases                                                                                 212-219 
 
Financial Window-Dressing Cases                                                                219-225 
 
Financial Benefit Cases                                                                                  225-228 
 
 
Comparative Cross-Country Case Analysis: 
 
Manipulative Use Cases                                                                                 228-234 
 
Financial Window-Dressing Cases                                                                235-237 
 
Financial Benefit Cases                                                                                  237-239 
 
Options Backdating                                                                                        239-240 
 
Hidden Share Ownership                                                                               241 
 
Other UK/US Differences                                                                              241-245 
                                                  
 
Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
Background                                                                                                   246-247 
 
Motivations and Manner of OBF Applications                                            247-250 
 
Legal Implications                                                                                        250-255 
 
Suggestions for Future Research                                                                  255 
 
Concluding Remarks                                                                                    255 
 
 
Bibliography                                                                                                256-285 
 
Appendix 1: Case Studies Summary 
 
                    US Cases                                                                                   286-322 
 
























































I wish to express my deepest gratitude to my panel of supervisors, namely; Dr. 
Andrew Haynes (first supervisor), Professor Stephen Griffin (second supervisor), 
Associate Dean Martin Cartwright (third supervisor); and my LLM thesis supervisor, 
Mrs. Helen Barker. This ‘advisory team’ have provided me with invaluable guidance 
and assistance. My gratefulness also extends to Dean Brian Mitchell of the School of 








































This cross-national investigation is undertaken to examine the legal consequences 
arising from off-balance sheet financing (OBF) in the corporate world. OBF like other 
forms of creative accounting emerged in the 1960’s when some corporations saw the 
need to window-dress their financial statements. These needs range from the need to 
facilitate access to cheaper funding sources, preparation for takeovers, share value 
enhancement, board and management remuneration justifications, and the more seedy 
aim of financial fraud.  
 
Previous works looked at the subject mainly from the financial perspective, with 
primary focus on its beneficial or negative effects. This comparative country case 
study seeks to gather further insights on the motives behind its employment and how 
these might give rise to various legal implications to the users, financial advisers, and 
financial gatekeepers (comprising internal audit committees, external auditors, and 
financial regulators) in the UK and US capital markets. Further details of the purpose 
and aims of this investigation, together with the research approach and study 
methodology employed are provided in chapter one. 
 
As the use of OBF instruments are linked to corporate financial reporting, chapter two 
of this study will examine and compare the usefulness and challenges posed by them 
to preparers and users in both jurisdictions. The analysis will also cover the statutory 
obligations behind its preparation and disclosure and the roles played by accounting 
and financial regulators to ensure the quality of financial reporting. 
 
The varied nature of OBF instruments and how these are reported in financial 
statements will be addressed in chapter three. This chapter will compare and contrast 
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its applications in both the defined capital markets and will also analyse how its 
manner of use may impact upon the quality and reliability of corporate financial 
reporting. 
 
Like other forms of borrowing, OBF may pose serious financial and legal risks to the 
preparers, their advisers and financial gatekeepers; depending on the motives behind 
its employment and the manner of its disclosure. These will be explored and discussed  
further in chapter four of this investigation. 
 
Deeper insights into the motives behind the use of OBF will be accessed from three 
pairs of corporate case studies from each jurisdiction. One pair from each will cover 
those using OBF for viable financial benefits; a second will cover those with financial 
window-dressing aims, and; the third on those with dishonourable or fraudulent 
objectives. Details of these intra and cross-case analysis will be provided in chapter 
five. 
 
The study will end through chapter six with conclusions on how and why the use of 
OBF may pose legal implications to OBF preparers, financial advisers, and financial 
gatekeepers in varying manner in the UK and the US capital markets. It will also 
discuss the wider implications to the global capital markets and suggest relevant areas 
for further research. 
                                











                                                       CHAPTER ONE 
                         




This chapter will introduce the aims for the undertaking of this study. This will be 
followed by a discussion on the research context. The significance of the thesis as 
well as its contribution to knowledge is addressed thereafter. Key insights and prior 
research and theories are then critically examined for the purpose of identifying the 
research gap and the pertinent research question. The research approach and 
methodology employed are then discussed as the closing part of this chapter.   
 
The Research Aims 
 
Prior works on OBF comprising mainly book chapters and consultancy papers were 
undertaken from a financial perspective. This academic investigation will extend from 
this to incorporate the legal perspective. In particular, it will examine its legal 
implications to financial information preparers, connected advisors and various 
financial gatekeepers in the UK and US capital markets. This comparative cross-
country case investigation is envisaged to generate wider global implications to 
market participants across the world as the two jurisdictions taken together lead and 
dominate the global capital markets in terms of width, depth, and innovations. 
 
An off-balance sheet transaction is commonly defined as, ‘The funding or refinancing 
of a company’s operations in such a way, that under legal requirements and existing 
accounting conventions, some or all of the finance, may not be shown on its balance 
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sheet.’[1] It thus allows businesses to engage in such transactions without disclosure or 
only as footnotes in their financial statements.   
 
OBF is the product of creative accounting techniques. Viewed from a more positive 
perspective, OBF represents a financial innovation of high practical value to 
corporations seeking to raise funds under less stringent conditions. It is 
entrepreneurial and growth-oriented. Some of its more commonly used instruments 
include consignment stock financing, sale and repurchase agreements, debt factoring, 
securitisation, leasing and loan transfers.[2]  
 
OBF by securitisation is by far the more complex of the lot. These include debt 
underwriting, derivatives, contingent banking and bank assets securitisation. They are 
widely and popularly used because of their enormous flexibilities when compared to 
the more traditional sources of funding and also because suppliers do make huge 
profits out of them. However, in view of their immense complexity, the underlying 
risks behind their usage are not often fully grasped. This poses great challenges to 
corporations in terms of risk management whenever these are used with inadequate 
understanding or precautions. 
 
The mixture of motives in the use of OBF generates controversies. Investors who are 
apparently hurt by them have condemned its use in the aftermath of high profile cases 
like Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat; and indeed in much earlier cases like BCCI, 
                                                 
[1] Para 5 (1), TR 603,’Off-Balance Sheet Finance and Window Dressing’, Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in England and Wales’, December 1985 
[2] Elliott, B. & Elliott, J., ‘Financial Accounting and Reporting’, 9th edition, 2005, Prentice Hall: Essex, 
295-314; McBarnet, D., ‘After Enron: Corporate Governance, Creative Compliance and the Uses of 
Corporate Social Responsibility’, in Justin, O. (ed.), ‘Governing the Corporation: Regulation and 
Corporate Governance in an Age of Scandal and Global Markets’, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: West 
Sussex, 2005, 205-222. Professor McBarnet argues that OBF accounting practices frustrate the whole 
idea of true and fair accounts. 
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Maxwell, and Barings. Regulators and watchdogs tasked to look after shareholders’ 
welfare and creditors’ rights are now paying more and closer attention to OBF, 
particularly in the wake of the 2004 BCCI liquidator’s suit against the Bank of 
England. The abusive use of OBF together with the wilful distortions of on balance 
sheet items and other forms of management culpabilities have generated huge 
financial catastrophes.[3] Nonetheless, much of the financial community still holds to 
the belief that OBF is extremely useful to corporations when properly used.[4] Hence, 
OBF when used for financial leveraging is a double-edge sword depending on the 
manner and reasons for application as well as business and market conditions.[5] 
 
The debate over the pros and cons of OBF for corporate funding purposes continues 
despite attempts by the accounting and financial regulators to streamline disclosure 
requirements for OBF instruments. The major difficulties faced by the accounting and 
regulatory bodies lie in the way accounting standards are formulated both within 
countries and between countries. Within countries, whilst standards exist for the way 
in which OBF instruments should be reported, professional judgements still need to 
be exercised. Attempts to internationalise and harmonise accounting standards have 
also encountered difficulties, especially for financial derivatives. 
 
                                                 
[3] Smith, T., ‘Accounting for Growth’, 2nd edition, Random House: London, 2002. This work focuses 
primarily on the techniques of on-balance sheet distortions; Thomas, A., ‘Introduction to Financial 
Accounting’, 4th edition, McGraw-Hill: New York, 2003, 12-14; US Senate, ‘The Fall of Enron: How 
Could it Have Happened’, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Hearing, 107th 
Congress, S.Hrg. 107-376, 24/01/2002; US House of Representatives, ‘The Financial Collapse of 
Enron: Part 4’, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations Hearing, Committee on Energy and 
Commerce, 107th Congress, Serial No. 107-90, 14/03/2002; Hodson, N.M., ‘Detecting Fraud and 
Managing the Risk’, in Justin, O. (ed.), ‘Governing the Corporation: Regulation and Corporate 
Governance in An Age of Scandal and Global Markets’, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: West Sussex, 2005, 
Chapter 10. Here, the researcher lamented the lack of actions to address motivation, which he regards 
as the most compelling lever in recent fraud cases; Kranacher, M-J., ‘Financial Statement Complexity: 
A Breeding Ground for Fraud’, The CPA Journal, 09/2006, 80 
[4] Wayman, R.J., ‘Off-Balance Sheet Entities: The Good, the Bad and the Ugly’, available at 
http://www.researchstock.com, 08/02/2002 
[5] Weston, J.F. & Copeland, T.E., ‘Managerial Finance’, Casell Educational Ltd: London, 1989, 474-
475 
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This investigation argues that OBF when used under particular circumstances would 
generate not only serious financial consequences when not properly managed but also 
serious legal implications to corporate directors, auditors, financial advisors and 
financial regulators. A proper understanding of such legal implications would 
motivate a more careful use of such otherwise innovative and beneficial financial 
instruments. Creditors would also find the research insights useful, as the use of OBF 
could impose risks upon their borrowers’ debt servicing capacities. As for investors, 
further knowledge of this would provide them with better directions for their 
investment strategies. 
 
Whilst the UK and US share many common law traditions, there are various 
divergences. For instance, after the Enron debacle, the US imposed tighter regulations 
and rules over the use of specific OBF instruments. In contrast, the UK still hung on 
largely to its voluntary disclosure regime reinforced by a specific reporting standard. 
This thesis will adopt a comparative approach in order to compare and contrast the 
legal implications of OBF between these two jurisdictions.[6] 
 
The Research Context 
 
In the late 1980’s, in response to the growing doubts on the quality of corporate 
financial statements in the UK, members of the financial community jointly produced 
the 1992 Cadbury Committee Report.[7] This report acknowledged the possibility of 
different accounting treatments being applied on basically similar facts, with the 
consequence that different financial positions could be reported, with each apparently 
                                                 
[6] Prior analysis tends to look at OBF from the more restricted national perspective. 
[7] Parkinson, J. E., ‘Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law’, 
Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2002; Cadbury, A.,’ Corporate Governance and Chairmanship: A Personal 
View’, OUP: Oxford, 2002 
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complying with accounting standards to exhibit ‘a true and fair view’. OBF was cited, 
as one of the contributing factor towards the manipulation of financial data. 
In response, the Committee recommended a ‘Code of Best Practice’ for all UK listed 
companies in the UK. This was reinforced by a ‘comply or explain‘ procedure 
whereby directors would have to confirm their compliance to this Code or to explain 
their deviations. This version of voluntary disclosure system did contribute to some 
improvements, but was severely tested in the BCCI case. The bank collapsed 
primarily because of its significant involvement in criminal activities and enormous 
exposure to the Ghokal Shipping group. It employed OBF instruments to hide illicit 
activities and the huge losses in the latter.[8] 
 
Financial corporate governance received further attention in the aftermath of the fall 
of Barings and appeared in the form of a Combined Code, which was given currency 
by the UK Stock Exchange as part of its continuous reporting obligations. The 
updated 2003 Combined Code paid particular attention to risk management, internal 
controls, institutional shareholders’ involvement, and auditor independence.[9] 
 
These obligations were taken to a new level in 2005 when the government  enacted a 
new regulation requiring companies listed on the Main Board of the London Stock 
Exchange to prepare an Operation and Financial Report (OFR) as a key component in 
their Annual Reports. Of concern to these listed corporations was the inclusion of a 
new criminal offence of ‘recklessly approving an OFR’ with potential unlimited 
                                                 
[8] House of Commons Second Report,’ Banking Supervision and BCCI: The Implications of the 
Bingham Report’, HMSO, February 10, 1993 
[9] Mallin, C.A., ’Corporate Governance’, OUP: Oxford, 2007, 20-27; Parkinson ,J. E., ’Corporate 
Power and Responsibility: Issues in the Theory of Company Law’, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 2002, 
160-61 ; The Cadbury Committee, para 4.47; Sheridan, L., Jones, E. & Marston, C., ‘Corporate 
Governance Code and the Supply of Corporate Information in the UK’, CGAIR, Vol. 14, No. 5, 
09/2006, 497-503; Charkham, J.P. & Ploix, H., ‘Keeping Better Company: Corporate Governance Ten 
Years On’, OUP: Oxford, 2005. The authors here argued for stronger enforcement mechanisms, 
‘private’ if possible, public if necessary as the Combined Code is a ‘soft law’, which at best secures 
flexibility but at worst with such sanctions as there are seemed inadequate to secure compliance. 
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fines.[10] In the meantime even well before this, significant numbers of FTSE 100 
corporations had already incorporated OFRs in their 2003 Annual Reports because of 
of its earlier voluntary adoption as a best reporting practice. In making such voluntary 
disclosures, the Boards of these listed corporations showed confidence of the quality 
of their financial reporting. Then again such exemplary financial corporate 
governance behaviour seems to flow mainly from corporations in strong financial 
positions with minimum or no exposures to OBF. 
 
However, it can be argued that the combined effects of the Combined Code, the less 
aggressive financial behaviour of UK listed corporations, and greater transparency of 
executive incentives like stock options grants probably contributed to the reduced 
incidence of financial scandals in the UK when compared to the US.[11] This is not to 
imply that UK financial reporting is free from the ills of OBF. It is indeed often the 
subterranean nature of OBF which makes it so difficult to reach such conclusions. 
UK’s experience of the Barings Bank failure and some other subsequent cases 
illustrated this point only too well.[12] 
 
In the face of the huge calamities inflicted on the US economy in terms of large job 
losses, equity evaporations from important pensions funds, and irrecoverable losses to 
investors and creditors arising from the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and others; the 
Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) had to respond in a tough and fast manner in 
                                                 
[10] Ross, L. ‘The Operating and Financial Review’, Financial Management, May 2005, 28 
[11] Solomon, J. & Solomon, a., ‘Corporate Governance and Accountability’, John Wiley & Sons ltd.: 
London, 2004, 117; Fasterling, B., ‘Prospects and Limits of Corporate Governance Codes’, in Paul, U. 
A. & Greg, N. G. (eds.), ‘International Corporate Governance after Sarbanes-Oxley’, John Wiley & 
sons Inc.: New Jersey, 2006, 467-484 
[12] supra note 8; Other high profile cases include Farepak and the MG Rover Group; Palepu, K. G., 
‘Information and the Regulation of Markets’ in Geoffrey, O., Tom, K. & Jeremy, G. (eds.), ‘Corporate 
Governance in the US and Europe: Where Are We Now?’, Palgrave Macmillan Ltd.: Basingstoke, 
2006, Chapter 15. The researcher here argued that the auditors could help improve the quality of 
financial information by critically challenging the information content in public accounts. 
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order to secure investor confidence. [13] Fuller or more transparent disclosures are now 
demanded for OBF reporting. Corporations in the US had to spend millions to cope 
and comply with the now stricter disclosures requirements demanded by the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOA). The increasing numbers of financial restatements 
filed in by corporations in the US over the last two years also gave some reasons for 
concern that all is not over yet where OBF controversies are concerned. A case in 
point is that of Computer Associates where its previous CEO was found guilty of 
tampering with the company’s account.[14] 
 
The study of OBF is shaped by developments in the theory and practice of financial 
corporate governance, and in particular financial disclosures theories. In respect of 
corporate governance, it seems to be the result of fusion between law and economics  
(taken to include finance and accounting). There is now a growing body of literature 
examining the relationship between legal origin, investor protection, risk analysis and 
corporate finance.[15] La Porta and his colleagues arguably are the main driving force 
behind this approach. They demonstrated empirically the links between the legal 
framework and financing patterns and eventually corporate performance and 
                                                 
[13] s401 (a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002: Coffee, J.C., ‘The Professions and Corporate 
Governance’, Oxford: OUP, 2006. Professor Coffee argued that gatekeeper failures primarily 
contributed to the unfolding of large US corporate scandals; Aglietta, M. & Reberioux, A., ‘Corporate 
Governance Adrift: A Critique of Shareholder Value’, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2005. SOA was 
argued here to be an inappropriate response as it was premised on the gatekeeper failure thesis. The 
researchers attributed the root of the crisis to the incessant focus on shareholder sovereignty and the use 
of stock markets in a framework of aggressive acquisition policies without obvious economic logic. 
[14] Berenson, A.,’ The Number: How America’s Balance Sheet Lies Rocked the World’s Financial 
Markets’, Pocket Book: London, 2003, 188-194; Simpson, S.S., ‘Corporate Crime, Law, and Social 
Control’, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2002, Chapter 7. The empirical study here suggests 
that the thrills of power over regulators and competitors or the success of gaming the system act as 
powerful incentives for managers to perpetuate corporate crimes. 
[15] Emmons, R. W. & Schmid, F. A., ’Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance’ and Berglof, 
E. & von Thadden, E-L., ’The Changing Corporate Governance Paradigm: Implications for Developing 
and Transition Economies’, in Stephen, S. C. & Gavin, B.,’ Corporate Governance and Globalisation: 
Long Range Planning Issues’, Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2000, 59-94 , 275-306 
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economic growth. Their research also indicated significant differences between 
countries at different levels of development.[16] 
 
Financial information is used within corporations and by external parties. Internally, 
management uses financial information for decision-making and planning purposes. 
Externally, investors, creditors, and professional analysts used it for their various 
respective agenda. For management the supply of such information could either imply 
additional compliance costs and revelations of corporate secrets to competitors; or 
opportunities to communicate with various stakeholders to secure support for their 
positions or their financial agenda [17] OBF by its nature appears to go against the 
information needs of shareholders and other stakeholders who require enhance 
transparency for informed decision-making. 
 
The Confederation of British Industries (CBI) and others have long argued against  
increasing regulations being introduced for compliance by the business community in 
terms of spiralling costs and bureaucratic red tapes. For instance, new reporting rules 
of the 2005 International Accounting Standards (IAS) have led to massive reporting 
compliance cost burdens.[18] The tension increased further with announcements that 
the regulators would be watching closely some identified business sectors under 
economic stress to prevent the occurrence of systemic risks.[19] Economic risks 
management in particular became a subject of close regulatory scrutiny after various 
                                                 
[16] La Porta, R. et al, ’Legal Determinants of External Finance’, Journal of Finance, 1997, 52, 1131-50 
[17] Filatochev, I., Jackson, G., Gospel, H. & Allcock, D., ‘Key Drivers of ‘Good’ Corporate 
Governance and the Appropriateness of UK Policy Response’, DTI: London, January 2007, 35-40; 
Musa, M., ’Voluntary Financial Disclosure and the Unlisted Securities Market: An Empirical 
Investigation’, Ph.D. thesis, Glasgow University, 1989, 16-78. 
[18] The Financial Times, ’A City Policeman’s Lot is not a Happy One: FSA Under Fire Over 
Compliance Costs’, December 17, 2004 
[19] The Financial Times,’ City Regulator Plans to Get Tough with Accounts in Five Industries’, 
December 21, 2004. These were the automotive, pharmaceutical, retail, transport, and utilities sectors 
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regional economic crises and the ‘2000 Dotcom’ bubble.[20] The Enron and 
WorldCom dramas in 2002/3 sharpened the necessity for systemic corporate financial 
risks assessment. 
 
Financial disclosure theory and practice, corporate law theory and practice and risk 
theory and analysis therefore form the bedrock for the study of OBF. There are now 
increasing arguments for corporations and financial regulators to broaden their 
perception of risks. Rather than reacting to bad risk events, as is commonly the case, 
financial regulators now encourage capital market participants to define and anticipate 
upside risks. These include hazard risks, financial risks, operating risks, organisational 
risks and strategic risks. Regulated businesses and financial institutions are now 
required to put in place appropriate risks mitigation measures to protect corporate 
assets and shareholder interests.[21] This study by putting focus on the examination of 
financial and legal risks posed by the use of OBF will contribute further useful 
insights for more effective financial risk management. 
 
Significance of the Study  
 
Research on OBF before the Enron debacle both in the UK and USA has been  
confined mainly to its use as a financial innovative instrument for enhanced liquidity 
at favourable cost or as deceptive instruments to perpetuate various corporate frauds. 
Often its examination is also conducted as peripheral studies within the wider field of 
creative accounting practice.[22] After the Enron disaster, the research thrusts in the 
                                                 
[20] Williamson, J., ’The Years of Emerging Market Crises: A Review of Feldstein’, Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol. XLII (September 2004), 822-837 
[21] Slywotzky, A., ’Exploring the Strategic Risk Frontier’, Strategy & Leadership, 2004, Vol. 32 No. 6, 
11-19; Gunningham, N. & Rees, J., ‘Industry Self-Regulation’, Law and Policy, Vol. 19 (4), October 
1997, 363-407; Black, J., ‘Managing Regulatory Risks and Defining the Parameters of Blame: A Focus 
on the Australian Regulation Authority’, Law and Policy, Vol. 28 (1), January 2006, 1-30 
[22] McBarnet, D. & Whelan, C.,’ Creative Accounting and the Cross-Eyed Javelin Thrower’, John 
Wiley & Sons Ltd.: West Sussex, 1999, 3-13 
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UK and even more so in the US began to pay greater attention to OBF and in 
particular to the aggressive use of ‘Special Purpose Vehicles’ (SPVs) as funding 
vehicles. The main studies tend to dwell on their financial effects and the  
apportionment of blameworthiness between market participants .[23] To gain a greater 
understanding of the hazards of OBF, however, not only must this phenomenon be 
examined from this perspective but also on the reasons for their occurrence and the 
legal implications of these to directors, professional consultants, auditors, and 
financial regulators. 
 
For financial democracy and market discipline to function effectively, explicit 
disclosures of the financial health of corporations are not options but necessary 
obligations of corporations. Where such information is not timely or faulty, punishing 
consequences may follow. In as far as OBF is concerned, much controversies and 
debates surround the manner it can be presented or in some situations not 
presented.[24] 
 
Though there are certain guidelines and procedures for OBF presentations in financial 
statements, these are not ironclad. Such rules are characterised by flexibilities and 
options. For as long as they appear to adhere to general accepted accounting 
principles (GAAP) or the applicable standards, they are deemed to comply with the 
‘true and fair view’ criterion, and through that comply with the requirements of the 
                                                 
[23] Mayer, Brown, Rowe, & Maw, ‘SPE (SPV) Transaction Update: Concerns Over the Use of SPEs 
(SPVs) by Financial Institutions’, available at http://www.MayerBrownRoweMaw.com,  01/02/2002, 
4-9 
[24] Horn. C. M., ‘In Defense (Defence) of Moderation: Avoiding Overregulation of Special Purpose 
Entities’, Washington Legal Foundation, Vol. 17 No. 39, 20/09/2002; Chandra, U. et al., ‘Enron-Era 
Disclosure of Off-Balance-Sheet Entities’, Accounting Horizons 20.3 (09/2006), 231-253; Wallace, W. 
A., ‘Adding Value Through Accounting Signals’, California Management Review, Vol. 46, No. 4, 
Summer 2004, 120-137; Epstein, B. J., ‘Early Warning: Recent and Forthcoming Financial Reporting 
Developments That May Spur Business Litigation’, Securities Litigation Report, 10/2006, Vol. 3 No. 9, 
9-14.  
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1989 Company’s Act.[25] Despite this, under certain circumstances it can be 
misleading or in extreme cases read as calculated with the intention to deceive. The 
separation between a borderline legal indiscretion and acceptable legal discretion can 
be paper-thin. It is dangerously easy to fall out from one to the other. Further 
knowledge and analysis of OBF reporting practices and their legal implications will 
be of use not only to accounts preparers but also those who need to monitor or 
regulate their applications. 
 
The function of the balance sheet has evolved from that of ensuring the proper  
matching or balancing of the assets and liabilities of the business to that of an 
instrument for the ascertainment of value. This transformation came about on the back 
of the mergers and acquisitions frenzies in the 1980’s and thereafter. These 
developments in the capital markets especially in the UK and US saw the essential 
need to use the balance sheet to derive valuations for the worth of businesses.[26] Such 
widespread practices take place despite its inherent limitations. Foremost, it provides 
information, which is mainly historical and do not show explicitly contingency 
transactions which might adversely affect the financial health of a corporation nor 
does it provide assessments of changes in the business environment. It also ignores 
pertinent non-financial matters, which may have subsequent financial consequences, 
such as corporate reputation damage or the loss of creative corporate talents in service 
industries.  
 
                                                 
[25] Sections 226-7 CA 1985 
[26] Elliott, B. & Elliott, J.,’ Financial Accounting and Reporting’, 9th edition, Prentice Hall: Essex, 
2005, 303-306; Sprouse, R. T., ‘Accounting for What-You-May Call It’, The Journal of Accountancy, 
1966, October, 45-53. Here, criticisms were made against traditional cost-based accounting to argue the 
case for the fair value-based asset/liability approach; Storey, R. K. & Storey, S., ‘The Framework of 
Financial Reporting Concepts and Standards’ FASB: Norwalk, 1998 
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Balance sheet valuations are crucial not only in terms of merger activities but also for 
ascertainment of board remuneration or for the making of investment decisions by 
caretakers of pension funds. It is also the main tool for those who earn their livelihood 
as independent advisors or consultants or as rating agencies. All of them use balance 
sheet analysis to evaluate corporations in terms of their intrinsic worth.  It is within 
this context that some OBF instruments can create controversies, by being kept out as 
normal on-balance sheet items. 
 
Past and recent financial scandals have shown how easy credit and speculative mania 
can contribute to ‘irrational exuberance’ in the capital markets. This refers to extreme 
buoyant market conditions where asset prices are driven unusually high without 
support of viable economic justifications and are therefore at high risks of imminent 
collapse. Often this is associated with fraud and criminal conduct by corporate 
executives. Three independent reports covering over a decade in the UK, US, and 
Italy concluded that these could not have occurred without the willing or naive 
participation of financial intermediaries; all of whom encountered conflicts between 
their motivation to generate income from their corporate borrowers and those placing 
investment funds in their care.  
 
Ground evidence appear to show that these conflicts were resolved in perpetuation of 
their own agenda despite the presence of regulatory, managerial, and market-
discipline guidelines set to safeguard investors’ interests.[27]  
                                                 
[27] Smith R. C. & Walter, I., ‘Governing the Modern Corporation: Capital Markets, Corporate Control 
and Economic Performance’, OUP: Oxford, 2006, Chapter 10. The authors identified 2 type of 
conflicts of interest; type 1 pertaining to those arising between a firm’s own economic interests and 
those of its clientele, and type 2 which develops between clients and inducing the firm to work for one 
with adverse interest to the other. (Prince Jefri v KPMG [1999] 2 AC 222 is a good example of this 
category of case, where the House of Lords ruled against its continued perpetuation) 
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Indeed, it is market and information imperfections even in highly developed financial 
system such as those of the UK and US which provide the basis for the perpetuation 
of these conflicts of interest. OBF and other forms of negative creative accounting 
contributed to the rise of such flawed financial information flow. 
 
To present ‘true and fair view’ accounts, corporations are required to comply with 
prevailing accounting standards.[28] This was made clear in an audit negligence suit in 
1985.[29] FRS 5 and FRS 8 were formulated to deal with the problems posed by OBF. 
The former requires corporations to report on the commercial realities of transactions, 
and the latter on disclosures of dealings between connected parties.[30]  
 
The UK Law Society, however, did not support this position as it maintains that it is 
more appropriate to look at the legal effects of transactions, because interpretations on 
the basis of economic effects may lead to subjective variations. The disagreement has 
persisted over the last two decades and is still awaiting resolution. FRS 8 requires 
corporations to be more transparent on related party transactions. There are some 
ambiguities over this standard. This was amply demonstrated in the BCCI debacle 
where the meaning and implications of FRS 8 were severely tested.[31] Further 
                                                 
[28] supra note 25 
[29] Lloyd  Cheyham & Co. Ltd. v Littlejohn & Co [1987] BCLC 303 
[30] IAS 17 Leases, IASC revised 1997. This was the first formal imposition of the substance over form 
principle of accounting. As the IASB has not issued a standard on accounting for this, guidance on this 
can be derived from the Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements; 
Holgate, P. ‘Accounting Principles for Lawyers’, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006, 
Chapter 5. 
[31] Related party transactions were not explicit in much of Enron’s commercial activities as 
exemplified by the NatWest-Enron SPV case; Arden, M. H., ‘Accounting and the Law: A Legal 
Viewpoint’ and McBarnet, D. & Whelan, C. J., ‘Regulating Accounting: Limits in the Law’, in 
Michael, B. & Anthony, G. H. (eds.), ‘Accounting and the Law’, Prentice Hall International (UK) Ltd.: 
Hertfordshire, 1992, 76-82 and 99-111 respectively. McBarnet and Whelan discussed the problems of 
OBF reporting compliance whilst Dame Arden argued for the use of accounting concepts and 
standards, which are clear to non-accountants to facilitate legal enforcement. 
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insights addressing this kind of problem will be helpful for corporations and 
regulators 
 
Accounting practices in the 19th and 20th centuries were significantly subjected to 
British influence.[32] However, the increased activities of multinationals and 
emergence of economic blocs[33], together with environmental and cultural differences 
shaped the development of accounting systems in different economies[34]. These 
variations provided the basis for the grouping of accounting behaviour across 
economies.[35] This resulted in the distinction between countries on the basis of strong 
or weak equity market classification.[36] Using this basis of accounting classification, 
the UK and US are placed in the strong equity category. This implied the orientation 
of accounting towards the safeguard of investors’ interests through enhanced 
reporting transparency. 
 
Some have also argued that various societal values like short and long term financial 
orientations have also contributed to the differences in accounting management 
practices.[37]Accounting values like secrecy, transparency and flexibility were also 
said to be influential in the development of accounting practices.[38] Indeed, a major 
controversy in advanced economies concerns the clash between self-regulation by the 
professional community or more state intervention through public regulations. As an 
example, in the UK the concept of ‘a true and fair value’ relies heavily on the 
                                                 
[32] Edwards, J. R., ‘A History of Financial Accounting’, Routledge: London, 1989 
[33] ibid 
[34] Gray, S. J.,’ Towards a Theory of Cultural Influence on the Development of Accounting Systems 
Internationally’, Abacus, March 1988, 7 
[35] Nobles, C. W., ’A Judgemental International Classification of Financial Reporting Practices’, 
Journal of Business Finance and Accounting’, Spring 1983, 8 
[36] Nobles, C. W., ’Towards a General Model of the Reasons for International Differences in Financial 
Reporting,’ Abacus, 1998, 34 (2) 
[37] Hofstede, G., ’Cultural Dimensions in Management and Planning,’ 1984, Asia Pacific Journal of 
Management, January; Hofstede, G.& Bond M. H. ’The Confucius Connection: From Cultural Roots to 
Economic Growth,’ Organisational Dynamics, 1988, 16 (4) 
[38] supra note 34, 12-13 
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judgement of the accountants whereas in much of continental Europe and the US 
greater reliance is placed on prescriptive rules.  
 
Societal values reinforced by accounting values therefore drive the nature of 
particular accounting systems.[39] Based on this approach, the Anglo-American 
accounting system is argued to be of high transparency and optimism. In contrast, the 
European continental system and that of Japan are less transparent and more 
conservative. Indeed, the huge successes of the Anglo-American economies have also 
led to the transplantation of much of their financial reporting practices across the 
world. 
 
The capital market exerts a dominating influence on accounting regulation in the US. 
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), however, enforces the securities 
laws and formulates and enforces the accounting standards as well. The SEC’s 
standards-setting function has, nonetheless been delegated to the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), but it retains the right to intervene. Listed 
corporations in the US have to adhere to the standards set by the FASB. Where the 
capital market is concerned, the US is reputed to have the most comprehensive system 
of accounting regulations in the world.[40] Yet, for some reasons it was unable to 
prevent the occurrence of the massive financial scandals in the 2001/02 where OBF 
manipulations played major roles. 
 
Like the US, accounting regulations in the UK are geared mainly towards the  
information needs of investors. Unlike the US, however; the UK’s accounting 
                                                 
[39] ibid 
[40] Nobles, C. & Parker, R., ‘ Comparative International Accounting’, 5th edition, Prentice Hall: NJ, 
1998, 66-116; O’Brien, J., ‘Governing the Corporation: Regulation and Corporate Governance in an 
Age of Scandal and Global Markets’, in Justin, O. (ed.)., ‘Governing the Corporation: Regulation and 
Corporate Governance in an Age of Scandal and Global Markets’, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: West 
Sussex, 2005, 1-20. The global reach of US financial regulations is highlighted here.  
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community and its stock exchange get relatively more involved in the regulatory 
process. After a spate of financial scandals, the UK Financial Reporting Council 
(FRC) set up the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) to parallel that of the FASB in 
the US. Its quiet agenda was to discourage state intervention by instituting a code of 
best practice reporting through a self-regulatory process. To underline the importance 
of its accounting standards, the ASB indicated at a very early stage that departure 
from their accounting standards will only be accommodated for the purpose of 
reflecting the true and fair view principle.[41]  
 
Hence, whilst both accounting settings share many common traditions, the US model 
appears to have a much tighter and detailed set of regulatory regime. Yet, the financial 
scandals perpetuated largely through the use of OBF are far more extensive and larger 
in scale in the US. This study will gather insights for better appreciation of this 
occurrence. 
 
The UK and USA capital markets taken together are highly significant in terms of size 
and global reach.[42] In as far as financial governance and financial innovations are 
concerned; they are exemplary leaders to the rest of the world. This comparative UK 
and US study will generate useful practical insights on OBF practices and reporting 
obligations in these two respective economies. It will also seek further insights on 
why their different regulatory approach for OBF has and may continue to lead to 




                                                 
[41] ASB ‘Accounting Standards’, June 1993, paragraph 18 
[42] International Stock Exchange Federation, ‘Market Capitalisation of World Stock Exchange’, 
available at http://www.internationalstockexchangefederation.com 2006 
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Prior Research and Theoretical Background 
 
Four studies on OBF have been undertaken in the US. One dealt primarily with the 
issue of value generated by OBF to shareholders. The work suggests that the use of 
OBF contributed to the enhancement of shareholders’ value. It also provided an 
analysis of the underlying process involved. Its omissions of information and analysis 
on the financial risks and distortion effects of OBF have, however, deprived a more 
balanced view of the financial impact of this financial instrument.[43] 
 
The impact of operating leases as an OBF instrument on debt ratings was examined in 
another study. The research findings suggest that whilst moving debt off-balance 
sheet may be useful in maintaining higher debt ratings, this does not appear to fool the 
market because the yields on new bond issues showed that the market evaluates off-
balance obligations despite their limited disclosures. This analysis could have been 
enriched by the assessment of the impact under varying market conditions and the 
controversial conflicting roles of financial intermediaries.[44] 
 
The more extensive US third study examined whether OBF scandals were a product 
of profound systemic failure or mere isolated incidents of corporate fraud. The 
investigation concluded that it was probably the former. The work emerging so close 
after the Enron debacle understandably took a pessimistic position. Corporate frauds 
perpetuated through OBF were significant and probably extensive but they were still 
not serious enough to suggest a profound systemic failure of the US financial 
economy. The investigation drew attention on how businesses expand and bury 
financial risks posed by the use of OBF instruments and why very little was done to 
                                                 
[43] Leigh, M.& Olveren, L., ’Off-Balance Sheet Financing—What Value Does It Bring to the Firm?’, 
Graduate Business School Working Paper, Goteborg University, Jan. 2001 
[44]  Lim, S.C., Mann, S.C., & Mihov, V. T., ’Market Evaluation of Off-Balance Sheet Financing: You 
Can Run But You Can’t Hide,’ Neeley School of Business, Texas Christian University, Working 
Paper, May 3, 2004 
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contain or deter their abusive applications. Stemming from a largely financial 
perspective, legal analysis of the consequential effects of OBF was restricted to some 
peripheral comments on regulatory enforcement deficiencies. The study argued that 
further state intervention to curb the ills of corporate excesses and professional 
conflicts of interest within the capital market was not really needed as existing 
securities laws were adequate for such purposes provided these were seriously 
enforced.[45] This was shown to be the case in various subsequent high-profile 
corporate fraud cases involving the use of OBF. 
 
A fourth piece of research centred on Enron as a single case study. It addressed in 
great details on how the corporation, its board and managers used OBF and other 
creative accounting techniques to glorify the corporation’s performance through a 
mixture of misleading, deceptive and pure dishonest acts. More importantly, the work 
demonstrated how the corporation and its directors were able to perpetuate corporate 
frauds with varying support from financial intermediaries and financial gatekeepers. 
These range from active collaborations to blind eye postures. 
 
This study also implied that careful analysis of the company’s financial statements by 
financial intermediaries and financial regulators and some minimum corporate 
enquiries would have uncovered various serious financial weaknesses despite the 
shrewd application of the creative accounting charade. While the claim by this and 
others may have some merits, these are weakened by the general failure of the market 
to detect the underlying corporate deception before the revelations made by inside 
corporate whistle-blowers. In fact, the catalysts for eventual scrutiny by the SEC in 
                                                 
[45] Ketz, J. E., ’Hidden Financial Risk’ John Wiley and Sons Inc.: NJ, 2003. 
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many high profile cases were initiated only after the contributions made by these 
whistleblowers and findings of particular academic research.[46] 
 
This piece of research, however, illustrated the massive fraudulent activities mounted 
through special purpose vehicles (SPVs). This was a serious charge as SPVs were also 
innovatively used in many forms of securitisation to unlock low cost liquidity in the 
larger financial and capital markets. Nonetheless, prior to this argument little attention 
was paid to the bad side of SPVs. As the problems at Enron were unfolding, the 
World Bank conducted a special global study on the use of SPVs across economies. 
The investigation found evidence of their links to money laundering and other illicit 
activities.[47] The US Enron case study could have been further enriched by 
investigating more closely the financial and legal reasons for the continuing 
applications of SPVs despite concern looks from financial regulators. 
 
Thus US studies pre-Enron dealt mainly with the rationalisation of the use of 
particular OBF instruments like leasing and how they helped to enhance share values. 
Studies after the outbreak of the Enron scandal gave some attention to various other 
OBF instruments but still tend to focus on SPVs due to their extensive use in Enron 
and some other cases which followed and for the most part are also predominantly 
finance-based works. 
 
In the UK, the use of SPVs to promote the use of OBF was examined critically in a 
legal reform proposal paper. This policy paper in fact challenged the rationale and 
                                                 
[46] Jensen, B., ’Bob Jensen’s Thread Frauds at Anderson, Enron and WorldCom’, available at 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm, 11/10/2004; The SEC’s 2006 investigations of options 
backdating in corporate America for instance were also prompted by another academic research 
finding. 
[47] World Bank, ‘Special Purpose Entities’, available at  http://www.worldbank.com, 2003 
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legality of the activities of SPV’s especially in overseas financial services havens with 
tainted reputations. It urged the Law Commission to prevent the abusive use of such 
entities through legal reforms.[48] It is submitted that the approach taken by this 
review paper was weakened by the lack of more convincing arguments and evidence; 
and the failure to incorporate other financial instruments associated with OBF. It 
missed the opportunity to press home a more convincing case by its restrictive view of 
OBF. 
 
The use of creative accounting techniques (including OBF) to generate misleading 
financial statement was addressed in two separate studies. The initial study focused in 
details on both ‘on and off-balance sheet’ tools. This investigation concluded that 
such manipulative techniques were allowed to flourish by regulators despite various 
limitations and dangers these posed to investors and lenders.[49] As OBF accounted 
for only one component of a plethora of creative accounting techniques, it was only 
given a cursory treatment by this study. 
 
Building perhaps from the earlier study, the second UK investigation looks beyond 
the techniques of creative accounting to include the response by enforcement agencies 
and the judiciary. This study indicated the general reluctance of enforcement agencies 
to intervene with the practice of creative accounting. It also concluded that subsequent 
corrective actions made produced only very limited results, and that the accounting 
itself industry itself is still developing new weapons to contain and deter the 
manipulative use of creative accounting.[50] This study only made sparing discussions 
of OBF in passing as it used creative accounting as its main unit of analysis. 
 
                                                 
[48] Berg, T.,’ Recharacterisation of Enron’, Journal of Business Law, 2003, May, 205-38 
[49] Smith, supra note 3 
[50] supra note 22 
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A much more detailed investigation on OBF in the UK was carried out in a 
quantitative-based study. This focused on the diffusion aspects of OBF. It explored 
extensively the innovative features of financial instruments associated with OBF over 
the last two over decades. It examined the demand and supply equation of OBF 
products. It showed how the demand for financial innovation created various risks 
transferring products and more importantly why financial services institution issue 
OBF assets. The risks involved and the penalties paid by those who used it without 
proper understanding were also given some attention in the study. The main 
contribution of this work is the provision of key insights on the competitive and 
strategic interactions across firms in the context of innovation adoption and diffusion 
and in relating these to financial services.   
 
It showed clearly how the industry transformed from relationship banking (associated 
with lower risk and lower earnings) to transactional banking (associated with higher 
risks and higher earnings). This largely quantitative-based study is particularly 
effective for the demonstration of high risks associated with the latter banking 
approach, but it is less effective in dealing with the legal analysis of corporate fraud 
and associated criminal activities related to cases like Barings and BCCI.[51] 
 
OBF risk transfer features were also analysed in a risk awareness manual. This work 
dwelt essentially on the key concepts and process of financial risks management 
against the background of UK financial corporate governance practices. Control of 
risk, containment of risk and risk management especially in banks within the context 
of the Basel Accord were also raised in the study. Some discussions on the duties of 
                                                 
[51] Molyneux, P. & Shamroukh, N., ‘Financial Innovation’, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: West Sussex, 
1999, 13-79 
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directors against the background of UK company law were also addressed. It did not, 
however, connect adequately directors’ general role in financial risks management. It 
could have achieved more with further discussions and analysis of OBF financial 
reporting obligations imposed by accounting standards and how this may contribute to 
better risks management and evaluation.[52] 
 
OBF practices and the challenges they posed to financial reporting in terms of the 
transparency criterion were discussed extensively in a consultancy paper. This work 
together with others sharing the same sentiments may have significantly contributed 
to the reconstituted reporting standard for OBF, namely Financial Reporting Standard 
5 (FRS 5). FRS 5 requires the reporting of OBF to reflect on the commercial realities 
or substance of transactions.[53] This was said to have contributed to the lesser 
perpetuation of corporate frauds through the use of OBF in the UK in comparison to 
that of the US where more prescriptive reporting rules governed their applications. 
 
Risk management was examined against financial regulatory frameworks in the UK, 
US, Japan and other developing economies in another work. This was approached 
from a regulator’s perspective, and understandably focused its analysis on how 
regulators approach and manage risks pertaining to innovative financial products like 
OBF.[54] The economic, political and legal analysis of money-laundering perpetuated 
through the use of secret trusts and SPEs in various international financial services 
centres was undertaken through a robust academic study. The analysis could have 
been enriched by some reflections on the role of creative accounting techniques to 
                                                 
[52] Coyle, B., ‘Risk Awareness and Corporate Governance’, Financial World Publishing: London, 
2004, 15-29, 48-88, 140-161 
[53] Peasenell, K .V. & Yaansah R .A., ‘OBF’, ACCA Publications: London, 1988 
[54] Goodhart, C. et al,’ Financial Regulation: Why, How, and Where Now?,’ Routledge: London, 2003, 
38-43, 44-97, 116-141, and 142-188 
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money laundering activities.[55] The risks of liability for financial regulators in high 
profile corporate and banking failures were legally analysed in an extensive study.  
 
In particular, it drew out the charge of public misfeasance against financial regulators 
over the scandalous collapse of BCCI and Barings through ineffective monitoring of 
improper applications of creative accounting and particular OBF instruments. [56] 
However, its evaluations concentrate more on the limits to financial regulation, with 
the OBF factor mentioned only in passing. Financial manipulation in the UK and US 
capital markets was legally analysed in another academic study.[57] The study focused 
mainly on the comparative strengths and weaknesses of the criminal justice process in 
both jurisdictions and though superseded by new legislations some useful insights 
could be drawn on the securities laws governing the capital markets in both 
jurisdictions. 
 
In view of the country’s earlier encounter with OBF-type scandals in the late 1970s 
and the introduction of FRS 5, UK studies tend to cover OBF instruments in the 
context of various financial reporting weaknesses flowing from connected and opaque 
transactions. Owing to this, UK post-Enron studies did not change much as most 
Enron-type issues like connected parties’ transactions and so on were already covered 
earlier. Instead, more interests were centred on how creative accounting may have  
contributed to global money-laundering activities. 
                                                 
[55] Hinterseer, K. J. P., ‘Financial Secrecy and the Law: An Enquiry into the Legal Aspects of Money 
Laundering in a Political-Economic Context’, PhD Thesis, Institute of Advanced legal Studies, 
14/02/2001 
 
[56] Hadjiemmanuil, C., ’Banking Regulation and the Bank of England,’ LLP Ltd.: London, 1996, 338-
414 
[57] Fryer, P A., ’Insider Dealing an Market Manipulation: A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory 
Enforcement in the UK and US,’ PhD thesis, University of Wolverhampton, 2000, 39-75, 171-203 
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The survey and analysis of prior main works in the US and the UK on OBF 
applications therefore showed a clear focus on creative accounting analysis. The 
peripheral works merely scrutinised OBF in passing as a form of creative accounting. 
Enron case studies focused on the causes for its failure and ascertainment of 
blameworthiness between connected market participants. Studies on enforcement by 
financial regulators in the capital market focused on market abuse practices in general 
and consequently omit to highlight on OBF manipulations in particular. This literature 
review shows the need for a much more comprehensive integrated academic study on 
OBF; meaning the need to extend from the financial focus to the more important legal 
implications arising from its manner of employment. 
 
The Research Question 
This thesis argues that the debate concerning off-balance sheet financing should not 
be restricted to accounting issues, but should rightfully cover the relatively more 
important legal implications for directors, financial consultants, auditors, and financial 
regulators. Prior research demonstrates that there is also as yet a comprehensive 
academic investigation looking at the implications of OBF from an integrated 
financial-legal perspective. The ‘bits and pieces’ approach of prior works or their 
leanings towards other research agenda showed the gap for an academic framework to 
deal specifically with the motivations behind OBF applications and reporting 
practices and how and why under particular circumstances these may generate 
varying legal implications for various market participants.. 
 
This study will therefore develop from the hitherto largely financial perspective to 
incorporate the legal analysis of OBF. The central research question for this study is 
accordingly framed as follows: 
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                            ‘Why and how will the use of OBF generate legal implications for 
corporate directors, financial advisors, auditors, and financial regulators?’ 
             
This investigation, and in particular the data-gathering process will be guided by the 
following sub-questions: 
1. Why do corporations borrow and do they bother to pay enough attention to the 
financial and legal risks involved? 
2. Why do they choose OBF over the more traditional forms of borrowings? 
3. What are the common problems posed by OBF in financial reporting, and how 
financial regulators addressed these? 
4. Under what circumstances will the use of OBF pose financial and legal risks 
to accounting preparers and financial gatekeepers? 
 
Research Approach  
 
As the focus of this investigation is on legal issues, it will primarily draw on the use 
of the doctrinal or black letter approach traditionally employed in legal research.  
Some elements of empirical research will be adopted nonetheless to enhance the 
information gathering and analytical process. The doctrinal approach argues that, 
’…there is a distinctly legal mode of reasoning that determines ‘correct’ rules, facts 
and results in particular cases, i.e. law is presented as a closed logical system. On this 
view, the answer to all legal queries are contained in books—legal reasoning is simply 
a matter of looking up the rules of law (in statutes and case-books) and applying them 
to the facts of the problem…and by this process arrive at the ‘right’ result.’[58]. It 
therefore uses reason, logic and argument. It is an internal approach taking the 
perspective of an insider in the system; and draws its sources mainly from statutes and 
                                                 
[58] Fox, M. & Bel., ’Learning Legal Skills,’ 3rd edition, Blackstone: London, 1999, 239 
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decided cases and supplemented by lawyers’ reflective literature. This study, 
however, needs to consider the effects of law on corporate and management actions 
including the political acceptability of public policy implemented through legal 
instruments.[59] 
 
Traditional scholarship as dictated by the doctrinal approach has over the years been 
enriched by the empirical study of the practice of law which drew on the disciplines 
of sociology, philosophy, psychology, finance, and economics. Accordingly, legal 
research is now said to be influenced by socio-legal studies, critical legal studies, and 
the law-and-economics movement. The law and economics approach has been 
observed to be the dominant methodology in US legal scholarship and is increasingly 
witnessed in the UK in competition law, labour law, company law, and financial 
services regulations.[60] Though this study does not use the pure version of the 
empirical approach, it nonetheless draws heavily on the evidence provided by 
empiricists as to how law works and how it affects corporate decisions.[61]  
 
On the basis of the above, the archive method commonly used in legal and major 
accounting studies will be adopted here.[62] The survey method is not considered 
appropriate for studies pertaining to sensitive reporting issues like those connected 
with OBF. This is because most of the professionals involved in this activity have a 
high consciousness of the possible legal implications of their opinions in view of 
                                                 
[59] Ibbetson, D., ‘Historical Research in Law’, in Peter, C. & Mark, T. (eds.), ‘The Oxford Handbook 
of Legal Studies’, OUP: Oxford, 2003, 863-879 
[60] Bonner, D., ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’, Sweet & Maxwell, Law Quarterly Review, 
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[61] Baldwin, J. & Davis, G., ‘Empirical Research in Law’, in Peter, C. & Mark, T. (eds.), ‘The Oxford 
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recent outcomes of current cases pertaining to the use or rather the misuse of such 
products.[63] The increasing willingness of the FSA to enforce various rules 
surrounding the abusive application of various financial products is beginning to be 
felt in the financial community. This has made OBF users and suppliers more 
sensitive about the dissemination of information even for research purposes other than 
those commissioned by the FSA. 
 
The archive method goes beyond describing the events in the past. It helps to 
illuminate the present. It is of particular relevance to studies on accounting and 
finance. In the process, data is being interrogated and the assumptions behind them 
evaluated. Issues and themes of importance to the study in question could then be 
uncovered through the technique of hermeneutic interpretation. Hermeneutics puts 
particular focus on the historical and social context surrounding a phenomenon when 
interpreting text. Increasingly hermeneutics has been used in legal research where the 
reasons behind judgements and interpretations of statutes are being sought.[64]In this 
regard, content may not be the most critical feature of a document. Rather, the 
dynamics involved in the interactions between a document’s production, 
consumption, and content represent a more important focus.[65] Documents analysis in 
this work will thus be driven by this guidance. 
 
Archival records are, however, subject to some limitations as these are compiled 
through a selective process and often weakened further by weaknesses associated with 
the recall process. To mitigate this problem, this work will wherever possible make 
                                                 
[63] Supra note 22. The researchers encountered such problems in their work; In January 2005, the Bank 
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use of alternative sources of information pertaining to the study’s line of enquiry or 
crosschecked against the results of different studies.[66] 
 
The main archive method used in the study will be complemented by the case method 
as used in social science research.[67] The case method provides the avenue for 
understanding the nature of OBF in terms of the techniques, procedures, or systems in 
which it is being employed. Where this work is concerned, the case method will be 
employed to generate explanatory insights on OBF practices. The case method is 
usually viewed to be effective in addressing the how and why of research issues.[68] 
The interpretive case approach as used in this investigation will accordingly offer 
theoretical generalisations. It will not therefore use a sampling logic but will instead 
use replication and extension logic. The process will thus involve the transferability of 
findings between different contexts.[69] 
 
In respect of this work, the case study approach will have to be appropriately 
modified and adapted to the research environment. As mentioned earlier, previous 
research on OBF encountered difficulties in drawing out direct response from 
members of the financial community in view of the sensitivity issue. So instead of 
relying on interviews at case sites, this work will gather and analyse data obtained 
from primary statute sources and rules handbooks as well as from secondary data 
sources like annual corporate reports, government publications, and other data 
accessible from the Internet. These include works and data from other research 
disciplines for cross-checking purposes. 
                                                 
[66] supra note 64 
[67] de Vaus, D., ‘Research Design in Social Research’, Sage: London, 2003, 233-266. 
[68] Mallin, C.A. (ed.), ‘International Corporate Governance: A Case Study Approach’, Edward Elgar: 
Cheltenham, 2006. This text demonstrates the effective use of the case method in financial governance 
studies; Bob, R., Scapens, R. W. & Theobold, M., ‘Research Method and Methodology in Finance and 
Accounting’, Thomson: London, 2002, 142-162 
[69] Lincoln, Y. S. & Guba, E.G., ‘Naturalistic Inquiry’, Sage: London, 1985 
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For an effective undertaking of the case method, the formulation of a theoretical 
proposition or research question would be necessary. In the case of this work, the 
research question as derived earlier is formulated as follows: 
 
‘Why and in what manner will the use of OBF generate legal implications for 
corporate directors, financial advisors, auditors, and financial regulators?’ 
 
The data gathering and analysis process for each case will therefore be guided by the 
above central proposition and the following sub-questions which operate as the ‘case 
study protocol’. This will ensure the systematic ‘interrogation’ of corporate data: 
• What kind of OBF products are the company using? 
• What are the reasons for their use? 
• Why are they preferred over the more the traditional forms of on-balance sheet 
financing? 
• Are controversies involved in their use by the company and if so, why? 
• How is the company’s performance in terms of profitability and liquidity? 
• Were there any significant threats to the company’s operations? 
 
The use of the above case study protocol and the collection of a chain of evidence 
from different sources will thus contribute to the reliability and consistency of data 
gathering.[70]To produce a convincing text, all relevant issues would be explored and 
explained. The writing up of the case will involve the ensuring of a high level of 
procedural reliability; transferability; and the avoidance of selective plausibility to 
minimise biasness.[71] One other main weakness of case studies concerns the difficulty 
of limiting the boundaries of a subject matter. To deal with this issue, this study will 
                                                 
[70] Yin, R. K., ‘Case Study Research: Design and Methods’, 3rd edition, Sage Publications Inc.: 
Thousand Oaks, 2005, 19-53 
[71] ibid; Thomas, A. B., ‘Research Skills for Management Studies’, Routledge: London, 2004, 127-133 
 40
restrict the examination of OBF reporting case practices to the UK and US capital 
markets. 
 
A comparative research approach has also been adopted for this study. This 
’…consists of a pluralist approach to methods and theories centred mainly, but not 
exclusively around the theme of comparing countries under the umbrella term ‘cross-
national’ study.’[72] Four benefits have been identified with the undertaking of 
comparative research; namely the import-mirror view (IMV); the difference view 
(DV); the theory-development view (TDV); and the prediction view (PV). 
 
The rationale behind IMV is the contention that a better understanding of a country’s 
own practices can be obtained through looking at the practices in other countries 
especially between those, which are broadly similar. From this perspective, the goal is 
lessons rather than the creation or the examination of theories. The DV is about 
variable historical conditions and the need to explain and appreciate the difference. 
The TDV considers both endogenous and exogenous factors. Endogenous factors are 
those, which are closely associated with the country under examination. In contrast, 
exogenous factors are those not peculiar to it, like global capital and global trade. 
Understanding the impact of similar programmes in other countries would improve 
the quality of the prediction of their outcomes in the country under study. The PV 
argues on the benefits of forecasting future consequences of current policies.[73] 
 
As much as there are benefits associated with comparative research, the problems 
surrounding its use must also be appreciated. Constraints like handling the 
comparison of like with like will be adhered to closely. Care will also be taken so as 
                                                 
[72] May, supra note 62 (a), 152 
[73] ibid, 157-159 
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not to assume that what is appropriate for UK culture is also likely to be acceptable in 
the US and vice-versa. Accordingly, meanings of common terms will be interpreted 
within the context of either jurisdiction.[74] This comparative study is justified on the 
grounds that though OBF is used in both jurisdictions; the legal framework and 
circumstances surrounding their use appear to show some variations. Accordingly 
useful insights may emerge for future guidance of preparers, financial gatekeepers and 
regulators across the key capital markets of the world. 
 
All said, the modified legal research method as developed for this study is to a 
significant extent multidisciplinary in nature as it borrows and distils insights from 
other disciplines, in particular economics, politics, and finance. In turn, the outcome 
of this work is expected to contribute relevant insights from legal reasoning to these 
said disciplines in various meaningful ways. This is supported by the current view that 
the interface between different sociological disciplines is not one but a two-way 
traffic.[75] 
 
Study Scope and Limitations 
 
This investigation will rely on primary data from statutes and secondary data of 
published corporate reports. Triangulation of data and perspectives will be achieved 
through cross-checking or verifications from alternative data sources where available. 
The study will also limit its investigation to the more commonly used forms of OBF 
instruments in the UK and US capital markets. This means that the study will focus on 
leasing; securitisation; and to a restricted extent, derivatives employed primarily to 
circumvent regulatory restrictions or accounting rules.  
                                                 
[74] ibid, 159-163 
[75] Bonner, supra note 60 
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The investigation will, however, include other financial mechanisms involving the use 
of creative accounting to understate expenses, inflate sales, understate liabilities or 
overstate assets. This is because they too may have the ultimate effect of artificially 
raising corporate market capitalisation to provide unsustainable justifications for the 
funding of takeover activities or realisation of unjust high executive compensation. 
Finally, only a brief reference will be made to some of the more relevant provisions of 
CA2006 concerning liabilities to directors and auditors. Nonetheless, a broad analysis 





























                                                 
[76] Yeoh, P., ‘Book Reviews: (a) Alocck, A., Birds, J. & Gale, S., ‘CA 2006: The New Law’ (b) Duzer, 
P., ‘CA 2006’ (c), Walmsley, K. (Consultant Ed.), ‘Butterworths Company Law Handbook 20th Edn 
Supplement-The CA 2006’, Business Law Review, July 2007, 216-218. 
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                                                     Chapter Two 
 
 





The purpose of this chapter is to provide the theoretical and practical background 
settings which shaped the use and reporting obligations of OBF. It will involve the 
analysis and evaluation of the function of financial information within the context of 
the accounting and financial regulatory environment in both the UK and the US. The 
discussions will take into account pertinent corporate and securities law prevailing in 
both economies. Further, financial corporate governance items, which bear upon the 
manner of use and reporting of OBF in both jurisdictions will also be compared and 
analysed. 
 
The Role of Financial Information 
 
The association between share prices and financial information is widely known in the 
capital markets of the UK and US. This has been attributed to the premise that 
investors and other financial intermediaries require financial information pertaining to 
the financial health and prospects of corporations for their investment decisions.[1]  
Demand for financial information is said to originate from seven user groups, namely; 
the management, the investors, the creditors, the financial analysts, business 
networks, the government and the public.[2] These users have been identified as those 
                                                 
[1] European Central Bank (ECB), ‘Assessment of Accounting Standards from a Financial Stability 
Perspective’, available at http://www.ecb.int/pub, December 2006, 8; Chebotareva, N., ‘IFRS: Who are 
Financial Statements Really for?’, Accountancy Age 12/10/2006, available at 
http://www.accountancyage.com. Financial information historically addressed the general needs of 
existing shareholders. Existing accounting framework now talks about general purpose accounts, and 
recognises users to include also creditors and lenders, suppliers and service providers, tax authorities, 
employees, management and directors, financial analysts, and potential sophisticated investors. 
Regulators and preparers now struggle to balance the different needs of these users. 
[2] FASB, ’The Corporate Report ’; FASB 1975 & 1978 
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with reasonable rights to data concerning the economic status of corporations, which 
impact upon their interests.[3] 
 
The monitoring of a corporation’s performance in terms of effectiveness and 
efficiency by investors, creditors and financial analysts is underpinned by the agency 
theory. This is perceived as the economic or contractual relationship between the 
shareholders (the principals) and management (the agents) wherein the former needs 
to use financial information to assist in the evaluation of management’s compliance 
with their general duties and obligations.[4]  
 
It has been suggested that the principal’s use of the compensating function might not 
induce the flow of reliable information from the agent and that unless complemented 
by other optimal strategy, the former might not secure truthful information.[5] 
Assuming this can be achieved, such financial information can be used to gauge 
future events and uncertainties in order to implement various risk management 
strategies.[6] The more important users for this way of using financial information 
comprise hedge fund managers, pension fund managers, investment banks, and 
professional analysts.  
 
The information content of financial information and its effects on share prices has 
consistently produced research findings’ support for the relationship between them.[7] 
                                                 
[3] ibid 
[4] Halpern, P. J. N.,’ Systemic Perspectives on Corporate Governance Systems’, in Stephen, S.C. & 
Gavin, B (eds),’ Corporate Governance and Globalisation: Long Range Planning Issues’, Edward 
Elgar: Cheltenham, 2000, 15-16 
[5] Feltham, G. A., ‘Financial Accounting Research: Contributions of Information Economics and 
Agency Theory’, in Richard, M. (ed.), ‘Modern Accounting Research: History, Survey, and Guide’, 
CGA Foundation: Vancouver, 1984,  179-202 
[6]  Coyle, B.,’ Risk Awareness and Corporate Awareness’, Financial World Publishing: London, 2004, 
60-88 
[7] (a) Verrecchia, R. E., ‘Policy Implications from the Theory-Based Literature on Disclosure’ in 
Christian, L., Dieter, P. & Anthony, H. (eds.), ‘The Economics and Politics of Accounting’, OUP: 
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Studies have also shown the material role played by the information content of 
financial information when corporations make various kinds of performance 
announcements as they comply with the dictates of the capital market.[8] Previous 
research has, however, also demonstrated that changes in accounting methods may 
exert various effects on the income statement. These in turn may induce various 
consequences in the capital market.[9] 
 
Financial Information and the Capital Market  
 
Irrespective of the specific needs of various users of financial information, the 
demand for greater financial and related information has been consistently on the rise 
and accelerating with each wave of financial crisis or financial scandals. This is not 
only confined to emerging economies but include those of advanced economies like 
the UK and US as well. Whilst there are various benefits corporations can gain from 
greater release of timely financial information in terms of positive publicity and so on, 
significant costs are also involved to generate and deliver such information.  
 
Corporations respond to this either out of regulatory compliance or on a tactical basis. 
They, however, appear to respond differently in different economies as a result of the 
impact of differences in their accounting systems, which are in turn influenced by 
cultural and other factors.[10] 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Oxford, 2004,  149-163; (b) Lev, V., ‘On the Usefulness of Earnings and Earnings Research: Lessons 
and Directions from Two Decades of Empirical Research’, Journal of Accounting Research , 1989 
Supplements, 153-192 
[8] Kothari, S.,’ Capital Market Research in Accounting’, Journal of Accounting and Economics’, 
September 2001, 105-232 
[9] O’Glove, T. L. & Sobel, R., ‘Quality of Earnings’, Free Press: London, 1987 
[10] Fisherman, M. & Hagerty, K., ‘Mandatory versus Voluntary Disclosure in Markets with Informed 
and Uninformed Customers’, Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation, (2003) 19: 45-63; Wilson, 
A.,’ UK and International Accounting Standards’, Butterworths, 2001, 1235-1363; Healy, P.M. & 
Palepu, K. G., ‘A Review of the Empirical Disclosure Theory’, Harvard Business School Working 
Paper, December 2000.  
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Whilst the regulatory framework does shape the disclosure orientations of 
corporations, many do so tactically in the capital market. Various theories have been 
formulated for this phenomenon. An example is the ‘signalling’ theory, which 
contends that corporations tactically disclose financial information irrespective of the 
regulatory framework in order to reduce the perceived informational risks of 
investors. It is further argued that with risk reduction, investors are more likely to 
react more positively towards the corporations’ shares or their funding plans.  
 
To add credibility to a corporation’s claims of its superior performance, some desired 
characteristic would be ‘signalled’ (flashed) out. Stock market values are one good 
example of such suitable objective market indicators. As management is deemed to 
have knowledge of economic characteristics relevant to the valuation of a 
corporation’s worth, it has the incentive to beam that information to the market. For 
the ‘signal’ to function as a reliable proxy, the net benefits have to be positively 
correlated with the level of economic characteristics in a corporation’s possession and 
the level of actual signalling.[11]  
 
Studies have shown that the market reacts positively to tactical forecast disclosures 
from corporations with good news and negatively to those with worrisome ones.[12] 
This is because such tactically disclosed information reduced the informational 
uncertainties surrounding the stocks in question. A well-informed financial 
                                                 
[11] (a) Greenbaum, S. I. & Thakor, A. V., ‘Contemporary Financial Intermediation’, Academic Press: 
San Diego, 2007, 25-28 (b) Strong, R. A., ‘Practical Investment Management’, Thomson Inc.: Mason, 
2004, 224-235 
[12] Revsine, L., Collins, D. W. & Johnson, W. B.,’ Financial Reporting and Analysis’, Pearson: NJ, 
2004, 9-11 
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community is considered more likely to act positively towards a corporation’s stocks 
due to the perceived reduction of information risk.[13] 
 
For those corporations requiring external funding, tactical disclosures of information 
are perceived to reduce the risk of unsuccessful fund raising or are helpful in reducing 
their cost of capital.[14] Due perhaps to these very compelling motives, some 
management has chosen to disclose information selectively to minimise forecast 
deviations which are unlikely to be welcomed by the financial community.[15] Such 
suppression of information can endure only up to the level of mandatory disclosure 
obligations. At this point, the financial community would be able to assess the 
previous disclosed information critically and would respond accordingly in terms of 
lower valuation for the corporation’s shares and higher cost of capital for the 
corporations involved. This is the consequence of the manipulation and 
misrepresentation effects, where creative accounting in general and OBF reporting in 
particular may get entangled.[16]  
 
Financial Information and Firm Valuation 
 
Managerial theory suggests that management is likely to disclose sales and 
profitability data tactically in order ‘to signal’ to its interested constituents its 
achievements. This is perceived to provide them with the advantage of access to 
                                                 
[13] Radebaugh, L. H. & Gray, S. J.,’ International Accounting & Multinational Enterprises’, 5th edition, 
John Wiley & Sons: NJ, 2002, 108-109 
[14] Choi, F. D.,’ Financial Reporting and Disclosure in Relation to Broadly Based Capital Markets, 
PhD. Thesis, University of Washington, 1972 
[15] Meek, G. K. et al., ‘ Factors Influencing Voluntary Annual Report Disclosures by US, UK and 
Continental European Multinational Corporations’, Journal of International Business Studies, 26 
(01/09/1995), 555-72 
[16] Eccles, R.G.,’ The Value Reporting Revolution: Moving Beyond the Earnings Game’, John Wiley 
& Sons Inc.: New York, 2001, 68-89 
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cheaper sources of funds; attract support from trading partners and suppliers; enhance 
corporate prestige, and through all these provide the basis for increased rewards.[17]  
Management under pressure or in pursuit of ‘illusory growth’ to conjure financial 
strength image or market size may also resort to tactical signalling. This is 
occasionally implemented to enhance share valuation for the purpose of attracting 
further support from the capital market or to ward off potential takeover threats.[18] 
 
Where corporate ownership is fragmented, which is usually the norm in the capital 
market, the behavioural school argues that management is unlikely to be guided by 
the profit-maximisation objective, but will instead opt for a more satisfying goal. This 
theory maintains that management would disseminate information to the passive 
shareholding group that the latter’s interest would be safeguarded, and that there 
would be no diversion to other constituent groups.[19] This version was taken a step 
further by the principal-agency theory. Here, management was explicitly 
acknowledged as an active partner to safeguard shareholders’ interests. Under this 
model, financial reports were taken to be stewardship reports where management 
would be evaluated by the shareholders for the calibre of their performance.[20] 
 
The agency theory rests on a contractual relationship between shareholders and  
management. In view of the conflicts of interest among the various constituents in 
                                                 
[17] Tirole, J., ‘The Theory of Corporate Finance’, Princeton University Press: NJ., 2006 
[18] Healy, P.M. & Wahlen, J.,’ A Review of the Earnings Management Literature and Its Implications 
for Standard Setting’, Accounting Horizons 13, December 1999, 365-83; Marris, R.,’; Hake, E. R., 
‘Financial Illusion: Accounting for Profits in Enron’, Journal of Economic Issues, Vol.XXXIX, No. 3, 
09/2005, 595-611 
[19] Shleifer, A., ‘Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioural Finance ‘, OUP: Oxford, 2000; 
Simon, H. A.,’ Administrative Behaviour’, London: Macmillan, 1957 
[20] Emmons W.R. & Schmid, F. A.,’ Corporate Governance and Corporate Performance’ in Stephen, 
S.C. 7 Gavin, B. (eds.),’ Corporate Governance and Globalisation: Long Range Planning Issues’, 
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2000, 59-93; Villiers, C., ‘Corporate Reporting and Company Law’, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2006, 13-36. Here, it is argued that disclosure can be justified 
on other grounds including the prevention of theft, investors’ protection, informed decision-making, 
accountability and legitimacy of corporate activities.  
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corporations, the monitoring and enforcing of the contracts between the key parties, 
namely the agents and the principals would involve the incurring of three types of 
costs. These are the monitoring costs expended on financial reports; the bonding costs 
associated with auditing; and share value reduction cost associated with the 
management practice of corporate resource diversion.[21]  
 
Arguments are also raised that the relatively better informed economic agents may be 
stimulated to capitalise on their informational advantage. These are exemplified by 
insider trading scandals in the capital market even though such activities are supposed 
to be restrained by various deterrents. Such problems associated with asymmetric 
information when occurring too frequently may contribute to market failure or 
breakdown, justifying regulatory intervention by the state.[22] This is prevented from 
happening by the capability and incentives of market participants to make use of 
various mechanisms to deal with the asymmetric information problem.[23] 
 
With the introduction of share option schemes as incentives or additional rewards for 
management, it has been further argued that management would endeavour to reduce 
uncertainties by disclosing relevant information, which could enhance share prices in 
order to benefit from these schemes.[24] Later events appear to show, however, that 
such tactical information disclosures could be carried to extremes involving the wilful 
distortion of data. 
 
                                                 
[21] Yosha, O., ‘Information Disclosure Costs and the Choice of Financing Source’, Journal of Financial 
Intermediation (1998) 4:3-20 
[22] Greenbaum & Thakor, supra note 11(a) 
[23] (a) ibid; (b) Lev, B. & Zarowin, P.,’ The Boundaries of Financial Reporting and How to Extend 
Them’, OECD 1998, 18 
[24] Berenson, A.,’ The Number: How America’s Balance Sheet Lies Rocked the World’s Financial 
Market’, Pocket Books, 2004, 96-110; Fama, E. F.,’ Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm’, 
Journal of Political Economy, April, 1980, 288-307 
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Research has shown that tactical disclosure of financial information varied according 
to the characteristics of corporations in terms of their capitalisation structure, earnings 
potential, ownership composition, board structure, corporate reputation, existence of 
various incentives like share options and so on. Studies covering these and related 
phenomena have evolved continually over the years.[25] Where the broader interests of 
the public are concerned, there is justification for research to go beyond the mere 
interests of management, shareholders, and financiers, to include further insights on 
the behaviour and response of auditors, financial analysts, and regulators to the 
developments and changes occurring in financial reporting and the financial standards 
setting process.[26]  
 
On this score, it is increasingly being recognised that financial reporting can be an 
imperfect tool for communicating with shareholders when management’s objectives 
are not in line with those of the former. As indicated earlier, there are pros and cons 
for management to undertake tactical information disclosure through delays or 
manipulative reporting. This limitation is, however, counterbalanced by accounting 
and disclosure regulations which improved the functioning of the capital market. 
Accounting regulations narrow management’s ability to record financial transactions 
inconsistent with shareholders’ interests.  
 
Disclosure regulations work towards investors receiving timely and relevant 
information derived from appropriate financial reporting standards and as verified by 
the auditing gatekeepers. Nonetheless, the managing agents may still ‘game the 
                                                 
[25] Adhikari, A & Tondkar, R. H.,’ Environmental Factors Influencing Accounting Disclosure 
Requirements of Global Stock Exchanges’, Journal of International Financial Management and 
Accounting, 4(2), 1992, 75-105; (b) Musa, M.,’ Voluntary Financial Disclosure and The Unlisted 
Securities Market: An Empirical Investigation’, Ph. D. University of Glasgow, 1989, 62-88 
[26] Strong, supra note 11 (b), 243-257 
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system’ where they perceived the gains from non-compliance through manipulative 
earnings’ reports exceed the costs of compliance as derived from the risks of litigation 
and regulatory sanctions. In this sense, disclosure options are therefore the product of 
disclosure requirements and management’s incentives to disclose information 
tactically.[27] 
 
Auditing and the Quality Assurance Function 
Auditing began in the 19th century with the role of verifying the honesty of people 
entrusted with fiscal rather than managerial responsibilities.[28] Auditing then focused 
on the monitoring of management’s stewardship function. With further commercial 
developments, auditing went on to assume the function of checking underlying 
financial records and documents.[29] This subsequently paved the way to the 
establishment of the fundamental principles of auditing through the impact of case 
laws. Foremost, the courts made clear that auditors were professionally expected to 
exercise reasonable care and skill.[30] The courts also told auditors not to assume the 
posture that something was always amiss but rather to ensure that when such was the 
case, they should exercise care and skill to ensure that the underling data and internal 
controls were dependable. [31]  
 
The underlying conceptual framework for auditing appears to have been initiated with 
various postulates constructed in 1961. These dealt with the verifiability of financial 
                                                 
[27] (a), Musa, supra note 25 (b); (b) Levitt, A.,’ The Numbers Game’, Remarks at New York University 
Center (Centre) for Law and Economics, September 28, 1998, available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch220.txt on January 11, viewed on 11/01/2005; (b) Verrecchis, 
supra note 7 (a) 
[28] Littleton, A.C., ‘Accounting Evolution to 1900’, American Institute Publishing Co.: New York, 
1933, 260 
[29] ibid, 264-265 
[30] Cosserat, G. W., ‘Modern Auditing’, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.: West Sussex, 2000,  Chapter 1, 
citing London and General Bank (1895) 2 Ch. 673 and Kingston Cotton Mills Co. (1896) 2 Ch. D279 
[31] Irish Woollen Co. Ltd v Tyson and Others [1900] 
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statements to the independent status of auditors. Indeed, financial statement users 
began to rely on external auditors’ report for assurance that the accounting 
information provided by management is relevant and reliable for decision-making 
purposes.[32] This is argued to be the product of conflicts of interest occurring between 
market participants; the serious consequences for various decision-makers; risks of 
misinterpretation and unintentional error arising from accounting complexity; and the 
remoteness preventing users from directly gauging the quality of the financial 
reports.[33] The concepts of the feasibility and necessity of accounting was 
subsequently taken a stage further with the idea of audit as a control tool for ensuring 
accountability. [34] 
 
The Audit Function in the UK and US 
 
In the US, companies trading on a national stock exchange and companies that have 
over 500 shareholders and assets exceeding US$ 5 million are required to have their 
accounts audited. (This condition varied between different states). In the UK, a 
limited company is exempted from the submission of audit reports where it is a small 
company in compliance with the criteria set out in section 249A of the CA 1985, or 
where it is a dormant company defined under section 249AA. The former refers to a 
company with turnover not exceeding £1 million and with balance sheet aggregate not 
more than £1.4 million. Auditors in the US and the UK are nominated by the audit 
committee or committee of independent directors and approved by the shareholders.  
                                                 
[32] Cosserat, supra note 30 
[33] ibid 
[34] (a) Clinard, M .B. & Yeager, P.C., ‘Corporate Crime’, Transaction Publishers: NJ, 2006; (b) Flint, 
D., ‘Philosophy and Principles of Auditing: An Introduction’, Macmillan Education: Basingstoke, 
1988, 17 
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The auditors in the US are duty bound to express an opinion on the fairness with 
which the financial statements presents fairly, in all material respects its financial 
status, operational results, and its funds flows in conformity with GAAP. In the UK, 
the auditors are obliged to present an independent examination and opinion, for 
shareholders, on whether the financial statements give ‘a true and fair view’ of  
financial statements prepared in accordance with the CA 1985. The Accounting 
Standards Board (ASB) in the US issues the statements on auditing standards. The 
Auditing Practices Board (APB) comprising the six principal accountancy professions 
is the source of auditing standards in the UK. 
 
Where fraud detection is concerned, auditors in the US are expected to evaluate the 
risk that fraud may contribute to material errors in the financial statements. Guided by 
such assessments, auditors are expected to design their work to give reasonable 
assurance of detecting errors due to fraud that are material to the financial statements. 
Similarly in the UK, auditors are required to secure adequate evidence to provide 
reasonable assurance that the financial statements are free from material mistakes, 
whether caused by fraud or other irregularities.[35] To mount effective suits, US 
shareholders need only to prove that the audited statements were materially 
misleading and that the auditors were grossly negligent. In contrast, UK shareholders 
                                                 
[35] Radebaugh, supra note 13, 324-337; Arnull, C. J., ‘Auditors’ Reports, Misconceptions and Third 
Party Disclaimers’, Tolley’s Journal of Professional Negligence, Vol. 18 No. 3 2002, 146-155. The 
researcher here suggested the use of a disclaimer to third party claims to avoid misconceptions of their 
obligations. Specifically, auditors in the UK could clarify in their reports that their opinions were 
intended for the objectives of Part VII of the CA 1985 and for the benefit of shareholders’ only; 
Hemraj, M. B., ‘The Detection of Financial Irregularities in US Corporations’, JFC Vol. 10 No. 1, 
2002, 85-90; ‘The Liability of Accountants and Auditors under the Federal Securities Acts and the 
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organisations (RICO) Act in the USA’, JFC Vol. 10 No. 2, 2002, 
159-165. Here, it was pointed out that the US judiciary were divided on auditors’ failure to detect fraud 
emanating from accounting irregularities; but in general, should suspicions arise, auditors were 
expected to detect management fraud. However, statutory provisions from the SEA 1933 and 1934 and 
RICO (with no equivalent in the UK) may extend auditor’s liability to non-contracting parties, in both 
the civil and criminal spheres. These taken together with the use of class action suit partly led to the 
litigation explosion dilemma in the US. 
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will have to prove not only the failure of the auditor to exercise reasonable care and 
skills, but also that they had relied on his work and that this reliance resulted in a 
measurable loss. This restricted scope of auditor’s duty probably account for the 
lesser auditing suits in the UK than the US. 
 
The audit profession is still confronted with the issues of ‘expectations gap’ and 
‘auditor independence’. With regard to the first, the Statements on Auditing Standards 
assume the position that the auditors are responsible only for exercising due care in 
the conduct of the examination. The standard of due care exercise may therefore be 
inadequate to cover all forms of financial deception.[36]  
 
This disparity between the users’ and the auditors’ perceptions of the quality of audit 
functions is known as the audit expectations gap.[37] Owing to this, much more clarity 
is being sought over the respective roles and responsibilities of auditors and directors. 
Auditors unlike directors are not responsible for the preparation of financial 
statements or the accuracy of data, or undertaking that the audited corporation would 
continue as a going concern.[38] 
 
Though management is responsible for the detection of fraud, the common view still 
has this expectation of auditors.[39] It has also been suggested that the audit 
expectations gap was partly the consequence of a failure to understand the external 
audit as an audit of motivations. This refers to the auditor’s understanding of 
                                                 
[36] AICPA Professional Standards, Section AU 316.01-08 
[37] Porter, B.A., ‘An Empirical Study of the Audit-Expectation-Performance Gap’, Accounting and 
Business Research, 24 (93), 46-98 
[38] ibid 
[39] (a) Cosserat, supra note 30; (b) Panel on Audit Effectiveness, ‘Report and Recommendations’, 
Public Oversight Board, 2000, 88 
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management’s motivation and their implications for potential weakness in the 
preparation of financial statements.[40] 
 
Auditors have responded to the expectations gap by spelling out in greater details the 
nature of their work as well as their duties and responsibilities and those of the 
directors. Some have argued that this approach, which makes extensive use of caveats 
and disclaimers, have depreciated the value and purpose of auditor’s opinion.[41] 
Building from this, the suggestion to include a financial statement expectations gap 
could be helpful.[42] It is also more realistic to acknowledge the limitations of 
financial statements and proceed from this to other pertinent issues surrounding the 
communication of business performance and business risk.[43]  
 
Audit is also viewed as type of comparative investigation of performance and 
expectation by a third party for monitoring and accountability purposes.[44] It is 
suggested that a bond of accountability can exist only when the two key elements of 
‘an account’ and ‘a holding to account’ are present. The former is exemplified by a set 
of published financial statements, and the latter refers to the action, which can be 
taken to make the directors liable for matters connected with the preparation of these 
statements.[45] 
 
The need for auditors to perform an independent function arises from the fact that  
                                                 
[40] (a)Gray. I.,& Manson, S., ‘The Audit Process’, Thomson Learning: London, 2005, Chapter 15; (b) 
Boyd, D. T., et al., ‘The Audit Report: A Misunderstanding Gap Between Users and Preparers’, 
National Public Accountant, December 2000/January 2001, 45(10), 56-60 
[41] (a) Gray & Manson, supra note 40 (a); Chitty, D., ‘New Words for Old’, Accountancy, July 2001, 
120-22 
[42] Higson, A., ‘Corporate Financial Reporting: Theory and Practice’, Sage: London, 2003, 163-183 
[43] Higson, supra note 42, 183 
[44] supra note 34 
[45] Gray, I. & Manson, S., ‘The Audit Process: Principles, Practices and Case’, 3rd edition, Thomson 
Learning: London, 2005, 116 
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there is a remoteness gap between management and users of financial statement. This 
is because users normally do not have access or the skills to query management who 
are accountable to them, and consequently has to rely on auditors who have the 
authority to access such information to function on their behalf.[46]  
 
In practice, auditors faced with the need to boost their own income may encounter 
difficulties in remaining independent. This is because of the fact that they may have to 
compromise with the same company in its capacity as a potential purchaser of other 
services, who might expressly or by implication require various compromises from 
the auditors in return. Nonetheless, because of market dictates, auditors are still 
inclined to report on material matters in order to sustain the value of their 
reputation.[47] This at times may lead to tensions between management and the 
auditors with consequential effects on their independent status.[48] In turn, the capacity 
of auditors to remain independent is affected by the size of non-audit based income 
and other factors.[49]  
 
To address these various challenges, UK accounting bodies have issued the Statement 
on Integrity, Objectivity and Independence (SIOS).[50] The EU Commission 
concerned over the variations in the handling of the issue of auditor independence 
issued its recommendations particularly in respect of non-audit services. This 
prompted the ICAEW issuing a Best Guidance Code in 2002. The SOA in the US 
                                                 
[46] supra note 32 
[47] Guy, D. M., Alderman, C. W. & Winters, A. J. ‘Auditing’, The Dryden Press: Fort Worth, 1999, 
Chapter 2 
[48] Guy, Alderman, & Winters, supra note 47; (b) Goldman, A. & Barley, B., ‘Auditor-Firm Conflict of 
Interests: Its Implications for Independence’, The Accounting Review, 49: 1974, 126-143 
[49] Millichamp, A. H., ‘Auditing’,  Continuum: London,  2002, Section 8 
[50] ICAEW, ‘Guide to Professional Ethics Statement 1.202: Integrity, Objectivity and Independence’, 
1996; Auditor Independence Guidance on Best Practice, 2002 
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prohibited the provision of nine non-audit services, and imposed six other 
requirements pertaining to issues like disclosure of non-audit services by the audit 
committee to rotation of lead partners every five years. The SEC has implemented 
these reforms. 
 
Regulation of Financial Reports 
Regulation of financial reporting in both the UK and the US are shaped by corporate 
laws, accounting regulators, the stock market, and best practice rules formulated by 
the accounting profession. The UK and US system shows a regulatory partnership 
between the public and private sectors. Generally, financial reporting regulations 
cover the disclosure of information; the format against which information is to be 
disclosed, and; the measurement and valuation of information. Regulations from the 
state focus on disclosure, whilst those from the private sector deals mainly with 
format, measurement and valuation. This distinction has been increasingly blurred in 
the last two decades, as both governments sought to respond to various large 
corporate scandals. Whilst the UK has opted for the principles-based approach as 
guided by best practices, the US has chosen a more state-intrusive approach involving 
greater reliance on prescriptive rules. 
 
Parliamentary (UK) and Congressional (US) Acts 
 
The current principal laws governing limited corporations in the UK originate from 
1900. These were amended in 1981 to implement the EEC Fourth Directive. The CA 
1985 repealed and put together the Companies Acts of 1948, 1967, 1976, 1980 and 
1981. More importantly, it inserted the ‘true and fair override’ in corporate law.  
The CA 1989 addressed specific rules for the form and content of financial 
statements, valuation, publication of accounts; and the functions, duties, powers and 
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qualifications of external auditors. Section 226 as inserted by the CA 1989 requires 
directors to prepare a balance sheet and profit and loss statement for each financial 
year. The section stipulates further that these financial statements have to give ‘a true 
and fair view’ of a company’s financial state of affairs. Schedule 4 of the section 
specifies the form and content of these statements and additional information to be 
conveyed via ‘notes to the accounts’. Section 226(5) also stipulates that where 
compliance with schedule 4 is inconsistent with the true and fair view, directors shall 
depart from this to the extent necessary to give ‘a true and fair view’, but ‘’Particulars 
of any such departure, the reasons for it  and its effect shall be given in a note to the 
accounts’’. The CA 1989 empowers the Secretary of State or its delegated body to 
initiate civil actions for companies failing to comply with accounting report standards 
and to restate defective accounts 
 
Rather than having a British version of the SOA, the UK approach has been through a 
process of consultation with the private sector, which resulted in a series of targeted 
measures, not many needing the force of statutes so as to achieve a higher quality of 
financial reporting and independence audit. Where the Companies (Audit, 
Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 (CAICE) is concerned, it has 
expanded beyond its original focus on auditing. Of relevance to this study is Part 1 of 
the CAICE which places additional responsibilities on the existing approved 
professional bodies to ensure that auditing of public companies are independently 
undertaken. The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is now empowered to set audit 
standards and enforcement and overseeing the approved accountancy bodies. Funding 
for the tasks undertaken by the FRC is financed by contributions from members of the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE), the professional community and the government. 
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Following Section 18 of CAICE, institutions which are assigned tasks by the FRC and 
financed by grants and their staff will be insulated from certain liabilities. This will 
imply that liability ‘only exists for misfeasance and acts incompatible with public 
rights’.[51] 
 
Section 3 of the CAICE in effect allows the Secretary of State to set up a Professional 
Oversight Board of Accountability to regulate auditors. Section 4 empowers the 
Secretary of State to delegate further functions to this new body. In pursuance of the 
issue of auditor independence, section 7 requires the mandatory disclosure of other 
services extended by auditors and its related or associated remunerations in kind. 
Auditors under Section 8 now enjoy the powers to call upon a wider group of 
personnel than before to provide them with information and explanation that they 
need. It would also now be a criminal offence to knowingly provide or recklessly 
provide auditors with misleading, inaccurate, or deceptive information. 
 
Directors will now be required to state in the Directors’ Report that they are not aware 
of material information not disclosed to external auditors. A director will also be 
liable to imprisonment or fine or both if he fails to assume reasonable actions to 
prevent the release of public information, which is deemed to be false or of reckless 
nature. In respect of this, the ‘ought to know’ test will apply. Indeed, this was already 
codified in section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 and subsequent common law 
decisions. 
 
                                                 
[51] Haynes, A., ‘The CAICE Act 2004: Content and Effect’, Handouts from Public Talk at IALS, 
18/04/2005; Smerdon, E., ‘A Practice Guide to Corporate Governance’, Thomson: London, 2004, 
xxviii-xxxiii 
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As for defective accounts, the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP) will be 
empowered to apply to court approval to amend unreliable accounts, seek information 
from the Inland Revenue, and insist on the release of information pertinent to its tasks. 
Parties failing to accede to the request of the FRRP will be deemed to have acted in 
contempt of court. The Secretary of Sate will now be empowered to select an 
institution to issue new standards for a new form of formal operating report. This 
refers to the Operating and Financial Review (OFR) which was introduced and then 
withdrawn again in favour of a ‘Business Review’. Finally, the powers of the DTI 
Investigators and Inspectors are considerably enhanced under CAICE to improve their 
capacity to access information. To assist this work even further, whistleblowers will 
now be provided with immunity. 
 
The Companies Act 2006 received Royal Assent in November 8, 2006 after some 
delays in Parliament over various contentious issues. The Act seeks to provide a 
comprehensive code of company law, and will replace almost the entire provisions in 
CA 1985, CA 1989, and CA 2004. The implementation time table for various sections 
of the new Act commenced on January 1, 2007 and is scheduled for completion on 
October 1, 2008. The FSA Transparency Rules (sections 1265-1273) and the new 
statutory basis of damages for false and misleading statements in directors’ reports 
came into force on January 20, 2007. The section on Takeover Panel statutory powers 
came into force on April 6, 2006. Basically, the CA 2006 when fully implemented 
will imply more codified obligations for directors and extra powers for regulators, 




Apart from the above, the Fraud Act 2006 has widened and integrated the offence of 
fraud now to include fraud by false representation (section 2), fraud by failing to 
disclose (section 3), and fraud by abuse of position (section 4). Where OBF disclosure 
practices are concerned, these new provisions carry with them probable significant 
legal implications. In practice, however as these provisions have transformed such 
misdemeanours into dishonesty-based offences various complex civil law issues 
might arise in the future. 
 
Increasingly, limited corporations and in particular listed corporations in the UK are  
also governed by directives flowing from the European Union (EU). The European 
Community 4th Directive for instance represented an endeavour to standardise key 
aspects of the form and contents of financial reporting; the Transparency Directive 
(TD) demanded more explicit disclosure of major financial items, and; the 2002 
International Finance Reporting Standards (IFRS) Directive required reporting 
compliance for this international reporting standard by 2005.[52] The power to 
implement any EC directives on corporate governance applicable to listed companies 
is now delegated to the FSA under the CA 2006. Corporate governance is taken to 
refer to the manner wherein directors conduct themselves, and the relationship 
between shareholders and boards. 
 
                                                 
[52] Stittle, J., ‘Annual Reports: Delivering Your Corporate Message to Shareholders’, Gower: 
Aldershot, 2002, 13-31; The TD was effected in the UK on 2007 through section 463 of the CA 2006 
and section 90A of FSMA 2000. This imposed a new statutory regime for financial reports including a 
personal liability for directors for losses suffered by companies as a result of any untrue or misleading 
statement in, or omission from the directors’ reports, directors’ remunerations reports or summary 
financial statements. Professor Paul Davies’ final report ‘Issuer Liability for Misstatements to the 
Market’ has recommended that the threshold for liability should remain fraud (knowingly or recklessly 
making an untrue or misleading statement). This report is available at http://www.hm-
treasury.gov.uk/davies; European Association of Public Banks, ‘European Banking and Financial 
Services Law’, 2nd edition, Kluwer Law International: New York, 2006; Ferran, E., ‘Building An EU 
Securities Market’, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2004, Chapters 5, 6 & 7 
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The US Federal Constitution provides the federal government with powers to regulate 
financial reporting of businesses with multiple state activities, but allows individual 
states to hold residual powers. The state laws governing financial reporting 
obligations are less onerous than those found in the UK, but for larger listed 
enterprises these are governed by far more detailed federal rules. The hitherto largely 
unregulated financial reporting in the nineteenth century was brought under federal 
supervision through the Securities Act of 1933 requiring registered issuers to make 
public disclosures on accounts and other relevant information as a consequence of 
widespread corporate fraud. The Securities Act of 1934 required annual and other 
periodic reports to the Securities Exchange Commission, which was created by the 
Act itself. The Investment Company Act and the Investment Advisers Act followed 
this in 1940. The former requires mutual funds to provide investors with financial 
statements and their investment policies. The latter regulates investment advisers 
managing assets exceeding US $25 million. Federal intervention in corporate and 
financial services laws became more onerous with the introduction of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act 2002 (SOA) to restore the fundamental integrity of US markets through the 
tightening of corporate disclosure rules and the prevention of serious conflicts of 
interests.  
 
It has been contended that, ‘The SOA does not alter the substantive standards for 
indictment and conviction. Nor does it make anything new criminal that was not 
theoretically unlawful before. But, by substantially enhancing the sentences for white-
collar crime in the current political and economic environment, the legislation will 
lead to more convictions and tougher sentences. Ironically, it will lead to more trials. 
Under the Federal sentencing guidelines, it has become very risky to go to trials, as 
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the prosecutor can charge one way for plea-with one set of outcomes under the 
sentencing guidelines-and another, harsher set of charges for an indictment and trial 
and judges have little power under the guidelines to ameliorate the resulting 
unfairness. However, if the possible sentence under this new legislation is so severe, 
then there is little incentive to plead and more trials to follow’.[53]  
 
It has also been contended that the SOA is the product of political expediency and 
uneasy compromise and hence not a well-formulated policy in many respects. It is 
also further suggested that it would not have mattered much anyway, as corporate 
governance in the US is very much a state and not federal issue. In practice, the 
Delaware legislation sets the rules for the majority of listed corporations, which have 
opted for the low taxation and the more highly protective laws and judicial rulings in 
that state.[54] 
 
Other than the creation of the PCAOB, SOA’s intrusions into the state control of 
corporate governance are not really substantive. For instance, audit committees 
already have the powers to appoint or to retain public auditors. It is also argued that 
the attestation provisions; the auditor rotation rule; the discouragement of 
organisational and incentive compensation conflicts of interest from security analysts; 
or the disallowing of auditor advisory services would in any case evolve through 
market forces as standard practice. ‘The corporate abuses of Enron…and the others 
were primarily a market problem and the role of the government should be to remove 
                                                 
[53] Saville, R.J. et al., ‘SOA 2002: Summary and Analysis of Criminal Provisions’, Thein & Priest 
LLP, available at http://www.thelenreid.com/articles/art_138.htm, viewed on 05/02/2005 
[54] Bebchuk, L.A. & Hamdani, A., ‘Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from History’, Columbia Law 
Review, Vol. 106, 2006, 1793-1839. Here, Professor Bebchuk and Hamdani argue, that as state laws 
have been unable or unwilling to use modern tools to provide adequate safeguards for investor 
protection, a systematic and comprehensive investigation of the desirable extent of federal intervention 
in corporate law is long overdue. 
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impediments to market-like conflicts of interest and then let market do what it does 
best—respond to information with precision and efficiency. That is why the most 
significant change has been, appropriately on the market side’.[55] 
 
After Enron and the introduction of the SOA, the early effects on US Board rooms 
appear to signify a shift in power away from the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and 
the emergence of a climate of fear. ‘The old attitude of informal cooperation with the 
CEOs has been replaced by a new spirit of legalistic, often antagonistic, check-the-
boxes formality’.[56] This is said to lead to a culture of blame, with a more formalistic 
approach for the management agenda and the acceleration of the downsizing of at 
times necessary informal management structures.  
 
‘The downsizing of the CEO has led to a certain extent, to the super sizing of 
advisers. That’s not necessarily a cure for everything that ails corporate America. It is 
true that successful CEOs will have to be consensus builders in the future…The age 
of the absolute corporate monarch…is over’.[57] Thus the early effects of the SOA 
                                                 
[55] Monks, A.G. & Minow, N., ‘Corporate Governance’, Blackwell: Oxford, 2004, 248-249; Ribstein, 
L. E., ‘Market vs Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002’, The Journal of Corporation Law, Fall 2003, 1-67. Here, Professor Ribstein provided very robust 
arguments that markets are capable of responding more quickly and precisely to corporate fraud than 
regulation formulated out of a highly charged political environment; Klock, M., ‘Two Possible 
Answers to the Enron Experience: Will it be Regulation of Fortune Tellers or Rebirth of Secondary 
Liability?’, The Journal of Corporation Law, Fall 2003, 69-109. Here, Professor Klock urged the return 
to the original disclosure philosophies of federal securities laws and the amendment of statutes to 
specifically provide for aiding and abetting liability in circumstances where common law has denied it; 
Gupta, P.P. & Leech, T., ‘Making Sarbanes-Oxley 404 Work: Reducing Cost, Increasing 
Effectiveness’, IJDG, Vol. 3, No. 1 2006, 27-28; Alles, M. G. & Datar, S., ‘How Do You Stop the 
Books Being Cooked?: A Management-Control Perspective on Financial Accounting Standard Setting 
and the Section 404 Requirements of the SOA’, IJDG, Vol. 2 No. 2, 2004, 119-137.  
[56] (a) Henry, D., France, M. & Lavelle, L., ‘The Boss on the Sidelines: How Auditors, Directors, and 
Lawyers are Asserting Their Power’, Business Week, McGraw-Hill, 25/04/2005, 67-71; (b) Brock, 
W.J. et al., ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and Its Impact on US Listed Companies’, in Joseph, C. F. L. (ed.), 
‘International Corporate Governance’, Euromoney Books: London, 2006, Chapter 3 of the book cited a 
survey showing significant numbers of US listed corporations going private as a consequence of SOA. 
[57] Henry, supra note 56 (a), 71; Smith, R. C. & Walter, I., ‘Four years After Enron: Assessing the 
Financial-Market Regulatory Cleanup’, The Independent Review, V. XI, n. 1, summer 2006, 53-66. 
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appear to be somewhat divided. John Snow, the former US Treasury Secretary has 
cautioned against the dangers of over-regulation and the prosecution of CEOs for 
innocent mistakes.  
 
The Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan whilst conceding that in the 
aftermath of SOA, CEOs have become overly cautious resulting in less job expansion, 
maintains that ‘… the 2002 legislation had been surprisingly successful. It has 
significantly reinforced the principle that shareholders are the owners and corporate 
managers are entrusted to work on their behalf to allocate resources to their optimum 
use’.[58] It is interesting to note that Greenspan a year on in the face of global 
mounting criticisms of the SOA, voiced support for the reduction of some of its more 
onerous provisions.  
 
The current US Treasury Paul Hanson took this a step further by setting up the Capital 
Market Regulations Committee to review and simplify some of SEC’s implementing 
provisions for the SOA. Its December 2006 report put significant blame on the 
onerous demands of the SOA for the lower pace of public listings in the US capital 
market. The Committee recommended further enhancement of shareholders’ rights; 
adoption of a more risk and principles-based regulatory approach by the SEC and 
other self-regulatory organisations; greater clarity for public and private enforcement, 
and; some implementation changes for Section 404 of the SOA. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
The researchers here highlighted SOA’s direct and indirect intervention costs and advocated for self-
policing quality enhancement.  
[58] Balls, A., ‘Greenspan Praises Corporate Governance Law’, available at http://www.FT.com, viewed 
on 16/05/2005 
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Meanwhile in the UK, the SOA has escalated the average price FTSE audit fee by 
some 12%. Accountancy firms and financial recruitment houses have been provided 
with the prefect opportunity to regain some of the public confidence lost in the 
immediate aftermath of the Enron scandal. This aside, the internal control weaknesses 
disclosures are now supported by empirical studies that these do transmit valuation-
relevant information.[59]  
 
The Financial Reporting Council (FRC) supervises regulation of financial reporting 
and auditing in the UK. The FRC undertakes the auditing regulation function through 
its oversight of the Audit Practices Board, which sets audit standards; the Professional 
Oversight Board, which generally oversees the regulatory responsibility of the 
profession, and; an Investigation and Discipline Board tasked with the responsibility 
of supervising public interest cases. 
 
The FRC supervises financial reporting through the Accounting Standards Board 
(ASB) and the Financial Reporting Review Panel (FRRP). The ASB is the country’s 
official standards setter. Corporations are required under the corporate laws to comply 
with these standards or provide reasons for departure from these standards in order to 
satisfy the requirement for the true and fair view principle in financial reporting. The 
FRRP enforces compliance to the accounting provisions of the Companies Act and 
the ASB’s standards. It can access court order for compliance where corporations 
failed to comply. In practice, most corporations accede to its instructions.  
                                                 
[59] Perry, M., ‘Higher Cost, More Work, More Fees: Sarbox (SOA) Opens New Doors for 
Accountants’, Accounting and Business, 02/2005, 23-24; Gupta, P.P. & Nayar, N., ‘Information 
Content of Control Deficiency Disclosures under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: An Empirical Investigation’, 
IJDG (2007) 4, 3-23. This empirical study supports the argument that internal control weakness 
disclosures under sections 302 and 404 of SOA do convey valuation-relevant information and is ergo 
not imposing unnecessary deadweight costs on shareholders. 
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The government, the stock exchange, and the accounting profession fund the FRC’s 
activities jointly. The FRC has also identified itself as part of the private sector 
process of self-regulation with primary functions to guarantee the independence and 
integrity of the standard-setting process. This government’s imposition of the OFR in 
2006, and its subsequent unilateral withdrawal without serious consultation of the 
FRC raised some doubts on this claim.[60] 
 
The primacy of law in financial regulation in the US is maintained through the legal 
instrument, which Congress used to set up the SEC. The federal legislature 
occasionally reminds the public of its ultimate authority when it enacts laws providing 
for detailed financial reporting rules. The SEC comprises five members appointed by 
the US President. Its main function is to regulate the stock exchange. In furtherance of 
this, the SEC requires all listed corporations to submit to it periodic financial reports 
which complies with US Generally Accepted Accounting Practices (GAAP). It can 
impose penalties and fines for non-compliance. The SEC has, however, delegated its 
GAAP formulation functions to a standard-setting organisation in the private sector, 
namely the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). The FASB is funded by 
eight sponsoring organisations with interests in financial reporting. Though the 
ultimate determinants of accounting concepts and standards rest with the Board’s 
judgement, it is obliged to consider the views of all participants before entering a 
decision.[61] 
 
                                                 
[60] Pendelbury, M. & Groves, R., ‘Company Accounts: Analysis, Interpretation and Understanding’, 6th 
edition, Thomson: London, 2004, 1-19; Jopson, B., ‘Setback for Regulator as PwC is Cleared’, The 
Financial Times, 09/01/2007, 17. This first publicly aired FRC disciplinary complaint against an audit 
firm for falling short of professional standards in its 2002 audit of Mayflower was dismissed by a 
tribunal. The FRC is currently investigating the work of accountants at MG Rover and Isoft, both the 
subject of extensive controversies. 
[61]  Haskins, M.E., et al., ‘International Reporting and Analysis’, McGraw-Hill: Boston, 2000 
 68
Stock markets commonly imposed further reporting obligations for their members. 
For example, the UK stock exchange imposed further disclosure requirements on top 
of those required by the statute and accounting standards. Listed corporations, for 
instance are required to comply with the provisions of the Financial Reporting 
Standards (FRS) and to explain significant departures from these. The situation is 
broadly similar for the US, where its various stock exchanges also imposed further 
disclosure obligations for quoted corporations, especially those effected in response to 
guidelines provided by the SEC. Financial reporting obligations are also on occasions 
subjected to the influence of the ASB and FASB respectively in the UK and US; and 
through periodic consultations and dialogues. Finally, firm specific rules also exert 
influence on financial reporting practices. This appears in the form of the accepted 
practice for the ‘true and fair view’ in the UK, and the ‘present fairly rule’ for the US. 
 
The’ true and fair view’ and ‘present fairly’ rules 
 
Under these rules, preparers of accounts when addressing matters not regulated by a 
higher rule are compelled to formulate their own rules with assistance from their 
auditors. The Companies Act states that the requirement to observe the true and fair 
view principle overrides all its other provisions. When financial statements are 
prepared according to the provisions of the Companies Act do not provide ‘a true and 
fair view’ because of the effect of a particular provision in the Companies Act, then 
the preparer should depart from this provision because the general requirement to give 
‘a true and fair view’ overrides this particular provision. Many Commonwealth 
jurisdictions and various EU member states also follow this rule. However, it has 
assumed an ambiguous role in UK accounting. As a legal residual clause, it seeks to 
ensure the compliance with both the spirit and the letter of corporate law. As a 
characteristic external to accounting, it helps to motivate the observance of good 
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principles beyond accounting; or it may just be included as part of generally accepted 
accounting principles.[62] 
 
The relationship between accounting standards and the law in general, and the true 
and fair view rule in particular necessitates clarifications. Legal opinion on this issue 
was expressed in 1993 as follows; ‘…The Court will infer from Section 256 that 
statutory policy favours both the issues of accounting standards (by a body prescribed 
by regulation) and compliance with them: indeed section 256 (3)(c) additionally 
contemplates the investigation of departures from them and confers power to provide 
funding for such purpose. The Court will also infer in my view from paragraph 36A 
of Schedule 4 that accounts, which meet the true and fair requirements, will generally 
follow rather than depart from standards; and that departure is sufficiently abnormal 
to require to be justified. These factors increase the likelihood, … that the Courts will 
hold that in general, compliance with accounting standards is necessary to meet the 
true and fair view requirement.’[63] 
 
Thus, ‘fairness’, ‘opinion’, and the concept of a flexible definition underpin the 
subjectivity of the true and fair view rule. This is beneficial in that experts can 
respond quickly with changes in accounting issues, and suitable exceptions to the rule 
are provided for peculiar circumstances. This, however, can lead to problems 
connected to the issues of consistency and comparability. This implies the necessity 
of detail analysis to ascertain actual transaction events against what have been 
                                                 
[62] Walton, P., ‘The True and Fair View in British Accounting’, European Accounting Review (1993) 
2 (1), 49-58; Hopkins, L., ‘The Audit Report’, 2nd edition, Butterworths: London, 1995, 34-53.  
[63] Legal opinion provided by Mary Arden QC in 1993; Odeon Associated Theatres Ltd v Jones 
[1971]1 WLR 442. This case supports the argument that the true and fair view is based on the 
application of commercial accountancy practices and not on the basis of revenue law criterion; Wilson, 
J., ‘International Accounting’ in John W. (ed.), ‘Current Issues in Accounting and Auditing’, Tudor 
Publishing Ltd.: Birkenhead, 1996, 41-44. The EU Fourth Directive requires the overriding of 
regulations where necessary to meet the requirements of the true and fair view.  
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assumed. This is where financial reporting standards become relevant. Still, as the 
true and fair view test is a legal one, advocates have called for definition and 
clarification of this phrase. The CA 2006 has ignored this, and indirectly showed the 
government’s preference for flexibility[64]. The FRC clarified in August 9, 2005 that 
the substitution of the ‘true and fair’ over-arching test by the ‘fair representation’ 
principle of the International Accounting Standards (IAS) would not affect UK’s 
position. This implies that the ‘true and fair’ principle still underpins UK financial 
reporting standards.  
 
In sharp contrast, US auditors are required by their professional rules to state that the 
accounts that they have audited present fairly, in all materials respects, the financial 
position of the corporation concerned and in conformity with US GAAP, and the 
Statement of Auditing Standards No. 69. The US ‘present fairly in conformity with 
GAAP’ rule has to be followed. It is a disciplinary offence for US auditors to issue 
unqualified audit reports that do not comply with GAAP. The large numbers of rules 
released by the SEC following the introduction of SOA demonstrate clearly this 
approach. 
 
Comparative Analysis of UK and US Financial Regulations 
Where the UK is concerned, the body of rules adhered to by accountants for the  
                                                 
[64] Higson, supra note 42, 163-183; McGee, A., ‘’The ‘True and Fair View’ Debate: A Study in the 
Legal Regulation of Accounting’, MLR 54:6 11/1991 874-888; Ekholm, B-G & Troberg, P., ‘Quo 
Vadis True and Fair View?’, JIAAT, 7(1), 113-129. The researchers maintained that the phrase is made 
in relation to the concept of intrinsic value as applied in the efficient market theory and based on this, 
information provided to shareholders are also relevant to other users with economic interests. They 
further asserted that the overriding nature and flexibility of the true and fair principle plays an essential 
role as ‘a defence against creative compliance and the unsuitability of general rules in specific 
circumstances’. 
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preparation of accounts make up the UK GAAP. Its five components are, namely; the 
provisions of the Companies Act, the standards issued by the ASB; the Stock 
Exchange listing rules; professional recommendations; and the practice of leading 
professional firms and large corporations. Within this hierarchy, law exerts the 
greatest authority. Though ASB standards may occasionally override a specific 
provision in the Companies Act, the overriding capacity of the ‘true and fair view’ 
principle as set out in section 1 of the Companies Act assures law’s supremacy. 
 
By comparison, strong political forces headed by the Congress and the SEC drive the 
FASB. For instance, in 1993 the FASB had to withdraw its proposal to require the 
treatment of share options as an expense item after serious lobbying by the SEC and 
Congress. Various interests groups in turn lobbied the latter two. This showed clearly 
that the SEC has to take into account the position of Congress in the discharge of its 
regulatory function. The FASB in turn has to accede to the superior authority of the 
SEC.  
 
Thus, financial reporting in the US is highly regulated; geared towards the 
information needs of participants in the capital market; and displays a high level of 
disclosure obligations. In contrast, the UK system addresses wider aims and adopts a 
rather flexible approach underpinned by the ‘true and fair view’ principle. Research 
has shown that US GAAP measures of earnings for the period 1985-87 were much 
more conservative than UK GAAP earnings. On average, UK earnings were between 
9 and 25 percent higher than the US earnings due to differences in accounting 
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principles.[65] Such differences may narrow as both jurisdictions begin to converge 
through the influence of international accounting reporting standards. 
 
International Accounting Standards 
 
Accounting systems vary across economies. To facilitate comparison and so on,  
multiple sets of statements might have to be prepared or the users might have to 
become more familiarised with each of these different systems. Either approach could 
be cumbersome. The accounting communities’ response towards this issue has been 
through the process of standardisation through imposition of a narrower set of rules or 
harmonisation through reduction of variations to increase the compatibility of 
accounting practices.  
 
Harmonisation of the Anglo-Saxon accounting practice based on ‘general accepted 
accounting principles’ with those of the explicit legal text approach of much of 
continental Europe encountered a ten year delay; but by that time global 
harmonisation had become more of a priority. Besides, many EU corporations seeking 
to raise funds in the US capital market had to comply with US rules. Given these set 
of circumstances, the EU threw in its lot with the International Accounting Standards 
Board (IASB) where it enjoys some influence, and from where it hopes to exert more 
influence on the US GAAP.[66] 
 
                                                 
[65] Weetman, P. & Gray, S. J., ‘International Financial Analysis and Comparative Corporate 
Performance: The Impact of UK versus US Accounting Analysis on Earnings’, Journal of International 
Financial Management and Accounting, Summer-Autumn, 1990; Yeoh, P., ‘A Comparative Analysis 
of Financial Corporate Governance in the UK and the US’, paper presented at Socio-Legal Studies 
Association 2007 Conference at Kent University Law School, 04/04/2007 
[66] Alexander, D. & Britton, A., ‘Financial Reporting’, 7th edition, Thomson Learning: London, 2004, 
222 
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IASB evolved from its predecessor, the International Standards Committee (IASC) in 
1973 as an independent private sector organisation dedicated to the narrowing of 
variation for presentation of accounting data.[67] The IASB’s General Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) operates across national boundaries in contrast to say 
the UK GAAP or US GAAP. In theory at least, from the global capital market 
perspective, the IAS GAAP should be relatively more important. In practice, the SEC 
still holds sway when corporations try to raise funds in the US capital market.[68] 
 
The EU issued IASs for listed European corporations through its regulation for 
accounting periods on or after January 1, 2005. This has the force of law without 
further action by member nations. The EU Commission will nonetheless decide the 
applicability of individual IAS within the EU. It may adopt an IAS only if: it is not 
contrary to the principles of the Fourth and Seventh Directives or the European public 
good policy; and comply with the principles of comprehension, reliability, relevance 
and comparability required of financial disclosures for making economic decisions 
and the evaluation of corporate stewardship.[69] 
 
The Enron affair has provided grounds for the EU and others to argue that Enron and 
Enron-type scandals have shown clearly that it was not the question of compliance to 
US GAAP but rather inappropriate compliance, which matters. Hence, the EU has 
                                                 
[67] ibid, 173 
[68] ibid, 173-174. The SEC is now said to be planning for the mutual recognition approach to facilitate 
cross-border listings and so on. 
[69] Rafforinier, B. & Walton, P., ‘International Accounting Standards Board’, in Peter, W., Axel, H & 
Bernard, R. (eds.), ‘International Accounting’, 2nd edition, Thomson Learning: London, 2003, 3337;  
Hopt, K., ‘Financial Disclosure and Accounting’, in Klaus, H. et al. (eds.), ‘Capital Markets and 
Company Law’, OUP: Oxford, 2003; Cearns, K., ‘The First Year of IFRS in Europe: Lessons Learned 
and Challenges to Come’, Butterworths JIBL, Vol. 21 No. 8, September 2006, 3. The changeover to 
IFRS generated some controversies in regard to fair value accounting and dividend payment; Neveling, 
N., ‘IFRS Application ‘Inconsistent’ as Benefits Fail to Materialise’, Accountancy Age, available at 
http://www.accountancyage.com, 01/02/2007. A Standard & Poor’s report raised concerns that in the 
process of transition to IFRS many companies were facing further restatements to smoothen out 
inconsistencies in the manner the reporting regime was undertaken; Grant, P., ‘Road to Global 
Standards Agreed’, Accountancy Age 27, available at http://www.accountancyage.com, 27/02/2006.   
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taken the position that there will be greater convergence if the US GAAP adopts a 
more principles-based rather than rules-based approach.[70]  
 
Principles (UK) versus Rules-Based (US) Financial Reporting 
 
 
Specific details to answer as many potential contingencies as possible drive US 
accounting standards. These have made standards longer and more complex; and 
provided the flexibility for corporations to structure transactions to circumvent 
unfavourable reporting. Further, the tilt towards bright-line accounting rules shifted 
the focus from consideration of the best accounting treatment to concerns for 
satisfying the letter of the rule. For instance, ‘… with respect to Enron, the audit firm 
Arthur Anderson was charged with designing financial instruments that met the 
technical requirements of GAAP while violating the intent. Public disclosure of 
Enron’s procedures has given rise to a renewed debate over whether accounting 
standards should be based on rules or principles’.[71] To allay these concerns, the SOA 
nominated the SEC to evaluate the feasibility of the principles-based approach. 
 
Simply put, the principles-based approach provides a conceptual basis for accounts 
preparers to follow instead of a list of detailed rules. The Chairman of the FASB, 
Robert Herz explained that, ‘Under a principles-based approach, one starts with 
laying out the key objectives of good reporting in the subject area and then provides 
                                                 
[70] Alexander, supra note 66  
[71] Benston, G. J., Bromwich, M., Litan, R. E. & Wagenhofer, A., ‘Worldwide Financial Reporting: 
The Development of Future Accounting Standards’, OUP: Oxford, 2006, 46; Kershaw, D., ‘Evading 
Enron: Taking Principles Too Seriously in Accounting Regulation, (2005) 68(4) MLR 594-625. Here, 
the researcher argued that Enron and its auditor failed to employ both ‘transaction specific rules and 
principles or to pay due regard to the principled qualitative characteristics of accounting’. He doubted 
whether the use of UK GAAP by the decision-makers would have brought a different outcome; 
Benston, G. J., ‘Accounting Doesn’t Need Much Fixing Just Some Reinterpreting’, in Donald, H.C. & 
Stuart, L. G. (eds.), Corporate Governance at the Crossroad: A Book of Readings’, McGraw-Hill: New 
York, 2005, 492-505. It is argued here that consultants designed accounting procedure that are in 
technical accordance with GAAP, even though these procedures tend to mislead investors and violate 
the substance or spirit of GAAP. 
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guidance explaining the objective and relating it to some common examples. While 
rules are sometimes unavoidable, the intent is not to try to provide specific guidance 
or rules for every possible situation. Rather, if in doubt, the reader is directed back to 
the principles’.[72] Under the principles-based approach, accountants in the UK are 
given the professional discretion and responsibility for determining that the 
accounting statements show a true and fair value.  
 
Opponents argued that a principles-based standard frequently transforms into a rules-
based standard in order to enhance comparability and consistency for financial 
reporting users. The US SFAS 133 fair value principle for derivative and hedging 
activities for instance attracted no less than 22 statements to clarify the working 
definition of derivatives. In effect, the fair value principle transformed into a detailed 
rule with complex guidelines and exceptions giving preparers the opportunity to 
structure contracts for more favourable reporting.[73] 
 
Conversely, the lack of precise rules might lead to inconsistencies in the use of 
standards for comparative analysis. For instance, preparers are required to recognise 
both an expense and a liability for a contingent liability that is probable and estimable. 
However, a contingent liability that is reasonably possible is only identified in the 
footnotes. Without precise rules, it is difficult for preparers to ascertain whether 
liabilities are probable or are only reasonably possible. In the absence of rules, the 
quality of financial reporting would be affected adversely due to the reduction of 
comparability and consistency. Additionally, it is widely believed at least in the US 
that many accountants prefer rules-based standards, as they perceive that the 
                                                 
[72] Shortridge, R. T. & Myring, M., ‘Defining Principles-Based Accounting Standards’, The CPA 
Journal, available at http://www.nvsscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/804/essentials/p34.htm  
[73] Shortridge, supra note 72 
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justification for lawsuits would be considerably reduced, once financial reporting 
conforms to accepted rules.[74] 
 
The FASB’s October 2002 discussion paper on the principles-based approach 
acknowledged that its benefits outweigh its cost. Its adoption it argued would lead to 
greater convergence to the IASB already accepted in the EU. The FASB, however, 
favoured a gradual conversion to this approach because of the prior need to improve 
accounting concepts and develop an overall reporting framework; and the necessity to 
reduce the number of exceptions contained in its current standards. For example, the 
FASB plans to eliminate ‘application exceptions’, commonly granted to achieve 
desired accounting results to reduce the complexity of standards and reflect more 
explicitly the economic events of an entity.[75] The SEC nonetheless rejected the 
principles-based approach in its 2003 review because its adoption would provide 
inadequate guidance to auditors and corporations and caused the loss of 
comparability.[76] 
 
Despite these limitations, arguments have been made that the benefits of the 
principles-based approach outweighed its drawbacks. For example, the proponents 
asserted that the US FAS 133 provisions were presented in 449 pages, not counting 
four further amendments as of July 2004. In contrast, the comparable IASB standard 
provisions, which adopt the principles-based approach, have only 289 pages and these 
include illustrative examples and implementation guidance.  
 
                                                 
[74] ibid 
[75] FASB, ‘Proposal: Principles-Based Approach to US Standard-Setting,’, FASB: Washington DC, 
2002 
[76] SEC, ‘Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002’, FASB: Washington DC, 
January 2003 
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Another OBF example concerns the treatment for lease accounting. The US GAAP, 
which uses the rules-based standard, formulated four detailed benchmarks to 
distinguish between financial and operating lease. This was because in the 1980s 
many corporations were turning this into an abusive form of OBF. This did not work 
well, as corporations made use of the explicit rules to justify and carry on with its use 
as an OBF instrument. In sharp contrast, the principles-based International 
Accounting Standard 17 (IAS 17) states simply that a lease, ‘is classified as a finance 
(i.e. capital) lease if it transfers substantially all of the (the entire) risks and rewards 
incident to ownership’ to the lessee. In effect, IAS 17 does not provide corporations 
with the option to structure contracts that avoid minimum requirements. This in 
essence implies that it is difficult to structure contracts to permit OBF under IAS 
17.[77] 
 
Indeed, the principles-based approach merits support because its broad guidelines can 
cater to wide-ranging situations; results in simpler standards, and; reflects more 
accurately the underlying performance of businesses and more importantly curtail the 
opportunity for financial manipulations. Further, it does provide auditors with the 
opportunity and responsibility to exercise their professional judgements to ascertain 
whether financial reports they audited actually fairly represent its financial health and 
liquidity positions. The auditors’ hands would also be strengthened relative to 
corporate influence, as the latter can no longer argue that the former must attest that 
the corporate statements are fair as they conform to the rules of GAAP.  
 
                                                 
[77] supra note 75 
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This may, however, require an oversight to ensure that auditors who fail to act 
professionally due to a lack of probity or skill are effectively held to account.[78] The 
debates over principles-based and rules-based accounting standards in the US are far 
from over, despite favourable official US opinions for the former. The lack of 
enthusiasms especially for practising accountants appear to be their inherent fear of 
losing their ‘shields’ in the form of explicit rules against lawsuits. It will require the 
firm resolve of all those connected with financial reporting; from preparers, standards-
setters, auditors, and the wider public to effect the principles-based approach in the 




The Financial Services Authority (FSA) and the Serious Fraud Office in their own 
capacities or in conjunction with the Crown Prosecution Office for the more serious 
criminal cases enforced financial regulations in the UK. Generally, statute laws 
provide penalties for breach of the laws. The CA 1985 and 1989 along with the CA 
2006 include a number of technical breaches such as failure to submit accounts on 
time, which results in minor criminal penalties or automatic penalties. Corporate 
frauds of a more serious nature carry more severe penalties. It would seem that the 
threat of criminal prosecutions encourage widespread corporate compliance with the 
law as only a handful of cases have been brought before the courts to date. 
                                                 
[78] ibid; Williams, P., ‘Stick to Principles or Go by the Rules’, available at http:// 
www.accountancyage.com, CRN 09/06/2006. This article calls upon auditors, standards setters, and 
preparers to support the case for the principles-based approach; Williams, P., ‘Time to Decide: 
Principles or Rules?’, Finance Director, available at, http://www.accountancyage.com, 26/10/2006; 
Bratton, W.M., ‘Rules, Principles, and the Accounting Crisis in the United States’, in John, A. & 
Joseph A. M. (eds.), ‘After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in 
Europe and the US’, Hart Publishing: Portland, 2006, Chapter 8. Professor Bratton argued that the US 
accounting crisis occurred less from the form of GAAP standards whether rules- or principles-based, 
than from their application to fact and enforcement; and indeed arose out of the relationship between 
auditors and the corporate issuers. 
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The FSA derives its powers from FSMA 2000 and these exceed those of its 
predecessors.[79] The FSA has been given enforcement powers relating to its Code of 
Market Conduct. Participants who breached the market code will face penalties or 
have their gains disgorged. This civil route was not hitherto available in the previous 
financial regime. This new market abuse regime therefore aims to minimise financial 
crime and other sharp market practices. More than this is the convergence of the 
hitherto three financial clusters separated by custom, informal norms and cartels. 
Indeed, it is about the updating and modernisation of the financial services sector.[80] 
 
Given the wide legislative, investigative, disciplinary and prosecuting powers 
extended to the FSA, various mechanisms have been put in place to ensure that it will 
act responsibly and be held to account for all its actions. The FSA being an 
incorporated body is not directly answerable to parliament but to the HM Treasury, 
which has the power to appoint and dismiss its board and chair. The FSA is also 
required to present an annual report relating to; the discharge of its functions; the 
extent to which it has met its objectives; the degree to which it has complied with the 
principles set out to guide its work (section 2(3) of the Act); and any other matters 
directed by the Treasury. The Treasury via Sections 12 to 18 of the FSMA is also 
                                                 
[79] (a)Taylor, M., ‘The Policy Background’, in Michael, B., et al (eds.), ‘Blackstone’s Guide to the 
Financial Services and Markets Act 2000’, OUP: Oxford, 2001, 1-6; (b) Dignam, A., ‘Capturing 
Corporate Governance: The End of UK Self-Regulating System’, IJDG 2007, 4, 24-41. The research 
attributed the decline of the self-regulatory system as being indicative of a decline in trust between the 
state and industry to the harm of both. 
[80] supra note 79 (a) 11-16; Bazley, S. & Haynes, A., ‘FSA Regulation and Risk-Based Compliance’, 
2nd edition, Tottel Publishing Ltd.: West Sussex, 2007. Chapters 4 and 5 explained FSA’s strategy to 
move to a risk-based approach to regulation and the adoption of principles-based rules emanating from 
its July 1997 report on the ‘Reform of the Financial Regulatory System’; McCormick, R., ‘Legal Risk 
in the Financial Markets’, OUP: Oxford, 2006, chapter 10. Legal risk is discussed at length here; Rider, 
B. A. K., Lexander, K. & Linklater, L., ‘Butterworths Compliance Series: Market Abuse and Insider 
Dealing’, Butterworths: London, 2002. Here, the authors discussed the legal implications on the 
making of false statements by issuers and directors; Bennett, C., ‘The Market Abuse Link between 
Shell and Enron’, Company Lawyer (2005) 26 (6), 180-185. Here, the researcher argued for off balance 
sheet accounting to be monitored as a FSA regulated activity to facilitate the enforcement of market 
abuse against directors, auditors, and other professional advisors. 
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empowered to commission reviews on FSA’s operations.[81] Despite this, some have 
argued that the scope for judicial review of its work would be constrained by the 
extensive, ’… subjective criteria to the way in which the FSA is required to discharge 
its tasks (section 2 (1) (b))’.[82] 
 
The FSA is shielded from suits other than for acts done in bad faith or in breach of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (Schedule 1, Para. 19). The broad immunity from suit 
appears to be balanced by a robust independent complaints procedure (as set out in 
Schedule 1, Para. 7 (1) (b)). This is intended to provide redress for participants in the 
financial services sector hurt by inappropriate acts of the FSA. 
 
The FSA is guided by four statutory objectives; namely the maintaining of market 
confidence (section 3(1)); the promotion of public awareness (section 4(1)); consumer 
protection (section 5 (1)); and financial crime reduction (section 6 (1)). The rest of the 
principles are concerned with the caution that the regulatory functions of the FSA 
should not provide unnecessary impediments to healthy competition or be stifling to 
innovations in the industry.[83]  
 
                                                 
[81] supra note 79 (a), 17-36 
[82] (a) ibid, 24; (b) Omoyele, O., ‘Accountability of the Financial Services Authority: A Suggestion of 
Corporate Governance’, Company Lawyer 2006, 27(7), 194-203. Here the researcher asserts the 
limitations of existing mechanisms and suggests the incorporation of corporate governance practices as 
the way forward. 
[83] Haynes, A., ‘The Financial Services Regime’, in Andrew, H. (ed.), ‘Butterworths Financial Services 
Law Guide’, 2nd edition, 2003, 2-3; 3rd edition, 2006, Tottel: West Sussex; Whittaker, A.M., ‘Better 
Regulation—Principles v Rules’, [2006] J.I.B.L.R. 233-237. This FSA article stressed that the regulator 
favours greater use of principles-based regulation in view of its greater fairness and predictability. The 
latter is improved by formal guidance from the FSA and the use of informal case studies; Severn, D., 
‘The Grand Old Duke of York’, March 2007 Money Management’, 76-79. The FSA is currently 
shrinking its Handbook of Rules to make its principle-based approach works better in terms of growth 
and innovation. 
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The FSA has no direct role in deciding on the contents of financial reports other than 
those for detailed regulation of prospectuses. The FSA’s concern in the contents of 
financial reports arises from its prudential supervisory responsibilities pertaining to 
capital adequacy and liquidity measures founded on financial data.[84] High standards 
of financial reporting quality are connected, however, with the FSA’s objectives of 
protecting investors and the provision of fair, efficient, and transparent markets. As 
such, accounting and audit standards and in particular their enforcement are of crucial 
interests to the FSA.  
 
The ASB, the accounting standards regulator, in contrast has no enforcement powers 
other than to apply to court for the resubmission of defective financial statements. 
This self-regulatory process appears to sit well with the business community as very 
few court orders have been made to date.  
 
Where the Combined Code of Corporate Governance is concerned there are no tools 
available to enforce it, being a mere code of best practices. Nonetheless, most market 
participants keep well within its provisions to avoid unnecessary visits from the FSA. 
So far, some listed institutions have breached the code on the provision for the 
separation of the posts of Chairman and Chief Executive Officer (CEO), and on the 
recommendation that the former should not be appointed from a prior CEO.  
Ergo, as a self-regulatory code, and as long as corporations can provide good reasons 
for their departure from it, no penalties can come about.  
 
                                                 
[84] FSA 2000 Annual Report, 17 
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The SFO normally in conjunction with the DTI or the Crown Prosecution Office 
undertakes serious corporate fraud cases, but usually within certain parameters, like 
case size and degree of public interest. Thus far, the SFO has enjoyed mixed success. 
As a result of the collapse of a couple of lengthy and expensive trial cases in 2005, the 
SFO is now seeking reforms through the Attorney General for the use of the single 
judge route for complex fraud cases.  
 
US: Securities Exchange Commission (SEC ) 
 
 
Banking activities are regulated by the Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
and others. The Commodities Futures Trading Commission and primarily the SEC 
regulates securities activities. As financial products and services are generally 
regulated by function, the US regulatory system is ergo functional in nature. To 
facilitate comparison with the US system, the SEC is selected in this study for suitable 
comparison with the FSA. The SEC or the State Attorney General’s Office or both 
jointly supervise and enforce breaches of corporate and securities laws. Corporations 
in the US are established under state rather than federal laws.  
 
There was therefore initially no national law governing the flow of financial 
information to investors. The 1929 stock market crash attributed part of the blame to 
inadequate information given to shareholders. The Securities Act of 1933 (SA 1933) 
stipulated the financial disclosure requirements for initial offerings, whilst the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA 1934) listed disclosure requirements for those 
already listed as well as those traded in over-the-counter market. These and other later 
federal acts superseded the state laws concerned. The SEC was set up under the SEA 
1934 to administer these sets of regulations. 
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The SEC, an independent federal agency, relies on the FASB to develop GAAP.[85] 
Despite this, the SEC occasionally intervenes, when it finds the private sector not 
moving in the desired direction or proceeding too slowly. Since the 1970’s the SEC 
prioritised more on disclosure rather than measurement issues. The thrust of the 
SEC’s policy is the protection of individual investors and the safeguarding of the 
securities trading system.  
 
The SEC has been concerned with various creative accounting practices in the capital 
markets, which have the effects of exaggerating revenue and profits or the 
understating of debts.[86] It implemented a four-point plan to address these issues. 
These involved improving the accounting framework; enhancing the statutory audit 
for listed corporations; beefing up the audit committee process; and pursuing the 
cultural change within the professional, financial, business, and related regulatory 
authorities. The SEC’s serious view of the then prevailing problems was articulated 
through various enforcement actions.[87] 
 
To help improve the quality of external audit, the Public Oversight Board Panel on 
Audit Effectiveness issued numerous guidelines.[88] While the Treadway Committee 
recommended for a much stronger and more independent audit committee, the Blue 
Ribbon Committee made other recommendations on their nature and functions.[89] 
SEC’s message to the financial community appeared to have some positive effects as 
some changes have been observed. These did not, however, appear to be sufficient to 
                                                 
[85] Accounting Series Release (ASR) No. 150 
[86] Levitt, A., ‘The Numbers Game’, Speech in New York University Center (Centre) for Law and 
Business, September 28, 1998’, available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch220.txt, viewed on 
06/01/2005 
[87] SEC Enforcement Cases, available at http://www.sec.gov, as at 01/09/1999 
[88] Public Oversight Board , ‘Audit Effectiveness Releases Exposure Draft’, issued on 06/06/2000 
[89] Young, M., ‘Accounting Irregularities and Financial Fraud: A Corporate Governance’, Harcourt: 
Oxford, 2002 
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eliminate creative accounting practices altogether, as the perpetrators were pressured 
by stronger motives and forces. Enron and other related financial scandals, which 
unfolded from 2001 onwards, gave credence to this perspective. 
 
Functioning like a regulatory champion in Wall Street, the New York State Attorney 
General, Eliot Spitzer mounted a series of high profile cases against CEOs, outside 
directors, auditors and financial advisers.[90] Some were sent to jail for the wilful 
distortion and manipulation of financial reporting, but the bulk settled out of court 
with hefty fines. Aside from the high profile criminal cases, settlement was reached 
between the ten largest investment banks in the US and the SEC, the New York 
Attorney General, NYSE, and other state regulators. This 2002 Global Legal 
Settlement scheme involved a fine of US $1.4 billion on the accused financial 
institutions, with further undertakings by them to improve the quality of information 
in the financial markets. The latter requires these financial institutions to make their 
analysts’ recommendations public; and to contract with at least three independent 
research firms to provide research to their brokerage customers over a five-year 
period.[91]  
 
                                                 
[90] Macey, J.R., ‘Politics on Wall Street: The Implications of Eliot Spitzer on State-Federal Relations 
in the Regulation of Public Corporations and Capital Markets in the US’ in Hopt, K. J. et al. (eds.), 
‘Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and US’, OUP: 
Oxford, 2005, 85-103; O’Brien, J., ‘Redesigning Financial Regulation: Eliot Spitzer, State-Federal 
Relations and the Battle for Corporate Control’, in Justin, O (ed.)., ‘Governing the Corporation: 
Regulation and Corporate Governance in an Age of Scandal and Global Markets’, John Wiley & Sons 
Ltd.: West Sussex, 2005, 295-315 
[91] Mishkin, F.S., ‘The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets’, Boston: Pearson 
Education, 2006, 202-203; In the Billing v Credit Suisse First Boston case , the Supreme Court held on 
19/06/2007 that underwriters are entitled to ‘implied immunity’ from private antitrust suits for their 
actions in underwriting initial public offerings (IPOs). This means that whilst private plaintiffs may still 
claim under securities laws for alleged wrongdoing relating to IPOs, they cannot seek treble damages 
under antitrust laws or to avoid the heightened pleading standards of the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995; Rider, B., ‘Editorial: Minding Other People’s Wealth’, JFC Vol. 12 No. 3 2005, 
198-199. The editor here highlighted the significant rise of obligations on professional advisers and 
intermediaries to ‘blow the whistle’ when they are or should have been suspicious. 
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Clearly, this was a direct response to the conflicts of interest generated by the key 
financial analysts involved in Enron and WorldCom. Some of the settlements made 
use of the deferred prosecution mechanism, wherein the state prosecution office 
would suspend prosecution in exchange for specific undertakings by the defendants. 
A good example of which was that imposed on KPMG for its alleged role in the 
construction of sham tax shelters for their customers. Apart from the payment of a 
hefty fine, KPMG had to undertake to be on good professional behaviour for one year, 
and be subjected to a mandatory review of its professional conduct by an independent 
consulting firm.[92]  
 
Thus, a climate of financial reporting compliance fear developed in the capital market 
which appeared to promote greater professionalism and ethical behaviour.  
This was, however, rudely disrupted by the management share options backdating 
scandals unfolding in the latter part of 2006, despite the introduction of relevant 
provisions in the SOA for the reporting of share options.[93] Until the market corrects 
such deviant behaviour, investors might need to be more vigilant with assistance from 
securities regulation. 
 
Comparative Analysis of UK and US Financial Regulators 
 
The financial regulator in the US, namely the SEC was created through a statutory 
provision to ensure the protection of investors by making financial disclosures on a 
stipulated regular basis mandatory to corporations listed in the capital market. In 
                                                 
[92] US Department of Justice, Re KPMG-Deferred Prosecution Agreement, 2005; US Senate 
Committee on Finance, ‘Tax Shelters: Who’s Buying, Who’s Selling, and What’s the Government 
Doing About It?’, 21/10/2003, 108-371; Robinson, J. K. & Urofsky, P.E., ‘Deferred Prosecutions and 
the Independent Monitor’, IJDG, Vol. 2 No .4 2995, 325-347 This research reviewed questioned the 
value of these Deferred Prosecutions Agreements (DPAs) which have no formal or informal guidance 
on firm eligibility.  
[93] Bawden, T., ‘American Economy Under Threat from Notes on A Scandal’, The Times, 09/12/2006, 
66. The article stressed the seriousness of the problem as to date some 160 corporations became under 
SEC investigations and more are expected. 
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contrast, the FSA in the UK is structured as a corporation and hence governed by a 
Board of Directors instead of state appointed commission members as in the US. The 
powers of the SEC are drawn from the SA 1933 and SEA 1934, whereas the FSA 
derives its power from the FSMA 2000.  
 
The SEC focuses mainly on the regulation of corporations listed on the capital market 
of the USA. It can act against US listed corporations as well as non-USA corporations 
listed there. Under the SOA, it can also take actions against infringement of its rules 
and regulations by foreign corporations, which have financial dealings with US listed 
corporations. The FSA’s duties and obligations go beyond corporations listed in the 
London Stock Exchange, as it has regulatory duties over the entire UK financial 
system. These include the banking and insurance business. It also enjoys rights to 
enforce actions against non-UK institutions and individuals who have used and 
abused the financial services sector in the UK. 
 
The SEC is guided in its work by its mission statement as well as various related Acts 
passed by Congress. It is in a sense supervised by Congress as the latter determines its 
budget. In the case of the FSA, its work is mainly guided by the FSMA 2000, but it is 
also led by Eleven Principles, which overarch the regulations surrounding its tasks. 
Breach of these principles may lead to disciplinary action by the FSA, whilst breaches 
of FSA regulations may lead to civil suit. The activities of the FSA are monitored and 
scrutinised by a Parliamentary Committee and the Treasury. The latter wields 
considerable influence over the FSA as it determines its budget. 
 
Where enforcements are concerned, both regulators have access to civil as well as 
criminal sanctions. Both also work closely with the Prosecution authorities, where 
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criminal liabilities are involved. On a comparative basis, it would appear that the SEC 
is more aggressive in its enforcement practices. This could be attributed to its 
aggressive use of plea-bargaining, which is not as yet available to the FSA. This 
approach is often taken, as the results tend to be quicker than via the criminal sanction 
route, which is hampered by the higher burden of proof associated with its use.[94] 
Still, unlike its predecessors, the FSA has been given much broader powers under 
FSMA 2000, to pursue civil and criminal actions. The increasing pace of its 
disciplinary and enforcement activities already visibly shows some effects of these.[95] 
 
Both regulators operate under a broadly similar financial system characterised by 
good corporate governance, transparency, accountability, and the rule of law. These 
are the ingredients, which have contributed to the success of their capital markets. 
Both also rely on private sector initiatives to safeguard and develop accounting 
standards, policies, and procedures. Despite these broad similarities there are some 
differences in terms of style and approach. For instance, the SEC has powers over the 
development of accounting standards, which have the force of law, even though it 
uses this only when it is not comfortable with private sector initiatives. In contrast, the 
1985 CA provides the statutory backing for the accounting standards developed 
                                                 
[94] The FSA disclosed in April 2007 that it is contemplating the adoption of US style plea-bargaining 
mechanism to strengthen its enforcement procedures; Fryer, P.A., ‘Insider Dealing and Market 
Manipulation: A Comparative Analysis of Regulatory Enforcement in the UK and the US’, PhD thesis, 
University of Wolverhampton, 2000, Chapters 5 and 6; Braithwaite, J, ‘Markets in Vice, Markets in 
Virtue’, OUP: Oxford, 2005; Rashkover, B. W. & Winter, C .B., ‘The Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on 
SEC Enforcement in Public Company Disclosure Cases-Part 1 & 2’, IJDG, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2005, 312-
324 & Vol. 3 No. 1, 2006, 49-58 respectively. The articles illustrated SEC’s use of SOA in its recent 
employment of large civil penalties (section 308(a)), expanded equitable remedies (section 305(b)), and 
the placement of so-called extraordinary payments to executives in escrow (section 1103). The SEC 
has also brought several cases alleging false certifications under SOA, whilst the PCAOB a SEC 
supervised agency also initiated two subsequently settled cases 
[95] FSA 2006 Annual Report; Arnold, M. & Wiesmann, G., ‘Private Equity Checks for Banks’, 
Financial Times, 12/06/2007, 17. The FSA has announced plans to conduct a semi-annual exercise on 
banks’ exposures to leverage lending and to ‘investigate worries about conflicts of interests within 
private equity firms, such as between the buy-out funds and their own in-house advisory firms, which 
receive fees on services to the fund’. 
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almost entirely through the accounting and business communities. CA 2006 has 
maintained this position. 
 
The extent and scale of financial scandals in the UK is comparatively less worrisome 
than that in the US over the last five years or so. This may be attributed to the various 
guidelines provided by various corporate governance committees; the alertness of the 
accounting profession to respond to various challenges confronting the integrity of 
their profession; and in particular its higher transparency for management stock 
options. The more interventionist mode of UK institutional investors in regard to 
matters like board composition, directors’ appointment, executive compensation 
schemes, and disclosure policies; and a relatively more shareholder friendly corporate 
legal regime also contributed to a more balanced engagement and mix of outside and 
inside board members to lend further influence on corporate directions and controls. 
However, matters can still be further improved upon through a more enhanced form 
of transparency in corporate reporting.[96] 
 
Prior to the passing of the SOA, the regulatory framework in the US already has in 
place various specific rules governing the use of particular OBF instruments. This 
was, however, not integrated under a central principle as is found in the UK. 
Businesses have resorted to creative compliance to lessen transparency. As a result 
some corporations like WorldCom and Global Crossing have exploited the loopholes 
                                                 
[96] Owen, G., Kirchmaier, T. & Grant, J., ‘Corporate Governance in the US and Europe: Where Are 
We Now?’, in Geoffrey, O., Tom, K. & Jeremy, G. (eds.), ‘Corporate Governance in the US and 
Europe: Where Are We Now?’, Palgrave Macmillan: Basingstoke, 2006, Chapter 1;  Yeoh, P., ‘The 
History of Corporate Governance: Key Lessons Never Really Learned?’, paper presented at 2006 SLS 
Conference at Keele University, 07/09/2006; Jopson, B., ‘Companies Make Patchy Progress on 
Reporting Performance’, Financial Times, 16/01/2007. This article cited the findings of the ASB, 
which found that only some 45% of the companies investigated produced financial report exceeding 
statutory requirements and that most were deficient in the provision of forward-looking information on 
fears of litigation stemming from good-faith forecasts that might turn out to be wrong.  
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to engage in various deceptive commercial activities. The US regulatory authorities 
have responded to this and related issues through specific provisions in the SOA. 
 
By comparison, the UK has FRS 5. This is a specific financial reporting standard for 
OBF formulated in the mid 1980s in response to the corporate scandals prevailing 
then. This probably explains why the UK subsequently responded mainly with soft 
laws in the wake of huge corporate frauds prevailing in the 2000s in the US and the 
EU. The UK, however, has just updated and completed the reforms of its corporate 
laws. These included among other things, new provisions for corporate disclosure 
obligations, directors’ accountability and liability as well as auditors responsibilities 
and liability. It has to be mentioned that the UK is not entirely spared from the 
limitations and weaknesses of financial reporting. The recent Alfred McAlpine, MG 
Rover , and Isoft cases where faulty financial reporting have been alleged 
demonstrated clearly the need for continued vigilance on the part of investors and 
financial gatekeepers in the UK. 
 
On an overall basis, the ‘light touch’ financial regulation in the UK is perceived to be 
working reasonably well with far less corporate scandals of the scale witnessed in the 
US. The UK stock market is about a fifth of the US capital market, but is more global 
in character with about 50% proportion of international companies compared to the 
latter’s narrower band of 30%. The UK stock exchange is also fast becoming a global 
beacon for the listings of large foreign corporations particularly from Russia, China, 
and India. The US Capital Market Regulation Committee raised concerns over the 
decline of US share of the global IPO market and the increased use of private equities 
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over the public market.[97] In response, it made ‘…32 specific recommendations in 
four key areas-shareholder rights, the regulatory process, public and private 
enforcement and Section 404 (Auditor Compliance Testing) of the SOA 2002-to 
improve the regulatory system and give US capital markets the competitive boost 
necessary to respond to the increasingly aggressive efforts of other countries to attract 
equity capital markets’.[98] 
 
The above development and similar development in the EU might spell the beginning 
of regulatory competition as stock markets across the world compete for business. 
Other than the alluded fear of the US that their stock markets have lost business to the 
UK; the latter itself has begun to entertain fear of losing business to less stringent 
financial regimes in the Netherlands and in Guernsey. Private equity funds and hedge 
funds in particular are loud on their calls for less regulatory intrusion in the capital 
market as their modes of operation prefer a less transparent type of financial reporting 
regime. On the other hand, the market prefers otherwise. The challenge for financial 
preparers regulators is to find a balance in financial reporting which can accommodate 
adequately both these needs. OBF reporting faces a similar dilemma. 
 
Increasingly, however, growing recognition is given to the difficulties of transplanting 
governance protection from one jurisdiction to another. Indeed, dispersed ownership 
                                                 
[97] Ip, G., ‘US Listing Loses its Value’, WSJ, 28/11/2006, 1. This article cited the work of Professor 
Luigi Zingales of Chicago University which suggests that the average premium for US listings was 
51% from 1997-2001, but declined to 31% from 2002 to 2005; Bagheri, M. & Nakajima, C., 
‘Competition and Integration Among Stock Exchanges: The Dilemma of Conflicting Regulatory 
Objectives and Strategies’, OJLS, Vol. 24 No. 1 (2004), 69-97; Yeoh, P., ‘The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
2002: Time for Some Tinkering?’, Business Law Review, April 2007, 90-93 
[98] Reliable Plant Magazine, ‘The Committee on Capital Markets Regulation: American CEOs, 
Academics Want to Roll Back Regulations’, available at http://www.reliableplant.com/article, viewed 
on 05/12/2006; Harshbarger, S. & Jois, G. U., ‘Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley 
and the Future of Corporate Governance’, Akron Law Review, 40:1, 2007, 1-53. The researchers here 
urged regulators to ensure that prosecution and enforcement do not become ends in themselves, and to 
adopt a more flexible approach when the needs arise. 
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particularly in the US creates managerial incentives to manipulate financial benefits 
resulting in the misappropriation of private benefits of control. In contrast, the 
predominant concentrated ownership as found in most of continental Europe attracts 
the low-visibility extraction of private benefits.[99]  
 
The UK being a member state of the EU is subjected to the influence of the 
development of EC corporate law. It has, however, been argued that EU company law 
directives and regulations exert little impact on corporations’ governance and 
management. They failed to address principal company matters like fiduciary duties 
and shareholder remedies; characterised by under-enforcement of rules which are 
implemented and construed differently in different member states, and; underpinned 
by optional rules which are said to be market-mimicking and of little relevance or 
avoidable. In contrast, national company laws such as those in the UK still regulate 
primary matters.[100] 
 
The US response to the financial scandals through the SOA is criticised as an over-
reaction and knee-jerk in nature.[101] Developments four years on seemed to give 
greater weight to this view. Accordingly, it is further argued that market participants 
like institutional investors which now make up two-thirds of all shares traded in the 
US, regulators, and enforcement agencies must deploy their power and influence to 
                                                 
[99] Coffee, J.C., ‘A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the US and Europe Differ’, in John, A. & 
Joseph, A.M. (eds.), ‘After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation in 
Europe and the US’, Hart Publishing: Portland, 2006, Chapter 6. 
[100] Enriques, L., ‘EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial Are They?’, in John, A. 
& Joseph, A.M. (eds.), ‘After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising Securities Regulation 
in Europe and the US’, Hart Publishing: Portland, 2006, Chapter 17 
[101] Ribstein, L. E., ‘Market vs Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002’, Journal of Corporation Law Fall 2003, 18-61 
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insist on the proper performance of the fiduciary duties that corporate directors and 
financial intermediaries have in common.[102]  
 
Evidently, the situation is different for the UK. Well before the onset of Enron or 
Enron-type debacles, respectable professional groups were already criticising and 
succeeding in the initiation of reforms to curb conflicts of interest and so on especially 
in the UK. This is said to help avoid the making of legal reforms in haste and without 
proper scrutiny.[103] 
 
Changes made to the existing financial reporting framework by US, UK and EU 
financial regulators have contributed value. Among others, this includes more 
forward-looking information that reflects a corporation’s overall performance, risk 
profile, and expectations of future prospects. Nonetheless, it should further 
incorporate generic provisions common to all businesses and be of help to intra 
industry comparative analysis.[104]  
 
As financial markets become more interlinked and market participants increasingly 
operate globally, regulatory issues can no longer be dealt with on a national or even 
regional level. To deter and prevent apparent isolated problems from disappearing and 
re-emerging elsewhere, financial regulators need to adopt a more global approach.  
                                                 
[102] Smith, R. C. & Walter, I., ‘Four Years after Enron: Assessing the Financial-Market Regulatory 
Cleanup’, The Independent Review, v. XI, n.1, Summer 2006, 66 
[103] Davies, P., ‘Enron and Corporate Governance Reform in the UK and the EC’ and Hopt, K. J., 
‘Modern Company and Capital Market Problems: Improving European Corporate Governance after 
Enron’ in John, A. & Joseph, A.M. (eds.), ‘After Enron: Improving Corporate Law and Modernising 
Securities Regulation in Europe and the US’, Hart Publishing: Portland, 2006, Chapters 12 & 13 
respectively.  
[104] Kennesaw State University Corporate Governance Centre, ‘21st century Governance and Audit 
Committee Principles’, available at http://www.kennesaw.edu/cgc/21stcentury_2007.pdf, 08/05/2007; 
Yeoh, P., ‘Narrative Reporting: Déjà vu in Creative Compliance?’, paper presented at 2006 SLS 
Conference in Keele University, 07/09/2006 
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The use of recognition and equivalence devices to achieve coordinated solutions, for 
instance needs close monitoring especially in the context of different governance 






















                                                 
[105] Alexander, K. et al., ‘A Report on the Transatlantic Financial Services Dialogue’, Harvard Law 
School Discussion Paper No. 576, 01/2007 
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                                                   CHAPTER THREE 
 






This chapter will examine the forms and shapes that Off Balance Sheet Financing 
(OBF) has assumed over the years. It will also demonstrate how it can be put to 
improper use, and how the state and the professional community deals with some of 
the problems created by OBF in corporate reporting. 
 
OBF Instruments 
As OBF has no precise definition, financial instruments that can be treated away from 
the balance sheet, are captured in its classification. They all share the same 
characteristics that they do not result in the full disclosure of the underlying 
transactions. These are also structured to support specific financial strategies of a 
corporation. OBF surged significantly in the 1970s and 1980s partly because of high 
volatility in interest rates and foreign exchange rates. Banks responded with OBF 
products to enhance their customer relationship, but more importantly for the massive 
huge fee income. OBF items comprising options, standby letters of credit, loan 
commitments and guarantees and futures and forward contracts usage grew in 
popularity. 
 
OBF instruments hence evolved mainly through the innovations of investment banks 
and other related professional groups. This study will examine those of concern and 
interest to the accounting regulators and investors. Where the UK is concerned, these 
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are found in the Application Notes of Financial Reporting Standard 5 (FRS 5),[1] 
which is specifically constructed to deal with some of the excesses of OBF 
instruments. These Application Notes are part of the accounting standard and are 
authoritative when used to help in its interpretation. The main thrust of FRS 5 is its 
emphasis of substance over form. In contrast, in the US for the pre-Enron era, specific 
rules governed the reporting obligations for each different type of OBF instruments 
rather than any specific overall OBF standard. It was only the SOA, which 
subsequently provided detail rules for the specific reporting of OBF transactions. 
 
As no international standard has been issued for the accounting of substance over 
form, guidance is available mainly from the Framework for the Preparation and 
Presentation of Financial Statement.[2] In accordance with the guideline, transactions 
that meet with the specifications of an asset or liability are to be reported on-balance 
sheet irrespective of the legal nature of the transaction. In accordance with the said 
framework, assets are rights or other access to future economic benefits controlled by 
an entity as a result of past transactions or events.[3] From this perspective, control 
refers to the power to secure future economic benefits in respect of an asset and to 
restrict access to these benefits by other parties.[4]  
 
In contrast, liabilities are the existing obligations of a corporation arising from past 
transactions, the satisfaction of which will result in an outflow of resources with 
                                                 
[1] FRS 5,’ Reporting the Substance of Transactions’, April 1994. FRS 5 is developed mainly through 
ASB’s Statement of Principles and deals specifically with transactions whose form is in divergence 
with economic realities. 
[2] IAS, ‘Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statement’, IAS CX, 1989, para 
49 
[3] supra note 1, para 12. 
[4] ibid, para 3 
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economic benefits.[5] The focus is hence on the reporting of the underlying economic 
reality of a transaction rather than on the issues of legal ownership or assumption of 
legal responsibility for liabilities.[6] 
 
IFRS Treatment of OBF 
 
As mentioned earlier, thus far no single international standard guides off balance 
sheet transactions. Nonetheless, where disclosure is concerned, the International 
Accounting Standard insists that,’ …management should develop policies to ensure 
that the financial statements provide information that is …reliable in that 
they…reflect the economic substance…and not merely their legal form’.[7] 
Elaborations are outlined in: 
 
• IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. This is 
accompanied by IAS 39, Implementation Guidance Questions and Answers 
• IAS 1, Presentation of Financial Statements; and IAS 32, Financial 
Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation, and 
• SIC-12 (The Standing Interpretations Committee of the IASC (to be replaced 
by the International Finance Reporting Interpretations Committee of the 
IASB))-Consolidation-Special Purpose Entities 
• IAS 17, Accounting for Leases 
 
 
UK listed corporations are required to present group accounts in line with IFRS 
approved for use in the EU commencing from January 1, 2005. IAS 32 and IAS 39 
are meant to deter and prevent manipulation and abuse. It is still too early to ascertain 
                                                 
[5] supra note 1,  para 4 
[6] Elliott, B. & Elliott, J., ‘Financial Accounting and Reporting’, 9th edition, Prentice Hall: Essex, 2005, 
301 
[7] IAS 1, Presentation of Financial Statements, Revised July 1997, paragraph 20 (b) (ii); Alfredson, K. 
et al., ‘Applying International accounting Standards’, John Wiley & Sons Australia Ltd.: Sydney, 2005 
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their effectiveness in regard to this objective. Nonetheless, flexibility offered by IAS 
32 and 39 has raised fears that this might result in wide variation in practice and pose 
considerable difficulties for comparative analysis between businesses. Still, IAS has 
given practical guidance where many other standard setters have failed to grasp or 
do.[8]  
 
UK Response to IFRS 
 
Until the revision of the CA 1989, it is not possible to implement IAS 32 and IAS 39 
in the UK. The law at the current moment allows both historical cost and alternative 
fair value accounting, but in broad terms liabilities are normally expressed at 
historical cost, and unrealised gains are generally not captured in the profit and loss 
statement. In contrast, IAS mandates that liabilities will have to be measured at fair 
value and that unrealised gains may be captured in the profit and loss statement in 
specified situations.  
 
Other than the impending changes to UK’s corporate law to keep in line with the 
requirements of the international standards, the ASB issued ‘Financial Reporting 
Exposure Draft (FRED) 30 Supplement-Financial Instruments: Hedge Accounting for 
a Portfolio Hedge of Interest Rate Risk’ in August 2003. This helps to bring FRED 30 
in line with the revised IAS 32 and 39. Despite these updates and revisions, questions 
have been raised and still left not answered adequately in connection with the issue 
that’… some financial instruments will be required to be measured at cost and some at 
                                                 
[8] Elliot, supra note 6, 338; Cearns, K., ‘The First Year of IFRS in Europe: Lessons Learned and 
Challenges Still to Come’, Butterworths JIBFL, 09/2006, Vol. 21 No. 2. The researcher noted that the 
transition in the UK was achieved well; Barnes, D. & Marshall, E., ‘The Impact of International 
Standards on Securitisation Deals’, International Financial Law Review, 2003, 7-10; Benston, G. J., 
‘Fair-Value Accounting: A Cautionary Tale From Enron’, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25 
(2006), 465-484. Here, it is argued that Enron’s abusive use of fair-value accounting was substantially 
responsible for its downfall.  
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fair value. The boundaries between the two will rely on subjective judgements of 
management’.[9] 
 
US Response to IFRS 
 
Ernst & Young reported that the accounts of 130 foreign private issuers submitted to 
the SEC showed more than 200 differences between the IFRS and the US GAAP.  
On account of this and other problems, the SEC is reportedly exploring the option of 
moving away from current reconciliation guidelines;[10] and towards an 
internationally set of reporting principles developed by the IASB.[11] The more 
practical solution out of this dilemma is for the SEC to opt for mutual recognition of 
accounting standards with those they have confidence in, and there are signs that it 
would probably move in this direction. 
 
In pursuance of s. 401(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, the SEC now requires 
disclosure of off-balance sheet transactions in the Management’s Discussion and 
Analysis (MD & A) of Financial Condition and Results of Operations section of the 
SEC disclosure reports. This has to be effected in a separate presentation of the said 
document. It has defined off-balance sheet transactions to include any transactions or 
contracts with an unconsolidated special purpose vehicle, wherein a corporation 
has:[12] 
 
• Any obligations under specified guaranteed contracts; 
                                                 
[9] Alexander, D. & Britton, A., ‘Financial Reporting’, 7th edition, Thomson: London, 2004, 338; 
Aglietta, M. & Reberioux, A., ‘Corporate Governance Adrift: A Critique of Shareholder Value’, 
Edward Elgar: Cheltenham, 2005, Chapter 5. The classical arguments for the adoption of the ‘fair 
value’ principle by the IASB are rejected by the authors. Instead, they argued that ‘fair value’ increases 
instability.  
[10] Accountancy, ‘Gulf Between US and International Accounting Standards Remains’, Accountancy, 
16/04/2007, available at http://www.gaapweb.com 
[11] Revsine, L., Collins, D. W. & Johnson, W. B., ‘Financial Reporting and Analysis’, 3rd edition, 
Pearson Education, Inc.: NJ, 2004, 1018 
[12] Lander, G. P., ‘What is Sarbanes-Oxley’, McGraw-Hill: New York, 2004, 23-24 
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• A retained or contingent interests in financial assets transferred to the 
unconsolidated vehicle, which act as credit, liquidity, or market risk support to 
that other corporation for such assets; 
• Any current or contingent obligations under derivative instruments; 
• Any existing or contingent obligations within a significant variable interest 
possess by the corporation in the unconsolidated entity that extends financing, 
liquidity, market risk, or credit risk assistance to the corporation, or partakes in 
leasing, hedging, or research and development services with the corporation. 
 
The comprehensive definition thus provided is to capture the common means used by 
businesses to carry out OBF, which are usually confusing and often unclear to 
investors and creditors. These prescriptions are meant only for contractual 
transactions and exclude preliminary negotiations and contingent liabilities flowing 
from litigation, arbitration, or regulatory actions. It is interesting to note that where 
this latter point is concerned, the biggest US supermarket was recently urged by the 
joint pleas of US and UK institutional shareholders to be more transparent about its 
contingent obligations arising from regulatory and related litigations.[13] 
 




This analysis will cover major OBF financial arrangements like consignment stock, 
leasing, securitisation, and derivatives as well as certain relevant investment 
accounting and pension accounting schemes. These said schemes are sometimes used 
in conjunction with OBF instruments to provide corporations with the avenues to 
achieve financial window-dressing or worse still financial misrepresentation.  
                                                 
[13] Financial Times, ‘UK-US Alliance Confronts Wal-Mart’, 02/06/2005, 1 
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Earnings Exaggeration via Consignment Stock and Others 
 
The SEC has laid down six criteria for compliance before recognising revenue for 
sales with right of return attached (SFAS No. 45).  For instance, where a distributor 
enjoys the right to return unsold copies of the products; and not to pay the 
manufacturer until sales of the products to final customers the ‘sales’ should not be 
recognised as revenue until the earnings process is completed and an exchange has 
occurred. Other than this approach, some corporations are known to have recognised 
revenues; when future services remained to be provided; before shipment or before 
customers’ unconditional acceptance; or even when customers are not obligated to 
pay[14] This OBF instrument is, however, not suitable for very large-scale financial 
manipulation due to customers’ warehousing constraints. 
 
Investment Reporting Manipulation 
The classification of investments in debt and equity securities as trading, held-to-
maturity, or available for sale provide opportunities for aggressive reporting practices. 
Where a corporation has significant control over the management of an investee 
corporation or has less than 50% of its shareholdings, then the equity method of 
accounting will have to be employed. This means the corporation’s investment 
account will be adjusted for its proportionate share of the investee’s income (or 
losses). On the other hand, if a corporation holds more than 50% of an investee’s 
                                                 
[14] (a) SEC, ‘Revenue Recognition’, Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 104, 13/12/2003. Computer 
Associates suffered serious erosion of credibility and confidence as a result of such manipulative 
reporting in 2000; (b) SEC v Kendall Square Research Corporation, Accounting and Enforcement 
Release No. 854, [1995-1998] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74369 at 63.4000 (12/11/1996). Here, the 
improper accounting by the corporation caused a restatement of its revenue by some 50% less over the 
period reviewed. The settled injunctive action with the SEC resulted in US$ 1.1 million monetary relief 
from the corporation’s past president; (c) Schilit, H., ‘Financial Shenanigans’, McGraw-Hill: New 
York, 2002, Chapter 4. Here, Schilit maintains that revenues should only be recognised only after the 
earnings process is completed and an exchange occurs; (d) MacDonald, E., ‘Regulators Seek to 
Penalize Auditor Who Missed Fraud’, WSJ Interactive Edition, 06/01/2000, available at 
htt://interactive.wsj.com     
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shareholdings, then it will need to employ the consolidation method. In this case, the 
investor corporation will have to substitute its investments account with the investee 
corporation’s assets and liabilities. 
 
The important thing to note is that where the trading security position is taken, 
unrealised profits and losses are surfaced in the accounts. In contrast, where the 
available-for-sale is concerned, gains or losses are recognised only upon disposals. 
Hence, though both positions provide similar income over the period concerned, they 
recognise gains and losses differently for each year.[15] Though both approaches do 
adjust their investment accounts to reflect changes in fair value, it is more popular for 
corporations to adopt the available-for-sale method as it provides them with the 
flexibility on when to book in their gains or losses. This will imply that through this 
process, corporations can have the option to use such gains or losses to impact on 
their overall profitability position. As for the equity method, it adjusts the investment 
account by absorbing the corporation’s proportionate share of the investee’s gains or 
losses less any dividends received.[16]  
 
Though classification has to be made at the acquisition point, it can be adjusted later 
due to changes in regulations or changes due to business combinations. Where such 
investments migrate between different categories, they have to be adjusted for fair 
value and/or reflected in reported earnings. ABC Bancorp in 1999 and AFLAC in 
1998 engaged in such creative practices, resulting in the former boosting its income 
by US$ 59,000 and the latter recognising unrealised investment gains of US$ 1.1 
                                                 
[15] supra note 14 (a)  
[16] (a) Bauman, M. P., ‘The Impact and Valuation of Off-Balance-Sheet Activities Concealed by 
Equity Method Accounting’, Accounting Horizons Vol. 17, No. 4 , 12/2003, 303-314; (b) Epstein, B. 
J., Nach, R. & Bragg, S. M., ‘Wiley GAAP 2006: Interpretation and Application of Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles’, John Wiley & Sons Inc.: NJ, 2005, 407-468 
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billion Loss recognition of US$ 1.4 billion in 1994 was postponed by Quaker Oats 
Company through the same approach. Presidential Life Corporation broadly echoed 
this in 1997.[17] 
 
The above involved the erroneous postponement of loss recognition. Companies can 
additionally ‘manage’ their earnings through strategic selections of their portfolio of 
investments for sale. IBM for instance, reported a gain of some US$ 4 billion from its 
disposal of Global Network in 1999. Similarly, First Union Corporation in the same 
year netted a gain of US$ 23 million from its sales of 14 branch banks, and in the 
process met with the capital market’s expectations [18] 
 
Liabilities are undervalued on other occasions to inflate current earnings. These may 
involve the under-accruing of operating expenses as demonstrated in General Electric 
Company’s financials in 1998 involving the sum of US$ 100 million, and in the 1996 
accounts of Centuri Incorporated by US$ 0.9 million. On the other hand, the 
understatement of accounts payable will help lower the cost of sales and hence boost 
profits. This appeared to be the reporting approach undertaken by Guilford Mills 
Incorporated in its 1997 income statement and balance sheet[19] 
 
Understatement of liabilities and exaggeration of net profits can also occur when 
contingent liability is disregarded and not accrued when they ought to be. Basic 
accounting practices require such liabilities to be accrued when it is deemed probable 
that these have been incurred and their amounts reasonably estimated. Indeed, Lee 
Pharmaceuticals’ failure to accrue for its contamination costs resulted in significant 
                                                 
[17] Mulford, C.W. & Comiskey, E.E., ‘The Financial Numbers Game: Detecting Creative Accounting 
Practices’, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: New York, 2002, Chapter 8. 
[18] Mulford & Comiskey, supra note 17 
[19] Mulford & Comiskey, supra note 17 
 103
overstatement of its financial health. [20] Finally, various businesses rather than 
consolidation to avoid the absorption of debts mounting their subsidiary investments, 
which are making heavy losses, used the equity the equity method for investment 
reporting. [21]  
 
The ‘creation’ of income through financial assets reclassification such as achieved by 
the above mechanisms is generally confined to businesses with active trading 
portfolio. Yet, as demonstrated by the examples given, various corporations have 
opted to boost their income through such means while not falling under this category. 
In most occasions, it would appear that the corporations involved were motivated to 
do this to inflate their earnings to stay in line with capital market expectations to help 
shore up their equity valuations. 
 
Pension Financial Reporting 
The two basic types of pension plans are the ‘defined contribution plans’ and the 
‘defined benefit plans’. The former involves the employer and at times the employees 
contributing specific sums of cash into a pension fund, the size and timing of which 
are usually determined by agreements between employees and employers. The cash 
benefits to be secured upon retirement will depend on the size of contributions and the 
efficiency of the pension fund in managing its investments. This naturally will not 
guarantee the amount of cash the retirees will receive. With this arrangement, the 
corporation will assume no long-term obligations of the retirees’ benefits resulting 
                                                 
[20] ibid 
[21] Ketz, J. E., ‘Hidden Financial Risk’, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: 2003, Chapter 3. Here, the researcher 
illustrated the use of the equity method by Elan, Coca-Cola, and arguably WorldCom to understate the 
true extent of their external liabilities.  
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consequently with the latter bearing the risks should a shortfall occur.[22] In contrast, 
‘defined benefit plans’ will involve corporations having to assume long-term 
obligations for the amount retirees’ will receive. This means that employers will bear 
the risks when the plans have inadequate assets to pay.[23] 
 
Pension costs vary in accordance with employers’ undertakings, interest rates, and 
pension plans modifications. The level of under-funding of defined pension benefit 
plans reflects the seriousness of the pension deficit problem. The Pension Benefit 
Guarantee Corporation (PBGC) stated that the deficit in 2004 stood at some US 
$353.7 billion. This has critical implications. For example, major US airlines and 
major automobile corporations with large work force may be compelled to petition for 
bankruptcies to liquidate their pension burdens. In response, the Senate struggled to 
pass a bill allowing airlines and other corporations to, ‘…spread their pension plan 
funding over a more manageable schedule of 25 years-instead of the current four 
years –and under more stable, long- range terms…’[24] 
 
This proposal does not appear to have gone down well with the PBGC, as reflected by 
two fundamental questions raised through its executive director, Bradley Belt. 
‘…Does it simply put off the day of reckoning and does it lessen or exacerbate the 
moral hazard in the system already? My concern is it would not satisfy either of those 
guide points’.[25] He went on to argue that the proposal would not entirely remove the 
risks to the PBGC. The airline industry, however, counterpoint on the grounds that the 
                                                 
[22] (a) Revsine, L. et al., ‘Financial Reporting and Analysis’, Prentice-Hall: New York, 2005, 749-750; 
(b) Epstein, supra note 16, 758-797 
[23] Epstein, supra note 22 (b); FASB, ‘Employers’ Disclosures About Pensions and Other Post-
Retirement Benefits’, SFAS No. 132, Revised December 2003 
[24] (a) Daniel, C., ‘Corporate Liabilities: Pensions Funds Shortfall at Record US $353.7 Billions’, 
Financial Times, 08/06/2005, 28; (b) Abrams, J., ‘Senate Approves Pension Overhaul Plan’, 
www.WashingtonPost.com, 17/11/2005. Here, the US Senate estimated the pension shortfall at US 
$450 billion, and provided in the legislation to extend the time limit for the airline industry to beyond 7 
years to address the unfunded pension liabilities. 
[25] Abrams,  supra note 24 (b), paragraph 8 
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massive legacy costs, astronomically high fuel prices and low capacity utilisation at 
that time have already seriously damage its profit performance. It will not therefore 
have the financial capacity to deal properly with the pension deficit issue without 
assistance from the government. The stark similarities between the PBGC deficit and 
social security was best summed up by David Walker, the Comptroller General of the 
Government Accountability Office, when he said, ‘The government does not have 
direct responsibility for the PBGC, but…on current trends, it would be highly likely it 
would face a taxpayer bail-out’.[26] In any case, the Bill to shore up Private Pensions 
was passed on November 16, 2005. 
 
The nature and size of the pension deficit problem probably explains why some 
corporations do understate the depth of their pension funding problems through 
various means. This it appears is commonly achieved through the hiding of pension 
gains and losses and amortisation expenses. One way of realising this is through 
increasing the interest rate assumption, which will result in the lowering of a 
corporation’s projected benefit obligation. Higher rates also reduced accrued pension 
liabilities and cut down on the net pension cost. It is nonetheless not financially 
prudent to net the projected benefit obligation and the pension plan assets to 
understate the negative impact of this.[27] 
 
In a nutshell, defined benefit plans have an off-balance implication, with vital 
information not directly shown on the financial statements. This is going on despite 
FASB’s guidelines that employer should disclose its liabilities to employees in 
                                                 
[26] ibid, last paragraph 
[27] (a) Ketz, supra note 21 ; Schilit, H., ‘Financial Shenanigans: How to Detect Accounting Gimmicks 
& Fraud in Financial Reports’, 2nd edition, McGraw-Hill: New York, 2002, 109-110. By changing its 
pensions accounting assumptions, Lucent was able to drop its earnings growth by 31% instead of the 
less favourable 42%. 
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present value terms, and that they should also disclose the fair value of assets held in 
their pension plans in view of various loopholes. An extremely worrying feature is 
that, ‘Twenty-two of the 26 (Dow 30,inclusiveof GM in particular)) were 
underfunded (under-funded) based on funded status-that is financial reality.  
Seventy-three percent of America’s most successful firms really had underfunded 
(under-funded) pension plans. The underfunding (under-funding) averaged $1.8 
billion a firm, 46.9 billion (in) total.  In other words, these companies reported 
pension net assets of $119 billion, while in fact they were underfunded (under-
funded) by $46.9 billion-that is a swing of $166 billion that represent off-balance 
sheet obligations’.[28]  
 
Aside from the pensions’ issue, other post-employment under-funding is equally 
serious also on account of its off-balance sheet focus. Both taken together do require 





Lease arrangements come in two forms, namely; operating leases, which are purely 
rental payments; and capital leases, which from a commercial reality perspective are 
thinly disguised forms of purchases of assets. As the latter assumes liabilities on the 
part of the lessee corporation, efforts are often made to divert them away from the 
balance sheet proper.  
                                                 
[28] Giroux, G., ‘Earnings Magic and the Unbalance Sheet’, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: New York, 2006, 
105-106; Tunick, B., ‘The Looming Pension Liability: Analysts Focus on Problems that FASB Rules 
Ignore’, Investment Dealers Digest, 14/10/2002; ( c) Clark, G. L. & Monk, A. H. B., ‘The Crisis in 
Defined Benefit Corporate Pension Liabilities Part 1: Scope of the Problem’, Pensions, Vol. 12 (1), 43-
54; Part 11: Current Solutions and the Future Prospects’, Vol. 12 (2), 68-81 
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To deter and discourage lessee corporations from over-indulging in this form of 
financial camouflage, the FASB formulated four criteria for the recognition of 
capitalised leases. Based on this FASB guideline, where any one of these following 
criteria is complied with, then the specified lease arrangement will be deemed to be a 
capitalised lease:[29] 
 
• Flow of ownership title to the lessee; or 
• Availability of purchase option; or 
• Where the lease terms are no less than 75% of an asset’s economic life; and, or 
• Where the present values of the minimum lease payments are no less than 
90% of the asset’s fair value. 
 
Rules-based rather than principles-based accounting is clearly demonstrated in 
operating lease financial reporting. Bright-line tests, the euphemistic expression for 
‘cookbook’ accounting are used to structure operating lease ignoring their economic 
substance. Lessee corporations circumvented the FASB rules for lease accounting 
through various ingenious ways. For example, by discounting cash flows at the 
usually higher incremental borrowing rate, lessee corporations can stay off the 90% 
rule and avoid having to capitalise on their leasing arrangements.[30] Another way 
lessee corporations can avoid lease capitalisation is by not guaranteeing the residual 
value of the leased assets. A further way of avoiding lease capitalisation is to structure 
                                                 
[29] (a) FASB Statement No. 13, ‘Financial Accounting and Reporting for Leases’, 1976; (b) supra note 
16 (b), 467-468; (c) MacDonald, E., ‘Debt Hazards Ahead’, Forbes, 18/06/2007, 80-81. The FASB is 
reported here to be making plans to treat operating leases as any other loans by 2009 and that the IASB 
will also respond similarly. A study conducted by the Georgia Institute of Technology shows that 
corporate earnings per share (EPS) decreased significantly and the liabilities to equity ratio also rose 
significantly when corporations comply with this new reporting rule. For instance, BJ’s Wholesale 
Club’s EPS will drop from US $1.40 to US $0.28 and its debt equity ratio will rise from 95% to 226%. 
[30] (a) Ketz, supra note 21 (b)Epstein, supra note 16 (b) 
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lease payment obligations with a hybrid of a fixed sum plus a contingency rental fee 
derived as a percentage of sales of a lessee corporation.[31] 
 
Leasing fraud occurring in the late 1980s in circumstances where there are 
intermediaries/third parties involved; where highly profitable ventures appear 
suddenly; where new products or financial arrangements are being structured; or 
where the contracts are with relatively unknown parties. Such leasing frauds may 
involve an illusory lessee, multiple financing, and connected foreign suppliers. [32] 
 
Fraudulent leasing conveys risks not only to the direct parties involved, but also to 
investors and other creditors in general. However, happening on a more widespread 
scale is the manipulative reporting of operating leases. These tend to feature more in 
airlines, which lease large fleets of their aircrafts; and in large retailing, which uses 
lease retail space a lot.  The airline industry in the US is particularly fond of engaging 
in the camouflaging of its lease arrangements as operating leases to avoid the full 
glare of the capital market of their finances. For instance, when United Airline’s 
capitalisation structure properly accounts for its capitalised leases, equity constituted 
not more than 1% of its structure. This was long before it filed for bankruptcy 
proceedings. US Airways too met with the same fate shortly thereafter.[33]  
 
                                                 
[31] (a), Ketz, supra note 21; Parker, P. M., ‘Financial Benchmarks: Avis Group Holdings’, San Diego, 
Icon Group International, 2006. Avis Rent-A-Car created a separate trust to borrow in order to finance 
the acquisitions of cars which the latter then leased to Avis for its rental fleet; (b) Miller, P. B. W. & 
Bahnson, P. R., ‘Hertz Tries too Hard to Buff up its Statements’, Accounting Today, available at 
http://www.webcpa.com, May 21-June 3, 2007, 15-17. In contrast, its key competitors, Hertz and 
National Car Rental make direct acquisitions of their rental vehicles. 
[32] Clark, T. (ed.), ‘Leasing Finance’, Euromoney Publications: London, 1990 
[33] (a) Morrell, P. S., ‘Airline Finance’, Ashgate Publishing Limited: Aldershot, 2007, Chapter 12. 
Morrell’s investigation found that US leveraged leases and other industry problems like intense market 
competition contributed to the bankruptcies of at least 9 airlines in the US since 1978 .; (b) Kahn, J., 
‘The Great Airline Leasing Disaster’, Fortune, Vol. 147 (1) 2003, 1-2 
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By opting for the understatement of their level of borrowings, lessee corporations 
hoped to project their operations as not being unduly burdened by debts and hoped 
further that enhanced profits would provide them with the means to pare these down. 
Whilst they are aware of the risks they would be taking, they have unfortunately 
deprived their other creditors and investors with the same platform to decide on their 
own.[34] 
 
It has been estimated that, ‘…companies in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index, 
off balance sheet operating lease commitments, as revealed in the footnotes to their 
financial statements, total US $4,482 billion’.[35] The rationale for this upsurge in the 
use of operating leases is that besides boosting returns on assets, it lowers the 
conventional way of reporting debts. Investors have also argued that the 90% test 
drove the structuring of these deals and ignore economic realities; and above all 
FASB 13 amounted to all rules and no principles thus making it easier to manipulate 
even its apparent strict exceptions and criteria.[36]  
 
Over the last few years, however, the leasing industry market penetration of business 
investment in equipment has remained stagnant at around 31%. The leasing market 
apparently has been constrained by a ‘…lack of consistent guidelines and changes 
under SOA and the 2004 Tax Act’.[37] The SEC apparently does not share this view 
because of the sizeable treatment of this form of debt only as footnote items. It is 
                                                 
[34] MacDonald, supra note 29 (c ) 
[35] Arizona Real Estate, ‘Help U Sell Valley Wide: FASB 13 Operating Lease’, 
http://executivecaliber.ws/sys-tmpl/fasb13operatinglease, viewed on 25/04/2005 
[36] ibid 
[37] Neumann, D. P., ‘US: Market Review’, in Lisa, P. (ed.) ‘World Leasing Yearbook’, Euromoney: 
Essex, 2006, 486; Giroux, supra note. Giroux cited a 2005 SEC report, which estimated that some 63% 
of all listed companies used operating leases and some 22% used capital leases. The estimate for 
operating lease commitments for all listed companies was US$ 1.25 trillion. 
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making plans to require operating leases to be reported as on balance sheet items by 
2008 or 2009. 
 
Factoring 
In factoring, a company can borrow as much as 80% of the face value of its 
receivables from the lending institution (or the ’factor’) thereby receiving its fund in 
advance. A factor’s fee will be levied in addition to the interest charged on the loan 
amount taken. The amount used can be large as exemplified by Mattel’s disposal of 
some US$ 400 million of its receivables under factoring arrangements in 2004. 
Factoring may be conducted with recourse, which means that the lending institution 
can look to the borrower for payment should the latter’s customers default on their 
obligations. Alternatively, it may be arranged without recourse, in which case the 
lending institution will have to assume the risks of bad-debt losses. Generally, the 
former is considered as one of the earlier form of OBF because receivables and 
liabilities are eliminated from the balance sheet, and at best the contingent liability is 
disclosed only as notes to the financial statements. Some companies have made 
abusive use of this loophole in financial reporting resulting in various untoward 
consequences.[38] 
 
Weak market conditions and the pressure to meet up to capital market expectations 
sometimes caused listed corporations to factor away their receivables (debtors) 
                                                 
[38] (a) Berk, J. & DeMarzo, P., ‘Corporate Finance’, Pearson: Boston, 2007; (b) Naser, K. H. M., 
‘Creative Financial Accounting: Its Nature and Use’, Prentice Hall International (UK) Limited: 
Hertfordshire, 1993; (c) Jackson, C. W., ‘Business Fairy Tales’, Thomson: Mason, 2006. Jackson here 
provided some details on how Al Dunlap artificially boost Sunbeam’s income through the controversial 
‘bill and hold sales policy and subsequently liquidated the associated receivables through without 
recourse factoring with a wholly owned subsidiary. This later required a restatement of Sunbeam’s 
financials because of sales and profit overstatements of US$ 95 million and US$ 71 million 
respectively. Dunlap had to settle personally in the shareholder class-action fraud lawsuit brought 
against Sunbeam. Additionally, he paid a penalty fine to the SEC and agreed to a permanent ban from 
serving as a director of quoted companies.  
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without adequate disclosures in order to jack up their sales.  This was witnessed in 
one such US listed company, which resorted to this in the wake of weak market 
conditions and the production of unsuitable products.[39] This caused revenue and 
profitability to be respectively overstated by US $42.1 million and US $17.6 million. 
Apart from filing the necessary restatements of its financial statements, the 
corporation also reached settlements with the SEC. In the administrative proceedings, 
the Corporation’s President, Controller and Vice-President of Finance, and Director of 
Distributor Sales agree to a cease-and-desist order.[40] 
 
Securitisations and the Use of Special-Purpose Vehicles/Enterprises (SPVs/SPEs) 
SPEs are business entities devised to perform specific or limited undertakings. The 
initiator or sponsor can create SPEs as partnerships, trusts, or business corporations. 
The basic form will entail the transfer of assets by the sponsoring company to the 
SPEs. The SPEs will reimburse the sponsoring company with cash invested by 
investors or lenders, and convey to the latter asset-backed securities.  
 
Securitisations provide the sponsoring corporations with a much cheaper source of 
credit compared to direct borrowings principally because of the presence of well-
defined streams of cash flows available in the SPEs for the investors. Another good 
reason for the use of SPEs is the assistance they give for the minimisation of tax 
liabilities of the sponsoring corporations. Good examples of these are synthetic leases, 
which allow the sponsoring corporations to treat them as operating leases for financial 
reporting and capital leases for tax purposes.[41] 
                                                 
[39] Maremont, M., ‘Blind Ambition’, Business Week, 23/10/1995, 78-92 
[40] Plunkett, L. M. & Rouse, R. W., ‘Revenue Recognition and the Bausch and the Lomb Case’, The 
CPA Journal, September 1998 
[41] (a) Revsine et al, supra note 22 (a), 660; (b) Hartgraves, A. L. & Bentson, G. L., ‘The Evolving 
Accounting Standards for SPEs and Consolidations’, Accounting Horizons, September 2002, 242-258; 
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Some sponsoring companies like the use of SPEs as it allows them to enjoy off 
balance sheet debt liabilities. Technically, it is not appropriate as most SPEs are 
normally directed and control by the sponsoring companies even though they do not 
hold majority equity interests. Besides, the financial risks assumed in the form of 
guarantees provide further grounds for the presence of such debt liabilities on the 
sponsoring corporations’ balance sheet. Increasingly, corporations will also need to 
exercise more caution in the use of SPEs as tax avoidance vehicles less they become 
embroiled in tax frauds controversies as experienced by some.[42] 
 
In response to the various corporate scandals in 2002, the FASB will now classify 
certain SPEs as ‘variable interest entities (VIEs)’ where their total capital at risk is 
insufficient to finance their operations (usually less than 10% of assets) or where they 
lack the ability to make decisions, the obligation to absorb losses, or the right to 
receive returns. In such cases, the VIE has to be consolidated with the entity which 
has the ability to make decisions, obligation to absorb losses, and the right to receive 
returns. This immediately dismisses the advantage of VIEs as financial window-
dressing devices.[43] This appears to be a direct regulatory response to constrain the 
manipulative use of SPEs.[44] Still, there appears to be some room for manoeuvrability 
as the bright line threshold of 10% need not be observed where the SPEs can show 
evidence that they can fund their activities without additional subordinated financial 
                                                                                                                                            
Kendall, T. K. & Fishman, M. J. (eds.), ‘A Primer on Securitization’, MIT: Boston, 1998; Norton, J.J., 
Spellman, P. R. & Dupler, M. S. (eds.), ‘International Asset Securitisation’, LLP: London, 1995 
[42] Teather, D., ‘KPMG Tries to Head off Tax Shelters’ Prosecution’, The Guardian, 17/06/2005 
[43] (a) supra note 29 (b), 144-150; (b) FASB Proposed Interpretation No. 46 (FIN 46) ‘Consolidation of 
Certain SPEs’, 28/06/2002, updated as FIN (46R) in December 2003; Schwartz, S. L., ‘Enron and the 
Use and Abuse of SPEs in Corporate Structures’, University of Cincinnati Law Review, 2002, Vol. 70, 
1309-1318; Dharan, B. G., ‘Financial Engineering with SPEs’, in Julia, B. (ed.), ‘Enron Meltdown: 
Facts, Analysis, and Recommendations’, Commerce Clearing House: Houston, Fall 2002 
[44]Hartgraves, A. L. & Benston, G. J., ‘The Evolving Accounting Standards for Special Purpose 
Entities and Consolidations’, Accounting Horizon, Vol. 16 (3), September 2002, 245-258 
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assistance; or their equity levels are as large as other similar businesses; and their 
equities are greater than estimated projected losses.[45] 
 
There were varying responses to the new ruling. Most large corporations voluntarily 
consolidated their SPEs’ debts.[46] Sampra Energy, the parent of California Utility San 
Diego Gas and Electric was one such good example.[47] The PNC Financial Group 
had to be compelled by the Federal Reserve Board to do so.[48] Homebuilder, 
Hovnanian Enterprises viewed the new rules as not so suitable for the homebuilding 
industry involving land and lot options. It could perhaps turn to the use of 
‘unconsolidated qualifying special purpose entities (QSPEs)’ as alternative VIEs to 
avoid the formal reporting of OBF, as is currently being pursued by Dell and others. 
The QSPE mechanism needs an independent, financially solvent entity with absolute 
control over the acquired assets. Such transfers are treated as sales to independent 
parties, resulting in the removal of the assets from the balance sheet and recognition 
of a gain or loss on sale.[49] 
 
Apart from corporations making financial restatements in order to account for their 
financial links with SPEs initiated by them, banks and financial institutions and others 
who were implicated for their roles have owned up to their indiscretions. They settled 
with creditors and shareholders class-action lawsuits brought against them. Citigroup 
agreed to pay respectively US $2 billion and US $2.58 billion to former shareholders 
of Enron and WorldCom for its role in helping these corporations disguise various 
debts through the use of SPEs and other off balance sheet devices. The financial 
                                                 
[45] FASB, supra note 43 (b) 
[46] Reason, T., ‘All in the Family: Fin 46 Made Companies Admit Paternity of Special Purpose 
Entities: But it also Resulted in Some Surprise Adoptions’, CFO, September 2004 
[47] ibid 
[48] Brown, K., ‘Creative Accounting: Four Areas to Buff Up a Company’s Picture’, WSJ, 21/02/2002, 
1-4 
[49] Wild, J. et al., ‘Financial Statement Analysis’, 9th edition, McGraw-Hill: Boston, 2007, 150-156 
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conglomerate does not regard such settlements as an admission of any legal wrong. 
The settlement decisions were taken ‘solely to eliminate the uncertainties, burden and 
expense of further protracted litigation’.[50] 
 
Other banks and financial intermediaries are facing similar lawsuits from disgruntled 
shareholders and secured creditors for their involvements in similar and other cases 
also involving the use of SPEs or other off balance sheet device. These include JP 
Morgan Chase, Barclays PLC, Credit Suisse First Boston, Merrill Lynch & Co., 
Toronto Dominion Bank, Royal Bank of Canada, Deutsche Bank AG and the Royal 
Bank of Scotland.[51] Future problems appear to be lurking in the horizons because of 
the exceptions provided under the 10% equity threshold. Much depends on the 
manner corporations approached these exceptions as these can be manipulated into 




Corporations, financial institutions, pension and mutual funds, and governmental units 
are the end-users for derivatives whilst large international banks, securities houses, 
and some insurance companies and corporations with sound credit ratings are the 
dealers. For the most part, users employ derivatives to manage their interest rate and 
currency exchange exposures. Although there are large numbers of derivatives users 
and dealers, some six banks or so account for something like 83 per cent of the 
market. This rather high level of market concentration is attributed to the necessity of 
                                                 
[50] Bruno, J.B., ‘Enron Scandal: Citigroup Settles for $2 Million’, available at  
http://www.TheMiamiHerald.com,  viewed on 11/06/2005, 2 
[51] ibid 
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having complex risks managements system and the rationale to limit counterparty 
exposures.[52] 
 
Derivatives are said to provide good benefits to end-users in terms of risk 
management, yield enhancement, costs, and portfolio diversification. Risks arising 
from substantial variation of interest and exchange rate or commodity prices are more 
efficiently managed through derivatives. Many professional fund managers also find 
it economical to trade in derivatives besides getting the opportunities to reap higher 
returns in the derivative market than in the cash market. The opportunities for 
bringing down funding costs are also available from derivatives like cash swaps. 
 
Through derivatives like share index futures, corporations can enjoy the benefit of 
capital portfolio diversification more economically. Besides these, takeover bids by an 
offeror can be made more attractive through equity derivatives in mergers and 
acquisitions. Apart from functioning as financial instruments, derivatives do assist in 
the deepening of the financial and capital infrastructure of an economy. Finally, 
derivatives help generate useful price information. This is particularly useful for 
determining the values of the underlying instruments and commodities.[53] 
 
High returns are normally associated with high risks. One view has it that the risks 
associated with the use of derivatives are no different from the other more traditional 
financial instruments. It is claimed here that, ‘Derivatives help to manage risks in new 
ways—an important economic function. Yet the risks involved in derivative activities 
                                                 
[52] Walker, G. A., ‘Financial Derivatives-Global Regulatory Developments’, Journal of Business Law, 
66 January 1996, 50 
[53] Fox-Andrew, M. & Meaden, N., ‘Derivatives Markets and Investments Management’, Prentice-
Hall: NJ, 1995, 18 
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are neither new nor unique. They are the same kind of risks found in traditional 
financial products: market, credit, legal and operational risks’.[54] 
 
Market risk is normally associated with the business in which a corporation acts or in 
which a financial instrument is traded. Such changes in market conditions may cause 
a precipitation in the value of a derivative contract. Market risk is multiplied many 
folds where the leverage embedded in the derivative contract is enhanced. Proctor & 
Gamble (P&G) tried to lower funding costs by entering into a leveraged swap with 
Bankers Trust, but instead lost some US $157 million when interest rate rose in the 
United States.[55]  
 
Excessive leverage and adverse interest rate gyrations coming together can cause 
crippling losses as happened to the Orange County in the US. The county found it 
convenient and easy to reap huge gains from the leveraging of its investment fund on 
bonds. Unfortunately, it borrowed beyond its pool of financial assets. It incurred 
heavy losses of some US $1.5 billion when interest rate rose. Investment houses 
liquidating their collaterals exacerbated the situation.[56] 
 
Market risks also cover rollover, liquidity, and funding risks. Metallgesellschaft 
A.G.’s subsidiary MG Refining and Marketing (MRM) hedged against rising energy 
prices with short-term energy futures and over-the-counter swaps. This implied that it 
had to roll forward its contracts continuously to safeguard its position, and this it 
could achieve when spot prices were better than futures prices. As it transpired, the 
sharp fall in energy prices compelled MRM to post very high margins. When it 
                                                 
[54] Walker, supra note 52 
[55] Waldman, A.R., ‘OTC Derivatives and Systemic Risks: Innovations Finance or the Dance Into the 
Abyss’, The American Law Review, 43, 1994, 1023-1040 
[56] Crawford, G. & Sen, B., ‘Derivatives for Decision-Makers’, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: West Sussex, 
1996, 136-137 
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eventually had to liquidate its position the losses were so massive that it necessitated a 
US $1.9 billion resuscitating operation by some 15 banks to keep it afloat.[57] 
 
The failure of counterparty to fulfil its contractual obligations can result in a 
corporation sustaining heavy losses. This is usually referred to as credit risk. The 
credit exposure risk in derivatives is dynamic in comparison to that of traditional 
loans, which are static. Credit risk for exchange-traded derivatives like futures 
contracts is minimal because clearinghouses guarantee the performance of 
transactions. Likewise, as the counterparties to most over-the-counter (OTC) 
derivatives have good credit ratings, the risk of default is minor. This makes credit 
risk amount to only two to four percent of the notional amount.[58] Still defaults 
resulting from the insolvencies of counterparties do occur as exemplified in the 
collapse of investment bank Drexel Burnham Lambert.[59]  
 
The risk of losses emerging from faulty systems, controls and other human errors are 
referred to as operational risk. The classic example of this is when managers can 
conceal losses from unauthorised trading due to the lack of internal controls and 
supervision. This indeed was how Barings Futures Singapore caused the downfall of 
Barings Plc.[60] 
 
The risks of losses emerging from the non-enforceability of derivatives contracts are 
referred to as legal risks. The risk comes into being when it is held by the judiciary 
that a specified derivative transactions bear features that will not justify legal 
                                                 
[57] Edwards, F. R. & Canter, M.S., ‘The Collapse of Metallgellsellchant: Unhedgeable Risks, Poor 
Hedging Strategy, or Just Bad Luck’, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 87, 1995, 86 
[58] Waldman, supra note 55, 1032 
[59] Das, S., ‘Swaps and Financial Derivatives’, 2nd edition, Law Book Company: Sydney, 1994, 1150 
[60] Brown, C., ‘Report of the Board of Banking Supervision’s Inquiry Into The Circumstances of the 
Collapse of Barings’, JIBL 10, 1995, 446-450. The report held that the most glaring failing was the 
freedom given to Leeson to manage both the front and back office. 
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protection.[61] This could be due to these transactions being against public policy, lack 
of legal capacity on the part of the counter-party or infringements of local gaming and 
wagering laws. Hence, legal risks associated with derivatives are far greater than other 
financial transactions due to the uncertainty it posed to the existing legal framework. 
Legal risks are normally classified as; jurisdictional risk (like the netting provisions 
contravening local insolvency laws); counterparty risk (like when counterparties lack 
capacities); or as selling risks (like arising from the misrepresentation of the benefits 
of transaction by intermediaries). 
 
The effect of the failure of one institution may have on another or the entire financial 
system is commonly referred to as systemic risk. This can be effected through the 
domino effect of the failure of one institution on others or through the widespread 
reliance on continuous hedging strategies in the midst of market disturbance turning 
into an illiquidity-driven disaster. The risks of such contagious disorders have 
prompted international regulatory co-ordination of not only derivatives transactions 
but also other banking and securities transactions.[62] The scale and opaqueness of 
derivatives transactions and the illiquidity of customised OTC transactions bring 
about the concern of systemic risk over derivatives. 
 
In the context of the above general risk types, concerns have also been raised that 
derivatives are far more risky and difficult to manage. ‘These general types (credit, 
market, legal and operational) of risks exist for many financial activities, but the 
specific risks in derivatives are relatively difficult to manage, in part, because of the 
                                                 
[61] Samuelson, C.A., ‘The Fall of Barings: Lessons for Legal Oversight of Derivatives Transactions in 
the US’, Cornell International Law Journal 29, 1996, 767-781 
[62] Dale, R., ‘Derivatives: The New Regulatory Challenge’, JIBL 10, 1995, 11-12 
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complexity of some of these products and the difficulties in measuring these risks’.[63] 
On balance, it would appear that the far greater complexities and higher leverage of 
derivatives magnify the various risks featured in derivatives, and helps explain the 
massive losses borne by end-users. 
 
However, by themselves, financial derivatives are neutral and not necessarily 
inherently good or bad. Much depends on the objectives of their employment and how 
they are actually used. Derivatives can provide corporations with an extremely 
powerful instrument for sharing and shifting risk, including the means for transferring 
money off balance sheet to hide the real extent of their financial obligations. 
Institutions, which had the misfortune of mishandling the use of derivatives, have 
found these to be overwhelmingly costly. As mentioned earlier, this was painfully 
experienced by the Orange County in California, which went nearly bankrupt on 
account of them; and Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), which had to be 
rescued by the Federal Reserve Board.[64] 
 
Where LTCM was concerned, it was a hedge fund. It traded in swaps and equity 
volatility. It was operated by experienced Wall Street traders, and had two 1997 
Nobel laureates on financial economics in its partnership. Against a capital base of US 
$4 billion, it had massive derivative contracts of about US$ 125 billion. The value of 
the underlying assets against which the instruments were based was even much larger. 
Its capital base was alarmingly inadequate to provide the insurance the markets 
needed. It could transfer risks but was not able to extinguish them. It was speculating 
                                                 
[63] GAO Report, ‘Financial Derivatives: Actions Needed to Protect the Financial System’, US General 
Accounting Office, May 1994, 9 
[64] Kay, J., ‘The Truth About Markets: Why Some Nations are Rich But Most Remain Poor’, Penguin 
Books: London, 2004, 227-228 
 120
that the price of the insurance the fund was selling would fall adequately fast enough 
for it to buy back with a profit.[65] 
 
As it turned out, things went horribly wrong, and it was pushed to the brink of 
bankruptcy. It would have fallen that way if not for the support of the New York 
Federal Reserve Board. The Board acted out of concern over the systemic effect the 
colossal collapse would have on the entire financial system. This scarred the 
derivative business considerably as it was supposed to be managed by experts, and led 
to massive public outcry over the destructive nature of derivatives.[66] 
 
As seen in the Barings debacle, derivative contracts can be problematic for banks if 
they engage in complex derivative contracts they do not fully understand, buy too 
much of one type of investment, or buy them out of greed.[67] It must be emphasised, 
however, that certain derivatives are prudent and necessary for the banking system as 
it seeks to control risks. The reason for the derivatives market becoming so colossal is 
not because of slick sales campaign by dealers but rather because of their provision of 
economic value to their users. They contribute significantly to portfolio management 
by enabling pension funds and other institutional investors to hedge and adjust 
positions quickly and economically.[68]  
 
Nonetheless, unfamiliarity with the risks derivatives can generate very painful 
experience. The US $7.5 billion Orange County Investment Pool (OCIP) in Southern 
                                                 
[65] Kay, supra note 64 
[66] Lowenstein, R., ‘When Genius Failed: The Rise and Fall of LTCM’, Random House: London, 
2000, 40-48 
[67] Rodger, S., ‘Derivatives Good or Bad’, Savings and Community Banker, September 1994, 40-48; 
Landes, D., ‘Dynasties: Fortune and Misfortune in the World’s Great Family Businesses’, Penguin 
Group: London, 2006, 34-37. This study claimed that unlike 1890 when BB was rescued by the Bank 
of England and concerted efforts of all family members, on this occasion no similar efforts were made 
because of the relative larger size of the liabilities, the improbable contagion effect, and the absence of 
family enthusiasm as the bank’s equity was no longer dominated by family members. 
[68] Alan Greenspan, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank Testimony Before Congress on 19/05/1998 
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California announced in December 1, 1999 US $1.6 billion losses due to a highly 
speculative bet on interest-rate derivatives. Its investment manager, Robert Citron had 
with the help of various sales people from Merrill, CSFB, Stanley and Nomura 
leveraged the fund to the equivalent of US $21 billion and speculating on the belief 
that interest rates would continue downwards as they did throughout the latter 1980s 
and early 1990s. Initially, the fund achieved above average returns.  
 
This turned horribly sour when the Federal Reserve raised rates from February 1994 
onwards; but OCIP as a municipal investment fund was not a marked-to-market 
vehicle and did not have to reflect its losses on a daily basis until way too late. Orange 
County sued Merrill for the selling of risky securities in violation of state and 
securities laws. Merrill and others who were involved initially denied wrongdoings 
but chose to settle out of court later with US $437 million. Citron pleaded guilty to six 
felony accounts for making misleading statements in marketing securities, 
falsification of accounting records and redirecting investment funds. 
 
As a final note, it has been claimed that the value of derivatives is not an imaginary 
notion. In a global market environment driven as it is by constant and changing 
market risks; instantaneous information relays; and immensely advanced technology; 
derivatives are essentials. They have acquired the distinction of becoming 
indispensable in the management of risk and is therefore of great importance to 
national economies and indeed the global economy.[69] 
 
                                                 
[69] Melamed, L., ‘Keeping Risk on Track’, Futures Industry, December 1994, 11-17; Cowell, F., ‘Risk 
Management for Derivatives’, Derivatives Use, Trading and Regulation Vol. 12 No. 3 2006, 228-243. 
This article demonstrates how derivatives risk can be measured, managed, and where necessary, 
controlled, 
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Management Options Backdating 
Options backdating is a form of financial manipulation, which affects shareholders’ 
interest adversely. It involves the backdating of the option price for management 
option shares to an advantageously low point relative to higher market prices, such 
that the exerciser will definitely gain from exercising the share option. A celebrated 
research detected their widespread employment in the US capital market in 2005. This 
research finding was subsequently communicated to the SEC which led to the 
beginnings of further probes of significant numbers of corporations, at first confined 
to those in the Silicon Valley, but later extended to other more traditional 
businesses[70].  
 
Another recent study estimated that the average loss to shareholders was about 8% or 
about US $500 million per firm of those implicated in the scandal.[71] The extent of 
grant manipulation was found across 1150 firms or 12% of the firms examined for the 
period 1996-2005.[72] The SEC and the Justice Department is still in the process of 
investigating on this option scandal. So far, no less than sixty top executives inclusive 
of many CEOs have resigned over this alleged corporate wrongdoing.[73] The issue is 
one of lack of transparency or the non-disclosure of financial schemes, which have 
significant impact on shareholders’ equity interests. 
 
 
                                                 
[70] Lies, E., ‘On the Timing of CEO Stock Options Awards’, Management Science 51, 2005, 802-812 
[71] Naranan, et al., ‘The Economic Impact of Backdating of Executive Stock Options’, Michigan Law 
Review forthcoming. 
[72] Bebchuk, L et al., ‘Lucky CEOs’, Harvard Law School Research Project in conjunction with the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, available at http://www.law.harvard.edu, 16/11/2006 
[73] Bawden, T., ‘American Economy Under Threat from Notes on A Scandal’, The Times, 09/12/2006, 
66. The article referred to the dismissal of the highly celebrated and successful CEO of the United 
Health Group, namely William McGuire who agreed to forfeit a combined US $390 million in stock 
option compensation. 
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The UK Position 
 
Investment banks and the corporate banking units of commercial banks are mainly 
responsible for the marketing of OBF schemes to corporations here. Due to the 
controversial nature of such schemes, they are usually not explicit and less transparent 
than the other more traditional forms of financing. The suppliers of OBF are 
motivated by their sales and profit objectives, whilst the users seek financing cost 
efficiency and liquidity enhancement; or simply to avoid breaching their borrowing 
limits.  In practice, OBF providers usually target corporations with cash flow 
pressures or involved in takeover bids, as they are perceived to be more attracted to 
the general opaque nature of some OBF schemes. 
 
Earnings Exaggeration via Consignment Reporting and Others. 
Vehicles distributors use the consignment sales technique (CST) to effect OBF. The 
CST will involve the dealers paying the manufacturers only upon the sales of the 
vehicles involved and not upon delivery. In reality of course, the dealers are getting 
commercial loans from the manufacturers without having to capture them in their 
balance sheets. A variation of the CST is a form of synthetic sales arrangement (SSA), 
commonly used in businesses where the work in progress inventories take time to 
mature and where there is an overhang of over-supply, which deters financing from 
the traditional banking sector. Whisky distillations and wine production are good 
examples of these. Quite obviously, the finance companies are not interested in taking 
hold or delivery of such stocks and have their minds focus purely on the financial 
arrangements. This is solved by the provision of a buy-back clause or a repurchase 
option at future specified dates. Similarly, instead of excluding the assets and 
liabilities involved from their balance sheet, construction businesses for instance can 
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also elect to effect assignment of work in progress (AWIP) schemes, which may take 
a few years to complete. Such AWIP schemes are commonly structured to eliminate 
the companies’ obligations to pay the financiers direct. This means that they will not 
have to report this source of funding in their balance sheet; other than the disclosure 
of contingent liabilities by way of notes to the accounts.[74]  
 
Redeemable Preference Shares and Special Purpose Enterprises/Vehicles 
The CST, SSA and AWIP approach to OBF involves the tangible aspect of 
borrowing. There are two other versions of OBF, which serve nothing more than as 
synthetic devices to access funding without proper disclosure. This involves the issue 
of redeemable preference share mechanism (RPS) by subsidiary entities to financial 
institutions to secure borrowings for their parent corporations. The fixed dividends are 
usually set in accordance with the desired financial charges of these fund providers.  
Whilst the subsidiaries will have to account for this RPS, the parent company will 
need only to reflect these in its group accounts as minority interest. Since the normal 
focus of investors and creditors is normally on the subsidiaries, the parent company is 
able to assume borrowings without having to disclose it adequately. The more 
aggressive versions of using subsidiaries for the raising of funds are via the SPEs. As 
discussed earlier such business entities have the features of subsidiaries other than in 
name. Aside from the equity threshold criterion, the current principle is effected 
through the direction and control test irrespective of board composition.[75]  
 
These earlier styles of circumventing the law where recognition of subsidiaries is 
concerned have over the years become more sophisticated and harder to detect. To 
                                                 
[74] Griffiths, I., ‘New Creative Accounting’, Macmillan: London, 1995, 121-147 
[75] Griffiths, supra note 74 
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pursue the same objective of not wishing to recognise business entities as subsidiaries, 
various more complex capitalisation structures and cross-shareholdings are used. 
These are usually far more difficult to decipher. The off balance sheet funding source 
is often relayed across the group structure through the off loading of current or fixed 
assets to financial institutions for cash.  
 
Though there is nothing illegal about these transactions, the sponsoring companies are 
able to do as they pleased with the funds so obtained.  Minority investors and other 
creditors will not be able to follow what these sponsoring companies are really using 
the money raised for. For instance, the MG Rover Group collapsed in 2005 despite 
receiving a resuscitation fund of £2 billion from the previous main shareholder. It is 
now under investigations by both accounting and financial regulators for alleged 
accounting irregularities through a complex corporate holding structure. Similarly, 
Farepak, a subsidiary of a financial services parent corporation became close to 
liquidation in 2006 despite apparently receiving full cash collections from its 
customers without the equivalent delivery of goods to its clientele nor its suppliers 
paid, implying diversion of its cash collections to unrelated business purpose. It was 
restructured in a rescue operation led by a friendly party. 
 
Despite the adverse case examples, the proper use of SPVs for securitisation, ‘…is 
regarded as beneficial to the financial system, because it permits banks and other 
financial institutions to focus on those aspects of the lending process where they have 
a competitive edge. Some, for example, have a greater advantage in originating loans 
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Like the US, various corporations particularly in the travel and leisure industries in 
the UK are also using leasing as an OBF device. Similarly, the difficulties have 
always been the manner in which operating leases are distinguished from financial 
leases. Again, many of these arrangements are shrouded in vague terms and 
conditions, which will not require them to be categorised as the latter. In line with 
IAS 17 most UK property corporations would have to restate some of their buildings 
from operating leases to finance leases, especially those with long lease terms or sales 
and leaseback arrangements commonly used by supermarkets.[77] Conversion from 
operating to finance lease is likely to cause some adverse impact on most of these 
supermarkets’ reported earnings. The UK penetration rate of the leasing industry at 
around 13.8% is far lower than that in the US. Guided by IAS 17 and FRS 5, lease 
accounting rules in the UK appears to be less cumbersome. This should facilitate the 





                                                 
[76] (a) Arnold, G., ‘Corporate Financial Management’, 3rd edition, Pearson Education Ltd.: Essex, 
2005, 559. An examples cited here was Everton’s securitisation of its future sales tickets; (b) Shea, S., 
‘New Rules Promise Smoother Passage for Securitisations’, Financial Times, 11/01/2007, 10. Under 
new tax provisions, the financing process will be simplified significantly. 
[77] (a) Pickard, J., ‘Leases Left Hanging in the Balance: New International Standards on Property Will 
Have Serious Effect on Company Accounts’, Financial Times, 12/11/2004, 30; (b) Beattie, V., 
Goodacre, A. & Thomson, S., ‘Recognition versus Disclosure: An Investigation of the Impact on 
Equity Risk Using UK Operating Lease Disclosures’, Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 
27(9) & (10), Nov/Dec. 2000, 1185-1196. This empirical study found that investors/analysts in the UK 
do appear to recognise operating lease liabilities in their assessment of equity risk. 
[78] Paul, L. (ed.), ‘World Leasing Yearbook’, Euromoney: Essex, 2006,  441-449 
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Factoring 
Expanding sales and debtor balances enhances the use of factoring for clearing bank  
subsidiaries like Alex Lawrie of Lloyds TSB and HSBC Invoice Finance.[79] Though 
not necessary appropriate for every business, factoring can prove to be crucial to those 
facing depressive market conditions.[80] 
 
The scandalous use of OBF by some prominent corporations in the late 1980s led to 
the introduction of FRS 5 in 1994 to tackle the problem head-on. This financial 
standard basically requires corporations to report on the substance of their 
transactions so as reflect upon the commercial realities of their transactions. This it 
was thought would discourage the widespread dishonourable use of OBF. The fact 
that now and then corporations and tax consultants have been cautioned over their 
aggressive use of OBF or OBF related activities serve to indicate that it is still being 
kept in practice by various corporations.  
 
Pension Financial Reporting 
One variant form of off balance sheet accounting, which is causing major concerns to 
regulators and corporation, is pension liabilities. This is already a huge problem in the 
US especially for global airline and global car-making corporations. Over here in the 
UK, the issue is gathering immense concern especially in the context of mergers and 
acquisitions activities. For instance, when Marconi sold its core business to Siemens, 
its pension scheme reported a deficit of £109 million under IFRS accounting rules. 
This masked the true deficit significantly. The Pension Regulator only allowed the 
transaction to go through after Marconi injected £185 million into the scheme and put 
                                                 
[79] Arnold, supra note 76, 594 
[80] Byrne, F., ‘Vital Factor in Surviving Slump for SMEs: Invoice Discounting is Increasingly Used to 
Help Survive Cash Flow Problems’, Financial Times, 24/01/2002,12 
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aside a further £675 million into an escrow account. According to some financial 
experts, this is still inadequate as the deficit is estimated to be closer to £2 billion. It 
appears probable that the Pension Regulator preferred the scenario of a degree of 
under-funding compared to one where definitely the Marconi’s core business will 
become insolvent.[81]  
 
It is difficult for corporations to evade their pension commitments as UK rules require 
employers to formulate plans ‘…to fill deficit schemes within 10 years, may not roll 
up a pension scheme unless there is enough money in it to transfer the payment of 
benefits to an insurer, and cannot increase debt or reduce assets without running the 
risk that the UK’s Pension Regulator will seek to recoup from company directors 
personally any shortfalls to the Scheme’.[82] To get round the pension liability 
problem, corporations either close their scheme to new employees or owned up to the 
risks that pension schemes faced and transfer these to the capital markets in 
securitised, derivatised and raw form as a hedging exercise.[83]  
 
Pension accounting controversy arises from the difference between ‘accounting 
deficit’ and ‘buy-out deficit’. The former refers to the deficit estimated under UK’s 
FRS 17 accounting rules using a discount rate equivalent to that of long-term gilts; 
whilst the latter refers to the size of the deficit a corporation would need to cover if it 
plans to convince an insurance company to get it off its hands, and uses a discount 
                                                 
[81] Cohen, N., ‘A Riddle Wrapped in a Mystery’, available at http://www.FT.com, 29/11/2006, 2; Selb, 
C., ‘Pensions Watchdog to Tackle Firms that Shift Liabilities’, The Times, 09/10,2006, 42. The 
Pensions Regulator warned corporations that it is monitoring those which transfer pension liabilities to 
‘special purpose vehicles’. Deloitte found that the total deficit for final-salary pension plans for all UK 
companies is about £100 billion, with many struggling to pay off this deficit over the next 10 years 
despite increased contribution of around £20 billion. 
[82] Cohen, N., ‘Headache or Opportunity?’, available at http://www.FT.com, 29/11/2006, 1 
[83] ibid 
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rate at least 50 basis points lower than that used by the former. This means that 
accounting deficits are usually about 70% of the buy-out deficit, but problematically 
for financial report users and the UK Pension Protection Fund (PPF), the former does 
not appear in corporate accounts.[84] 
 
Comparative Analysis of OBF Applications in the UK and the US 
 
 
OBF financial scandals in the capital market in the U.K. and the US are probably the 
product of self-deception, excessive greed, and weak regulatory supervision.  
The tools or mechanisms for their coming into being in the early nineteenth century 
were crude and involved the deliberate omission or distortion of financial data in 
financial reporting. The authorities responded with the introduction of more 
transparent reporting obligations through changes in corporate laws and accounting 
standards.[85] 
 
In the 1960s through to the 1970s, creative accounting was used to enhance corporate 
ability to raise cheaper sources of funds from multiple sources or achieve positive 
window-dressing of their financial health. This was not to be enough as the need to 
improve upon the financial image of corporations became close to necessity when 
management of corporations began to be compensated with incentive-based 
employees’ stock options plans (ESOPs). Again greed and blind ambition began to 
take hold, as these high value stock options became very powerful incentives to 
                                                 
[84] Cohen, supra note 81: (b) Blake, D., Cotter, J. & Dowd, K., ‘Financial Risks and the Pension 
Protection Fund: Can it Survive Them?’, Pensions, 2007, Vol. 12 (3), 109-130 , (c) Blake, D., ‘Pnsion 
Finance’, John Wiley & Sons Limited: West Sussex, 2007 
[85] The US responded primarily through the 1933 and 1934 SEA, and the UK through the CA 1989 and 
updated FRS 5 in April 1994 
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artificially project earnings growth.[86] The UK and US authorities in the wake of 
these bad financial habits responded with stronger accounting policy measures.[87] 
 
Aggressive accounting then took on a new face. Constrained to some extent by more 
vigilant policing by the regulatory authorities corporate executives had to seek new 
and better ways of achieving this. Coincidentally, at this time, investment banks were 
also looking for avenues to achieve higher growth and profitability. Recognising the 
needs of their corporate clientele, they embark on aggressive moves to expand on this 
market niche. To attract corporate users, which required cheap sources of funds 
without breaching borrowing limits, many investment houses began to introduce OBF 
to the former through various financial instruments.[88] 
 
In its early forms, OBF were less complex. It acquired more sophistication as 
corporations needed to disguise the way they sourced and used their funds.  
With massive profits staring in the eyes of all major participants in the capital market 
in the mid 1990s and fuelled by the massive flow of cheap funds from enthusiastic 
investment bankers, the ‘dotcom’ boom surfaced, ‘…in August 1995, when 
Netscape…went public, and it ended, for all intent and purposes, in April 2000, when 
the NASDAQ crashed. Between those dates, more than three hundred Internet 
companies went public.’[89] In comparison, the UK internet boom mirrored what 
                                                 
[86] Ross, S.A. et al., ‘Corporate Finance’, McGraw-Hill: New York, 1999, 578-582. 
[87] The process in the UK began with the 1998 Dearing Report which culminated in the formulation of 
new reporting obligations. Despite prodding from the SEC and the General Accounting Office over the 
problems created by leasing, pension accounting and the SPEs, the FASB in the US responded only 
with modest efforts in 1990 with guidance for the dealing of SPE accounting and only after the Enron 
debacle through Interpretation Number 46 in 2003 to deal with SPE reporting abuse. 
[88] Berenson, A., ‘The Number: How America’s Balance Sheet Lies Rocked the World’s Financial 
Markets’, Pocket Books: London, 2004, 87-95. The author showed how mergers financed by equities 
and OBF instruments increased merger and related fee incomes for individual institutions. These 
increased from 13% in 1980 to 32% in the 1990s. It was accompanied by many independent financial 
analysts compromising their research output. 
[89] Cassidy, J., ‘Dot.Con: The Real Story of Why the Internet Bubble Burst’, Penguin Books: London, 
2003, X 
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transpired in the US a year or two earlier. In the face of extensive and colossal 
corporate scandals in the US from 2000 to 2001, the US Congress responded with 
very highly prescriptive disclosure rules for OBF instruments; whilst the UK 
responded with Turnbull’s Review Recommendation on risk management 
practices.[90] 
 
Hence, comparatively the US relied on more detailed rules to tackle the indiscretions 
of OBF; whereas the UK appeared to make use of the principles-based approach. Both 
appear to have significant success in their own ways. The fact that the US appears to 
have a far larger share of gigantic financial scandals appears to suggest that the UK 
model is relatively more effective. The US approach appears to be encountering more 
problems, as many corporations were ingenious in finding ways to dodge the 
reporting rules. By contrast, UK corporations encountered more difficulties in 
circumventing FRS 5. Nonetheless, recent controversies of alleged creative 
accounting and OBF usage in MG Rover and so on served to remind investors of the 
risks of opaque transactions and the risks of creative compliance reporting.[91] Despite 
such negative occurrences, OBF continues to grow in sophistication and wider 
application.[92] 
 
Financial reporting in the UK is shaped by shareholders’ rights to information and 
rights to vote to pressure for change. In the US, shareholders’ right to information and 
                                                 
[90] ibid, IX; Chopping, D. & Stephens, M. (eds.), ‘Accounting Standards 2006/2007’, Wolters Kluwer 
(UK) Ltd.: Surrey, 2006, 358-447. The FRS 5 was first issued in April 1994. It has been amended by 
FRS 25 (IAS 29-Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentation) for accounting periods 
commencing on or after January 1, 2005 and by amendments to FRS 26 (IAS 39-Financial Instruments: 
Recognition and Measurement) for accounting periods on or after January 1, 2007.  Its objective is to 
ensure that the commercial effects of corporate transactions are reflected in their financial documents. 
[91] Financial reporting in these corporations was opaque and involved the use of complex SPVs. 
[92] Mankelow, N.., ‘Loan Market Hits Record Volumes’, Finance Week, 13/07/2005, 5, paragraphs 2 
& 3. 
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rights of ownership are limited under many state laws. Federal laws intervened only to 
provide for the disclosure of information for share transactions, and are naturally 
inclined towards earnings analysis. The quarterly earnings emphasis in the US adds 
relatively greater pressures to US corporations than those in the UK. This approach 
contrasts sharply with that in continental Europe where greater emphasis is placed on 
the return to capital analysis. Indeed, ‘A stock may be correctly priced, but legally 
hidden inefficiencies or dubious expenditure may be hidden inside the company with 
damage to shareholders’ interests’.[93] Indeed, OBF’s flexibility for earnings 
manoeuvrability helps to explain the persistent popularity of OBF despite tighter 
reporting rules.  
 
The use of creative accounting in general and OBF in particular may have probably 
contributed significantly to the material rise in financial restatements from January 
1997 to June 2002 in the US. This has been attributed to the declining cost of 
acquiescence for financial gatekeepers (in part due to the decline in legal threats)[94] 
relative to growth in benefits (when corporate management extended incentive 
packages in the form of more consulting portfolios to gatekeepers to nurture better co-
operation). This is said to prompt financial gatekeepers to diminish their desires to 
preserve their ‘reputational capital’. Placed in the increasing competitive environment 
and the weakening market for ‘reputational capital’, they engaged in various 
                                                 
[93] Bush, T., ‘Reporting Rules Fail Corporate US: The American Governance Model Does not Resolve 
the Weakness at the Heart of the System’, Financial Times, 12/07/2005, 8 
[94] This is attributed to the Supreme Court’s decisions in 1991 and 1994 which respectively shortened 
the statute of limitations (Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350 (1991)) 
and eliminated private aiding and abetting liability (Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v First Interstate 
Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994) in securities fraud cases; The Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act of 1995 (that raised pleading standards for securities class actions exceeding that for fraud 
actions in general); and The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (which abolished 
state court class actions alleging securities fraud). 
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undertakings involving conflicts of interest.[95] For those in more serious cases, this 
attracted various legal implications thereafter. For instance, underwriters were found 
to be liable for not establishing due diligence defence under Section 11 of SEA 1933 
in the WorldCom litigation.[96]. 
 
In the meantime, it could be unwise to habitually use OBF for window-dressing as 
this may lead down the financial ‘slippery slope’;[97] and caused those responsible to 
self-deceive that they were acting appropriately and disregard the risks of 
punishment.[98] Indeed, many corporate fraudsters in the UK and more so in the US 
were already people of substantial means and did not set out to perpetuate fraud. 
‘Instead they were tempted to ‘fudge’ time and again, until a mere white lie became 
outright fraud. The ‘choices’ that these individuals made were not choices as we 
commonly think of them, but decisions that were significantly constrained by the 
strong situational pressures that the market and its profit motive exerted’.[99] 
 
Other research have shown that in 1999 alone the SEC took 18 actions alleging that 
the purpose of these corporate frauds was to assist in the meeting of market 
expectations and compensation incentives. This implies that profits management can 
be undertaken within the confines of GAAP and fully disclosed to benefit from the 
                                                 
[95] Coffee, J. C., ‘Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance’, OUP: Oxford, 2006, 
Chapter 9. 
[96] In re WorldCom, Inc. Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The outcome of this case 
has some implications for outside directors as under section 11 of the SEA 1933 they are required to 
conduct reasonable investigation of those portions of the registrations statement not certified by 
experts. 
[97] Ayres, F. L. & Logue, D. E., ‘Risk Management in the Shadow of Enron’, Journal of Business 
Strategy, July/August 2002, 37-40; Kennedy, I. & Grubb, G., ‘Medical Law’, London: Butterworths, 
2000, 1968. The concept of ‘slippery slope’ is popularly used in medical ethics to highlight the risk of 
exposure to subsequent abuses. Similarly, this idea can be used to describe how financial window-
dressing may lull their users with a false sense of security and caused them to act inappropriately. 
[98] Langervoort, D. C., ‘Monitoring: The Behavioural Economics of Corporate Compliance with the 
Law’, 2002 Columbia Business Law Review 71 
[99] Hashbarger, S. & Lois, G. U., ‘Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future 
of Corporate Governance’, Akron Law Review (2007) 40:1, 9 
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flexibility offered by accounting standards or appear in more abusive forms resulting 













































                                                 
[100] Mulford & Comiskey, supra note 17 
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                                                      CHAPTER FOUR 
 




This chapter will commence by examining the nature and management of financial 
risk, and analyse in particular how and why the use or rather the excessive use of OBF 
may enhance such risk. This will be followed by a study of how and why excessive 
use of OBF may also lead to the implication of various kinds of litigation risks for 
corporate directors, auditors, financial advisors, and financial regulators. 
 
The Nature of Financial Risk and Risk Management 
 
 
Risk may be interpreted, ‘…as the possible variation in an outcome from what is 
expected to happen’. It is therefore concerned with variability, expectations of 
specified future events, and is linked to the variation between expected and actual 
outcomes.[1] Risks can appear in the form of pure or downside risk, and speculative or 
two-way risk.[2] The former is concerned with the risk of having events going the 
wrong way thereby causing losses of some kind. Normally such risks are taken care of 
by the purchase of insurance cover. The latter refers to the possibilities of either 
positive or negative outcomes. The usual response to this kind of risk is for 
corporations to put themselves in positions either to take advantage of favourable 
outcomes or minimise against unfavourable outcomes. 
 
Corporations face the risks of sales, profitability and liquidity variations when they 
formulate and implement their business strategies. This is their business risk. Though 
arguments have been raised that higher operating leverage (translated to mean capital-
                                                 
[1] Coyle, B., ‘Risk Awareness and Corporate Governance’.  2nd edition, Financial World Publishing: 
London, 2004, 2 
[2] ibid 
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intensive) corporations are more prone to business risk than labour-intensive 
corporations because of the inflexibility of their higher fixed costs, empirical evidence 
on this matter is inconclusive.[3] Business risks cover such things as product risk, 
macro-economic risk, technology risk, strategy risk and venture or enterprise risk. 
These are all basically two-way risks. It is, however, beyond the scope of this study to 
examine these in-depth but they will be referred to where they contribute to a better 
understanding of the phenomena under investigation. 
 
Financial risk on the other hand refers, ‘…either to a firm’s risk of bankruptcy or to 
the effects of leverage on earnings and stock-price volatility. For a given set of risky 
assets and operations, a firm’s financial risk, under either definition, increases with its 
business risk. A firm’s business risk and financial leverage work in tandem to 
determine the risk of the firm’s equity’.[4] This implies that shareholders need to be 
more mindful not only of the way businesses are run but also the extent borrowings 
have been used. 
 
Financial risk emanates primarily from factors external to the corporation. These 
cover things like credit risk, foreign exchange risk, interest rate risk, market risk, 
commodity risk, liquidity risk, gearing risk and capital adequacy risk. Only the last 
three named are of direct concern to this study. Liquidity risk refers to the risk of not 
being able to fulfil current obligations. Gearing risk refers to the extent of corporate 
borrowings in relation to shareholders’ funds. Capital adequacy funds refer to a bank 
or financial institution’s sufficiency of capital to support the level of its business.  
                                                 
[3] (a) Ogden, J.P., Jen, F. C. & O’Connor, P. F., ‘Advanced Corporate Finance: Policies and 
Strategies’, Essex: Prentice Hall Ltd., 2003, 262; (b) McCormick, R., ‘IBA Working Party on Legal 
Risk’, BJIBFL, Special Supplement, April 2004, Appendix 2, 33. Legal risk here is defined as the risk 
of loss to an institution (or individuals) which is caused primarily by amongst others defective 
transactions (as exemplified by some OBF schemes).  
[4] Ogden, Jen & O’Connor, supra note 3 (a) 
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Often linked to financial risks are operational and event risks. The former refers to the 
negative impact arising from human or technological mistakes because of the 
inadequacy of internal processes and systems. The latter refers to downside risks, 
which are usually very difficult and costly to cover by insurance. These include 
disaster risk, political risk, regulatory risk, reputation risk and litigation risk.[5] This 
study will only cover the analysis of litigation, regulatory and reputational risks. 
 
Since the 1970s, corporations have now become well acquainted with the increased 
volatility associated with wide fluctuations in exchange rates, interest rates, and 
commodity prices. They are now more concerned with the approach and instruments 
to deal with exposure to such risks. It is not that easy to identify the impact such 
volatilities have on a typical corporation. For instance, housing developers will be 
impacted upon very negatively when interest rates go up steeply irrespective of the 
size of their external borrowings. This is because steep interest rates affect the loan 
servicing capacity of house buyers adversely. Indeed, this factor will be of important 
consideration as financial statements on their own may not be able to disclose the 
nature of such risks explicitly.[6] 
 
As business is about the taking of risks, it is not practical or financially prudent to 
insure all kinds of risks. Much of modern day management tasks now include  
management’s obligations and duties to have in place reliable internal control systems 
to prevent fraud and other forms of financial deceptions from happening. Hand in 
hand with this is the focus on operational risks and contingency planning. This has 
now been extended to cover the risks associated with the protection and safeguarding 
                                                 
[5] Coyle, supra note 1, 6-8; Nakajima, C. & Rider, B. A. K., ‘Corporate Governance and Supervision: 
Basel Pillar 2’, in Simon, A. & Rifaat, A. A. K. (eds.), ‘Islamic Finance: The Regulatory Challenge’, 
John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pte. Ltd.: Singapore, 2007, 342-365. 
[6] Smith, C., ‘Managing Financial Risk’, in Joel, M.S. & Chew, D. H. (eds.), ‘The Revolution in 
Corporate Finance’, Blackwell: Oxford, 1998, 283-317 
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of IT systems for the sustained competitiveness of corporations and the avoidance of 
fraud.[7] 
 
Risk management, in particular financial risk management is now increasingly 
regarded as part and parcel of modern day corporate governance principles. 
Corporations now are increasingly required to review annually the systems they have 
in place for the better control and management of risk. Risk models by their nature 
can be very complex, ‘…and can appear to be black boxes to board members who fail 
to keep up with progress in risk methodology. Just as a patient is unlikely to accept 
being operated on with medical technology from the 1960s, so corporations today 
require board members who have a solid grasp of modern risk evaluation and 
management techniques…It is not a matter of board members acquiring an in-depth 
understanding of technical subtleties: it is a matter of leveraging their deep knowledge 
of business to engage in competent risk thinking as required by modern day 
corporation’.[8] In connection with this, it must be emphasised that the use of 
financially innovative instruments used in OBF cut both ways. They can leverage on 
both earnings and losses; depending on their particular nature; the context of their 





                                                 
[7] Thomas, K., ‘A New Era of Accountability’, Financial Times, 10/06/2005, 2-3 
[8] Cossin, D., ‘A Route Through the Hazards of Business’, Financial Times, 10/06/2005, 4-5; Gilligan, 
G., ‘Managing Risk in Financial Services Contexts’, The Company Lawyer Vol. 26 No. 11, 2005, 341-
344; Deakin, S. & Konzelmann, S. J., ‘Learning from Enron’, CGAIR, Vol. 12, No. 2, 04/2004, 134-
142. The researchers here attributed the failure of Enron to mismanagement of corporate risk; Gray, J. 
& Hamilton, J., ‘Implementing Financial Regulation: Theory and Practice’, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: 
West Sussex, 2006, 25-54. Chapter 2 of this text explained the justifications for FSA’s adoption of a 
risk-based supervision framework.  
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Financial Risks in OBF 
 
 
OBF can magnify the financial risks of inability of corporations to meet up with their 
credit obligations because of the opportunity these instruments provide for them to 
borrow beyond prudent means. Whether an external level of borrowing is ascertained 
to be at a healthy level or otherwise is dependent on existing debt servicing capacity, 
market competitiveness conditions, and above all easy access to alternative sources of 
funds.[9] On the other hand, various pressures may induce corporations to prefer OBF 
over other traditional debt instruments. These range from financial window-dressing 
purpose to fund raising problems posed by poor business performance. [10] 
 
International financial institutions are very perturbed by the leveraging effects of 
OBF. It was one of the major contributing factors to the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis 
and the Russian Financial Crisis, which followed thereafter.[11] The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) commissioned a study to evaluate the systemic effects of OBF 
in mature markets especially in regard to the use of financial derivative and related 
instruments.  
 
The study made the following conclusions, ‘Counterparty due diligence, market level 
surveillance and prudential supervision of individual institutions are currently 
constrained by the lack of a measure for off-balance-sheet leverage. The regulatory 
costs associated with the assuming of leverage on-the-balance sheet have prompted 
                                                 
[9] supra note 6, 174-187. Here the authors designed a framework for the evaluation and selection of a 
viable financial mix; Clark, T., ‘Cycle of Crisis and Regulation: The Enduring Agency and 
Stewardship Problems of Corporate Governance’, CGAIR, Vol. 12 No. 2, 4/2004, 153-161. The 
researcher here argued that recessions uncover corporate excesses and booms hide them. This resulted 
in cycles of corporate governance crisis and regulatory reforms. 
[10] Ogden, Jen & O’Connor, supra note 3 (a), 513-542. Here, the authors highlighted the key 
determinants of a corporation’s choice of liability type.  
[11] Beenhakker, H.L., ‘The Global Economy and International Financing’, Quorum Books: Westport, 
2001, 121-147 
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institutions to take on leverage through off-balance-sheet operations. To judge 
potential defaults and to determine the potential for financial market turbulence it is 
necessary to gain an understanding of overall leverage, incorporating both, on- and 
off-balance sheet activities…The substantial off-balance-sheet leveraging activities 
and the limitations of current capital adequacy requirements for derivatives call for an 
appropriate capitalisation measure that accurately captures total exposure, on- and off-
balance sheet’.[12] Such a measure is still in the process of construction. This implies 
that the leveraging risks of OBF in the capital and financial markets are not easy to 
detect. Nonetheless, the non-disclosure of such risks where required may give rise to 
legal consequences. 
 






Depending on the way OBF is formatted and presented, it may have the potential of 
misleading, distorting, or misrepresenting the financial health of corporations. In the 
UK in the 1970s and 1980s, the accounting community has already had misgivings 
about its employment. The ICAEW for instance highlighted OBF’s potential to 
mislead investors and creditors.[13] This view was consolidated by the financial 
regulator, which took the stronger view that it was not a good practice as it distorts 
profitability returns. The ASB (or the ASC then) added further that financial 
institutions usually marketed such financial packages aggressively, even though such 
                                                 
[12] Breur, P., ‘Measuring Off-Balance-Sheet Leverage’, IMF Working Paper, WP/00/202, 2000, 25-26; 
Jones, M.A., ‘ But for Causation in Actions for Non-Disclosure of Risk’, Tolley’s Professional 
Negligence, Vol. 18 No .3, 2002, 192-204 
[13] ICAEW, ‘Off-Balance Sheet Financing and Window-Dressing’, Accountancy, February 1986, 129 
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apparently innovative financial products tend to disguise borrowings and have the 
potential to mislead users of financial statements.[14]  
 
This does not, however, imply that borrowers or their sponsors conspired to distort 
financial statements. This is because there could be other more compelling or 
honourable objectives as mentioned in the earlier section of this investigation. OBF 
could be used by borrowers for taxation objectives, for risks limitations or for 
bringing down their costs of accessing the use of external funds. Still, by limiting or 
omitting the disclosure of such financial packages through various means, borrowers 
may assume the risks that their financial statements are purposefully misleading and 
do not provide a true and fair view of their financial health.  
 
This perception is not without merits. It is possible for accounts prepared in  
conformance with legal requirements which may not accord with the true and fair 
view requirement. It is also possible that misleading financial statements compiled 
within the letter of the law may not accord with the principle of fairness. Under those 
circumstances highlighted, it is possible for directors and corporate accountants to 
breach reporting obligations. They may also run the risk of facing litigations for 
breach of duty when found to be involved with the use of OBF which gives rise to 
misleading statutory accounts.  
 
Where the Companies Act is concerned, there is no direct guidance on the meaning of 
a ‘true and fair view’. ‘Although accounting standards now have a statutory force,[15] 
the Act does not require in so many words that a company’s accounts must comply 
with them, nor does it say that non-compliance will be one and the same as an untrue 
                                                 
[14] ASC, ‘Exposure Draft (ED) 1487: Accounting for OBF’, Accountancy, April 1987, 166 
[15] By S.I. 1990 No. 1667 formulated under CA 1985, s 256(1), the ASB was made the standard 
issuing institution.  
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and unfair view. There is merely a very strong view that, [16] that is how the Act 
would be interpreted were a case to come before the courts. The Act does specifically 
require disclosure in the accounts where a company has not complied with applicable 
standards,[17] the reasons for non-compliance, and what the figures would have been 
had it done so’.[18] 
 
‘We should note that more than one true and fair view might be possible at one 
time[19]: the word ‘a’ is important. Thus we can sometimes say ‘A is right but B is not 
wrong either’.[20] For example in the UK, declining-balance depreciation is much less 
common than straight-line depreciation, yet everyone regards it as a perfectly valid 
method of accounting…To such accounting choices involving professional judgement 
there can never be a precisely ‘correct’ solution.’[21] 
 
As it currently stands, corporate law requires corporations to adhere to accounting 
standards, and if they fail or depart from doing so they will have to provide reasons. 
This means that there is now an overriding provision for corporate or group accounts 
to give a true and fair view.[22] More details will thus have to be furnished where the 
mere compliance to the specific rules do not appear to be adequate. It will also 
suggest that corporations may have to depart from standards where such compliance 
will not result in giving a true and fair view. 
                                                 
[16] Leonard Hoffman QC and Mary Arden in 1983 stated jointly, that’…accounts which depart from 
the standard without adequate justification or explanation may be held not to be true and fair’, cited by 
Wainman, D. in ‘Company Structures’, 2nd edition, 1999, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 20 
[17] s.227(6) CA 1985 
[18] ibid 
[19] Ashton, R. K., ‘The Agryll Foods Case: A Legal Analysis’, Accounting and Business Research, 65 
Winter 1986, 4. Here the court was not prepared to accept the substance of transaction to be consistent 
with a ‘true and fair view’ principle. This case might be interpreted differently to day in view of ASB’s 
release of’ FRS 5: Reporting the Substance of Transactions’ in April 1994 
[20] Byrne, G., ‘To What Extent Can the Practice of Accounting be Reduced to Rules and Standards’, 
Journal of Accountancy, November 1973, 364-379 
[21] Myddelton, D. R., ‘Unshackling Accountants’, Bucks: IEA, 2004, 47 
[22] s.228 & 230 of the CA 1985 
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Indeed, the usefulness and reliability of financial statements is not the product of rules 
compliance alone. ‘…The legislative provision of ‘true and fair’ specifies an overall 
quality standard for company accounts. It is an output standard. However, the 
accounting rules are…input standards…’[23] A true and fair view is underpinned by 
the consistent application of generally accepted accounting principles incorporating 
the appropriate measurement, classification, and disclosures of items expressed in the 
balance sheet and the profit and loss statement. It would probably suggest a mere 
compliance to accounting standard even though doing so may mean the divergence 
from current generally accepted practices. Until the judiciary gives its take on what a 
true and fair view really means, this overriding legal principle is subject to the 
interpretation of the accounting community.[24] 
 
Schedule 4 of the CA 1985 and general accounting standards dictate five types of 
reporting requirements for corporations to follow, including disclosure and 
measurement rules.[25] It has to be highlighted here that there are conflicts between 
Schedule 4 of the Companies Act 1985 and UK’s accounting standards. They occur 
in: paragraph 3(2) on research and development; paragraph 3 (7) on proposed 
dividends; paragraph 12 on realised profits and pensions costs; paragraph 18 on 
residual value and investment properties; paragraph 20(1) on the capitalisation of 
development costs; paragraph 21 (2) on goodwill; and paragraph 21 (3) on the length 
of economic life of goodwill and intangible assets. [26] 
 
Fair value provisions for derivatives under accounting standards will cause the 
recognition of unrealised profits whereas the Companies Act of 1985 operating under 
                                                 
[23] West, B. P., ‘Professionalism and Accounting Rules’, Routledge: Abingdon 2003, 1 and 197 
[24] Myddelton, supra note 21, 48; Lasok, K. P. E. & Grace, E., ‘The True and Fair View’, 10 Co. Law 
13, 1989; McGee, A., ‘The True and Fair View Debate’, 54 MLR, 1991, 874  
[25] Myddelton, supra note 21, 60-65 
[26] West, supra note 23, 176-180 
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the principle of financial prudence does not allow for the capture of such unrealised 
profits. Despite this, the principle of ‘a true and fair view’ as initiated in the UK is 
now more or less also fully embraced in the EU.[27] This indirectly appears to point to 
the need for discretionary self-regulation instead of statutory standards.[28] 
 
Apart from the legal challenge posed by the overriding legal requirement of a true and 
fair view, directors will have to grapple with the honesty obligation enshrined under 
common law.[29] Directors are expected at all times to exercise their duties and 
obligations honestly. So, where OBF packages result in presentation of a 
corporation’s debt position lower than it actually is; or contribute to the circumvention 
of lending terms in financial covenants without disclosure, directors may have 
exercised their powers improperly and acted in breach of their duties to act 
honestly.[30] This may lead to a fine but can involve imprisonment where the offence 
is committed with intention to defraud or to deceive. 
 
                                                 
[27] Article 2(3) of the Fourth EEC Directive 1978; Edwards, V., ‘EC Company Law, OUP: Oxford, 
2003, 128-130; The Company Lawyer, December 2006. The ICAEW expressed concerns over the EU 
Transparency Directive (2004/109/EC), art. 4(2)(c ), which mandated the use of ‘a true and fair view’ 
even for half-yearly interim corporate accounts which are formatted differently from the annual audited 
accounts; Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002, art. 4; Regulation (EC) No. 1725/2003 
[28] Hopwood, A.G., ‘Ambiguity, Knowledge and Territorial Claims’, British Accounting Review, 
22(1), March 1990, 85 
[29] Griffin, S., ‘Company Law: Fundamental Principles’, 4th edition, Pearson Education: Essex, 2006; 
Re City Equitable Fire Insurance Co. Ltd.[1925] Ch. 407;  Though directors’ duties to companies are 
broadly similar to those in the US, the culpability standards is negligence instead of gross negligence 
and also unlike the US there is no access to the formal doctrine of the business judgement rule. 
However, the UK judiciary is generally reluctant to intrude into corporate decision-making or to hold 
directors liable for mere errors of judgement (Howard Smith Ltd. v Ampol Petroleum Ltd. [1974] AC 
821). 
[30] s.227 (3)-(6) of CA 1985; s.233 (1)-(5) of CA 1985; Gregory, R., ‘Directors’ Duty to Exercise 
Discretion’, Bicester: CCH Editions Ltd., 1998. Professor Gregory argued here that based on the 
decision of Erlanger v New Sombero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218, directors are also expected 
to exercise a duty of discretion; and that this discretion should be exercised independently, be 
informed, and undertaken through a duly convened board meeting. This duty is codified under CA 
2006 together with other 6 general duties (ss 170-180 CA 2006) 
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Where directors’ duty of skill and care is concerned, the law appears to be heading 
towards a more objective position.[31] Further statutory provisions and court decisions 
appear to support this view.[32] Directors of listed corporations are under statutory 
obligations to keep accounts drawn under specific format for annual audit by 
independent qualified auditors for presentation and approval by shareholders before 
filing with the Registrar of Companies.[33] In conjunction with this, directors are to 
prepare such accounts so as to provide a true and fair view of the corporation’s 
financial health and a true and fair view of its profitability position for the financial 
year under review.[34] Failure to comply with this provision will render a director 
guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment, or a fine or both.[35] Further, the 
annual audited financial statements have to be approved by a board and duly signed 
by a member acting on its behalf.[36] 
 
Where annual accounts do not comply with the requirements of the Companies Act 
that are approved and signed, all directors who are parties to the approval, and who 
are aware of this fact or who are reckless as to whether they comply will be guilty of 
an offence and are liable to a fine. Every director at the time of approval of the 
accounts are deemed to be a party to the approval, unless he can demonstrate that he 
                                                 
[31] Dorchester Finance Co. Ltd v Stebbing [1988] BCLC 498; Norman v Theodore Goddard [1991] 
BCLC 1028; Re D’Jan of London Ltd [1993] BCC 646; Re Landhurst Leasing plc [1999] 1 BCLC; Re 
Barings plc [1999] 1 BCLC 433; Griffin, S., ‘The Personal Liability and Disqualifications of 
Directors’, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999. Personal liabilities of directors are discussed extensively 
here 
[32] s.214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 especially subsection(4)(a); s.6 of the CDDA 1986.; The CA 2006 
has now codified 7 general directors’ duties. It appears henceforth actions can be taken against 
directors even if they have nor benefited from an alleged breach or have not shown bad faith as 
establishing negligence is sufficient. 
[33] Sections 221 & 222 CA 1985 and the Combined Code require Directors to issue a responsibility 
statement before the auditor’s report outlining their responsibilities for preparations of accounts on a 
true and fair view and the taking of responsible steps to prevent and detect frauds. 
[34] s.226(2) CA 1985 
[35] s.221 (6) 
[36] s.233(1) 
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took all reasonable actions to prevent its approval.[37] These statutory provisions are 
perhaps the most telling way to render directors accountable to shareholders. Public 
disclosure of financial statements therefore helps to put the limited liability principle 
of corporations within a more balanced perspective. 
 
Directors are in part facing litigation risks where the preparation of balance sheet and 
directors’ statement are concerned. The impact of OBF packages on these two 
documents can be material and cause them to be misleading either arising from 
omission of material information, inadequate disclosure of material information, or 
distortion of material. This will then raise the issue as to whether these documents can 
still project a true and fair view or are otherwise misleading statements. 
 
Taking into consideration that the intentions behind the use of OBF can be based on 
both honourable and dishonourable objectives, litigation risks to directors will depend 
on the nature of their knowledge and whether they have taken reasonable steps to 
prevent the approval and presentation of financial statements which are likely to be 
misleading or false because of the omission of OBF schemes or their inadequate 
disclosures. Further, directors’ opinions as expressed in the directors’ statement 
accompanying the accounts can be construed to be misleading or even false where it 
fails to account for OBF in accordance with prevailing accounting standards; or 
departs from such standards without providing adequate details. Where such financial 
statements and directors’ opinions are deemed to be misleading or false, then the 
directors, being the makers of such documents could probably be liable for the tort of 
deceit.[38] 
 
                                                 
[37] s.233(5); ss 414 and 419 CA 2006 
[38] The House of Lords held in Derry v Peek (1889) 14 App. Cas. 337 that negligence is insufficient 
condition for the tort of deceit. It must either be of wilful recklessness or dishonest intention. 
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Where the directors’ statement is deemed to be false on account of omission or 
distorted by OBF schemes, then the directors concerned may be held to account for a 
further criminal offence. The mens rea for this infringement is knowledge or 
awareness that the information omitted or distorted is or maybe materially misleading, 
deceptive or false.[39] Where there is proof of intent to deceive members or creditors, 
then a director who publishes or concurs in the publishing of the accounts or 
statement, which to his knowledge is misleading, will be liable for a prison term of 
not more than seven years if found guilty of the offence.  
 
It is also not necessary for the falsified document to be accepted or acted upon. ‘A 
document is ‘made’ for an accounting purpose where that is the purpose of the 
document; but a document may be required for an accounting purpose though made 
for some other purpose so long as it is required, if only in part, for an accounting 
purpose.[40] It appears that documents fall into two categories; (i) Those from the 
inspection of which jury, with such experience and knowledge of the world as jurors 
may be expected to have, could be satisfied that the document was so required and (ii) 
those from which no such inference could be safely drawn. In the second category, 
there must be evidence of the purpose of the document. The court or jury may infer 
from the circumstances that the document is so required[41] but only if there is 
sufficient evidence for this conclusion to be drawn.[42] Jurors must not be assumed to 
know about accounting practice’.[43] 
 
                                                 
[39] Sections 17-19 Theft Act 1968; Section 91 FSMA 2000 empowers the FSA to impose penalties on 
issuers or its directors for breaching the provisions of sections 397 (1) of FSMA 2000 where there is a 
pre-existing fiduciary relationship. Section 397 (2) provides for the obligation to correct false 
impressions. 
[40] A-G’s Reference (no. 1 of 1980) [1981] 1 Ell ER 366, [1981] 1 WLR 34, CA 
[41] Osinuga v DPP [1998] Crim LR 216, DC 
[42] Sundhers [1998] Crim LR 497 
[43] Smith, J., ‘Smith & Hogan Criminal Law’, 10th edition, London: Butterworths, 2002, 618 
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The statutory provision refers explicitly to officers of a body corporate or 
unincorporated association, which clearly includes directors. This offence is capable 
of being committed only if there is an intention to deceive members or creditors about 
the corporation’s state of affairs. The offence is said to be wide as, ‘…it extends to the 
publication of any written statement or account which may be misleading in a 
material particular. It is not necessary to show that there is any view to gain or intent 
to cause loss in publishing the statement or account, though no doubt either or both 
will often be present’.[44] Hence, knowledge of purpose upon which the document is 
being used is not critical for the mens rea.[45] It has to be emphasised that the offence 
only requires the intent to deceive and no intent to defraud is required. The statutory 
provision appears to have effect only when applied to the making of false or 
misleading statements by directors to existing members or creditors and not to 
potential investors.[46] 
 
Where the meaning of ‘material’ is concerned, it has been interpreted to refer to 
things of importance or things, which matter[47]; or where it might affect the result of 
proceedings.[48] It has been, ‘…suggested that a particular is material when its 
existence is such that it might have an influence on the deliberation and subsequent 
conduct of a person reading it’.[49] 
 
Section 70 of the Companies Act 1985 in contrast to the Theft Act 1968 is more 
explicit about the protection of intending or potential investors. The former stipulates 
                                                 
[44] ibid, 621 
[45] Graham [1997] 1 Cr App Rep 302 
[46] Leng, R., ‘False Statements by Directors and the Theft Act s.19’, Co. Law 06, 1985, 274 
[47] Mallet [1978] 1 WLR 820 
[48] Millward [1985] QB 519 
[49] Smith, A.T.H., ‘Property Offences: The Protection Through the Criminal Law’, London: Sweet & 
Maxwell, 1994, 709 
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that an individual authorising the issue of a prospectus containing an untrue statement 
will be guilty of an offence and liable to imprisonment, or a fine, or both, unless he 
can demonstrate that the statement so made was not material, or that there were 
grounds to believe up to the time of the issue of the prospectus that the statement was 
true.[50]  
 
Upon confirmation that a statement is untrue, the CA 1985 places the burden of proof 
on the offending party to demonstrate, ‘…that he neither knew nor had reason to 
know about the falsity, whereas the Theft Act required (and requires) the prosecutor 
to establish knowledge’.[51] The Companies Act further elaborates that a statement is 
construed to be untrue where it is misleading in the form and context in which it is 
included in a prospectus. A statement is part of a prospectus if it is contained in it, or 
‘…in any report or memorandum appearing on its surface or by reference 
incorporated in it, or issued with the prospectus’.[52] 
 
Depending on the background of the situation, directors responsible for the 
publication of misleading or false statements may be charged under other provisions 
of the Companies Act.[53] A new statutory provision has also been introduced 
whereby directors can face criminal proceedings when they fail to disclose material 
                                                 
[50] ibid, footnotes at 23 
[51] ibid; Birds, J. et al (eds.), ‘Boyle & Birds Company Law’, 5th edition, Jordans: Bristol 2004, 629. 
Here, the editors argue that, ‘Section 19 of the Theft Act 1968 must certainly be given at least as wide 
an interpretation by the courts so long as an intention to deceive can be established’. They further 
argued that the courts have taken this position in earlier cases under s.84 of the Larceny Act 1861, the 
predecessor of s.19 of the Theft Act 1968. They cited the two cases of R v Kylsant [1931] KB 442 
(CCA), and R V Bishirgian (1935) 154 LT 499 (CCA) as support for this argument. 
[52] s.71 CA 1985; section 47(1) of the FSA 1986 is very similar to this. Where listed securities are 
concerned, s397 FSMA 2000 will apply. 
[53] sections 95(6), 110(2), 156(7), 173(6), 216(3), 89A(2), 450, 451, 577(4) 
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information, which they are aware of to the auditors concerned. The level of skill and 
care required is based on the objective test.[54] 
 
Public corporations are said to be part and parcel of long chains of capital 
manipulation. ‘Corporations own the shares of other corporations in complex chains 
in which the agency of human beings seems dwarfed by the structures of capital 
holdings. The twentieth-century discussion of a collapse of a shareholder power over 
the management of corporations-the divorce of ownership of capital from control of 
capital-seems to suggest a recognition that the corporation is to be seen as the modern 
holder and embodiment, in itself, of capital; that capital is the actor whose instrument 
is the corporation’.[55] It is further argued that, ‘…for the task of controlling that 
economic power and humanising and socialising the use of capital are the 
directors…’[56] Much of the time directors in the UK operate without direct 
shareholders’ intervention, specific reference to employees’ interests, or trade 
                                                 
[54] s.9 of The Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004 inserts a new s. 
234ZA after s.234 in the CA 1985. This was cited by Haynes, A. in an IALS public lecture on, ‘The 
Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act 2004-Content and Effect’, in 
18/04/2005; Omerod, D., ‘The Fraud Act 2006-Criminalising Lying?’, Crim. L. R. March 2007, 193-
217. Sections 2 to 4 of this Act deal with disclosures of information. The author, however, regretted the 
undue emphasis put on dishonesty which would probably generate prosecution difficulties; Wilson, S. 
& Wilson, G., ‘Can the General Fraud Offence Get the Law Right?’, The Journal of Criminal Law, Vol. 
71 No. 1 Feb. 2007, 36-52. Here, the researchers argue for greater publicity on the serious harm 
inflicted on society owing to extreme business opportunism. They stressed that despite these 
provisions, and unless more media coverage are provided, the wider society would not take such white-
collar crimes seriously and would continue to treat them as victimless crimes resulting in low incidence 
of enforcement. 
[55] Cotterrell, R., ‘The Sociology of Law: An Introduction’, London: Butterworths, 1984, 137 
[56] (a) Janice, D., ‘Directing Public Companies: Company Law and the Stakeholder Society’, 
Cavendish Publishing Ltd.: London, 2001, 148; (b) Ingley, C.B. & Walt, N. T., ‘Corporate 
Governance, Institutional Investors and Conflicts of Interest’, Corporate Governance: International 
Law Review, Vol. 12 No. 4, 10/2004, 534-551. Here, the researchers argue that the board should use 
their collective skills to assume a leadership role to regain trust eroded by management conflicts of 
interest by operating beyond the boardroom setting to the overall governance framework; (c) Yeoh, P., 
‘Directors’ Business Review Report: The Transparency Controversy’, Business Law Review, January 
2007, 5-7 (d) Yeoh, P., ‘Direction and Control of Corporations: Law or Strategy?’, Managerial Law, 
2007 forthcoming issue 
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creditors.[57] As noted earlier there are now some statutory and non-statutory 
intrusions into their freedom. The current codification of their obligatory duties and 
growing trend of shareholder activisms would help speed the change of management 
culture in respect of financial integrity in general and proper financial disclosure in 
particular. 
 
Individual directors might also need to take note that increasingly the judiciary has 
demonstrated reluctance in accepting submissions based on collective board 
responsibility and has stressed that the standards of both care and skill will depend on 
the particular functions assumed by a director.[58] The courts have nonetheless 
emphasised that the increasing emphasis on functional responsibility is tampered with 
by a degree of collective responsibility, and in particular pertaining to the statutory 
obligations of accounts preparation and disclosure.[59]  
 
The significance of functional responsibility is shown vividly in the case of non-
executive directors who are envisaged to enrich corporate management by bringing in 
particular skills and experience and to provide a degree of independent and detached 
oversights on all corporate issues. ‘However, they can only consider and oversee the 
issues and information which are presented to them, which arise out of that 
                                                 
[57] Ingley & Walt, supra note 56 (b); Keay, A., ‘Company Directors Behave Poorly: Disciplinary 
Options for Shareholders’, Society of Legal Conference Paper, presented at Keele University in July 
2006. The researcher demonstrated the difficulties shareholders will encounter when thinking of 
disciplining errant directors; Clinard, M. B. & Yeager, P.C., ‘Corporate Crime’, Transaction 
Publishers: NJ, 2006. The researchers here argued that directors have little risk of criminal convictions 
for their illegal actions on behalf of the corporation as they tend to be insulated by complex legal and 
social features. Issues of intent, direct knowledge and so on are said to inhibit the application of the 
criminal label to corporate offenders. 
[58] This view is supported by the decisions in Barings Plc (No. 5) [1999] 1 B.C.L.C. 433 at 488, Re 
D’Jan of London [1993] B. C. C. 646 at 648, Hedley Byrne v Heller [1963] 2 All ER 575 and relevant 
provisions of the Insolvency Act 1986 and the Company Directors’ Disqualification Act 1986. 
[59] Reed, R., ‘Company Directors-Collective or Functional Responsibility?’, Company Lawyer (2006) 
27(6), 170-178 
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information, or which arise out of documents or information which they ought to have 
requested on being put on enquiry by the information given to them. If this limited 
function of non-executive directors, by reference to information and documents 
reasonably available to them, is accepted then there is no reason for any special 
standard or skill or care applying specially to them.’[60] Finally, directors now also 
owe a positive duty to disclose their own misconduct. The courts have used the policy 




In keeping with the new expectation of the tasks of auditing, auditors’ access to 
corporate records and other information has now been strengthened further. They can 
now access information from all levels of corporate employees who are now required 
to comply without unreasonable delays.[62] These individuals will also face criminal 
proceedings where they furnish information, which is misleading, deceptive or false. 
 
Parallel to the enhanced expectations of their tasks and obligations, auditors have 
called for a cap on their liabilities for negligence. In line with this, the government is 
planning law reforms to, ‘…to make auditors liable if they are reckless and to enable 
them to negotiate contractual limitations to some aspect of their liability…’[63] 
                                                 
[60] (a) Reed, supra note 59, 176; KirkBride, J. & Leza, S., ‘Can the Non-Executive Director be an 
Effective Gatekeeper?: The Possible Development of a Legal Framework of Accountability’, CGAIR, 
Vol. 13, No. 4, 07/2005, 542-550. Here, the researchers argued for the imposition of gatekeeper 
liability on non-executive directors to help enhance their effectiveness in financial governance; (b) 
Cheffins, B. R. & Black, B.S., ‘Outside Director Liability Across Countries’, Texas Law Review 
(2006) Vol. 84, 1387-1480. Though all directors bear equal legal responsibility for company actions 
(Dorchester Fin. Co. Ltd. v Stebbing [1989] B.C.L.C. 498 (Ch.)), the recent case of Equitable Life 
Assurance Society v Bowley [2003] EWHC (comm.) 2263, (2004) 1 B.C.L.C. 180 suggests that the 
UK judiciary is prepared to adjust the duties of part-time non-executive directors accordingly. 
[61] Hemraj, M. B., ‘Case Comment on Duty of Loyalty: Company Directors’ Positive Obligation to 
Disclose their Own Misconduct’, Company Lawyer (2006) 27(6), 183-185 
[62] s.8 of the CAICE 2004, which inserted new sections 389A and 389B to the CA 1985 
[63] DTI, ‘Company Law Reform White Paper March 2005’, Registrar, Issue 62, June 2005, 8; sections 
532-539 of CA 2006 provide for the use of limited liability agreements with regard to audit work. 
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Auditors’ accountability may arise under common law or statute. They may face 
possible actions for breach of audit contract and negligence from their clientele or 
even in specific circumstances to third parties to whom a duty of care is owed. 
Auditors may also face statutory sanctions if they breach various provisions of the 
Companies Act governing their duties and responsibilities. Other than these, they may 
also be sanctioned by their professional body for professional misconduct that may 
lead to expulsion from membership and practice. 
 
Litigation risks for auditors have increased significantly over the past few years, 
mainly on account of huge losses suffered by investors and creditors over various 
large financial scandals. It is not difficult to see why this trend is growing. Investors 
and creditors found it beneficial to take on auditors where the chance and source of 
recovery from the more direct sources are remote or worst still no longer available.  
Auditors are liable to their clientele shareholders at common law and under the statute 
for their statutory duties and obligations. Auditors may face conspiracy fraud charges 
if they fail to provide qualified reports when accounts are distorted. On the other 
hand, they may face defamation charges from affected parties when they make serious 
errors in the making of qualified reports because of flaws in their auditing routine.  
 
As discussed earlier, two landmark cases established the principle that as 
professionals they need only exercise reasonable care and skill expected of their 
profession. Where fraudulent acts are concerned, they will not be held legally liable 
when their suspicions are not aroused. In other words, they are to act as ‘watchdogs’ 
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and not ‘bloodhounds’[64], and that they must not certify what they believe to be 
untrue and use reasonable care and skill before they attest that what they certify are 
true.[65] 
 
The expectation from the auditing profession took a significant change in 1941 in the 
US and in 1958 in the UK. In the US, pressures for the change arose from the 1941 
SEC Report on the McKesson and Robbins fraud case, which highlighted various 
weaknesses, associated with the auditing community and prompted increased 
responsibilities for the profession. Examples of these include internal control system 
examination and debtor circularisation. In the UK, it was prompted by Lord 
Denning’s assertion in the Formento case that auditors need to have an enquiring 
mind and to institute checking to ensure that no serious mistakes have occurred.[66] It 
has also become increasingly evident over the years that the courts now demand a 
higher standard of care from auditors than before.[67]  
 
The growth in stature and complexity of the capital and financial markets from the 
1980s onwards has contributed greatly to the huge growth of non-audit management 
services. These have acquired a stature rivalling that of traditional auditing in terms of 
demand and contract value. The changing financial environment has therefore helped 
sow the seeds of conflict for the profession, to surface later in the context of huge 
financial scandals in the late 1980s in the UK and the late 1990s in the US. Three 
change drivers are said to have shaped these newfound roles and expectations of 
                                                 
[64] Kingston Cotton Mill Co. (No. 2) (1896) 2 Ch. 279 
[65] London & General Bank (No. 2) (1895) 2 Ch. 673 
[66] Formento (Stirling) Ltd. v Selson Fountain Pen Co. Ltd (1958) 1 WLR 45 
[67] Thomas Gerrard & Son Ltd (1967) 2 All ER 525 
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public auditing. These are the fraud and error detection factor; the audit independence 
factor; and extension of audit liability factor.[68] 
 
In view of the special difficulties of spotting fraudulent acts in comparisons to errors, 
auditors are accountable only for; undertaking their tasks with a reasonable 
expectation of detecting material omission or misstatements of accounts brought 
about by error or fraud.[69] Auditor independence assists in the provision of objectivity 
to its attestation and monitoring responsibilities. Where non-audit services are 
provided and have been delivered without going against current standards and 
legislative rules, then auditors need to be more vigilant in not only having actual 
independence from the board, which effect their appointment or continuance of 
appointment, but also to ensure their own perceived independence as well. Such 
indicators include the resistance to depend unduly on particular audit clients, and the 
avoidance of incompatible duties.[70] 
 
Where audit liability is concerned, the case of Caparo[71] seems to have shown the 
reluctance of the House of Lords to extend the proximity test found in the Hedley 
Byrne case[72]. The Caparo decision limits the boundary of the auditing profession’s 
duty of care to the company and existing shareholders collectively relying on their 
report and professional opinion. The House of Lords also held that auditors owed no 
obligations to potential investors or individual shareholders for economic loss 
suffered, not unless the auditors have provided indications that these shareholders 
could rely on the financial documents so audited by them.  
                                                 
[68] Cosserat, G., ‘Modern Auditing’, John Wiley & Sons Ltd.: West Sussex, 2000, 10-11 
[69] Statement of Auditing Practice (SAS) 110: International Standard on Auditing (ISA), 240 
[70] Wallman, S. M. H., ‘The Future of Accounting, Part III: Reliability and Auditor Independence’, 
Accounting Horizons’, Vol. 10 No. 4, 1996, 76-97 
[71] Caparo Industries Plc v Dickman & Others (1990) 1 All ER 568.  
[72] Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Hedley & Partners (1963) 2 All ER 575 
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The Cadbury Committee on financial governance basically concurs with the decision 
in Caparo. They were concerned that the extension of auditors’ liabilities may 
deteriorate and open the floodgates for frivolous litigations.[73] The Committee’s 
position has not fully allayed the fears of auditors that they could be fully liable to the 
corporations they audit and their shareholders collectively in view of the expanding 
numbers and size of litigations they are currently facing. They are also fearful of the 
extension of their liabilities to other investors relying on their audited statements 
where they may have carelessly assumed responsibilities to the parties concerned. 
 
Such concerns of the auditors appear to have some basis given the outcomes of some 
new cases.  In the 1996 case of ADT, the court found against the auditing firm in the 
case as a senior partner had orally confirmed to ADT that he stood by the audited 
accounts, which later turned out to be defective. The court held that the audit firm by 
confirming the accounts had assumed responsibility.[74] Despite filing appeal, the firm 
settled out of court for a sum of £50 million. Similar litigations against auditors 
followed thereafter in the Maxwell and Barings Bank cases. In a Royal Bank of 
Scotland case, the court found against the auditor on the basis of requisite knowledge 
of the purpose of the audited financial statements by the plaintiff user. However, as 
                                                 
[73] (a) The Cadbury Report, ‘Report of the Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate 
Governance’, Gee: London, 1992; (b) Ultamares Corporation v Touche (1931) 174 NE 441; (c) French, 
Mayson, & Ryan, ‘Company Law’, 2006-2007 Edition, OUP: Oxford, 2006. Here, the authors cited the 
case of Man Nutzfahreuge AG v Ernst & Young [2005] EWHC 2347 (Comm), which stated that the 
liability of negligent statement is limited to liability for losses attributable to the inaccurate statement. 
They further cited further cases like Caparo, Williams v Natural Life Health Foods Ltd [1998] 1 WLR 
830, and Phelps v Hillingdon London Borough Council [2001] 2 AC 619 to emphasise that the test of 
liability is objective. 
[74] (a) French, Mayson, & Ryan, supra note 73 ( c) citing ADT Ltd v BDO Binder Hamlyn [1996] BCC 
808 and Equitable Life Assurance Society v Ernst and Young [2003] EWCA Civ 1114, [2003] 2 BLLC 
603, [2004] PNLR 16, where the Court of Appeal stated that a company may argue that with the 
correct information from its auditors, it could have sought their advice which would have prevented it 
from acting in a manner to incur losses and in this sense the loss would be recoverable; (b) Jopson, B., 
‘PwC Fined for Audit Failure Linked to Transtec Collapse’, Financial Times, 12/2006, 3 & 20. Here, 
the Accountants’ Joint Disciplinary Scheme fined PwC and Coopers and Lybrand £495, 000 for failure 
to carry out adequate audit procedures. 
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demonstrated in the Galoo and BCCI cases, the court showed general reluctance to 
extend the scope of auditors’ liabilities to creditors who may have relied on audited 
statements to provide credits. [75]  
 
Still, the inconclusive position of the judicial tests for proximity and reasonable 
foreseeability and the fear of huge litigation claims have caused some audit firms like 
KPMG to incorporate their auditing work as limited corporations. Others have 
repackaged their insurance cover to meet with this problem or are taking steps to 
shield themselves through limited liability partnerships.[76] Others are waiting for DTI 
implementation guidance on the use of limited liability agreements provided under 
sections 532-539 of the CA 2006.  
 
As mentioned earlier, there is an expectation gap where fraud and illegal acts are 
concerned; and differentiating between error and fraud involves judgemental call.[77] 
Error is unintentional and there is no objective for personal gains. Examples of these 
are mistakes in data entries, misinterpretation of facts, or careless misinterpretation of 
accounting policies and standards. In contrast, fraud is intentionally perpetuated for 
personal benefits. The auditor is primarily concerned with fraud suspicion, and leaves 
it to the courts to determine fraud and other competent authorities to deal with the 
issue. The primary responsibility for the prevention and detection of fraud, it must be 
said is in the hands of the board and management of a corporation.[78] Auditing is in 
no position to determine the corporation’s good faith and reliability. This is because 
                                                 
[75] (a) Royal Bank of Scotland v Bannerman Johnstore Maclay (a firm) 2003 SLT 181; (b) Galoo Ltd. 
v Bright Grahame Murray [1994] 1 WLR 1360; and (c ) Bank of Credit and Commerce International 
(Overseas) Ltd. (BCCI) v Price Waterhouse [1999] BCC 351.  
[76] Limited Partnerships Act 2000  
[77]  Gray, I. & Manson, S., ’The Audit Process’, Thomson Learning: London, 2000 citing also SAS 110 
(ISA 240) Error and Fraud 
[78] ibid 
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corporate management can tamper with the internal control system by overriding the 
controls.[79] 
 
Auditors have the capacity and duty to perform their tasks such that a reasonable 
expectation of spotting illegal acts can be achieved. There is tussle between those who 
contend that the auditors are putting pressures on the courts and the public to accept 
lower standards of responsibility for fraud and those who argue that they can do more 
to assure the reliability of financial statements, like the provision of assistance to 
corporate management to have more effective internal control and risk management 
systems.[80]  
 
The difficulties for auditors are magnified when they are also expected to examine the 
consistencies of Directors’ Reports as found in Corporate Annual Report with the 
audited accounts. Any failure on the part of the auditors to spot these material 
inconsistencies and to resolve these with the corporation concerned before audit 
endorsement may evoke serious legal implications for the auditor concerned.[81] 
 
Authoritative guidance on minimum acceptable standards of professional conduct is 
available to deal with rules pertaining to independence, confidentiality, professional 
fees, and appointment.[82] Compliance to these codes of conduct is compulsory and 
detractors may even be expelled in serious cases. A statement of Fundamental 
Principles usually accompanies such codes of professional conduct. These usually 
                                                 
[79] Cosserat, supra note 68, 83 
[80] Gray & Manson, supra note 77 citing the Audit Practices Board, ‘The Audit Agenda’, 1994 
[81] S 458 CA 1985 where auditors may face the risks of being a party to carrying on business with the 
intent to defraud creditors or for other fraudulent aims. 
[82] These are provided by the Rules of Professional Conduct (Association), the Guide to Professional 
Ethics (Institutes) UK, and the International Federation of Accountants Code of Ethics for 
Professionals. 
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refer to the principles of objectivity, integrity, competency, skill, care and diligence, 
as well the principles of courtesy.[83] 
 
Auditors exercised professional judgements, which could expand their exposure to 
liabilities. However, ’…tort’s law of deterring socially undesirable behaviour will not 
be served by disproportionately expanding auditors’ liability’.[84] Whilst the 
consequences of making auditors liable for their failures in assessing the quality of 
financial statements prepared by management is a major issue, case law in this area 
holds that auditors are not insurers against the failure or losses of a company. [85]  
 
In the meantime, auditors in general are comforted to a large extent by the provisions 
in the CA 2006 which provides the avenue for capping auditors’ liability in joint 
consultation with their clientele; and post-Caparo decisions which generally accord 
with Caparo other than the distinguished Morgan Crucible case.[86] The UK 
government and the courts have therefore adopted a cautious approach; but the draft 
Community Directive in Company Law has sought to impose higher standards of 
liability for negligence on auditors and when made into law may expand the scope of 
auditors’ liability once again.[87] 
 
 
                                                 
[83] These are highlighted by the Association’s Rules of Professional Conduct. 
[84] Hill, J.W., ‘The Spectre of Disproportionate Auditor Liability in the Savings and Loans crisis’, 
Critical Perspectives on Accounting’, Vol. 5, 1994, 155 
[85] Sangha, D.S., ‘The Role of the Regulator, Auditor and Banker: The Limits of Regulation’, PhD 
thesis, University of Wolverhampton, 26/07/2002, 315 
[86] Hemraj, M., ‘Taking Stock of Caparo’, Company Lawyer (2006) 27(3), 82-89. The Morgan case 
was concerned with a contested takeover bid. In contrast, Caparo was concerned with the takeover of a 
public company by existing shareholders who expanded their portfolios and subsequently entered a bid 
for all the remaining shares; Morgan Crucible Co. Ltd v Hill Samuel & Co Ltd [1991] 1 All ER 148 
[87] Burbridge, P., ‘Liability of Statutory Auditors to Third Parties-Is the European Writing on the Wall 
for Caparo v Dickman?’, Tolley’s Professional Negligence, Vol. 18 No. 1, 2002, 40-66 
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Financial Advisors and Other Gatekeepers 
 
Financial advisers operate as independent financial advisers or as consultancy 
extensions of accounting, banking and financial businesses. There appears to be no 
clear definition for financial advisers or their duties and functions for the moment. 
The courts provide a bare minimum glimpse of this, when they describe the 
profession as an occupation requiring intellectual dexterity, or surgical skills, which is 
substantially different from the production or sales or arrangements for the production 
and sale of commodities. They further added that the word as used traditionally to 
refer to the three professions in the Church, Medicine and Law has now acquired a 
broader meaning as the line of demarcation may change from time to time.[88] 
 
In the area of professional negligence, professional status is accorded to a service or 
occupation, when; the nature of the work is skilled and specialised; the ethical 
principles attached to it are broader than mere honesty; there is an association to 
manage education entry and competency requirements, or adjudicate on errant 
misconduct; and when it has a degree of standing in the wider community.[89] Guided 
by these attributes, the law on professional negligence focused on standard white-
collar occupations like architects, accountants, surveyors, lawyers, doctors, insurance 
brokers, and even managing agents at Lloyd’s. Somehow, financial advisers were not 
accorded similar recognition. This perspective tends to assume a general conceptual 
approach to the area of professional liability, underpinned by obligations flowing 
from contract, tort and equity.[90]  
                                                 
[88] Car v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1921] 2 All ER 163 
[89] Jackson, R.M. & Powell, J.L., ‘Jackson & Powell on Professional Negligence’, 4th edition, London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1997, paragraph 1-01 
[90] Dugdale, A. & Stanton, K., ‘Professional Negligence’, 3rd edition, London: Butterworths, 1998; 
Nakajima, C., ‘Conflicts of Interest in English and Japanese Financial Law’, PhD Thesis, 1997, 45-79, 
138-177, Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, University of London, 1997. The duties of financial 
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For the moment, there does not appear to be a unified theory for professional liability. 
‘There may be a common underlying theory which binds professional negligence and 
liability together, but it is one which needs an intelligent application to the variety of 
contexts in which professional functions are performed’.[91] This stand is substantially 
influenced by the decision in Caparo. 
 
Financial advisers are individuals with this specialised calling or of other professional 
background (such as accountants and lawyers) providing financial advisory services 
as an extension of their main professional business. FSA 1986 gave recognition to the 
role and function of independent financial advisers and others concerned only with the 
dealing of financial products for the company they represent. Despite this, there are 
concerns about the wisdom of according status to a profession with liberal education 
and training stipulations.[92] This is of less concern to others who finds this argument 
unhelpful from the legal perspective as it is not important which specific group of 
financial advisers deserve the recognition of professional status.  
 
This contrasting view holds that what is important in practice, ‘…is the holding out, 
by self-styled financial advisers and others, of knowledge and expertise in the 
provision of financial advice and information. That holding out is sufficient to attract 
the imposition of legal obligations and any corresponding legal entitlements of the 
                                                                                                                                            
intermediaries and professional financial advisers in the context of conflicts of interest are discussed 
extensively in this thesis. 
[91] Stanton, K., ‘Professional Negligence in Tort: The Search for a Theory’, in Birks, P. (ed.), ‘Wrongs 
and Remedies in the 21st Century’, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1996, 67; Nasir, C., ‘Duties Owed by 
Professional Advisers to Third Parties’, Tolley’s Professional Negligence, Vol. 16 No. 1, 2002, 12-26. 
The inconsistent specifications of the circumstances by the courts wherein professional advisers may be 
held liable to third parties were criticised here; Walford, R., ‘The Evolution of Liability of 
Professionals to Non-Clients’, Tolley’s Professional Negligence, Vol. 18 No. 3, 2002, 177-191 
[92] Bret, M., ‘How to Read Financial Pages: A Simple Guide to the Way Money Works and the 
Jargon’, London: Brandon House, 5th edition, Random House: London, 2000, 12 & 36 
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customers who rely upon such information or advice, should it prove defective’.[93] 
On this basis, it may be appropriate to include investment banks, brokerage firms, and 
accounting firms involved in the provision of financial advisory services either as 
ancillary services or through separate legal entities created for this expressed purpose. 
 
The latter approach is derived mainly from the landmark decision in Hedley Byrne,[94] 
which is the bedrock of the law governing the provision of financial consultancies and 
information by advisers, especially in relation to insurance intermediaries as well as 
those in the legal and accounting professions. The critical element of the Hedley 
Byrne decision is the assumption of responsibility principle. This can be explained as 
follows; ‘That a person should be bound by legal duty of care to avoid causing 
economic loss to another in circumstances where a reasonable man in the position of 
the defendant would foresee that kind of loss and would assume responsibility for 
it’.[95] From this perspective, tort is the equivalent of the assumption of legal 
responsibility to another through a contractual or near to contractual relationship by a 
professional to undertake a service with care and competence to achieve an objective 
without negligence. If not, as a result of reliance, a claim can be filed for liability for 
direct economic loss.  
                                                 
[93] McMeel, G. & Virgo, J., ‘Financial Advice and Financial Products: Law and Liability’, OUP: 
Oxford, 2001, 36; Hollander, C. & Salzedo, S., ‘Conflicts of Interest & Chinese Walls’, Sweet & 
Maxwell: London, 2004, 1-7. Professionals involved in financial services like solicitors, financial 
advisors and accountants are exposed to various kinds of conflicts of interest which may generate legal 
implications. These include existing client conflict, former client conflict, personal conflict, and 
commercial conflict. It may involve the obligation to protect confidentiality which when breached may 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. Effective internal measures must be in place for professionals to 
claim the discharge of this high burden, and this implies the use of ‘structural and not mere ad hoc 
Chinese Walls’, meaning a firm within a firm effect. 
[94] Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd (1963) 2 All ER 575; Katter, N., ‘The Liability of 
Professionals to Third Parties for Negligent Misstatement Under Consumer Protection Legislation: 
Outflanking the Neighbourhood Principle’, (2007) 15 Tort L Rev 31 
[95] (a) Harvey, C., ‘Economic Losses and Negligence, the Search for a Just Solution’, 50 Can. Bar Rev. 
600, 1972, 620; (b) However, Mayson, French, & Ryan supra note 77 cited the case of Commissioners 
of Customs and Excise v Barclays Bank plc [2006] UKHL 28 wherein the court held that where 
assumption of responsibility is inappropriate, then a ‘threefold’ test comprising reasonable foreseeable 
consequence, sufficient proximity, and fair, just, and reasonableness may be applied.  
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Five important principles emerge on the law of professional negligence as a result of 
Hedley Byrne and other cases: [96] 
 
• Hedley Byrne set forth the principle in tort that law is derived from a 
defendant’s assumption of responsibility for the provision of professional 
services; 
• The principle allows the concurrence of actions in tort and contract. 
Translated, this means that a party injured by a breach in contracts may in 
principle choose to claim in tort; 
• Negligence in mis-statement is not necessary for the Hedley Byrne principle to 
apply, as negligent omissions are equally acceptable; 
• Action founded on pure economic losses can no longer be restrained as the 
assumption of responsibility is the rationalisation or technique harnessed to 
provide the avenue for the recovery of losses arising from the negligent 
delivery of services; 
• Irrespective of any contracts, assumption of responsibility is applicable to 
professionals.[97] 
 
Other than the avenues provided by the law of torts, victims of economic losses can 
file claims for breach of statutory duty. There is, however, a distinction between 
causes of action restricted to private persons and those commonly available to any 
                                                 
[96] Nocton v Lord Ashburton [1914] A.C. 32; Henderson v Merritt Syndicates Ltd [1994] 2 A.C. 145. 
Lord Brown-Wilkinson states in this case that the duty of care imposed on directors, agents and others 
is the same duty which arises from the circumstances they were acting and not from their status nor 
description.; White v Jones [1995] 2 A. C. 207 
[97] Jackson & Powell, supra note 89, 645-658; Watson, S & Willekes, A., ‘Economic Loss and 
Directors’ Negligence’, JBL May Issue, 2001, 233. The authors here expanded on the assumption of 
responsibility principles.  
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person. The former for instance refers to breach of FSA rules,[98] whilst the latter 
refers to breach of FSA requirements.[99] Claimants may find the breach of statutory 
duty option route helpful as; it circumvents the requirement to prove that a duty of 
care should be recognised at common law; and more importantly this option provides 
a much explicit details of the appropriate standard of care peculiar to a particular 
activity. As it resembles a form of strict liability, the only default that needs to be 
shown is non-compliance with the statutory obligations.[100] 
 
Though advantageous, the claim for breach of statutory duty under this heading must 
fulfil five critical elements, namely; (i) that the claim interest must be within the 
scope of protection of the legislation; (ii) that the legislation must explicitly or 
implicitly render the breach of duty actionable; (iii) that there must be breach of duty; 
(iv) that the claimant must have suffered damage; and (v) causation must be 
proved.[101] The use of this statutory scheme has been initiated in earlier cases under 
FSA 1986. One case concerned failed mainly on account of the fact that the 
claimant’s interest was outside of the scope of protection of the legislation 
concerned.[102] The other case failed as the claimants were deemed to be individuals 
outside the scope of the legislation’s protection.[103] 
 
It has been argued that with the amendments made in the FSMA 2000,[104] where 
there is a clear shift in statutory language to person from investor, and the extension 
of protection of the legislature to cover dependents of customers and third parties, the 
victims comprising widows and surviving children would succeed under the same 
                                                 
[98] s.150(1) FSMA 2000 
[99] sections 20(3) & 20(9) FSMA 2000 
[100] McMeel & Virgo, supra note 93, 188 
[101] McMeel & Virgo, supra note 93, 188-190 
[102] Norwich Union Life Insurance Co. Ltd v Oureshi [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 707 
[103] Gorham v British Telecommunications Plc [2000] 1 WLR 2129 
[104] s. 150 (1) FSMA 2000 
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statutory claim.[105] It has to be emphasised that these said claims were made on the 
basis that the professional service providers had dishonestly concealed relevant 
information.[106] These developments generate serious legal implications for 
professional advisors. For instance, where they provided advice to invest in various 
equity or derivative products, which are off balance sheet and fail to disclose material 
information, which they are aware of, they could be caught under these statutory 
obligations. In the eventuality of such circumstances, the more usual practical way out 
for professional advisors is to file for contributory negligence.[107] 
 
In broad terms, the court’s approach to the handling of professional standards appears 
to be as follows, ‘There is no reason in principle why a professional person should not 
by contract (or assumption of responsibility) promise to produce a result rather than 
merely exercise skill and care to do so, but in the absence of promise the courts will 
be reluctant to hold that he has impliedly given such an undertaking. In practice, 
however, many claims brought against professional people are based on failure to 
carry out fairly simple…functions and proof of the failure itself will virtually 
guarantee success in these cases whether the action is frame in contract or tort (or 





                                                 
[105] ibid  
[106] s.47 FSA 1986 
[107] (a) Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945; (b) Bennett, C., ‘The Market Abuse Link 
between Shell & Enron’, Company Lawyer 2005, 26(6), 180-185. Bennett argues that behaviour in 
relation to abusive OBF appears to fall under the criteria amounting to market abuse 
[108] Rogers, W. V. H., ‘Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort’, 7th edition, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1999, 
374 
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Compliance Risks in Financial Services Sector 
Directors, auditors, and financial advisers may need to take cognisant of their 
professional conduct in the financial services sector, especially when they engaged in 
the dissemination of financial information, which may be distorted or manipulated by 
OBF reporting manoeuvring. This is because of the risk that they may be caught for 
the conduct of market abuse under the FSMA 2000. Of relevance to this investigation 
is the conduct of behaviour relating to false or misleading information, and in 
particular pertaining to the dissemination of information which gives, or is likely to 
give a false or misleading impression as to market traded financial securities by a 
person who knew or could reasonably be expected to have known that the information 
was false or misleading such as financial analysts and investment advisors. This 
problem can be accentuated when such professionals are found to be aiding the 
agenda of related personnel to the detriment of their clientele or of particular clientele 
against another in classic conflicts of interest situations.[109]  
 
Opinions vary as to whether market abuse constitutes a civil or criminal offence. The 
distinction has important bearing for the ascertainment of the degree of burden of 
proof.[110] The Financial Services and Markets Tribunal (FSMT) appeared to concur 
with the FSA that the sliding scale principle would apply to determine the burden of 
                                                 
[109]  s118(7) FSMA 2000; Crockett, A. et al., ‘Conflicts of Interest in the Financial Services Industry: 
What Should We Do About Them?’, London: Centre for Policy Research, 2003; Hollander, C. & 
Salzedo, S., ‘Conflicts of Interest & Chinese Walls’, 2nd edition, 2004, London: Sweet & Maxwell. The 
authors point out that the FSA Rules recognise that conflicts will occur in regular business transactions 
and acknowledged that as long as appropriate measures are implemented to manage them, the service 
will be protected from regulatory criticism and action. Such measures include disclosures to the 
customer, declining to act, establishing Chinese Walls and reliance on a policy of independence; 
McVea, H., ‘Research Analysts and Conflicts of Interest-The FSA’s Response’, JCLS Vol. 4  Part 1, 
April 2004, 97-116; Nakajima, C. & Sheffield, E., ‘Butterworths Compliance Series: Conflicts of 
Interest and Chinese Walls’, Butterworths: London, 2004. Here, the authors highlighted the desirability 
of ‘reinforced Chinese Walls’ through the use of a restricted list and so on to curb conflicts of interest 
issues. 
[110] Haynes, A. (ed.), ‘Financial Services Law Guide’, Tottel:  West Sussex,  2006, 109-148; Blair, M. 
& Walker, G. (eds.), ‘Financial Services Law’, OUP: Oxford, 2006, 207-265 
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proof, implying market abuse to be closer to a civil offence.[111] Subsections 397(1) 
and (2) and section 397(3) provides for the respective offence of making misleading 
statements and misleading practices. The former offence applies to the making of a 
statement, promise or forecast which a person knows to be misleading, false, or 
deceptive or dishonestly concealing any material facts. A person who is reckless as to 
whether the statement made by him is misleading, false, or deceptive will also be 
caught under this provision. Additionally, section 15 of the Theft Act 1968 covers the 
publication of statements by an officer of a company which to his knowledge is or 
may be misleading, false, or deceptive in a particular material. So preparers and 
disseminators of financial statements containing the manipulative use of OBF may be 
subjected to sanctions under these said provisions.  
 
The AIT case was the first to be prosecuted by the FSA under section 397. This 
involved the making of a forecast on the basis of contracts, which did not exist at the 
time. Of the three defendants, two were found guilty of recklessness in the making of 
the misleading, false or deceptive statements and were subsequently jailed for 2 -3 
years.[112] So far, the more high profile examples pursued by the FSA concerns the 
Shell case involving material defects in the disclosure of its petroleum reserves in its 
balance sheet.[113] A less high profile case, but related to this study is the failure by 
Eurodis Electron Plc to notify the market of a drastic change in its financial condition 
but had instead presented a ‘clean working capital statement’. The FSA censured the 
                                                 
[111] Arif Mohammed v the FSA, Financial Services and Markets Tribunal Decision of 29/03/2005 
[112] R V Rigby, Bailey and Rowley, 2005 unreported. 
[113] Bennett, C., ‘The Market Abuse Link Between Shell and Enron’, the Company Lawyer, Col. 26, 
No. 6, 180-185; Accountancy Magazine, ‘Shell Fined £17 Million Over Misstatements’, 
www.accountancymagazine.com, 10/2004 
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listed corporation but would have probably mandated a substantial fine if not for the 





The tort of misfeasance in public office is acknowledged in courts.[115] It refers to, 
‘Damages…available for an ultra vires act if an official knowingly acts in excess of 
his powers or acts with malice towards the plaintiff’.[116] The rationale for the tort is to 
compensate those who have sustained losses as a consequence of improper or abuse 
of public power. It is underpinned by the principle that such power is to be exercised 
only for the public good and not for ulterior or improper purposes. Unlawful or 
unauthorised acts of persons holding office in public institutions like local authorities, 
government departments, or even Central Banks fall within this ambit, provided it is 
pursued with the requisite mental element. This tort in principle is extended to 
omissions provided these are conscious decisions not to act.[117] It may include the 
ignoring of obvious risks.[118] 
 
The test to be adopted has been reaffirmed by Lord Steyn as representing, ‘…a 
satisfactory balance between two competing policy considerations, namely enlisting 
tort law to combat executive and administrative abuse of power and not allowing 
public officers, who must always act for the public good to be assailed by 
                                                 
[114] Company Lawyer, ‘News Digest: Company Censured by FSA for Breach of Listing Rules’,  
Company Lawyer (2006) 27 (3), 92-93; Company Lawyer, ‘News Digest: Firm Fined in FSA’s First 
Anti-Fraud Control Case’, Company Lawyer (2006) 27 (5), 179-180. 
[115] Dunlop v Woollahara Municipal Council [1982] AC 158; Craig, ‘Compensation in Public Law’, 96 
LQR 413, 1980, 426-428 
[116] Markesisnis, B.S. & Deakin, S.F., ‘Tort Law’, 4th edition, Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1999, 374; 
Wood, P. R., ‘A Hidden Lesson of BCCI and the Bank of England’, Butterworths JIBL, Vol. 21 No. 1 
January 2006, 3. It is argued here that regulators should be allowed to make honest mistakes, without 
fear of liability if their judgements turn out to be wrong. 
[117] Three Rivers 1 [2000] 2 WLR at 1267, per Lord Hutton 
[118] Three Rivers Council v Bank of England (No. 3) [2001] 2 All ER 513 
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unmeritorious actions’.[119] However, in conformity with the character of the tort of 
public misfeasance, ‘…the act must be deliberate, not negligent or inadvertent or 
arising from a misunderstanding of the legal position…a failure to act can amount to 
misfeasance in public office only where (i) the circumstances are such that the 
discretion whether to act can only be exercised in one way so that there is effectively 
a duty to act; (ii) the official appreciates this but nevertheless makes a conscious 
decision not to act; and (iii) he does so with intent to injure the plaintiff or in the 
knowledge that such injury will be the natural and probable consequences of his 
failure to act’.[120] 
 
Under FSMA 2000, the FSA assumes the function of the listing authority for the UK 
capital market. To discharge this function, the FSA focuses ’…on the admission of 
securities to the official list and on the continuing obligations relevant to the 
continued admission of securities to the official list. This includes admitting 
companies to be officially listed, and suspending or removing them from the official 
list, setting minimum standards, including monitoring the dissemination of price 
sensitive information, and keeping the listing rules up to date.’[121] Its other functions 
include; the regulation of sponsors; investigation of breaches of the listing rules and 
certain offences under the FSMA 2000; and disciplinary action against issuers, 
directors and sponsors.[122] 
 
                                                 
[119] ibid 
[120] supra note 118, per Lord Millet; Tait, N. & Eaglesham, J., ‘Byers Viewed Railtrack as a Basket 
Case’, Financial Times, 13/07/2005, 4. Here, 49,000 shareholders accused the former Transport 
Secretary with ‘…a specific intention to injure the shareholders by impairing the value of their 
interests, and effectively expropriating their assets’. The court held otherwise. 
[121] Deringer, F. B., ‘Financial Services: Investigations and Enforcement’, Butterworths: London, 
2001, 627 
[122] Omoyele, O., ‘Disclosure, Financial Misconduct and Listed Companies: A Critical Analysis of the 
UKLA’s Continuing Obligations Regime’, Journal of Financial Crime, Vol. 12 No. 4, 2005, 310-326. 
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Where the lack of disclosure or omission of information pertaining to certain OBF 
financial packages result in the clear generation of misleading or false statements, and 
for which the FSA as the UKLA fails to act, and this culminates in investors and 
creditors suffering losses, a case may be filed for public misfeasance by the victims. 
The complainants can make use of two procedures to challenge the FSA, namely; via 
judicial review; or where judicial review is inappropriate via civil proceedings for 
damages. Where the second option is pursued, it must be borne in mind that this line 
of action is constrained by the FSA’s statutory immunity against liability in 
damages.[123] 
 
The circumstances of the case will decide on the choice of mechanism. Judicial 
review of the FSA or any other public body is not a simple process. The justifications 
for judicial review are very restrictive or limited as the courts have expressed a 
reluctance to look over the shoulders of public authorities and prefer to let these 
bodies get on with their tasks.[124] A successful action at judicial review will result in 
the courts making quashing orders, mandatory orders, prohibiting orders, injunctions, 
and /or claims. Damages are likely to be awarded only where there is some private 
law court of action. In respect of the FSA, damages claims are likely to be entertained 
where it acted in bad faith or breach conditions in the HRA 1998.[125] 
 
Where judicial review is inappropriate, civil actions may be pursued. Such actions 
will encounter three challenges. Foremost, such actions will have to deal with the 
quantifiable claims arising from wrongs impacted by public misfeasance. Second, the 
                                                 
[123] FSMA 2000, Schedule 1, paragraph 19; Beyers, G., ‘The Accountability of the FSA under FSMA 
2000’, Company Lawyer (2001) Vol. 22 (7), 220-221 
[124] R V Securities and Futures Authority, ex p Panton (1995) CA LTL, 6/3/95, CA 
[125] Deringer, supra note 121, 686 
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issue of statutory immunity for liabilities will need to be addressed. Third, other 
remedies may need to be reviewed as well.[126] 
 
Statutory immunity from liability in damages for the FSA covers the institution itself, 
its employees and others acting on its behalf and in the course of executing its 
functions.[127] Acts in bad faith and those affecting human rights are, however, not 
covered by the statutory immunity. Bad faith is taken to refer to malice, knowledge of 
lack of power for the action taken or wilful omission of required action.[128] Courts 
will look towards the award of claims against public bodies whose actions are 
incompatible with the ECHR, and awards may become necessary to provide just 
satisfaction to persons affected.[129] 
 
Other then the above options for filing claims against the FSA, which by nature are 
cost prohibitive and time-consuming; aggrieved parties may make use of the 
independent complaints scheme. The government as a counterweight to the statutory 
immunity shield extended to the FSA provided this additional option. This option is 
available to persons and institutions affected by the way FSA performed its statutory 
functions. Representatives of persons affected like solicitors can act on their own 
behalf.[130]  
 
The government’s intention is to provide FSA with the competence to deal with sharp 
practices and other forms of more serious wrongdoings in the securities and related 
                                                 
[126] ibid, 687-688 
[127] Sch. 1, paragraph 19 FSMA 2000 
[128] These were stated in Three Rivers Disytict Council v Governor and Company of the Bank of 
England [2001] 3 All ER 1, HL; Company Lawyer, ‘News Digest: BCCI Liquidators Drop Bank of 
England Claim’, Company Lawyer (2006), 27 (3) 91. The case collapsed after the High Court held in 
Novermber 2005 that it was no longer in the best interests of the creditors to continue. Deloitte, BCCI’s 
liquidator spend some £38 million and the Bank of England some 70 million on the case, which ran for 
12 years. 
[129] s. 8 (3)-(4) HRA 1998 
[130] COAF 1.2.1 FSA Handbook 
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markets more efficiently and effectively, for ‘…without statutory immunity, the 
proper and efficient action of the regulator would be frustrated by lawsuits and red 
tape. Frivolous litigation could be an extremely easy ploy to distract or hinder the 
regulator. The absence or the weakening of the immunity could also have more 
dangerous effects on the industry. It could lead to a tendency to over-regulation with 
the FSA seeking to collect more information than it needed, setting tougher minimum 
standards than necessary, avoiding giving guidance or waivers or taking longer to 
reach decisions than it otherwise would’.[131] The concession it gave in the form of the 
complaints scheme has to be appreciated in this light as well as the fact that the FSA 
has got to file an annual performance report to the Treasury for review and that the 
bulk of its financial resource come from contributions and fines by participants in the 
capital and related markets. In other words, it has limited financial resources to deal 
with litigations against it.  
 
 
Whilst errant actions of the FSA can be challenged, errant actions of directors, 
auditors and professional advisers can be disciplined by the FSA. In particular, 
directors may suffer liability to personal disciplinary action where they are knowingly 
aware of their corporation’s breach of the listing rules. The test is not likely to be a 
particularly high one.[132] The FSA can either issue a public censure or a fine to 
discipline the errant directors. It will review all relevant circumstances of the breach 
and the list of non-exhaustive factors contained in the Guidance Manual before taking 
a specific action.[133] Breaches of Part VI of FSMA 2000 may carry with them 
                                                 
[131] Economic Secretary to HM Treasury in Standing Committee, 13/07/1991 
[132] s. 417 FSMA 2000; McCormick, R., ‘Legal Risk in the Financial Markets’, Oxford: OUP, 2006, 
Chapter 10. It is emphasised here that senior management will be held accountable for ensuring that 
systems and controls are in place to manage market risk, credit risks, and related legal and reputational 
risks. 
[133] Draft Guidance Manual, paragraphs 11.3, 8.3.4, and 8.8.3 
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criminal law implications.[134] Where the contents of listing particulars or material 
parts of them are untrue or misleading, civil liabilities may arise for the sponsors, 
issuers, auditors, and directors concerned to persons who have acquired the pertinent 
securities and who have suffered losses as a result of these untrue or misleading 
statements or the omission of details required.[135] 
 
The work of the FSA as a single regulator since 1997 to promote efficiency and 
confidence in the capital and financial markets in the UK, are not without 
controversies. However, as John Tiner, the departing CEO of FSA puts it,  
‘There are real benefits of scale, of intellectual capital and of simplicity when the 
markets have one regulator. Some people say that integrating prudential and market 
pose a conflict of interest because there comes a time when you are so worried about 
market confidence that you take actions that, in the short term, are detrimental to the 
consumer’s interest. But the end result may be better for long-term stability’.[136] 
 
Others disagreed and have called for greater deregulation. They maintained that a lot 
of regulations benefit nobody. This argument even went as far as to suggest that FSA 
rules could easily be replaced by good standards of corporate governance, as there are 
not substantial differences between the two views.[137] The FSA’s CEO opposed this 
line of reasoning. He argued that the FSA based its standard of compliance on a set of 
high-level principles; and in particular; transparency, honesty, open communication 
and customer protection. These he added are the ingredients, which protects the 
                                                 
[134] Sections 93.85, 93.86 FSMA 2000 
[135] Sections 80 & 81 FSMA 2000; Equitable Life Assurance Society v Ernst & Young [2003] EWCA 
CIV 1114 
[136] (a) Kochan, N., ‘Too Much of a Good Thing: The UK’s FSA Has Set a Template of Regulation 
Aorund the World’, The Banker, July 2005, 27, paragraph 12; (b) Burger, R., ‘Are You the Weakest 
Link?: The FSA’s Financial Crime Review’, JFRC, Vol. 14 (3), 2006, 304-310; (c) Birger, R., ‘FSA 
Enforcement Process Review’, JFRC, Vol. 14 (1) 2006, 14-23. The FSA 2005 Process Review Report 
led to various changes in its enforcement regime to enhance transparency and effectiveness. 
[137] Kochan, supra note 136 (a), 30 paragraph 6 
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London capital and financial market from abuse. As he further points out, ‘The City 
has really liked the distinctive focus on the principles-based system. This has been 
very good for maintaining market confidence in the City and promoting high 
standards’.[138]  
 
Indeed, the FSA further claimed that such principles could then be put into practice 
through the provision of detailed rules of behaviour. In the end, it is difficult to locate 
a universally popular financial regulator, ‘But as long as the FSA can demonstrate that 
its model is superior to others, the prospects of another great British intellectual 
export becoming the global model--along with privatisation and central bank 
independence--are more likely than not’.[139] This is fast becoming a reality given the 
adoption or adaptation of the model in Poland, Germany, Japan, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, Scandinavia, Belgium, and the Netherlands. 
 
As for the claim for compensation against the FSA or other public agencies, the 
House of Lords in Three rivers has clarified that ‘…the requisite mental element is 
either (a) ‘targeted malice’, i.e. conduct specifically intended to injure a person or 
persons; or (b) ‘untargeted malice’, i.e. conduct whereby a public officer acts 
knowing that he has no power to do the act complained of and that the act will 
probably injure the claimant, it being sufficient here that an act is performed with 
(subjective or inadvertent) reckless indifference as to the outcome. Liability extends 
for losses to the claimant actually foreseen as the probable consequence, not all 
reasonably foreseeable losses. If an officer commits the tort, the employing authority 
                                                 
[138] Kochan, supar note 136 (a), 28 paragraph 1; Stewart, S., ‘Coping with the FSA’s Risk-Based 
Approach’, JFRC, Vol. 3 (1), 2005, 43-47. Driven by national legislation, FSA supervises through an 
increasingly transparent principles and risk-based approach, which it expects the regulated firms to 
follow. It, however, does not get involved with performance risk management. 
[139] Kochan, supra note 136 (a), 30 last paragraph 
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may be held vicariously liable unless the unauthorised acts are so unconnected with 
the officer’s authorised duties as to be quite independent of and outside those 
duties’.[140] 
 
So far, there has been one successful high profile compensation case made against the 
FSA, namely the case involving Paul Davidson (the ‘plumber’), Ashley Tatham and 
Nigel Howard. The FSA had imposed hefty fines against the trio for engaging in 
market abuse through their participation in spread betting to create a false market 
impression of a particular AIM stock. The FSMT overturned the long drawn case in 
late 2006 on the basis that the trio had not participated in the scheme to mislead the 
market. The FSA also received considerable criticisms over the quality of its factual 
evidence as it was also held by the FSMT that the seriousness of the charge will 
require a much higher burden of proof.[141]  
 
Prior to that, the FSA endured a series of well publicised adverse findings from the 
2003 Hoodless and Blackwell case, the 2005 Legal and General case to the 2006 
Baldwin case. This is counterbalanced by the recent settled cases with hefty fines for 
market misconduct. These include the fines of £6.3 million against Deutsche Bank, 
£13.9 million against Citigroup, and £17 million against Shell; and individual fines of 
£290, 000 in the Bonnier case, £350,000 in the Maslen case and £750,000 in the Jabre 
case.[142] Nonetheless, the FSA has   
                                                 
[140] Bailey, S., ‘Public Authority Liability in Negligence: The Continued Search for Coherence’, Legal 
Studies, Vol. 26 (2) June 2006, 157-158 
[141] Connety, J., ‘Courts in Davidson Declare Market Abuse a Criminal Act’, International Financial 
Law Review’, Vol. 25 (7) July 2006, 8 
[142] Parish, P., ‘The FSA Must Improve its Tribunal Record’, International Law Review, Vol. 25 (7) 
July 2006, 9-10; Mason, I. & Cooke, L., ‘CLG and Jabre-The FSA’s Attitude to Market Abuse’, 
Butterworths JIBL December 2006, 509-510 
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Entrepreneurs in the US can select which state statutes will govern their corporations’ 
internal affairs, irrespective of where their business will be conducted or where the 
major shareholders have their domicile. The courts appear to look to the law of the 
state of incorporation when dealing with a corporation’s internal affairs. The courts 
refer to this choice of law principle as the internal affairs doctrine.[144]  
 
Generally, businesses will flock to incorporate in those jurisdictions with the least 
restraints on management actions. This became know as the ‘race to the bottom’ 
theory. Others see this differently, and advocated the ‘race to the top’ thesis. They 
suggest that the competition between states to rake revenue and other benefits would 
result in the ability to provide better rules and procedures for protection of 
shareholder interests.[145] For the moment, Delaware is home to more than 50% of US 
quoted corporations and 60% of Fortune 500 in view of its competitive corporate tax 
regime and superior specialisation in corporate laws.  
 
In the US, the board comprises the inside (the executive directors), and the outside 
directors (non-executive directors). Before the Enron debacle in 2002, the outside 
                                                 
[143] Hayes, A., ‘Enforcing FSA Principles in Practice’, Butterworths JIBL December 2006, 507-508; 
Alcock, A., ‘Five Years of Market Abuse’, Company Lawyer (2007) 28, 163-171. Professor Alcock 
argues that FSA’s fairly cautious approach to market abuse proceedings will continue over the next 5 
years 
[144] Revised Model Business Corporation Act 1991 
[145] Kraakman, R. & Hansmann, H., ‘The Anatomy of Corporate Law’, OUP: Oxford, 2004 
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directors mostly function as rubber stamps for the decision-making autonomy of the 
inside directors, which included the all-powerful CEOs. This has been attributed to  
time constraints and limited access of independent information. Left very much to 
their own devices, the inside directors have over the years consolidated their power 
and influence by appointing outside board members who are known to be sympathetic 
and supportive of their values and causes.[146] 
 
 
The paucity of control by shareholders and the board has provided management with 
the opportunities to engage in controversial initiatives for self-enrichment rather than 
focusing on the prosperity of the corporation. Added to this are the dangers that such 
management may choose either to be ultra-conservative by not responding to the 
changing business environment (the shirking theory); or recklessly aggressive.[147] 
Both options will ultimately work against the interests of the corporation concerned. 
Increasingly, performance-linked compensation schemes and takeover threats have 
emerged to address these issues. Other than these, the SEC and various institutional 
groups have also been pushing hard for reforms in board composition and 
structure.[148] 
  
                                                 
[146] (a) Mace, M. L., ‘Directors: Myth and Reality’, HBS Press: Massachusetts, 1971; (b) Downes, M. 
& Russ, G. S., ‘Antecedents and Consequences of Failed Governance: the Enron Example’, Corporate 
Governance, Vol. 3(1), 2003, 83-85. This investigation supports the argument that the downfall of 
Enron was in large part to a lack of board ethics and board passivity rather than a lack of regulations; 
(c) Boyd, D. P., ‘Chicanery in the Corporate Culture: WorldCom or World Con?’, Corporate 
Governance, Vol. 3 (1), 2003, 83-85. This case demonstrated how and why board approval of 
‘sweetheart loans’ to the CEO contributed to the financial malaise in the company. 
[147] Gevurtz, F. A., ‘Corporation Law’, West Group: Egan, 2000, 234 
[148] These include the 1992 American Law Institute’s (ALI) ‘Principles of Corporate Governance: 
Analysis and Recommendations; the Revised Model Business Corporation Act 1991: the 1994 
American Bar Association’s ‘Corporate Directors Guidebook’; the 1997 National Association of 
Corporate Directors’ ‘Director Professionalisms’; and the 1997 Business Roundtable’s ‘Statement on 
Corporate Governance’. 
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The fiduciary duty expected of US corporate directors is the function of a duty to act 
carefully, a duty to act lawfully and a duty to act loyally.  The duty of care underpins 
the tort of negligence. The US courts have, however, provided a slight modification to 
this conventional approach. This is partly contributed by variations in state 
corporation statutes. In particular, the Delaware Supreme Court has held in the 
Graham case that the directors had to restrict their supervision to broad strategic 
issues rather than operational matters.[149] Some have argued that the issue is not one 
of directors being held to account for failure to supervise operational affairs but rather 
whether they have put in place a viable system of internal controls, which could have 
done the job.[150] 
 
Where directors are said to be making business decisions, which went bad, the 
consequences are subjected to what has come to be known as the ‘business judgement 
rule’ (BJR). This basically suggests that courts should not intervene and hold directors 
accountable for business decisions turning sour for the corporation; or for which 
reasonable minds might dissent.[151] There is no official definition of this rule though 
it is given recognition in the 1984 Model Business Corporation Act and ALI’s 
Principles of Corporate Governance.[152] As the BJR has been applied under different 
circumstances, it has shown some variations in its meaning and implications over the 
                                                 
[149] Graham v Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. 41 Del. Ch78, 188A 2d 125 (163) 
[150] Cary, W. L., ‘Federalism and Corporate Law Reflections upon Delaware’, (1974) Yale Law 
Journal Vol. 83, No. 4, March, 64; Lipman, F. & Lipman, L. K., ‘Corporate Governance Best Practices: 
Strategies for Public, Private and Not-for Profit Organisations’ John Wiley & Sons, Inc: NJ. 2006, 
Chapter 2. Fiduciary duties under Delaware Law incorporates a duty of care (covering a duty of care 
and a duty to stay informed); and a duty of loyalty (covering a duty to act in good faith, a duty of 
candour, and a duty to avoid conflicts of interests). Further, some 40 states other than Delaware allow 
directors to consider the interests of stakeholders other than equity holders in complying with their 
fiduciary duties. 
[151] Easterbrook, F. H. & Fischel, D. R., ‘The Economic Structure of Corporate Law’, Harvard 
University Press: Massachusetts, 1991, 93-100; Percy v Millaudon, 8 Mart. (N.S.) 68 (La. 1829) 
[152] Section 8.30 of the Act explained that no codification or definition of the rule is provided on 
account of the continuing judicial development on this issue; The ALI Principles of Corporate 
Governance at section 4.01 (c ) provides elaboration for the BJR.  
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years. Its more common interpretation states that courts should refrain from reviewing 
corporate decision-making where reasonable diligence has been applied and where 
such decisions are exercised in good faith, and free of conflicts of interest.[153] 
 
The BJR seemingly appears to suggest that directors need not look over their 
shoulders when making business decisions. This might not always be the case as 
indicated in three 1980s cases and five other more recent cases.[154] In one case, the 
‘…court expressly imposes on directors a duty to monitor with regard to whether the 
corporation’s officers…comply with the law in connection with their activities related 
to the corporation.’[155] Still, in general the BJR is widely recognised because of the 
difficulties associated with the second-guessing of business decisions.[156] Indeed, the 
most probable reason for the justification of the BJR is ‘…based on the USA being a 
litigious country…and the fact that the US legal system consists of derivative suits, 
class actions, and contingency fees…These are unique features adding to the legal 
costs of the business products and services—be it as a result of direct legal costs or 
from insurance cost—and the competitors elsewhere have an unfair advantage as they 
do not incur such additional costs. The BJR enables the US directors to carry on with 
their function(s) unimpeded.’. [157] 
 
                                                 
[153] Aronson v Lewis (1984) 473 A. 2d 805; Kamin v American Express Company (1976) 86 Misc. 2d 
809 
[154] The 1980s cases were Francis v United Jersey Bank (1981) 432 A 2d 814, Smith v Gorkom ( the 
Trans Union case) (1985) 488 A. 2d 858, and Hanson Trust Plc v ML SCM Acquisition Inc. (1986) 
781 F 2d 264. The more recent cases were; Cede v Technicolor Inc. (1993) 634 A. 2d 345, Paramount 
Communications v QVC Network (1994) 637 A. 2d 34, re Caremark International Inc Derivative 
Litigation 698 A. 2d 959 (del. Ch 1996), Rothenberg v Santa Fe Pacific Corp. 1995 WL 523599, 21 
Del J Corp L 309 Del. Ch Ct 5 September 1995, and Kahn v Tremont Corp 694 A. 2d 422 (del 1997). 
The last three cases were referred respectively as Caremark, Rothenberg and Kahn 
[155] Demott, D. A., ‘Legislating Business Judgement-A Comment from the US’, Company Securities 
Law Journal, Vol. 16, Oct. 1998, 576 
[156] Gevurtz, supra note 147, 289-301 
[157] Hemraj, M., ‘Company Directors: The Defence of the BJR’, Company Lawyer (2003) 24 (7), 219, 
paragraph 7 
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Justification for the BJR aside and of greater persuasion is the argument that it is the 
threat and fear of litigation that renders directors to be more diligent and careful in the 
discharge of their duties. ‘The Enron saga has revealed that it will now be exceedingly 
difficult for directors to manipulate and use accounting tricks to show a business in a 
better state than it really is. Directors will have to do better and discharge their duties 
properly by realistically assessing their actions rather than shielding themselves 
against the BJR’.[158] The outcome of Enron and WorldCom gave support to this 
view, but two other recent cases in the Delaware court have reaffirmed its vitality as 
well as the deference given to good faith decisions.[159] 
 
When the perspective of the shareholders’ is moved from owners seeking the 
fulfilment of obligations from their agents or directors to that of investors seeking 
honest and reliable information from management for the making of investment 
decisions, common law as well as securities laws do provide avenues for recovery of 
losses caused by false, incomplete or misleading statements. Under common law, 
where misleading statements are made, victims who suffer losses on account of these 
may void the contracts induced by such frauds, half-truths or misrepresentation and 
sue for recovery of monies from those concerned.  
 
As common law gave only limited protection to investors misled into investing and 
did not extend to victims in ignorance, state and federal securities laws were enacted 
to deal with the latter situation. The 1933 SEA for instance, has withered away the 
common law fraud of scienter. Issuers are held strictly liable for any distortions in the 
                                                 
[158] ibid, paragraph 8 
[159] In re Toys Rs Shareholder Litigation and in re Walt Disney Company Derivatives Litigation No. 
15452, 2005 Del. Ch LEXIS 113 
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registration statement.[160] Persons who signed the registration statement, every 
director of issuer, every experts who certify on any part of the registration statement, 
and the underwriters concerned will now assume liability unless they can prove due 
diligence.[161] The intention is to motivate these persons to ensure the accuracy of the 
registration statement. The Act also carries liabilities for those involved without the 
victims having to prove reliance.  
 
Appropriate provisions were also made in the Act to extend liability to distortions 
made external of the registration statement.[162] The act of making fraudulent, false or 
misleading statement in the initial issuance of securities is prohibited by the Act. Its 
violation may lead to actions by the SEC for injunctive relief or criminal 
proceedings.[163] To address the transactions of stocks in the secondary market, the 
1934 SEA was introduced.[164] The significance of this Act lay with its strong focus 
on disclosure requirements for securities as stipulated by the SEC. These refer to the 
annual 10-k forms; the quarterly 10-Q forms; and the 10-k forms for the report on 
significant events.[165] Through the provisions in the 1934 SEA, a timely and constant 
flow of information on widely held securities are assured to investors in the market. 
Investors who suffered losses on reliance of information so disclosed which turned 
                                                 
[160] Section 11 of the 1933 SEA 
[161] ibid 
[162] Section 129 (a) (2); Gustafson v Alloyd Company, 523 US 561, 115 S.ct 1061 (1995); Where a 
listed company is liable under federal securities laws for misstatements or omissions in documents filed 
with the SEC, a director of that company may also be liable if the directors is judged to be in control of 
the company; the director signed those documents, or; he fails to establish a personal due diligence 
defence. 
[163] The court in Aaron v SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 701-02 (1980) has held that subsection 17 (a) (2) and 17 
(a) (3) 1933 SEA does not require a demonstration of scienter, and negligence will suffice. 
[164] Section 12 (a) 1934 SEA requires securities traded on any national exchange to register the 
securities concerned 
[165] Section 13 (a) 1934 SEA; Post-Enron, the SEC became more willing to invoke disclosure 
obligations under Regulation S-K of the SEA 1934 to act even against independent directors. These 
were reflected In the Matter of the Walt Disney Company, Admin. Proc. 3-11777 (20/12/2004), and 
SEC v Chancellor Corp. et al., No. 03-10762 (Mel) (D. Mass.); Cheffins & Black, supra note 60 (b), 
1392-1399. The 2 professors here argued that the US legal environment is uniquely hospitable to 
litigations against directors in general. Despite this, outside directors of listed corporations in general 
encounter only a remote chance of breaching corporate duties because of access to BJR. 
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out to be false or misleading might enjoy cause of action. The perpetrators of such 
misleading information will then have to assume the burden of proof that they have 
acted in good faith and have no knowledge of their untruthfulness.[166] 
 
 
More important is Rule 10b-5, an administrative rule introduced by the SEC as 
empowered by Section 10(b) of the 1934 SEA. This has been used in claims against 
false and misleading statements.[167] Rule 10b-5 prohibits the making of false or 
material misstatements of material facts to induce transactions in securities. Failures 
to disclose all pertinent facts can lead to the making of misstatement even though such 
statements can be literally true on their own.[168] The making of overly optimistic or 
pessimistic opinions or estimates of financial projections is particularly susceptible to 
this charge.[169] 
 
The Supreme Court has held that stock purchase victims could avail themselves of 
implied private cause of actions under Rule 10b-5 in addition to those remedies 
expressly made available under the provisions of the 1933 SEA.[170] Unlike actions by 
the SEC or federal prosecutor, private claims have to contend more with the issues of 
reliance, causation, and remedies. The complications are compounded by the fact that 
most Rule 10b-5 cases do not fall within the ambit of direct dealings between victims 
and perpetrators. They are more commonly associated with the issuance of misleading 
statements like arising from the improper reporting of OBF packages for instance.  
 
                                                 
[166] Section 18 (a) 1934 SEA 
[167] This section makes it unlawful for the conduct of securities transactions to use any means of cross-
commerce, inclusive of facilities in national securities transactions any manipulative instruments in 
violation of rule imposed by the SEC. 
[168] SEC v Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F 2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) 
[169] Virginia Bankshares, Inc v Sandberg 501 US 1083, 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991) 
[170] Kardon v National Gypsum Co. 73 F Supp. 798 (Ed Pa. 1947); Superintendent of Insurance of 
New York v Bankers Life and Casualty Co. 404 US 6 (1971).  
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The Supreme Court resolved this issue, when it upheld a decision in a District Court 
case that relied on the commonly known ‘fraud on the market theory’, which is a 
presumption of law grounded in the efficient capital markets hypothesis.[171] The 
fraud on the market theory demonstrates a mechanism through which false statements 
can cause losses to victims who might never be aware of it. The 1995 amendments to 
the 1934 SEA have, nonetheless, placed the burden of demonstrating loss causation 
on the victims.[172] In other words, the victims will have to show that general 
economic factors could not have generated the same damage. This fraud on the 
market doctrine may be criticised for creating an incentive for investors to remain 
uninformed and ignorant resulting in a less efficient market. 
 
Financial Advisors and Other Gatekeepers 
 
Gatekeepers as adopted in this study refer to ‘intermediaries who provide verification 
and certification services to investors’. These cover verification of corporate financial 
statements by auditors; evaluation of corporate prospect by financial analysts or 
creditworthiness by debt rating agencies; and the work of solicitors in IPO and related 
functions. [173] Though corporations pay the evaluation and related fees paid to 
gatekeepers, the market recognises that the latter has less incentive to deceive than the 
former as they are said to pledge their reputational capital on the line. Theoretically, 
gatekeepers are argued to be unlikely to risk their hard-earned reputational capital for 
                                                 
[171] Basic, Inc v Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 108 S. Ct 978 (1988). The Supreme Court whilst formally 
endorsing the fraud on the market theory of reliance in cases of securities fraud also found that the 
presumption of reliance may be rebutted by the defendant demonstrating that the price was not affected 
by their misrepresentation, or that the plaintiff did not trade in reliance on the integrity of the market 
price; Affiliated Ute Citizens Utah v United States 406 US 128 (1972); TSC Industries v Northway Inc 
426 US 438 (1976); Blackie v Barrack 524 F 2d 891; Duffy, M., ‘Fraud on the Market’, (2005) 29 
MULR, 621-664 
[172] Rule 21D (b) (4) 1934 SEA 
[173] Coffee Jr., J. C., ‘What Caused Enron? A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s’ , in 
Clarke, T. (ed.), ‘Theories of Corporate Governance’, Routledge: New York322-, 2004,  
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any single client, as they do not share in the benefits from corporate fraud. The US 
courts generally uphold this view.[174] 
 
Yet, the 1990s showed significant gatekeepers’ failure. The ‘general deterrence’ and 
‘bubble’ theories seek to explain this.[175] The former suggest that both the threat of 
private enforcement and prospect of public enforcement declined in the 1990s. The 
former became about because of the shortening of the statute of limitations applicable 
to securities fraud; the Supreme Court Decision to eliminate private ‘aiding and 
abetting’ liability in securities fraud cases; the effects of the 1995 Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) and the 1998 Securities Litigation Uniform 
Standards Act (SLUSA).[176]  The latter theory holds that in classic bubble situations, 
investors practically reduced their dependence on gate-keeping services because of 
their optimistic assumption that the extraordinary returns will persist. 
 
 
As some gatekeepers may become more prepared to risk beating the system, the 
Supreme Court held that under Rule 10b-5 various gatekeepers might participate 
sufficiently in the deceit such that their own conduct might constitute the construction 
of a misrepresentation.[177] These are exemplified through the making of financial 
reports or expressions through opinion letters when they are aware that these will be 
used to perpetuate fraudulent acts in connection with securities transactions.[178] 
 
                                                 
[174] Coffee Jr supra note 173 citing the case of DiLeo v Ernst & Young 901 F.2d 624 (7th Cir. 1990) 
[175] Coffee Jr supra note 173  
[176] Coffee Jr supra note 173 citing the cases of Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v Gilbertson 
501 US. 350 (1991) and Central Bank of Denver v First Interstate Bank of Denver 511 US. 164 (1994) 
in support for the first and second reasons. 
[177] Gevurtz, supra note 147 
[178] ibid, citing the cases of Anixter v Home-State Products Co., 77F 3d 480 (3rd Cir. 1994) and Kline v 
First Western Government Securities, Inc., 24 F. 3d 480 (3rd. 1994) 
 185
Additionally, omission may also lead to misrepresentation of material facts when 
corporations and connected gatekeepers fail to correct mistakes, which they have 
become aware of. This can constitute a form of violation of Rule 10b-5.[179] 
Corporations and gatekeepers also have a duty to update statements, which have been 
rendered obsolete by subsequent events.[180]  
 
Finally, it has been further argued that probably the higher competitive environment, 
enhanced conflicts of interest, and the perceived decline for the reputational capital 
market caused gatekeepers to become more prepared to sacrifice their reputational 
capital and hence assumed greater legal risks.[181] Unfortunately for them, they 
became the targets of various class action suits subsequently when the market boom 




Four bodies are potentially involved in the enforcement of ethics and standards, 
namely; the State Boards of Accountancy; the SEC; the AICPA Professional Ethics 
Division; and the Joint Trial Board comprising the Ethics Division and the State 
Boards concerned. Members faced disciplinary actions in the form of expulsion, 
suspension or admonishment. Of critical importance to practising accountants are 
violations pertaining to state licensing statutes, which can lead to suspension or 
revocation from practising. 
 
Blameworthiness is fast becoming the bane of the auditing profession. When 
corporations performed badly or worse still collapsed, investors and creditors not only 
                                                 
[179] ibid, citing the case of Backman v Polaroid Corp., 910 F. 2d 751 (1st Cir. 1990) 
[180] ibid, citing he case of Greenfield v Heublein, Inc., 742 F. 2d 751 (3rd Cir. 1984) 
[181] Coffee Jr., J. C., ‘Gatekeepers: The Professions and Corporate Governance’, OUP: Oxford, 2006 
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looked towards directors but also third parties like financial advisers, attorneys and 
auditors for financial recovery.[182] In most instances, professional service firms prefer 
to settle out of court because of the adverse impact on office morale and business ties.  
 
In the United States, common law is state dependent. This means that courts in a 
particular state are not obliged to follow the case precedents in other states; but may 
borrow principles from other states where it does not have the pertinent precedents of 
its own. Courts are bound to follow statutes enacted by the federal or state legislatures 
unless these conflict with the federal or state constitutions. Courts will resort to their 
own interpretations where provisions of the statutes concerned are not explicit 
enough. In respect of audit statements and other related services, auditors may be 
liable for ordinary negligence, gross negligence, or fraud. To achieve these, the 
victims have to prove that they had relied and suffered damages arising from 
misstatements in the audited financial statements; and that adequate employment of 
Generally Acceptable Accounting Practices (GAAP) should have spotted such 
misstatements. The courts have reaffirmed the GAAP as the appropriate framework 
for evaluating fairness.[183] 
 
Ordinary negligence occurs when auditors fail to exercise reasonable care in their 
work. Gross negligence occurs when auditors fail to exercise minimum care. Fraud 
occurs when auditors issue opinions on financial statements or audit reports, which 
they know to be untrue. It differs from gross negligence in that the auditors not only 
                                                 
[182] Konrath, L. E., ‘Auditing: A Risk Analysis Approach’, South Western Publication: Cincinnati, 
2002, citing Arthur Anderson’s contributing negligence of US $220 million (WSJ, 10/12/1998, B15) in 
favour of Waste Management’s shareholders; BDO Seidman’s negligence payment of US $44 million 
over failure to detect any inventory overstatement (WSJ, 26/04/1999, B4), and Ernst & Yong 
negligence suit from Jackson National Life Insurance Company over failure to detect inflated sales 
(WSJ, 30/03/1999, B5); The Standard Securities Action Clearinghouse reported that in 1998, 235 
corporations were identified as defendants in federal class actions securities fraud lawsuit. 
[183] U.S. v Simon et al., 425 F. 2d 796 (2nd Cir. 1969) 
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lack reasonable foundation for their beliefs but also are aware of the falsity and 
intention to deceive. There is therefore a continuum of misrepresentation extending 
from innocent (belief with sufficient basis) to fraudulent (with awareness of 
falsity).[184] However, where there is collusion and senior management override of 
internal control systems and procedures, it is unlikely that auditors will be caught with 
gross negligence.[185] Nonetheless, gross negligence can occur where there is 
recklessness, and where adequate implementation of GAAP should have uncovered 
the errors or fraud (the Ultramares principle).[186] The case for fraud against auditors 
is founded on intentional deceit and auditor complicity.[187] 
 
Within the context of contract law, auditors may face contractual liability to their 
clientele for ordinary negligence, gross negligence, and fraud. This is normally not 
extended to third parties because of the privity of contract principle. This limitation 
does not apply where a third party is known by the auditor to rely on the audited 
statement.[188] This was reaffirmed in another case where it was ruled that auditors 
should be held liable for negligence for careless financial misrepresentation, which is 
used by an actually foreseen and limited class of persons.[189] Even when an auditor’s 
opinion is attached with a disclaimer, this principle still holds.[190] The courts have 
also held that for privity to be extended to third parties; auditors have to be aware of 
the specified use of the audited statements by a specified third party and their reliance 
                                                 
[184] Konrath, supra 182 
[185]  Konrath, supra note 182 citing the case of Cenco Inc. v Seidman & Seidman, 686 F. 2d 449 (CA 7 
1982) 
[186] ibid, citing the case of Ultramares v Touche, 225 N. Y. 170, 174 N. E. 441 (N. Y. Ct. App. 1931) 
[187] ibid 
[188] Guy, D. M., Alderman, C. W. & Winters, A. J., ‘Auditing’, The Dryden Press: Fort Worth, 1999 
citing the case of Rusch Factors, Inc v Levin, 248 F. Supp. 85 (D.R.H. 1968) 
[189] Konrath supra note 184, citing the case of Machata v Seidman & Seidman, 644 So. 2d 114 (Fla. 
App. 4 Dist, 1994) 
[190] Konrath, supra note 184 citing the case of Rhode Island Hospital Trust National Bank v Swartz 455 
F. 2d 847 (4th Cir. 1972) 
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on these for those expressed purposes.[191] The California Supreme Court has also 
made provisions for the possibility that third parties specifically identified in audit 
contracts as beneficiaries could sue under suitable conditions.[192] All these implies 
that the law involving auditors’ negligence to third parties is still evolving not least in 
states which had to grapple with the issue, but also those which have yet to address it. 
 
Both the 1933 SEA and the 1934 SEA expanded auditors’ liability to third parties 
beyond the boundary of common law.[193] Here, the plaintiff will not need to prove 
reliance, but instead the defendant will have to demonstrate that the former is aware 
that the disputed section of the reported document is false.[194] Section 10(b) of the 
1934 SEA and Rule 10b-5 are also wide enough to create an implied liability for 
auditors, but unlikely to attract strict liability due to the Supreme Court ruling that 
negligence was not adequate to violate Rule 19b-5 as there must be scienter.[195] 
 
Errant conduct of auditors may also attract criminal liability, principally under the 
securities fraud and false-filling statute under the 1933 SEA. In particular, Section 
32(a) of the Act prohibits violations with intent of any provisions of the 1934 SEA or 
                                                 
[191] Konrath, supra note 184, citing the case of Credit Alliance Corporation v Arthur Anderson & Co. 
No. 218 (N. Y. Ct. App. July 2, 1985) 
[192] ibid, citing the case of Bily v Arthur Young & Co., No. S017199 (Cal. Aug. 27,1992): Hemraj, M. 
B., ‘Taking Stock of Caparo’, Company Lawyer (2006) 27 (3), 82-89. Here, the researcher argues that, 
‘The Courts in the US, in their attempt to limit the indeterminate class of people to whom an auditor 
may be liable, require the plaintiff to rely on the audit report which was not foreseen but also 
acknowledged by the auditor. Besides the plaintiff, being a known user of the financial statement, a 
third party claiming reliance would succeed if the sole reason for audit work should be for their benefit. 
Further more, the relationship between them has to be equivalent to privity-based on direct 
communication and representation’. 
[193] Guy, Alderman, & Winters, supra note188 ; s. 119 a (o) 1933 SEA 
[194] Gervutz, supra note 147 citing S. 11 1933 SEA, which does away with the common law 
requirement of scienter and perpetuators are held strictly liable for any misrepresentations in the 
registration statement 
[195] Gervutz supra note 147, citing the case of Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 96 S. Ct. 
1375, 47 I. Ed. 2d 668 (1676).  
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of SEC rules under it.[196] For such criminal proceedings, the U.S. Justice Department 
or the state attorney general will file for violation of a criminal statute as plaintiffs. 
The primary defence available for auditors in this situation is to argue on the basis of 
good faith and the demonstration of due care supported by thorough documentation of 
the audit.[197]  
 
For the express purpose of overseeing public accounting firms, the SOA provided for 
the establishment of the Public Company Account Oversight Board (PCAOB).[198] 
The PCAOB is, however, not entirely autonomous as the SEC has some level of 
oversight over it.[199] In line with PCAOB’s primary objective, all audit firms 
performing work for listed corporations are required to register under it.[200] The 
PCAOB will levy a registration fee, which will vary from time to time for this 
purpose.[201] The main obligations of the PCAOB are the setting up of auditing, 
quality control, ethics, independence and other related standards in connection with 
the compilation of audited statements.[202] Foreign public accounting firms are also 
subjected to the Act and the oversight of the PCAOB.[203] Sanctions in the form of 
censure to financial penalties can be imposed on errant firms.[204] 
 
                                                 
[196] Guy, Alderman, & Winters, supra note 188. Here, the researchers explained that auditors may also 
be criminally prosecuted under the mail fraud statute; s. 24 of the 1933 SEA; s. 404 of the Uniform 
Securities Act; various state criminal fraud statutes; Rule 102 of the SEC’s own internal rules which 
empowers the SEC to sanction those who engaged in improper or unethical conduct from practising 
before it. The relevant partners of Deloitte & Touche and Arthur Anderson respectively auditors of 
Fine Host Corporation (in 2001) and Sunbeam, Inc (2003) were barred from practising for 2-3 years. 
[197] Konrath, supra note 184 
[198] (a) Backer, L. C., ‘Surveillance and Control: Privatizing and Nationalizing Corporate Monitoring 
After Sarbanes-Oxley’, Law Review of Michigan State University, forthcoming 2004 citing 101 (a)-(b) 
SOA; (b) Yakhou, M. & Dorweiler, V. P., ‘Corporate Governance Reform: Impact on Accounting and 
Auditing’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 5 (1) 2005, 39-44 
[199] Backer, supra note 198, citing s. 107 (a) 
[200] ibid, citing s. 102 (a) 
[201] ibid, citing s. 102 (f) 
[202] ibid, citing s. 103 
[203] ibid, citing sections 106 (a) (1), 106 (c ) 
[204] ibid, citing sections 104-105 
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To deter and prevent future conflict of interests between auditing firms and their 
clientele, the SOA widens the prohibitions of non-audit services, which can be offered 
to audit customers.[205] It even excludes tax services not pre-approved in advance by a 
corporation’s audit committee.[206] Similar to much of the other provisions in the Act, 
exemptions from these provisions are nonetheless available.[207] Further in order to 
enhance objectivity in audit work, an audit partner can now serve only for five 
financial years on rotational basis.[208] 
 
Aggressive Enforcements 
Post-Enron saw an apparently unprecedented series of fast-paced fraud enforcement 
cases made against corporations and high profile corporate leaders in the US. It has 
been argued that the charges avoided accounting matters and seems to fall into the 
categories of non-accounting behaviour (like electricity trading fraud); behaviour 
consequential to core accounting issues (like failure to declare tax liability and 
obstructing justice); and behaviour incidental to executing accounting practices (like 
wire fraud and aiding and abetting). Whilst effective in securing convictions in many 
of these corporate cases and providing perhaps good deterrent lessons for corporate 
America, it fails to give the signal against the use of manipulative accounting devices 
for unjust enrichment or other improper agenda. Such creative compliance practices 
could be deterred to some extent by the use of deferred prosecution agreements and 
the extra-legal developments of ‘corporate social responsibility’.[209] The former, 
                                                 
[205] ibid, citing s. 201 (g) 
[206] ibid, citing s. 201 (h) 
[207] ibid, citing s. 201 (b) 
[208] ibid, citing s. 203 (j) 
[209] (a) McBarnet, D., ‘After Enron Will ‘Whiter than White Collar Crime’ Still Wash?’, British 
Journal of Criminology, (2006) 46, 1091-1109; (b) Rossbacher, H. H., ‘The Business of Corruption, or 
is the Business of Business Corruption?’, JFC Vol. 13 (2) 2006, 202-213. The deferred prosecution 
mechanism is considered by the researcher to debase criminal sanctions and transforming prosecutions 
into a ‘budgetable expense’; (c ) Robinson, J. K. & Urofsky, P. E. & Pantel, C. R., ‘Deferred 
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however, needs to be used with more thought due to recent judicial criticisms that 
overzealous prosecutors in the KPMG tax cases may have violated the 
constitution.[210] 
 
UK and US Comparative Positions 
The use and disclosure of OBF packages in the US and the UK are converging along 
common themes in the aftermath of the Enron and related financial debacles. The US 
has responded mainly through the SOA and the UK through various reviews of its 
corporate governance code (as exemplified by the reviews conducted by Derek Higgs 
and John Smith), which culminated with the 2003 Combined Code and subsequently 
further modified in June 2006. The main thing to note where corporate governance is 
concerned is that the US basically adopts the market-pricing framework in contrast to 
the modified stewardship model embraced by the UK and various parts of Europe. 
Flowing from this, the concern in the US is about rules, which corporations have to 
certify that they have complied with. Whereas in the UK, the focus is on how 
corporations are being managed, risks management, and whether and how such 
matters are being communicated to the shareholders. 
 
The most distinctive difference is that in the US prescriptive system, public listed 
corporations are required to comply with prescribed rules, certify that they have done 
so, and report these accordingly to the relevant oversight bodies. In the largely 
                                                                                                                                            
Prosecutions and the Independent Monitor’, IJDG, Vol. 2 (4) 2005, 325-347. Here, the researchers also 
question the value of such agreements in the context of uncertainties over eligibility criteria, sanctions 
limits, and the cost of maintaining an independent monitor 
[210] Robinson, supra note 250 (c ); Waldmeir, P., ‘US Eases Rules on Corporate Confidentiality’, 
Financial Times, 13/12/06, 9. The 12/12/2006 ‘McNulty Memo’ modifies the 2003 ‘Thomson Memo’ 
by permitting attorney-client communications only in rare situations and limiting the powers of the 
prosecutors to require companies to cut off legal fees to employees under investigation. The McNulty 
Memo is available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/speech/2006/mcnulty_memo.pdf  
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principles-based UK system, there is reliance on ‘the comply or explain’ mechanism. 
Hence, it is said that in the US it is about compliance, certification and reporting and 
in the UK it is about doing what is right for the corporation. 
 
 
The US also puts greater relative emphasis on the separation of owners and 
management by insisting upon having majority independent directors, and 100% 
independent membership of its nominating and remuneration committees. The UK 
merely requires balanced representation for its board and other board committees.  
This often results in the UK having a more balance orientation from its board. 
Flowing from this, it is claimed that judgement on people issues is allowed to flourish. 
‘It’s the soft issues around board dynamics, body language, which supports a more 
entrepreneurial approach’.[211] 
 
The UK argument for balanced representation on the board is based on the premise 
that it will provide for greater accountability to ensure stability and long-lasting value 
for shareholders. In contrast, a US board is commonly dominated by a powerful CEO. 
This will mean that the board will hear from only one voice, and when his actions 
become fraudulent, but still appears to comply with the rules, then it will be difficult 
to detect these, let alone challenge them.[212]  
                                                 
[211] (a) Perry, M., ‘How UK and US Differ on Corporate Governance’, Finance Week, 13/07/2005, 15; 
(b) Vasilescu, A. M. & Russello, G. J., ‘As Gatekeepers, Independent Directors of Public Companies 
Faced Additional Security and Liability in the Post-Enron/WorldCom World’, IJDG, Vol. 3 (1) 2006, 
3-15. This research demonstrates that independent directors in the US are now taking actions and 
exercising their powers in the wake of settlements in WorldCom and Enron and SEC’s recent 
enforcement actions under the SOA. These twin developments indicate the vulnerability of independent 
directors to real financial, regulatory and criminal liability if they fail to execute their duties properly. 
[212] Keenan, J., ‘Corporate Governance in UK/USA Boardrooms’, Corporate Governance, Vol. 12 (2) 
April 2004, 172-179. This research indicates that some 75% of S & P 500 US corporations have the 
functions of the CEO and Chairman residing in the same person, whilst this is not usually the case in 
the UK; Class actions in 2005 against outside/independent directors in the US (10 in WorldCom 
settling with US$ 50m, and 18 in Enron settling US$ 13m) have caused them to respond by taking 
greater charge of corporate affairs when confronted with regulator scrutiny. These are exemplified in 
Computer Associates (SEC Litigation Release no. 18891 (22/09/2004) and AIG (AIG Press Release, 
21/04/2005) 
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This probably helps explain partially the higher incidence of frauds in the US in 
comparison to that in the UK as powerful inside directors and financial intermediaries 
collude to circumvent the rules to manipulate earnings report for improper agenda. A 
more precise comparison between financial governance as updated by the Turnbull 
Committee in the UK and by the SOA is provided below: [213] 
 
• UK: Guidance should not be confined to financial reporting but should cover 
all internal controls. 
US: There is focus on financial reporting controls. 
 
• UK: There should be no restrictions on corporations’ strategies to employ the 
guidance in manners appropriate to their own respective circumstances. The 
‘comply or explain’ principle should continue to be in use.  
            US: All corporations are required to comply with all rules. 
 
 
• UK: It is not appropriate for board of directors to comment on the 
effectiveness of a corporation’s internal control system in its annual reports 
and accounts. 
            US: Directors have to personally attest to the effectiveness of internal controls 
            in the annual report and accounts. CEOs and CFOs in particular have to certify 
           on the truthfulness and fairness of annual financial statements. 
 
• UK: External auditors’ responsibilities in respect of a corporation’s internal 
control statement should not be extended. 
 
US: External auditors are required to attest the effectiveness of the internal 
controls of corporations. 
                                                 
[213] supra note 211 (a), paragraphs 9 & 12 
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The broad financial governance framework appears to dictate how OBF packages 
have to be handled in financial reports. The UK in adopting the principles approach 
has come to rely on substance or commercial reality principle when dealing with the 
reporting and disclosure of OBF packages. However, this has been permeated to some 
extent by the rule-based approach on account of the adoption of the IFRS, which are 
to some extent rules-based especially in respect of IAS 32 and IAS 39 as discussed 
earlier.  
 
Where legal implications are concerned; directors, external auditors, financial 
advisers, and financial regulators are all exposed to litigation risks in varying degrees. 
Cases like Enron and WorldCom in the US have demonstrated that rules for the 
reporting of OBF packages have been circumvented in various ways. The UK on the 
other hand witnessed much less errant behaviour in respect of the reporting and 
disclosures on OBF after the introduction of FRS 5. This financial standard was 
formulated for guidance after various financial debacles in the 1980s.  
 
It is as yet inconclusive as to whether FRS 5 will completely eradicate the incidence 
of financial misrepresentation, as shown by the financial debacles in Barings, 
Independent Insurance Group, Farepak, and Transtec after its introduction.[214] This 
has become to some extent academic, as the UK has now embraced IAS 32 and 39, 
which operate more in the US rules-based tradition, at least where some OBF schemes 
are concerned. Early indications appear to show that the overall impact of IFRS on 
UK financial reporting is not unduly disruptive. 
                                                 
[214] Jopson, B., ‘PwC Fined for Audit Failures Linked to Transtec Collapse; ‘How Transtec’s Troubles 
Tarnished PwC’, Financial Times, 14/12/2006, 1 & 20 respectively 
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In comparison, early evidence on the impact of new rules introduced by the SOA has 
resulted in a significant increased of Financial Statement Restatements but moderate 
increase in prosecution of various financial indiscretions. Again, further analysis is 
necessary to have a more conclusive understanding of the impact of the new OBF 
reporting rules in order to appreciate their legal implications for direct and indirect 
parties involved in their employment and financial reporting. 
 
Not all earnings and liability disclosures are illegal acts.[215] ‘It is precisely because 
earnings management is not per se illegal, and the valuation of assets and liabilities 
often contains an element of legitimate subjectivity that the line between aggressive 
accounting and violative conduct requires careful attention’.[216] The conflicts of 
interest between management and shareholders at times cause public corporations’ 
reported financial performance to diverge from their actual performance. The liability 
of those directly and indirectly responsible may then be evaluated under the legal 
standards of financial fraud. These are of serious legal implications to corporate 
directors, auditors, financial advisers, and financial regulators; particularly where the 
intention to defraud is established. 
 
Whilst those associated with the use of OBF and the manner it should be reported 
have to be mindful of the legal implications, the confidence and integrity of capital 
markets can be sustained only if corporate financial disclosure is reasonably explicit 
and reliable. ‘Thus, the boundaries of acceptable accounting must be policed 
                                                 
[215] DeAmgelo, H. et al., ‘Accounting Changes in Troubled Companies’, Journal of Accounting and 
Economics 7, 1994, 113; Norris, F., ‘High and Low Finance: Forcing reality in Accounting of Tiny 
Firms’, New York Times, 13/10, 2006, C1. This article noted that the total number of restatements 
went up in 2005 and early 2006 especially among smaller firms. It suggested that this may be attributed 
to the effectiveness of the work of the Public Company Oversight Board on larger companies. 
[216] Sauer, R. C., ‘Financial Statement Fraud: The boundaries of Liability Under the Federal Securities 
Laws’, The Business Lawyer, Vol. 57, May 2002, 955-997 
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aggressively. Given the motives for deceit that will always exist, opportunity for fraud 
must be limited by the constant refining of our standards in the light of commercial 
reality’.[217] 
 
The US authorities have effectively used deferred prosecution agreements and plea-
bargaining to confront corporate wrongdoers and in the process achieved higher 
enforcement success rates. In contrast, the UK authorities mainly through the FSA 
prefer the civil route because of the relatively higher hurdles they faced in serious 
white-collar crimes. The continued obstacles faced by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) 
is reflected by its December 14, 2006 decision to cease its investigation of alleged 
improper financial misconduct perpetuated by BAE and various members of the Saudi 
royal family. The Attorney-General emphasised that the SFO’s decision ’…was taken 
out of necessity to balance the need to maintain the rule of law against the wider 
public interest, and that no weight had been extended to commercial interests or to the 
national economic interest’.[218]  
 
It is to be noted here that about a week prior to this, the Saudi authorities had 
indicated that it would withdraw future contracts for BAE if the SFO does not cease 
its investigations and that would have meant the loss of a lot of jobs and export 
                                                 
[217] ibid, 997; Green, S. P., ‘Lying, Cheating, and Stealing: A Moral Theory of White-Collar Crime’, 
2006, OUP: Oxford. The flexible US judicial approach for modern misleading offences in the US (like 
mail fraud, securities fraud and theft by deception) recognises that a statement that is literally true may 
constitute fraud as along as it is both material and made with the intent to deceive. These include, 
‘…representations as to the past or present, or suggestions and promises as to the future (Durland v US 
161 US 306 (1896), 313-314)’, and disclosures required by securities laws which are’…measured not 
by literal truth, but by the ability of the material accurately to inform rather than mislead prospective 
buyers (Lucia v Prospect Street High Income Portfolio, Inc 36 F 3d 170 (1st Cir 1994), 175’; McMahan 
v Warehouse Entertainment, Inc, 900 F 2d (2nd Cir 1990); Langervoort, D. C., ‘Half-Truths: Protecting 
Mistaken Inferences by Investors and Others’, (1999) 52, Standford Law Review 87. This article 
addressed treatment of half-truths, misrepresentation, and nondisclosure in securities fraud cases. 
[218] Attroney-General (Lord Goldsmith) Statement to the House of Lords, 14/12/2006; Robertson, D. & 
Baldwin, T., ‘US Justice Department to Scrutinise BAE’s Saudi Deals’, The Times, 27/06/2007, 48. 
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income. Despite this episode, and the proliferation of the use of SPEs or secret trusts 
in British tax havens in Jersey and the Cayman Islands, regulatory enforcement of 
financial services laws in the UK is still comparatively less subject to political 
intrusion than that in the US as indicated in earlier discussions.[219] 
 
At this current stage, FSA in comparison to the SEC is facing some criticisms over its 
handling of illegal insider trading. This casts doubts on the regulator’s enforcement 
effectiveness and with it some apprehensions over its long-term effects on the 
integrity of the UK capital market. Whilst the SEC has filed more than 300 insider 
trading cases since 2001 against more than 600 corporations and individuals, the FSA 
took actions only on 8 cases since 2001 and none for the first half of 2007.  
 
The FSA pointed to the difficulties of enforcement and enormity of the tasks 
involved; but more importantly the reality that it lacks the tools SEC has, partly 
because UK law prohibits it from using plea bargains or deferred prosecutions 
agreements. FSA’s own annual ‘market cleanliness’ surveys since 2000 suggests that 
illegal insider trading may have occurred prior to 25% of announced deals.[220] Illegal 
insider trading like OBF deceptive and manipulating reporting is market abuse 
offences. This suggests that FSA’s enforcement of OBF wrongdoings may also 
require a more robust approach. In this respect, the idea of making OBF a category of 
monitored activity may merit further study. 
 
                                                 
[219] O’Brien, J., ‘Beyond Compliance: Testing the Limits of Reforming the Governance of Wall 
Street’, International Journal of Governance and Ethics, Vol. 1 (2/3) 2004, 173 
[220] Xydias, A. & Lumley, J., ‘UK Agency Struggles over Insider Trading’, International Herald 
Tribune, 13/06/2007, 15. The article highlighted some examples of this phenomenon, which includes 
Hanson, Northgate, and Reuters. 
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Finally, directors, auditors, and financial advisors in the US in comparison to those in 
the UK in general face a legal environment uniquely conducive for litigation against 
them. These have been attributed to the widespread use of class action and derivative 
suits in the US; the treatment of plaintiffs’ attorneys as entrepreneurs seeking out 
legal violations and suitable clientele; and the fact that US litigants have to pay their 
own legal expenses regardless of case outcome. As a counterbalance, however, US 
directors and in particular inside directors are shielded from out-of-pocket payments 
by the access to the BJR, corporate charter provisions that eliminate liability for 
breach of duty of care, indemnification, and D&O insurance. In contrast, the shields 
against liability for directors in the UK are comparatively weaker, but lawsuits are 
also of lesser significance.[221] 
 
Still, to allay the fears that the UK may go the US way because of the emergence of 
case likes Equitable Life and Independent Energy Holdings where non-executive 
directors were made to pay out-of-pocket expenses, the UK 2004 company law 
amendment provides for the advancement of legal expenses and indemnification in 
third-party suits and the purchase of better D&O protection. As for the possibility of 
US style ‘send a message’ lawsuits, it has been argued that this is unlikely to gain a 
foothold in the UK because ‘Politics is less likely to come into play with British 
public sector pension scheme since the trustees are nominated by members rather than 
selected by politicians (as in the US) and the trustees delegate management of 
investments to advisors’.[222] 
 
 
                                                 
[221] Cheffins & Black, supra note 60 (b), 1419 
[222] ibid, 1420 
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                                                        Chapter Five 
 




The previous analysis of various corporate scandals in both the US and the UK has 
suggested that some businesses have been motivated by financial greed and the need 
to hide poor performance as they manipulate the use of OBF. Such actions have 
generated serious financial and legal implications for the preparers, auditors and 
advisors involved in corporate financial reporting. The analysis has also shown how 
the initial use of OBF for financial window-dressing can lead down the slippery slope 
to less honourable applications under heightened commercial pressures. These are, 
however, counterbalanced by those who are able to use OBF in more constructive 
ways for liquidity enhancement and lower financial costs. This chapter will examine 
more closely the motivations and legal risks associated with the manner of OBF 
applications by undertaking the cross-case analysis of three pairs of UK and US listed 
corporations.  
 
The first pair in each jurisdiction comprised corporations using OBF with fraudulent 
motives; the second pair for window-dressing of its financials, and; the third for 
beneficial economic reasons. Intra-country cross-case analysis will compare and 
contrast the three pairs of cases within each jurisdiction. To compare and contrast the 
cases between each jurisdiction, inter-country cross-case analysis will be undertaken 
thereafter. A summary of the cases used in this study is provided in Annex 1 (One). 




US Cross-Case Analysis 
 
 
Manipulative Use Cases 
 
Analysis of the first two cases namely, Enron and WorldCom appears to suggest that  
 
OBF mechanisms were used in fraudulent ways. Both corporations started off as well 
run profitable companies involved in dominant global scale businesses. It would  
appear that their initial success resulted in massive support from Wall Street and from  
 
the corridors of political power in Washington. Their success through massive  
 
acquisition strategies appear to produce phenomenal growth and profit results. 
 
 
Investment bankers, financial underwriters, rating agencies and analysts also 
acknowledged Enron and WorldCom as global innovative corporations of  
the future. Their consequent powerful support drove these corporate stocks to dizzy 
 
heights. These financial intermediaries and the executives and directors of the two 
 
companies made huge profits. For as long as the profits made were factual and above 
 
board, no significant harm came to investors and creditors. 
 
 
Problems arose when the reported profits could not be sustained as a result of 
weakening market conditions for their core businesses and huge losses amassed by 
their substantial acquisitions. The resulting huge losses and further acquisitions had to 
be funded by further debts and equities. To avoid downgrading by the rating agencies 
which would have disastrous effects on their stock values and future capacity to raise 
funds both corporations chose to make massive use of OBF and related creative 
accounting techniques to manipulate their financial reporting. The cover initially 
provided by the SPEs was finally removed by internal whistleblowers relaying 
information to the internal audit committees of both corporations and by the 
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emergence of some negative media reports. Under pressures of investigations by the 
SEC, both corporations had to make financial restatements.  
 
Normally, financial adjustments are made over errors caused by genuine judgemental 
errors over accounting policies or conventions. In their case, however, it became clear 
to the financial community that both corporations had resorted to use OBF and in 
particular SPEs and aggressive revenue reporting for financial manipulation. When 
their financial charades were exposed, both corporations’ stock values took severe 
beatings. This prompted further cash flow problems, which finally resulted in their 
bankruptcies. 
 
The downfall of both corporations resulted in massive financial losses for investors, 
creditors and suppliers and massive loss of jobs. The huge public outcry especially 
over Enron’s scandalous failure and the exposure of improper financial governance 
prompted Congress to introduce the SOA to safeguard investors’ interest with a 
comprehensive package of reporting and governance measures. This aside, the SEC in 
conjunction with the state prosecution offices concerned began to launch civil and 
criminal proceedings against various perpetuators of the corporate scandals. 
 
Consequently, various key directors and executives in Enron and WorldCom were 
finally charged with criminal offences under sections 11, 15, and 10(b) of the 
securities regulations for making false and misleading financial statements. It should 
be emphasised that in both cases, the acts of the defendants involved the use of OBF 
and other instruments for the deliberate understatement of huge debts as well as the 
falsification or misrepresentation of financial reports.  
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The use and proper reporting treatment of OBF instruments for liquidity enhancement 
and access to cheaper funding are considered in some quarters to be innovative 
funding tactics albeit on the aggressive side. Both corporations were initially pursuing 
such beneficial economic objectives. However, the directors and management also 
succumbed to the temptation of share riggings and insider trading to accumulate 
massive wealth. Once this agenda became tied up with the desperate need to cover the 
huge corporate losses, a series of illegitimate acts had to be perpetuated to shield the 
corporations’ fractured finances from the capital market.  
 
For some reasons, the key directors deceive themselves that their actions were 
appropriate and that they were behaving altruistically rather than greedily. This 
probably account for their complete disregard to the risk that they may loose 
everything from wealth to personal reputation. Their undertakings of such massive 
corporate frauds resulted in subsequent huge fines and long-term jail sentences 
imposed on them by the state. Indeed, instead of beating the system through the 
deceptive and reckless use of OBF, the key directors of both corporations became 
victims of their own financial greed, reckless management behaviour, and self-
deception.  
 
The management’s ability to perpetuate corporate fraud was considerably assisted by 
very co-operative actions from financial consultants and credit suppliers. These 
institutions and individuals gave support and credence to the deceptive financial 
schemes devised by the management, resulting in the initial euphoria and huge profits 
for every direct and indirect participant. Their collusions and abetments to such 
fraudulent schemes generated serious legal implications for themselves. The 
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seriousness of each varied in accordance with the specific nature of their conduct. 
Most of them were investment banks and institutional brokers which had provided 
consultancies or funding for the financial shams.  
 
Subsequent to the demise of Enron and WorldCom, these institutions were financially 
disciplined by the state through hefty fines reaching billions; and are still facing or 
settling with liquidators over their breach of fiduciary duties as well as the federal 
securities laws. Fortunately, for some of them, the US Supreme Court on June 18, 
2007 held in the case of Credit Suisse Securities (USA) LLC v Billing that securities 
laws implicitly precluded application of the antitrust laws to agreements among 
underwriting firms relating to initial public offerings. Otherwise, the fine imposed 
would have been three times of those imposed through the securities laws.  
 
All the institutions concerned in both cases chose to pay hefty fines through plea  
 
bargaining rather than go through long trials. Such arrangements allowed them to 
avoid conceding guilt, eliminate stress on staff morale, and the quick return to 
business as usual without serious damage to their business reputation. However, they 
were required under the agreed arrangements for deferred prosecutions to subject 
themselves to proper professional conduct certification for appropriate durations by 
approved external consultants.  
 
The auditor of Enron and WorldCom was Arthur Anderson (AA). The  
 
financial deception and false accounting were perpetuated in both listed corporations  
 
through the use of SPVs and other creative accounting techniques. Evidence 
unfolding slightly before the demise of both corporations seems to suggest some level 
of collusion on the part of the auditing firm. The shredding of audit papers by Arthur 
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Anderson staff in the case of Enron made matters worse. In both cases, financial 
restatements submitted for their previous two to three years’ fiscal positions indicated 
the vast extent of material misrepresentations in their earlier submissions. These 
constituted good grounds for legal actions against the corporations and the inside 
directors for infringement of section 11 of the Securities Act. The SEC also made 
enforcements against external directors, which were settled through the latter’s own 
pockets. This was uncommon during the pre-SOA period. 
 
Similarly, AA had to face class action suits from investors for providing unqualified 
audit opinions in the registration documents. It was alleged that AA’s audit of these 
corporations’ accounts had not been conducted in accordance with industry practices.  
AA’s  position during the trial process became untenable against the onslaught of 
mounting civil suits, investigative SEC actions, and the mass exodus of its clientele to 
other auditing firms. Ironically, it was only after the demise of AA that the Supreme 
Court ruled in its favour principally on the grounds that the audit firm did not possess 
the intention to materially mislead when it gave unqualified opinions to the materially 
defective audited statements.[1] This incident showed why audit firms become viable 
financial targets for victims of corporate fraud particularly when the affected 
corporations have become insolvent 
 
 
Auditing firms have long argued that corporate frauds are perpetuated by key 
executives or directors who through collusions among themselves and with other 
professionals were able to prevent fraud detection. They further argued that it was not 
their professional duty to prevent financial crimes. On the other hand, it can be 
counter-argued that whilst audit firms are not expected to be able to prevent financial 
                                                 
[1] Lane, C., ‘Justices Overturn Anderson Conviction’, Washington Post, 01/06/2005, A01 
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scams, greater public confidence can be secured when audit firms adhere closely to 
their professional standards and by being more vigilant as financial gatekeepers. 
Hindsight aside, it is difficult to understand why the controversial treatment of OBF 
and other related items were merely glossed over, despite their sheer size, and their 
potentially high default risks. Serious questions could have been easily raised further 
on the reported cash flows which are not in proper alignment with the reported profits. 
Answers for such unwarranted lapses of concentration may be found in the profitable 
consultancies extended to AA in both cases.  
 
 
Until these cases, no audit firms of AA’s size have been seriously indicted for 
exceeding the limits of US Securities and related laws. The usual punishment involves 
monetary fines, which firms like AA have covered through insurance. This more than 
anything else helps to explain the occasional cavalier attitude displayed by AA and 
others in the course of their audit. Such over-confidence may have contributed to fault 
lines in the profession. Unfortunately, this time around such lapse of focus and 
attention became too costly and the firm failed long before the outcome of its 
indictment or civil suits.  
 
 
It has been claimed through anecdotal evidences that Enron and WorldCom 
 
were not the primary cause of AA’s demise. Instead, Enron was the trigger for the 
slow form of professional suicide that had begun some years earlier.[2] The primary 
causes have been attributed to intense competition between the Big Four international 
audit practices, the fight for market shares and consultancy earnings, and above all 
                                                 
[2] Boyd, C., ‘The Last Straw’, Business Ethics Quarterly, Volume 14, Issue 3, 2004, 581-592. This 
article reviewed Toffler, B. L. & Reingold, J., ‘Final Accounting: Ambition, Greed and the Fall of 
Arthur Anderson’, Broadway Books, 2003 
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serious conflicts of interest at the expense of audit standards and overall business 
ethics. 
 
Despite the aftermath of Enron and WorldCom and the presence of SOA, many  
pertinent searching questions about the profession still haunt the corridors of financial  
 
governance circles.[3] In the face of public criticisms, the accounting profession has 
strived to improve its professionalism, but what it requires most is a stronger ethical 
base to deter professional conflicts. This poses difficult challenges, given the 
dominance of the big four in the industry and the absence of a viable alternative for 
the financial system. The fear of another ‘big four’ collapsing probably explained the 
political interference for the withdrawal of prosecution against KPMG in January 
2007 over various tax shelter scams. Nineteen of their senior executives including its 
chief financial officer are, however, still facing indictments.[4] 
 
 
Financial Window-Dressing Cases 
 
The Boston Chicken (BC) and Sunbeam Corporation (SC) cases unlike the previous  
 
two are not so clear-cut in terms of financial fraud. The facts and events surrounding 
the two cases appeared to suggest that the management actually perceived that they 
had complied with the reporting rules for the OBF schemes that they had devised.  
In the case of BC, its new principal directors and shareholders were from a capital 
market and big business background, and ergo considerably familiar with the 
workings of the stock market. Their strategy was to use the good access to funds in 
the capital market to fund a rapid growth strategy. Accordingly, they developed the 
                                                 
[3] ibid, 591 
[4] The Economist, ‘Business’, The Economist, 22-28/10/2005, 9. The firm itself had to pay a hefty fine 
to the state, and to agree to be put on professional probation for a year pending assessment by an 
independent consulting firm. 
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concept of ‘area franchisors’ (AFs), whereby experienced franchisees were appointed 
to host more than a dozen or so of other sub-franchisees. This way the number of 
franchisees was able to multiply manifold in comparison to the traditional concept of 
franchising. Also unlike traditional franchising, AFs needed only to finance twenty 
percent or so of the funds required. The rest of the finance in the form of convertible 
equity options were provided by a SPV indirectly controlled by BC through 
representation by its senior executives.  
 
The US accounting standard guideline clearly stressed that the test for consolidation is  
 
the control and direction of an involved enterprise and not the twenty percent  
 
threshold, which BC had interpreted to its convenience. Initially, BC had  
 
shrewdly strategise to convert their options into majority equities only when the AFs  
 
were making money but not when they were losing money. This meant that only  
 
profitable AFs were consolidated as subsidiaries and those which were not were kept  
 





Consequently, critics claimed that BC had understated the true extent of their huge 
debts. BC had, however counter-argued that this arrangement had been made explicit 
in the footnotes of their financial documents. This contention has not been well  
received as critics claimed that investors at large tend to look at key data  
 
especially that of earnings and earnings growth, and that such crafty reporting in  
 
essence has distorted these indices. BC’s choice of reporting for AFs as such did not  
 
go down well with some financial analysts and they became increasingly less  
 
supportive of its business and financial reporting. This subsequently provided 
pressures to BC. In terms of actual performance, many AFs and even BC itself were 
 208
facing losses on account of intense competition in the market place. To keep up with 
the charade, more AFs were signed up in the hope that things would turn for the 
better. Without close management attention, this did not come about. Under pressure 
from analysts and others in the capital market, BC finally had to own up to the losses 




BC‘s use of OBF mechanism was therefore primarily undertaken to fund the AFs.  
 
Unfortunately, the corporation growing at fanatical speed lost track of its principal  
 
agenda, which was to run a high quality healthy fast food business. The excessive  
 
reliance on AFS in fact transformed its business essentially to that of a financial  
 
service, which required a different management format and approach. BC failed  
 
to acknowledge and respond accordingly. Thus, the initial advantage provided  
 
through the use of OBF was withered away by excesses and a loss of business  
 
direction. The company had therefore used OBF instruments beyond viable economic 
parameters. 
  
Where SC is concerned, it was originally underperforming but had low debt levels.  
The company then appointed Dunlap as its new CEO, hoping to transform its ailing 
business. Dunlap was a cost cutting and turnaround specialist and in the first year of 
his tenure instituted severe job trimmings to achieve cost efficiency. Despite the 
reported financial improvement, he was not successful in selling the business as the 
company was operating in a mature competitive business environment. Dunlap then 
decided to grow the core business through an aggressive selling policy involving the 
use of ‘bill-and-hold sales accounting’, which allowed customers to take delivery of 
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goods ordered over an extended period of time but with sales immediately recognised 
as revenue. This effectively boosted the company’s turnover even though much of 
these products could be returned as unsuitable or for other reasons. Further growth 
through expensive acquisitions of related businesses on the unusual basis of revenue 
rather than the traditional earnings multiples was also undertaken simultaneously. The 
artificial sales mechanism and costly acquisitions became a financial burden to the 
company and had to be financed by huge expensive debts. When BC and these 
acquisitions failed to perform, the company became insolvent under the weight of 
these debts.  
 
Under pressure of SEC investigation, both companies had to file for accounting 
restatements. This prompted class action fraud lawsuits against them and their 
respective CEOs. In addition, the CEOs had to settle with the SEC over allegations of 
accounting fraud. The degree of blameworthiness of directors, auditors, and 
investment advisers vary. In both cases, the CEOs were dismissed and had to face 
various litigations. The investment advisers and financiers in BC and SC had to settle 
their civil litigation with compensation payouts to affected shareholders. The auditors 
involved on this occasion came out relatively unscathed.  
 
 
The litigation outcomes for both cases were short-circuited by out-of-court  
 
settlements. Nonetheless, the main lesson to be drawn from both cases is that when 
OBF instruments are used for financial window-dressing to understate debts and over-
state growth and earnings it would be unsustainable and may result in disastrous 
financial consequences. Its excessive use and over-aggressive financial reporting may 
also lead to various legal implications for directors and those who collaborated in 
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their manipulations through funding or gave assistance and advice in the design of 
these dubious schemes. 
 
This second pair of cases differed from the first pair in terms of much lower scale of 
debts and lesser financial complexities where the use of OBF is concerned. Whilst 
they appeared to be complying to reporting rules, in practice they were heading down 
the slippery slope of financial window-dressing into illicit financial schemes. As a 
consequence, the executive directors and advisors had to endure SEC and private 
litigations for their part in the filing of defective financial statements, which arose 
primarily from defective reporting of OBF and other over-aggressive revenue 
recognition methods. 
 
Financial Benefit Cases  
 
Microsoft Corporation (MC) and Worldmart (WM) are two global giants operating  
 
with impressive profits in their respective spheres of business. MC has in the initial 
phase of its operations made substantial use of employees’ stock options plans 
(ESOPs) as incentives to attract and retain highly skilled personnel. This was common 
practice particularly in the Silicon Valley in the 1980s until the unravelling of the 
options backdating scandals in 2006. 
 
In the wake of the Enron turmoil, the financial world became more concerned with  
 
the use of ESOPs as it had been recommended by financial regulators, that  
 
such options should be treated and reported as expense items, and not buried deep in  
 
accounting footnotes. They further argued that this would discourage management  
 
from resorting to questionable tactics to drive up earnings reports in order to benefit  
 




MC in 2002 opted to withdraw future use of ESOP and switch to the award of direct  
 
stocks as financial inducements for its personnel and directors. Fortunately, the  
 
recasting of its affected accounts to take account of its previous ESOPs were easily  
 
accommodated by its huge actual earnings reserves. A relatively small amount of  
OBF in the form of guarantees were only used to support new start-ups it helped  
 
launched as well as other business partnerships. All these are captured in the  
 
footnotes of the company’s accounts. Where the use of derivatives are concerned, the  
 
corporation appears to use them for hedging purposes. However, it is more likely that 
these are used to enhance earnings as they account for a high 30% of the corporate 
total. This is, however, financially justifiable given the corporation’s high free cash 
reserves. 
 
MC used OBF mechanisms for the attraction and retention of scarce talented high-
tech skilled personnel but did not make undue use of them. The company rightly  
focused on the key essentials of its business and it was the effective execution of these  
 
that led to its sustained robust revenues and earnings growth. Its profitability was  
 
driven by market share dominance and regular infusions of product innovations, and  
 
not by financial engineering as seen in the previous four cases. The corporation   
 
was also willing to switch to the use of direct stock awards and to expense stock 
options when granted to keep in line with mainstream accounting practices. It now 
uses OBF instruments sparingly to assist new venture start-ups and business ventures 
collaborating with its strategic programmes.  Indeed, MC’s forward-looking  
policy to scrap the use of ESOPs may have help kept the company away from their 
possible misuse as encountered in 2006 by Apple Computers and others.   
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WM too used OBF instruments in various SPVs which are complementing the 
operational aspects of its business, such as its supply chains. Even then, it has  
been careful enough to keep these within strict limits and for business improvement  
 
purposes. Hence, hereto like MC, OBF instruments are used in a small way for proper  
 
business objectives and not for improper financial objectives as was the  
 
case of the previous four examples. When used in this manner, OBF instruments are  
 
justifiable as suitable financial devices for growth seeking enterprises. They can also  
 
be of appropriate use to those who need to use them for viable financial restructuring  
 
schemes or liquidity enhancing securitisation purposes. 
 
 
Overall, the manipulative cases showed strong evidence of fraudulent intentions 
where the use of OBF is concerned, whereas the financial window-dressing cases 
under sustained commercial pressure and excessive management ambition went 
beyond their original aims and into reckless and probably illicit activities. In contrast, 
the operationally well-run companies were seen able to sustain their proper and 
effective use of OBF for financial savings or liquidity purposes. 
 
UK Cross-Case Analysis 
 
 
Manipulative Use Cases 
 
The first set of two cases, involved two financial institutions, namely BCCI and 
Barings Bank (BB). They became insolvent because of excessive financial leverage 
carried out with some help from OBF mechanisms. Though these banking institutions 
showed much similarity in terms of the wrongful application of OBF instruments, 
they do exhibit some shades of differences in terms of business strategy and 
management styles. BCCI wanted to reach out to the world markets through social 
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and political networks; whereas BB wanted to introduce financial innovations in 
emerging economies by making more and wider use of its core investment banking 
expertise.  
 
BCCI started its business with the laudable vision of providing financial assistance to  
new businesses neglected by traditional banking. It also wanted to cater to the needs  
 
of the newly emerging economies in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and South  
 
America. These sectors were of high profit impact, but they were also of high risks 
and required a high calibre of credit analysis and supervision. As a relatively new 
entrant, its skills in these dimensions were suspect. BB in contrast already had the 
investment banking expertise in its home market, and had the capacity to leverage this 
core skill in the emerging markets of Eastern Europe, South America and the Far East 
on a gradual selective basis. 
 
BCCI’s founding CEO opted to grow fast internationally to achieve the status of a 
large international bank with global reach. He found that he could achieve this by 
amassing huge deposits at high interests and on-lend to borrowers neglected by the 
established traditional banks but who were prepared to pay higher interests in view of 
various background limitations. This strategy works under the assumption that the  
level and size of delinquent accounts could be contained effectively. In practice, such 
high risks accounts were difficult to manage, and the bank soon came under severe 
stress. This was further weakened by the massive squandering of bank assets as 
favours to leading politicians in the US, UK, Asia, and elsewhere; and including the 
personal enrichment of both the founding CEO and his allies. Such massive cash 
outflows had to be funded by illegal money-laundering activities, and the churning of 
new deposits. 
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As BCCI got deeper into such illicit activities, OBF mechanisms like special vehicle 
companies were regularly used to transfer funds between operations to hide the extent 
of debt exposure. Artificial loss in derivatives trading was used to cover money 
siphoned off. In short, reckless financial management involving the use of OBF 
mechanisms was undertaken to distort the true state of the bank’s financial health.  
BB, in contrast was already acknowledged as a reputable investment bank. In the face 
of intense competition the bank chose to enter the fast growing and lucrative financial 
derivatives market in the early 1970s.  
 
Whilst the bank did put in place a risk management system, it could only be effective 
with sufficient management alertness and a high level of personnel honesty and 
integrity. Leeson who had earned the trust and confidence of BB’s senior 
management after completion of a difficult assignment in Indonesia was given the 
authority not only to head BB’s subsidiary in Singapore but also given the dual role of 
trading and backroom administration. This later turned out to be a fatal management 
misjudgement.  
 
The collapse of BB has been attributed by the Bank of England primarily to the 
corporate fraud perpetuated by Leeson, the ‘rogue trader’. Leeson never had initial 
trading experience when he was first posted to Singapore. He soon found the 
reporting of high profits from securities trading rewarding, financially in terms of 
higher personal earnings; and emotionally in terms of enhanced reputation as a high 
performer in the bank, even though these profits were manufactured and illusory. 
Soon, he became numb to the growing losses he had begun to accumulate in the now 
infamous ‘88888 account’, which he secretly used to his advantage.  
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In essence, this special account functioned like a special purpose entity (SPE) for 
Leeson’s sole use and manipulation.  It was a clear case of criminal breach of trust by 
a lower rank employee and not by any member of the board or even senior 
management team. This is the sharp contrast between what happened in BCCI and 
BB. In BCCI’s case, OBF instruments were used to camouflage its drug-trafficking 
and money-laundering activities in offshore havens. This was reflected for instance in 
the indictment of BCCI officials in Tampa Florida and the mounting of fraud charges 
against its executive directors for misappropriation of bank assets and other criminal 
misdemeanours.[5] Directors may incur personal liabilities where they breached 
pertinent statutory duties, engaged in wrongful[6] or fraudulent trading [7], or not 
complying with specific disclosure requirements.[8] 
 
In the case of BB, Leeson pleaded guilty to deceiving the bank’s auditors and of  
 
cheating the Singapore International Monetary Exchange (SIMEX) and was  
 
accordingly sentenced to six and a half year’s jail. Leeson’s use of the unsupervised  
 
88888 account to hide the losses by the artificial creation of false debtors showed how  
 
the concept of the special purpose vehicle can be modified for deception purposes.  
 
Where the executive directors of BB in the UK are concerned, they were found to  
 
have neglected their duty of care and skill to the bank. In other words, 
 
notwithstanding their particular experience and ability, they could be evaluated on  
 
objective standard of the skills required of reasonable directors. This was found in the  
 
judgment of Lord Justice Morrit when he said, ‘Directors have, both collectively and  
individually a continuing duty to acquire and maintain a sufficient knowledge and  
                                                 
[5] Re Smith & Fawcett [1942] Ch. 304, Dawson International plc v Coats Paton plc [1991] B.C.C. 276 
[6] Section 214 of the Insolvency Act 1986 
[7] CA 1985 s232 
[8] ibid 
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understanding of the company’s business to enable them properly to discharge their  
 
duties as directors. Whilst directors are entitled…to delegate particular functions to  
 
those below them in the management chain, and to trust their competence and  
 
integrity to a reasonable extent, the exercise of the power of delegation does not  
 
absolve a director from the duty to supervise the discharge of the delegated  
 
functions’.[9] This appears to emphasise on the objective rather than the subjective  
test. It also signals the potential but small litigation risk to non-executive directors in 
the common law duty of care and skill. The BB case also showed the willingness of 
the judiciary to disqualify directors on the unfit criterion where they fail to properly  
discharge the duty of care and skill expected of them. 
 
 
Inevitably because of the massive fraud, which took place in both cases and the  
 
collapse of two banks of some importance, investors and depositors as well as  
 
creditors were badly hurt in financial terms. Public outcry over the failures of the  
 
auditors to detect the fraudulent activities in both cases led to legal actions against  
 
them by the respective liquidators. KPMG, the liquidator for BB launched  
 
proceedings against Deloitte and Touche for the failure to detect the fraudulent  
 
activities conducted by Leeson. The High Court nonetheless ruled in 2003 that the 
 
failure was attributable to BB’s officials rather than the auditors. The auditing firm 
 
was ordered to pay £1.5 million on minor technical faults instead of the compensation 
sum of £131 million sought by BB. The Bingham Report, however, reprimanded the 
auditor for not making sufficient concerns to the Bank of England (BE).[10] 
 
 
                                                 
[9] Re Barings plc (No.5) [2001] BCLC 523 at 525; Re D’Jan of London Limited [1993] B.C.L.C. 646 
at 648; In Equitable Life Assurance Society Bowley and others [2003] EWHC 2263 [Comm.], Justice 
Langley said that companies may reasonably look to non-executive directors for independence of 
judgement and supervision of the executive management. 
[10] Accountancy Age, December 1992, 17 
 217
From a governance perspective, the audit firm’s role displayed strong signs of  
 
professional conflicts of interest. Its consultancy was actively engaged in the financial  
 
restructuring package scheme worked out for BCCI. The lack of urgency on the 
auditor’s part may be attributed to its belief that the bank could be saved by this said 
scheme. This was further complicated by the fact that the firm was known to have 
prior knowledge of BCCI’s irregular activities with connected parties.[11] 
The Bingham Report was also highly critical of the BE’s role over the collapse of 
BCCI. The flow of vital information about serious weaknesses at the bank, the dodgy 
reputation of its founder CEO, and the difficulties of regulating a bank as complicated 
as BCCI were communicated to BE long before Price Waterhouse did.  
 
However, the BE as the regulator then had to exercise prudence to avoid causing a run 
at the bank which may engender systemic risk for the entire financial system. 
Introspection of various weaknesses at the BE resulted in the introduction of newer 
preventive safeguards to deter and prevent future occurrences of such massive 
fraudulent activities. This apparently was inadequate. With the fall of BB, the BE was 
subjected to another internal inquiry. Nonetheless, concerns have been raised that a 
more rigorous inquiry had been avoided because of this.[12] 
 
In the meantime, Deloittes the liquidator mounted an £850 million misfeasance suit  
 
against the BE over its failure to handle the supervision of BCCI properly. The trial  
 
which began in January 2004 had by the third quarter of 2005 costs tens of million of  
                                                 
[11] (a) Mitchell, A. et al., ‘The BCCI Cover-Up’, Association for Accountancy and Business Affairs: 
Basildon, 2001, 32-33; (b) Accountancy Age, ‘BCCI: Auditor Was ‘Deceived’, Chairman Says’, 
Accountancy Age, 20/04/2006. Keiran Poynter, PwC’s Chairman claimed here that the criminal 
convictions proved that it was deceived. He also said that the firm accepted the fine of £150,000 on the 
basis that ‘to continue to contest the matter further would have been an expensive distraction from 
which no useful lessons would emerged’ ‘. More importantly he stressed the JDS ruling did not say that 
PwC should have concluded that the relevant BCCI accounts failed to give a true and fair view. 
[12] Mitchell, supra note 11 (a)  
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pounds in legal fees.[13] Deloittes had alleged that BE officials acted in bad faith, and  
 
with a knowing disregard for depositors’ interests. The case collapsed on November  
3, 2005, some 12 years after the writ was issued, upon the High Court’s decision that  
it was no longer in the best interests of creditors for litigation to proceed further. As a  
 
consequence, creditors ranging from local authorities to petty traders had to  
 
assume legal fees of about £100 million. The liquidator had already recovered some  
 
81% of their losses, and it was thought then that the risk of losing £100 million was 
 
worth the possibility of recovering a further £850 million from the BE.[14] 
 
 
Prior to the commencement of trial, questions had always been raised on the 
immunity status of financial regulators from civil suits. Depositors in regulated 
institutions have hitherto asserted the claim that they enjoy the right to assume that 
financial regulators have checked the bona fides of licensed financial institutions and 
their managers. The House of Lords had earlier ruled that under some circumstances a 
case of public misfeasance might be brought against such institutions.[15]  
 
Still, immunity for regulators is argued to be necessary as otherwise,  
 
’…regulatory decision-making would become slow and conservative in order to avoid  
 
litigation’.[16] The outcome of this case seems to suggest that compensation suits 
against banking regulators for public misfeasance and the like are unlikely to be 
sustainable. The issue, which would then arise is what safeguards can be installed to 
ensure that regulating bodies discharge their functions properly, if they are not to be 
                                                 
[13] Three Rivers DC v Bank of England (No. 3) [2000] 2 WLR 1220 
[14] Accountancy Age, ‘Deloitte To Pay Bank £73 Million Over BCCI: Award Brings Closure to 
Marathon BCCI Case’, Accountancy Age, 08/06/2006; ‘BCCI Claim Is ‘Most Expensive Fishing 
Expedition in History’ ’, Accountancy Age, 22/06/2006. Here, the Governor of the BE criticised 
BCCI’s liquidator Deloitte for taking up the case, and he also said that it demonstrated that the UK 
legal system is unable to bring speedy resolutions to commercial disputes. 
[15] supra note 13 
[16] Financial Times, ‘Profitless Blame Game BCCI Case Shows History is More Than Often Cock-Up 
Than Conspiracy’, 04/11/2005, 5 
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disciplined through compensation suits but only through judicial review which is 
time-consuming and possibly subject to political interference. 
 
Financial Window-Dressing Cases 
 
The next set of two cases, namely Polly Peck International (PPI) and the Robert 
 
Maxwell Group (RMG) showed how OBF instruments initially used for assisting 
 
strategic growth degenerated into their employment for distortion and 
misrepresentation of financial performance reporting. The key founding immigrant 
CEOs of both operations were both corporate leaders with charismatic personalities. 
Both, however, work through different avenues to transform hitherto medium 
enterprises to large international conglomerates of some standing in the capital 
market. Whilst Maxwell had his reputation tainted by a prior DTI inspection report, 
describing him to be unfit to lead listed corporations, Nadir in PPI appeared to launch 
his entrepreneur career with a clean sheet. 
 
 
Maxwell redeemed his reputation subsequently through hard work and significant 
business success. His initial growth through acquisitions strategy was effective. His  
powerful social and political networks in high places also aided considerably his 
business interests. Consequently, he cultivated strong ties with professionals, 
businessmen, and political leaders, which mattered to his business. He also secured 
good support from his company auditor, which enabled him to make effective use of 
creative accounting and in particular OBF instruments to hide the extent of personal 
and corporate debts. Maxwell’s corporate and personal debts rose dramatically to help 
fund his plethora of acquisitions. Maxwell’s growth through acquisitions strategy as 
funded by the capital market in the later stages became unsustainable when many of 
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them failed to perform. They began to bleed the corporate group instead of making 
contributions. This drove Maxwell to engage in the raiding of pension funds in his 
listed vehicles and the use of illegal share ramming activities to shore up stock prices. 
The latter had to be undertaken as much of his corporate shares had already been 
collateralised. OBF instruments had to be put to manipulative use to generate a 
positive spin of the group’s performance to avoid the scrutiny by its bankers and the 
capital market regulators.  
 
Through such activities, Maxwell was exposed to various legal risks. For instance, his 
misappropriation of corporate assets provided strong evidence of criminal breach of 
trust. He could have also been put on further investigation for infringing the IA 1986 
for wrongful trading under section 214 or fraudulent trading under section 213 of the 
same act.[17]  Or he could have been held personally liable for misrepresentation of 
disclosure obligations or as a joint tort feasor with the corporations he was involved 
in. [18] 
 
Where Nadir of PPI was concerned, he too had started well initially by working hard  
 
to grow his pioneering operations. His subsequent over-ambition and impatience led 
to his downfall. He selected to use his new found access to capital market funds to 
fund his acquisitions growth strategy. Initially, the strategy worked well and 
corporations led by him were rewarded with high stock prices. At the later stage, 
when many of these acquisitions were not performing to market expectations, the 
stock prices came under pressure. This put additional pressure on him because of 
margin calls by the lending institutions involved. Instead of coming clean on the 
                                                 
[17] Official Receiver v Doshi [2001] 2 BCLC 235 
[18] Standard Chartered Bank v Pakistan National Shipping Corp (No.2) [2002] UKHL 43. Here, a 
director was held liable for making deceptive statements relating to falsely dated bills of lading to 
secure payment. 
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inevitable insolvency of his business operations, Nadir sought to remedy the problems 
by engaging in financial deceptions through the use of SPEs in off-shore financial 
havens. When the group losses escalated severely, even the use of such illicit schemes 
became inadequate. Finally PPI went into liquidation. Nadir was charged with theft 
and false accounting but fled to Northern Cyprus after jumping bail. The legal 
questions surrounding the complex case will remain unanswered until the resumption 
of the trial process. This is probably unlikely given the stand of Cyprus in respect of 
extradition proceedings.  
 
Therefore, unlike the first set of two cases where relevant directors and managers had 
to face various punitive disciplinary measures for corporate fraud; legal issues 
pertaining to the second pair of companies remained unanswered as one founding 
CEO was found dead and the other had fled the country. Notwithstanding this, it 
would appear at least on common law principles and corporate statutory duties under 
the Companies Act and securities disclosure obligations, both CEOs would probably 
have faced punitive actions. Still, it may not be that cut and dry. Maxwell’s younger 
son for instance was absolved of all legal charges even though as a close co-director 
he was to some small degree implicated in many of Maxwell’s financial scams. 
 
Sharp criticisms were levelled at the auditing firms surrounding the financial  
 
statements of both MGC and PPI. In respect of the former, Chalmers Impey (CI),  
 
the auditor of one of the former’s member companies, namely Pergamon was 
 
reprimanded for its defective audit procedures. This had resulted in stock 
 
overvaluation and consequent inflated profit of some £2 million in its 1968 accounts, 
after financial investigation by Price Waterhouse. This became a subject of a Board of 
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Trade enquiry after the Takeover Panel began looking at the Leaseco Pergamon 
merger exercise. The July 1971 DTI report had asserted that Maxwell relied 
extensively on reckless distortion of financial statements to shore up profits of his 
business and that he could not be relied upon to manage listed corporations. The 
subsequent two other DTI reports in April 1972 and November 1973 were equally 
critical. After the collapse of key companies in the MGC, the subsequent 2001 DTI 
report maintained that Price Waterhouse, which had succeeded Coopers and Lybrand 
Deloitte as auditor should bear some significant responsibility for failing to report 
fatal pension funds accounting flaws to the trustees. 
 
Other than reputation damage, Price Waterhouse was fined £3.5 million by the Joint  
 
Disciplinary Scheme and had to settle out-of-court with the liquidators for £68 million  
 
and a further undisclosed sum for the defrauded pension funds. The use of dummy  
 
and offshore companies to transfer funds and assets between them and other  
 
businesses in the MGC stable through off-balance sheet mechanisms and the  
unauthorised or improper use of pension funds assets could arguably have been 
detected by the auditors had they perform their audit work on a more robust and 
professional basis. Their readiness and willingness to settle out-of-court gave some 
indications signals about the weaknesses of their audit work. To be fair to the auditors 
at the time of the Maxwell affair, they were supposed to function only as ‘watchdogs’ 
of commerce and not ‘bloodhounds’.[19]  
 
Their prime task was to ensure that the implemented internal control systems upon 
which companies rely on to produce financial statements are reliable for the 
                                                 
[19] Judge Lopes in Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co {No. 2} [1896] 2 Ch 279, CA at 288 
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generation of ‘a true and fair view’.[20] It is never their task to detect fraud, other than 
when it shows up in the course of their investigation of the underlying internal control 
systems. They needed to report on any shortcomings and can choose to remain silent 
if they are satisfied with the internal controls.  
 
Public consternations over the Maxwell and other fraudulent affairs led to the creation  
of the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) as the official issuing organ for the  
 
Statements of Standard Accounting Practice (SSAPs), and subsequently the Financial  
 
Reporting Standards (FRSs).[21] With the introduction of these accounting standards,  
 
auditors were now required to assess whether their clientele have complied with all  
 
the applicable standards, and to state reasons for non-compliance in order to ascertain  
a true and fair view of their clientele’s financial position. Unfortunately, in the case of 
the MGC businesses, no mention of breaches of any kind were highlighted in their 
audited statements despite the high probability that such was the case in some of the 
cases involved especially those connected with pension funds. 
 
 
Where PPI is concerned, its auditor Store Hayward was criticised for not being more  
 
careful in their evaluation of PPI’s overseas business interests and had relied 
completely on the work of PPI’s overseas local auditors. As it turned out later, the 
latter failed to exercise proper professionalism. The difficult trading conditions for 
PPI’s key operations in Cyprus and Turkey and their highly depreciated currencies 
should have alerted the auditor’s attention that the reporting of high profits were 
improbable. Their failure to respond to this huge problem provided good grounds for 
civil actions by affected parties. 
                                                 
[20] CA 1985, sections 235-237 
[21] S.I. 1990 No. 1667 made under CA 1985, section 256(1) 
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As for the role of financial advisors and lenders, the two cases suggest strong  
 
indications of conflicts of interest. Goldman Sachs in particular appeared to play a 
crucial role in the share ramming exercise conducted by Maxwell. Besides acting as 
Maxwell’s adviser, it also acted as his financier. They stood to gain in terms of 
millions of pounds through specially devised options schemes, which Maxwell had 
used for share price manipulation purposes and for which the bank is likely to have 
knowledge of. This was asserted in the 2001 DTI report. Though Goldman Sachs 
settled with the Securities and Futures Authority, the Joint Disciplinary Scheme, and 
the pension funds without the acknowledgement of guilt, the case facts showed the 
greed for easy profits behind their dual controversial roles as financial advisor and 
financier. When advisors and financiers compromised their professionalisms, they are 
likely to assume significant legal risks.  
 
It was also unlikely that the financiers for Nadir’s share ramming exploits in PPI were  
 
totally unaware of the reasons behind Nadir’s borrowings. The abrupt and clumsy 
way Nadir went about with his abortive plans to take PPI private again should have 
also put these financiers on higher alert. The dumping of PPI’s shares at the later stage 
probably reflected the extent of their worries and the risks they had been assuming 
despite the apparent lucrative nature of these controversial transactions.  
 
 
In contrast to the first set of two earlier cases, this second set of two cases  
 
demonstrated the high risks of using OBF techniques with improper motives even  
 
though the likely wrongdoings of the executive directors, the auditors, and the 
financial advisers and lenders were never proven in court. It also demonstrated that 
the use of OBF for financial window-dressing is seldom transition in nature as 
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intended by under-performing companies hoping to reverse their purpose when things 
turn for the better. This was seen in all these cases as things worsened under the 
combined weight of the extra debt burden and deteriorating market conditions. The 
out-of-court settlements by the parties concerned would suggest strong elements of 
improbity and financial misrepresentations. Hence, when the improper use of OBF 
mechanisms is combined with the falsification of accounts and other financial 
deceptions and in most cases they do, the perpetuators would likely face fraud 
charges. 
 
Financial Benefit Cases 
 
The third set of two cases highlighted the viable use of OBF instruments. In the case  
 
of Tesco (TC), it makes use of OBF instruments like sales and leaseback to release  
 
liquid resources from its physical warehousing and retailing properties to help with 
the funding of its acquisitions and expansions both locally and abroad. This 
strategically holds down the level of its external borrowings. TC also maintains the 
conservative financial policy of keeping its contingent guarantees for the funding of 
linked associates and subsidiaries at very modest levels. This was clearly disclosed in 
its financial footnotes.  
 
 
Unlike Enron, TC makes use of off-balance sheet contingent guarantees for the 
pursuance of proper business objectives. Such guarantees are extended to assist 
related businesses to gain access to financial resources for their working capital and 
other similar needs. Financial derivatives are in turn used by TC for hedging and not 
for trading purposes and would therefore not carry with them any significant risks.  
 
 
As TC is rated highly in the financial and capital markets because of its excellent  
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sales and profits records on a consistent basis, the corporation enjoys access to  
 
a wide range of cheap financial instruments including OBF instruments like  
securitisation. So far, it has exhibited strict financial discipline in managing its  
 
financial assets and liabilities in a responsible, effective and transparent manner. It has  
 
no good reason to succumb to the exploitation of the features of OBF for improper  
 
agenda. The vastly successful supermarket giant does not need to do this. Moreover, it  
 
is cushioned annually by £1.5 billion of annual suppliers’ credit.  
 
 
The case of Rentokil Initial Plc (RI) shows how a cash strong company is able to cope 
with media pressure over performance and boardroom problems. Unlike other listed 
corporations, which succumbed to the use of OBF for improper window-dressing in 
the face of poor operating conditions, RI continued to employ this for financial 
savings despite being put under strong competitive pressure over the last 5 years. In 
this respect it is assisted considerably by the cash rich nature of its business. This gave 
the operations considerable liquidity strength, which made it unnecessary for RI to 
window-dress its debt exposure levels. 
 
Still, the boardroom drama arising primarily from power struggles was also not 
helpful to the company’s cause. Fortunately, despite the misgivings over its last few 
years soft sales and profit trend, RI is still making decent profits of around £230 
million annually. It would appear that the capital market had grown accustomed to 
RI’s past decade’s 20% annual growth stemming from a good flow of high 
performing acquisitions, but which had become increasingly difficult to find. Added 
to that, the low market entry barrier of its core business had also contributed to intense 
competition and lower earnings for RI. This made it doubly difficult for RI to 
replicate its 1990s high earnings growth records. 
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As the company adapted to its new competitive environment and with different  
 
corporate leadership at the top it became the subject of an abortive takeover  
bid. The takeover in the event failed because of the absence of a well co-ordinated  
 
plan. This gave the opportunity for the board to formulate fresh strategies to enhance  
its future operations.  
 
The main reason therefore which contributed to the sparing use of OBF in RI was and 
still is its strong cash position. This provided it with a comfort zone to continue with 
its traditional popular policy of paying attractive dividends without needing to rely 
significantly on external borrowings. Also, the market has got used to its negative 
equity position brought about largely through a £1.9 billion shares buy-back policy. 
RI, however, in recent years indicated to the market that it prefers to return money to 
its shareholders and consolidates on its existing businesses rather than continuing with 
its past acquisitions policy. Given this strategy, RI never found the issue of 
borrowings to be an issue. It also endeavoured to convince the market to evaluate its 
performance on the basis of its ability to generate good cash flows. 
 
This position nonetheless changed in late 2004 when RI had to comply with the new 
EU financial ruling that it needs to have adequate financial reserves for the 
distribution of dividends. Due to the share buy-back programme, which the company 
initiated in 2000, its equity and reserves had already been exhausted. RI was 
compelled under the new EU ruling to undertake a corporate financial restructuring 
programme. This resulted in a new holding company with £2 billion distributable 
reserves to sustain its dividend distribution policy. Whilst it can comply with the new 
EU ruling, the new financial landscape may motivate RI to pay some attention to the 
size of its shareholders’ funds in the future, and with it the issue of gearing. Until 
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then, RI makes minor use of derivatives for hedging purposes and some leasing for 
financial savings. This case shows that when a company enjoys strong free cash 
flows, it is unlikely to undertake the conduct of OBF activities with improper 
underlying motives even when pressed with capital market expectations issues. 
  
This final pair of case showed that businesses with successful dominant competitive  
 
strategies like TC or those service-based business with strong cash positions like RI  
 
are unlikely to use OBF for window-dressing purposes. They used them to effect  
 
financial cost savings.  
 
The cross-case analysis of the three pairs of listed corporations in the US and the UK, 
confirmed the underlying motives behind the use of OBF in each of these pairs. The 
first set of corporations showed that there were clear intentions to defraud major  
participants in the capital market through the use of OBF and other related illegal 
financial activities. The second set showed that when OBF was used for over-
aggressive financial window-dressing, it risked breaching financial reporting rules and 
under strong commercial pressures may even degenerate into its manipulative 
applications. The third set of corporations showed the viable use of OBF instruments 
when businesses are running nicely or when they are engaged in service industries 
with strong cash flow features. 
 
Comparative Cross-Country Case Analysis 
Manipulative Use Cases 
The two pairs of cases in the UK and US, which made use of OBF instruments to 
perpetuate financial fraud and deception comprised Enron and WorldCom and BCCI 
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and BB respectively. All four shared certain common characteristics. In the first 
instance, all four were highly profitable and successful operations in the early years of 
their corporate history. All four also employed the growth by acquisitions or 
diversification strategy. These four corporations also funded their growth or 
expansion with high on and off balance sheet financing. 
 
Leveraging growth through high debt levels is commonly employed in Japan and 
elsewhere and embraced the internal control form of governance. This is not so 
commonly associated with listed corporations in Anglo-Saxon economies which rely 
on the external market for capital controls. Those of the former order believes that in 
their case, debt management can be better handled because the banking creditors are 
usually represented on the board and are therefore quicker to respond to financial 
pressures arising from business downturn. Anglo-Saxon capital markets, in contrast 
frown upon excessive debt exposures more so for underperforming companies, and 
discipline them either by takeover mechanisms or by charging higher financial 
charges.  
 
Usually when much of their acquired and traditional businesses fell apart, these highly 
leveraged corporations had to shield such heavy losses from public view in order to 
deflect the concerns of their financiers and to get continued support for their stock 
prices. High stock prices were necessary as large chunks of their shares had been used 
as collaterals for their hefty borrowings. Any serious fall in share prices might either 
result in margin calls or the need to provide further collaterals to the banking 
creditors. At this stage, they were normally not in a position to comply with either. 
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The corporate leaders in charge obviously knew that the usual form of financial 
window-dressing (to portray a picture of sound financial health with minimum debt 
risks) is only sustainable over the short term and is unlikely to do the job. To ensure 
the longer-term effect of financial window-dressing, they made use of special purpose 
vehicles (SPVs) and other forms of creative accounting. The intention was to use 
these to conjure up a rosy picture of high profitability and sound financial health. 
Enron achieved this by making the SPVs they created to absorb the high debt 
liabilities and financial expenses. They did not consolidate these SPVs despite having 
control over their management.  
 
WC capitalised its line expenses when the proper financial standard is to expense 
these against its income statement and also made use of fictitious ‘management 
companies’ to absorb further debts and expense. BCCI made use of sham off-shore 
companies and other money-laundering devices to divert away their liabilities and 
expenses. BB or rather Leeson employed a secretive account to hide huge losses and 
exaggerate profits. Thus, all four cases demonstrated that OBF mechanisms were used 
in conjunction with other forms of illegal financial deceptions. They differed only in 
scope and scale.  
 
The wrongful use of OBF to help understate liabilities and inflate profits illegally 
exposed those who were directly involved as well as those who were indirectly 
involved to high litigation risks. The key directors involved other than those in BB 
had to contend with criminal and civil suits. Those in BB were disqualified from 
holding office as directors for not exercising adequate internal controls over the use of 
speculative assets. Comparatively, the US directors received more severe fast-tracked 
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penalties because of its more hospitable litigation landscape for class action and 
derivative suits as well as extensive use of plea-bargaining. For example, Enron and 
WorldCom directors had to pay US $40 million of their own money to settle 
litigations against them. Similarly, the auditors and financial advisers were made to 
compensate with hefty fines. Investment banks, which appeared to have collaborated 
with Enron’s fraudulent partnership schemes, have settled with state prosecutors over 
their deeds. One clear example is the purchase of ‘Nigerian Barges’ by an investment 
bank from an Enron SPV. This was in fact a loan camouflaged as investment because 
of the buy-back arrangement clause at a hefty premium. This was a highly profitable, 
but was fraudulent in nature. 
 
The initial quick punitive actions taken in the US had been attributed to the actions of 
state prosecutors like Eliot Spitzer of New York rather than the SEC which acted 
more aggressively somewhat later. Spitzer, in particular was singled out as the 
foremost active state champion for enforcement against fraudulent acts. It turned out 
later that Eliot’s enthusiasm was in part motivated by his desire to run for the office of 
State Governor.[22] The existence of such state regulatory champions in the US 
implied high litigation risks for those who used OBF and related techniques to breach 
securities and corporate laws. This probably explains why many UK directors are 
against the current practice of extraditions to US courts to face such charges. The case 
of the ‘NatWest Three’ who were indicted by the US Department of Justice for 
wrongful participation in an Enron-related SPV scam, is a good example of this.[23]  
                                                 
[22] Macey, J. R., ‘Politics on Wall Street: The Implications of Eliot Spitzer on State-Federal Relations 
in the Regulation of Public Corporations and capital markets in the US’, in Hopt, K. J. et al (eds.), 
‘Corporate Governance in Context: Corporations, States, and Markets in Europe, Japan, and the US’, 
OUP: Oxford, 2005, 85-104 
[23] Thomas, K. R., ‘The New Extradition Regime-How Unjust Is It?’, Journal of Banking and Finance 
Law, Vol. 21 No. 8 2343. Since coming into force in 2004, the UK Extradition Act 2003 has caused 17 
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Though the SEC was criticised severely in various circles for sleeping on their watch 
as financial gatekeepers, those injured by the demise of these huge corporations could 
not muster the resources or find enough legal basis to sue it. In contrast, the Bank of 
England was taken to court by BCCI’s liquidators on the grounds of public 
misfeasance. The latter withdrew its suit subsequently when no sufficient evidence 
was forthcoming. Though the case showed the willingness of the House of Lords to 
entertain such action suits, it showed the immense difficulties in taking the central 
bank or other financial regulators to court over the way they managed their policies. 
 
The Enron debacle led to the introduction of the SOA in the US, which tightened 
regulatory obligations on directors, auditors, financial advisers, financial analysts, and 
solicitors. New provisions were also made to ensure fuller transparency where OBF is 
being specifically employed. The SEC acting under the SOA thereafter began to 
enforce more vigorously to include and target even external directors. 
 
The onerous regulatory obligations for director and auditors in particular have been 
criticised as these not only enhance considerably the costs of financial reporting but 
also the litigation risks exposure. Section 404 of SOA appeared to be the most feared 
provisions within corporate boards in the US and those outside having dual listing 
status in the US capital market. A Korn-Ferry survey put the estimate at an average of 
US $5 million for SOA financial compliance costs for Fortune 1000 firms. One 
                                                                                                                                            
UK nationals to be extradited to face the harshness of US federal justice for white-collar crimes. This 
was deemed unfair for those engaged in international business because of the aggressive stance of the 
latter and the exclusion of the need to provide prima facie case evidence; Tait, N., ‘Businessman Wins 
Battle Against US Extradition’, Financial Times, 29/06/2007, 6. The district judge ruled here that it 
was unjust and oppressive for a UK businessman to be extradited to the US to face a fraud trial. This 
together with the recent decision of the House of Lords to hear the appeal in another extradition case is 
said to spell the beginning of some checks and balances for the fast-track extradition process. 
 233
academic study singled out SOA for the market loss of US $1.4 trillion in the US.[24] 
This prompted the establishment of a Capital Market Regulation Committee (CMRC) 
to explore the potential for watering down some of the more onerous provisions of the 
SOA.[25]  
 
In the meantime, preliminary moves by the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) to 
takeover the LSE has induced the apprehensions of UK issuers that the SOA will be 
introduced through the backdoor. To ensure that the UK stock market is insulated 
from this, the UK is reported to be planning a new legal provision to ensure that the 
FSA will retain its right to promulgate and enforce rules pertaining to UK capital 
markets.[26] This in turn has raised concerns in the US over the race to the bottom by 
competing financial regulators.[27] The LSE in response made it clear that it has its 
own safeguards in place, and that its success could be attributed to the FSA’s light-
touch and principles-based regulatory regime and other advantages which London 
offers. 
 
The limits of the monitoring board and the focus on shareholder value have also been 
cited as serious contributing factors to the downfall of Enron and Enron-type 
debacles. Instead of propounding enhance monitoring role for the directors as what 
the SOA appears to do, suggestions have been made that it might be better to adopt 
                                                 
[24] Capital Market Regulation Committee December 2006 Report 
[25] ibid 
[26] Bloomberg, ‘New Legal Provisions for FSA’, available at http://www.bloomberg.com  12/10/2006 
[27] Ethical Corporation, ‘Europe: Corporate Listings—Seeking Regulatory Asylum’, available at 
http://www.ethicalcorp.com, 12/10/2006. Such concerns appear to attract some sympathies as reflected 
by the quick and sharp decline in share values after listing in AIM for Betcop, European Islamic 
Investment Bank, Burst Media, and Chariot. These companies were reported to be facing various 
difficulties shortly before their listings. 
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the stewardship model where directors take responsibility for ensuring the 
sustainability of corporate assets over time.[28]  
 
The US case of Enron and WorldCom also showed the dangers posed by stock 
options in executive compensation. Such options tend to make managers prefer risks 
for obvious reasons. ‘So managers with a rich load of options have incentives to get 
the stock price high by any means necessary, fraud included…Both pathologies—
fraud and costly risk-taking—appear to have occurred in Enron. Enron became a 
hedge fund, taking leveraged bets in exotic markets that if successful would produce a 
huge, disproportionate bonanza for its executives’.[29]  
 
The BCCI and BB debacles in their own ways tightened the BE’s supervision 
procedures. More importantly, they contributed in some ways to the introduction of 
FSMA 2000, and the emergence of the FSA as UK’s super financial regulator with 
enhanced regulatory enhancing powers. The offence of Market Abuse introduced in 
the new legislation includes the liability for providing misleading financial 
information. This is pertinent to those who opt to use OBF in the Enron/WorldCom 
manner. It means speedier flow of punitive actions through the less burdensome civil 
route which FSA can choose to take. Responding to criticisms over its low incidence 
of enforcement cases, the FSA is now exploring the use of deferred prosecution 




                                                 
[28] Deakin, S., ‘Learning from Enron’, ESRC Centre for Business Research, September 2003 
[29] Gordon, J.N., ‘What Enron Means for the Management and Control of the Modern Business 
Corporation: Some Initial Reflections’, available at http://www.ssrn.com, 30/03/2002, 16 
 235
Financial Window-Dressing Cases 
The second pair of UK/US corporations pertained to those using OBF for financial 
window-dressing purposes. Sunbeam Corporation (SC) and Boston Chicken (BC) 
were the US corporations investigated; whilst the Robert Maxwell Group (RMG) and 
Poly Peck International (PPI) represented the UK corporations under this category. 
Other than SC, which was underperforming in the intensely competitive household 
goods retailing sector, the other three had been performing well in the initial stages. 
All four, however, chose to grow via the corporate acquisition route, which required 
funding from the stock exchange and high debt levels. It also meant the need to 
sustain high share prices as much of these were used as collaterals for bank loans. 
OBF and related mechanisms were used to help shore up the share prices.  
 
SC used aggressive sales reporting (bill-and-hold) and BC used so-called area 
franchising developers (AFDs). The former essentially locked in artificial sales and 
factored the debts through a wholly owned subsidiary; whilst the latter funded 80% of 
franchisees’ funding needs and also have effective control of operations. Though the 
corporations provided footnotes to provide partial explanation for their accounting 
policies, these were considered as poor and even misleading financial reporting. 
Believing that they had not breached securities regulations, these corporations began 
to use such devices more and more to fund huge losses incurred. This was the 
financial slippery slope which led them to further improper actions taken in order to 
turn things around but in reality made things worse. Bankers and connected financial 
analysts helped them to employ such devices to the level of deception.  
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In the end, the key directors, auditors, and connected financiers had to pay punitive 
fines to the financial regulators or the state as settlements for causing the 
dissemination of unreliable financial information. These US cases showed how easy it 
was to get down the slippery slope of financial manipulation on false confidence 
derived from creative compliance to regulatory rules. Indeed, it was the OBF 
instruments, which provided them with the false sense of confidence and enhanced 
the litigation risks for key board members and the financiers who collaborated with 
them. 
 
In contrast, the UK equivalent of such OBF employment opted for the use of SPVs in 
offshore jurisdictions where financial regulations are either sparse or not being 
properly enforced. This pair of UK corporations used SPVs and a range of shell-case 
entities to shield the extent of their debts, inflate incomes and understate liabilities. As 
these are perpetuated in off-shore domains the perpetuators grew confident over their 
employment as their main core activities were at least said to be free from 
wrongdoings. This caused them also to over-exploit such OBF mechanisms to 
dangerous levels prompting fiscal and litigation risks to the key directors responsible 
for their creation and usage. On top of this, RMG also made improper use of 
corporate pension funds and assets. On paper, pension fund assets appeared as proper 
loans to other companies in the group; but these were not properly documented and 
the trustees were appointees of the CEO and not at all independent as required.  
 
Both these UK corporations also used funds generated by OBF to ram up share prices 
illegally. Maxwell died under mysterious circumstances, whilst PPI’s CEO 
absconded. Actions taken on other board members failed. The auditors were slapped 
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with punitive fines, but some financers who appeared to have collaborated with the 
offence got away for lack of sustainable evidence. Despite this, these cases showed 
that when OBF are used for financial window-dressing on regular basis, it is but a step 
down the slippery slope of financial manipulation. This is because of the false 
confidence, which OBF generates for the users and collaborators. 
 
It must be emphasised that these two UK cases contributed to the tightening of 
corporate disclosure rules. In fact, they are said to help result in the formulations of 
new disclosure standards for connected parties’ transactions, and the introduction of 
OBF disclosure standards in the UK in the late 1980s. It has been argued that it was 
the early introduction of such disclosure standards for OBF that probably explained 
the lower incidence and scale of OBF manipulation in the UK when compared to the 
US from the late 1990’s onwards. 
 
Financial Benefit Cases 
The third pair of UK/US corporations under examination here refers to those using 
OBF in proper manner to realise enhanced liquidity, savings in financial charges and 
tax benefits. Microsoft Corporation (MC) and Wal-Mart (WM) were the US 
corporations represented; whilst the UK corporations concerned were Tesco 
Corporation (TC) and Rentokil Initial (RI). Both MC and WM use contingent 
guarantees and SPVs to provide financial support to some of their suppliers. They do 
this for beneficial operational reasons. Both also claimed to be using derivatives for 
hedging purposes.  
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However, in the case of MC about one third of its net income originated from 
derivatives earnings. It is, however, unlikely to run any financial risks as its 
participation in this area is funded mostly by free cash flows. This is understandable 
as it can enhance its earnings through this with manageable risks. MC has also 
stopped using employees’ stock option plans (ESOPs) since 2003 in response to 
criticisms in the market. This turned out to be a wise move, as the company was not 
affected by the 2006 options backdating scandal. 
 
Like its US high performing counterpart, the UK corporations also employ OBF 
instruments to enhance liquidity and effect financial savings. TC uses sales and 
leaseback to unlock funds from its fixed assets to fund its growth plans in the UK and 
internationally. RI showed great financial discipline in the face of its current 
operational and boardroom problems by continuing to use OBF instruments to effect 
liquidity enhancement and financial savings rather than for extreme financial window-
dressing.  
 
It did the right thing by not succumbing to this temptation despite pressures from the 
market to show better financial numbers. This third pair of listed UK/US corporations 
has therefore used OBF instruments properly and productively. Much of this may be 
attributed to their strong performance and in particular their strong free cash flow 
position (which Enron and WorldCom and the rest hardly had).  
 
The striking difference between this third pair of US and UK corporations is that the  
latter tend to make more extensive use of the ESOPs, which had its origin in the 
Silicon Valley. One estimate suggests that as much as 90% of US corporations used 
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stock options.[30] These were developed as financial incentives or compensations for 
talented technical personnel taking low remunerations at the entrant stage of newborn 
corporations. Stock options provide executive directors, senior management and other 
employees with the right to purchase shares at a certain price; and if the share price 
climbs after the options are granted, profits can be huge.  
 
The Enron and WorldCom debacle has shown only too well how this can be exploited 
by corporate management to the point of fraud when pursued through excessive 
greed. The SOA has mandated enhanced transparency where this is concerned by 
changing the deadline for insiders to report any trading in their companies’ shares to 
within 2 days of the execution date of the transaction. The UK has much similar 
safeguards. It is thought that with this new provision, which requires companies to 
disclose ‘on a rapid and current basis’ additional information deemed necessary about 
a company’s financial operation, the abusive use of ESOP will be history. This was 
not to be. 
 
Options Backdating 
Greed again reared its ugly head, when the practice of options backdating was raised 
to the attention of the SEC. Options provide the holder with the right to purchase 
stocks for a fixed price at some date in the future. This exercise or strike price is 
normally the market price when the options were issued; but where it is subsequently 
backdated to a time when the shares were cheaper, then the holders will make 
handsome profits. The CEO of Capital One for instance made £134 million in 2005 
by exercising his options. This was the good news about stock options. 
                                                 
[30] Financial Times, ‘Too Many Bad Apples: Backdating Scandal Shows Failure of Executive Stock 
Options’, Financial Times, 07/10/2006 
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However, when share prices plummet below the exercise price of the options (and 
they do in reality) then companies either issue more options or re-price existing ones. 
The latter practice has caused many US corporations into actions close to fraud. It 
also gave the erroneous signals to management that even if their companies 
underperformed; they can still stand to gain. It has now been widely acknowledged 
that stock options are not effective incentives for enhanced corporate performance, 
because management loses nothing if stock prices go down; but have every incentive 
to take disproportionate risks to raise share prices through reckless acquisitions or 
investing in projects of dubious potentials. These have been amply substantiated by 
the findings of this study.  
 
Federal prosecutors and the SEC are currently investigating whether some 125 
corporations from blue chips like Apple Computer and Home Depot and smaller 
technology-based enterprises have ‘backdated’ or otherwise manipulated the dates 
they granted options to make them more profitable. So far, the CEOs of Brocade 
Communications and Converse Technology are facing criminal and civil charges for 
their participation in manipulating options; and the CEOs of McAfee and CNET have 
resigned over the timing of stock option grants.[31] Options backdating eats into equity 
funds, which are rightfully for a corporation to use to help enhance performance. It is 
an off balance sheet device designed for illegal purpose and should therefore be 
roundly condemned. 
 
                                                 
[31] Wong, G., ‘A Primer for Firms Hit By Stock Options Scandal’, available at 
http://www.CNNMoney.com, 27/10/2006; Walker, D.I., ‘Some Observations on the Stock Options 
Backdating Scandal of 2006’, Boston University School of Law Working Paper No. 06-31, 12/09/2006. 
The researcher suggests here that prosecutors, shareholders and others seeking compensation from 
executives shown to have indulged in backdating to be wary of the underestimation of executives’ 
backdating gains. If proven, backdating is a clear breach of fiduciary duty for undisclosed 
compensation. 
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Hidden Share Ownership 
Another form of off balance sheet device of some concern to financial regulators in 
the UK and now the US is the increasing emergence of ‘empty voting or hidden 
(‘morphable’) ownership of shares which (are) either clearly or likely to impact (on) 
voting rights’.[32]The worry centres on the increasing ability of hedge funds and other 
sophisticated investors to accumulate large voting positions through share borrowing 
and unregulated equity derivatives while having little or even negative economic 
interest in an enterprise. This will seriously undermined the link between ownership 
and voting rights.[33]  
 
The UK Takeover Panel has already responded to this problem in 2005 by requiring 
certain derivative holders to disclose their identity during an offer period if their stake 
exceeds 1 %. The SEC is still working on the appropriate response. This issue has 
serious implications as CEOs may be removed through this non-transparent process 
by secret warfare waged outside the purview of the public. This might motivate them 
to react by using OBF and other creative accounting techniques to drum up 
performance to ensure shareholders’ support.[34] 
 
Other UK/US Differences 
The comparative cross-country case analysis showed how and why many US 
corporations are more inclined to play the financial numbers game because of the 
incessant focus on shareholder value in part fostered by quarterly financial reporting 
                                                 
[32] White, B., ‘Concern in US Over ‘Empty Voting’, Financial Times, 06/10/2006, 29 
[33] White, B., ‘Thesis on Hedge Fund Tactics Gives Investors a Shock: Professor’s Warning on ‘Empty 
Voting’ Has Had Big Impact in the US’, Financial Times, 06/10/2006, 29. This was highlighted in a 
speech by Professor Henry T. C. Wu of the University of Austin at the Council of Institutional 
Investors Meeting in September 2006 
[34] ibid 
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Excessive management greed to profit quickly from the capital market further 
reinforced this temptation to manipulate earnings report through OBF and other 
creative accounting techniques.  
 
Overall, the comparative case study also showed how US corporations tend to make 
greater use of SPVs within its borders, whilst are fond of using offshore jurisdictions 
in Bermuda and elsewhere for structured finance and securitisation because of ‘…the 
willingness of their governments to address the legitimate needs of the international 
business sector of their economies and to keep regulation light but effective and their 
laws, particularly company laws, modern’.[35] Others have expressed concern over the 
use of these jurisdictions for the masquerading of money laundering and other illegal 
forms of financial transactions in the guise of legitimate securitisation.[36]  
 
Corporate directors, financial intermediaries, investment advisers, auditors, and 
financial regulators may have to be more mindful of the legal implications arising 
from the risks of such occurrence. Nonetheless, due to the strong US stance against 
offshore havens with poor quality legal enforcement frameworks which might attract 
money-laundering and related activities over the last few years, things have improved 
considerably. This is due to these jurisdictions’ competitive need to fight for foreign 
investments and not be let down by negative international publicity. 
 
Where the issues of conflicts of interests in the capital market are concerned, the SOA 
introduced further stringent rules to be observed by key market participants. The UK 
in contrast continues to rely primarily on soft laws like the Combined Code on 
                                                 
[35] Lamb, D., ‘Offshore: Golden Triangle’, available at http://www.legalweek.com, 12/10/2006 
[36]Johnson, J., ‘11th September and Revelations from the Enron Collapse Add to the Mounting Pressure 
on Offshore Financial Centre’, JFRC, Vol. 10 No: 4, 2002, 341-354. 
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corporate governance and the risks-based style of regulatory administration. It has 
been increasingly acknowledged that this has a relatively greater deterrent effect on 
the improper use of OBF or other forms of negative creative accounting, as it is 
generally more difficult to indulge in creative compliance within a principles-based 
financial disclosure system.  
 
In the end, past corporate fraud histories in both jurisdictions have shown that both 
hard and soft laws cannot realistically stamped out financial manipulations.[37] 
Powerful motivational factors will continue to induce corporate financial reporting 
behaviour in particular directions. Occasionally, even highly successful corporations 
may run foul of financial reporting regulations because of competitive pressures,   
management ambitions, or conflicts of interest.[38] Under such situations, some 
directors, financial advisors, and auditors became more prepared and willing to take 
undue risks as they believed from their perspectives that they were doing the right 
things and that the benefits of their actions were greater than the costs involved. They 
were as such not entirely motivated by the greed factor but by the need for recognition 
and self-actualisation in the eyes of the political and business communities as 
exemplary corporate leaders.[39]  
                                                 
[37] Yeoh, P. ‘The History of Corporate Governance: Key Lessons Never really Learned?’, 2006 SLS 
Conference at Keele University, 07/09/2006; Taylor, B. ‘Royal Dutch Shell: The Overbooking of 
Reserves’, in Christine, A.M. (ed.), ‘International Corporate Governance: A Case Study Approach’, 
Edward Elgar Publishing Limited: Cheltenham, 2006, 7-4; Taylor, B., ‘Why do Good Companies Do 
Bad Things?’, CGAIR (2006) 14 (3), 81-93. Here, the author offers various motivational reasons for a 
high performing company like Shell to indulge in negative creative accounting which resulted in a 
large market abuse fine from the FSA. This may range from the need to support market valuation to the 
maintenance of market competitive position; Schartz, P & Gibb, B., ‘When Good Companies Do Bad 
Things’, John Wiley & Sons Inc.: New York, 1999 
[38] Thevenoz, L. & Babar, R. (eds.), ‘Conflicts of Interests, Corporate Governance & Financial 
Markets’, Kluwer Law International: NY, 2006 
[39] Ribstein, L E.., ‘Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critiques of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002’, Journal of  Corporation Law Fall 2003, 18-61; Neher, A., ‘Maslow’s Theory of 
Motivation: A Critique’, Journal of Humanistic Psychology, (1991) Vol. 31 (3), 89-112. Maslow’s 
theory of hierarchical needs state that managers will strive for self-actualisation and recognition needs 
once their physical and psychological needs are already met. 
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For better effects, regulatory supervision needs to be strengthened by appropriate 
ethical foundations, based on checks and balances, and openness and transparency in 
financial reporting.[40] It has been argued cogently that it is ethical dilemma which 
needs to be addressed. Ethical dilemma is not about deciding when to break the law. It 
arises when a wrong decision could be made within the bounds of the law as is often 
the case where OBF is concerned.[41] 
 
The ethical framework should be further consolidated by professionalism from all 
market participants, be they insiders or outsiders. Professionals like auditors, financial 
analysts, and financial advisors must give objective and expert advice not tainted by 
personal biases and should above all be undertaken with independent judgement. The 
policy prescription ‘…is simple: regulators must align incentives to foster ethical 
conduct and to make it clearer when companies shirk this duty. Ever since Sarbanes-
Oxley was passed, there have been those in the business community who have said 
that the regulatory response to corporate misconduct went too far and that markets 
should be allowed to work. Yet we have seen that markets, left to their own devices, 
create in some cases precisely the wrong incentives: options backdating, ‘pretexting’ 
at HP, accounting misconduct, and more. Regulation allows bad actors to be 
sanctioned, but more than that, it helps turn around a race to the bottom’.[42]  
 
                                                 
[40] Epstein, E.M., ‘The Corporate Social Policy Process and the Process of Corporate Governance’, in 
Thomas, C. (ed.), ‘’Corporate Governance: Critical Perspectives in Business and Management’, 
Routledge: London, 2005, 323-347 
[41] Harshbarger, S. & Jois, G. U., ‘Deterring White Collar Crime’, Journal of Boston Business, August 
19-25 2005, 47 
[42] Harshbarger, S. & Jois, G. U., ‘Looking Back and Looking Forward: Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Future of Corporate Governance’, Akron Law Review (2007) 40: 1, 52-53 
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A ‘free market’ regime necessarily interferes with choices to some extent, meaning 
the use of a degree of regulation. The option becomes then not about between 
‘regulation’ and ‘no regulation’, but ‘between the kind and degree of regulation that 



































                                                 
[43] ibid, footnote 84 
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                                                           Chapter Six 
 





OBF is a debt instrument which may be partially visible or not at all in a user’s 
financial statement. Depending on the reporting approach taken, this may lead to 
varied opinions of the underlying profitability and financial health of a business. This 
controversial feature of OBF from a global perspective prompted the undertaking of 
this research. As most prior studies tended to be either fragmented in nature, of 
narrow finance-focus, or blurred with the intensity of other research agenda, this work 
was initiated to investigate OBF from a more integrated approach. It sets out to build 
from a largely financial dominated field to include and integrate with a legal 
perspective. In particular, this research chose to focus on the legal implications of 
OBF applications for, financial preparers like corporate directors; financial advisers 
like investment banks and other financial intermediaries; and financial gatekeepers 
like external auditors and financial regulators. 
 
The research direction developed involved the need to ascertain how and why 
particular motivations behind OBF’s employment may generate different legal risks to 
corporate directors, financial advisers, auditors and financial regulators. Guided by 
preliminary and brief insights of some prior works this study argues that principally 
businesses employ OBF; for the more honourable objectives of financial savings and 
liquidity enhancement; for financial window-dressing to safeguard  continued access 
to capital markets and share value enhancement purposes; or inappropriately as tools 
to assist in various forms of financial misrepresentations or deceptions. 
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As the study was structured to give emphasis to the legal perspective, the research 
approach adopted relied mainly on the traditional doctrinal research method. 
Nonetheless, this was complemented by the use of a modified case study approach in 
order to generate insights to help answer how and why OBF generates different risk 
implications to financial reports preparers and financial gatekeepers. This involved 
the investigation of three sets of listed corporations covering, first; those which had 
used OBF for fraudulent purposes; second, those which had used them controversially 
for financial window-dressing; and third those which had used them for viable 
economic reasons. 
 
Motivation and Manner of OBF Applications 
 
The findings of this study suggest that UK and US listed corporations employed OBF 
instruments fraudulently when faced with severe financial stress and onerous business 
conditions. This is often reinforced by senior executives’ greed to pursue unjust 
enrichment irrespective of actual conditions. More importantly, some of these errant 
executive directors also managed to deceive themselves that their actions to sustain 
the competitive position of their businesses were appropriate (even though illusory) 
and that they were ergo conducting themselves altruistically rather than greedily. 
They were therefore to a significant extent motivated by their need for public 
recognition of their corporate leadership.  
 
This higher Maslow hierarchical need probably caused them to completely disregard 
the risk of punishment or the loss of their personal fortunes and reputation. Indeed, 
this self-actualisation and recognition need is not confined to those running poor 
performing businesses but those managing high performing companies as well. They 
therefore manipulated the use of OBF not only to help lift stock prices to derive hefty 
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financial gains but also to project strong positive market leadership and image of their 
corporations despite the contrary in reality. The stock prices had also to be sustained 
at high levels to safeguard against margin calls of stocks put up as collaterals for debts 
incurred by the corporations and their CEOs. Under such conditions and further 
deterioration of business conditions, Enron and Enron-type corporations became 
bankrupt. The case analysis also showed that US corporations used OBF on a 
comparatively larger scale and extent due to their relatively greater preoccupation 
with the quarterly earnings report to comply with market expectations. 
 
This investigation also showed that the perpetuation of OBF by corporate 
management was considerably aided and abetted by bankers, financial advisers, and 
financial analysts. These institutions and individuals had participated widely for 
corporate profits and personal gains against a background of interest conflicts. 
Financial gatekeepers like auditors and financial analysts were also found to be more 
prepared to risk their reputational capital as they began to perceive, especially in the 
US lower legal threats because of some judicial decisions and securities litigation 
reforms in the 1990s. The study also showed that the UK is associated with lower 
incidence of OBF usage scandals partly because of the earlier introduction of OBF 
reporting standards in the 1980s and partly because of its principles-based financial 
regulatory approach. 
 
Findings from this study’s case analysis showed that the use of OBF to inflate 
earnings and understate liabilities can cause corporations to succumb easily down the 
slippery slope of financial window-dressing to financial manipulation and deception 
when further induced by enhanced business deteriorations and other enhanced 
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management motivations. Often for companies under this category, the financial 
window-dressing practices intended for the short or transition term could not be 
curtailed because of the need to meet up with market expectations or because of the 
false confidence developed that the financial gatekeepers would not catch them and 
that they could therefore continue to game the system. Though accounting footnotes 
were provided for OBF in many instances, these did not appear to be fully or properly 
digested for their risk implications by the financial gatekeepers primarily because of 
connected interests or conflicts of interest; and investors chained by ‘irrational 
exuberance’ in booming market conditions. This probably helped to explain why the 
improper use of OBF appeared to be condoned by the wider financial communities 
until way too late.  
 
The study also showed how US corporations were associated with the greater use of 
creative compliance to respond to the country’s test-based prescriptive regulations; 
and in the process indulged in falsification of financial information. The use of special 
purpose vehicles’, ‘bill-to-hold’ and the ‘area franchisor developers’ are good 
examples of such practices.  UK financial reporting in contrast for the comparative 
period was guided by the principle-based FRS 5 which rendered the more abusive 
form of OBF reporting more difficult. FRS 5 was introduced in the UK in early 1980s 
to deal with the key problems caused by OBF 
 
This investigation also demonstrated clearly that OBF need not always be associated 
with its use as a device to go round financial regulations for improper agenda. The 
innovative and financially beneficial features of OBF have been put to good use in 
business and financial circles probably much more widely than those who put them to 
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abusive applications. OBF instruments are widely used in businesses to effect 
financial savings and liquidity enhancement to fund growth and expansion.  
Banks and financial institutions for risks hedging purposes or the leveraging of 
earnings within a more viable risks management regime have also employed them 
extensively. 
 
Finally, findings from this investigation suggest that OBF instruments may manifest 
itself in newer forms to meet with the growing complex needs of the business and 
financial communities. Such financial innovations will no doubt give access to 
cheaper fund sources to assist in the healthy growth of businesses across the world. 
However, financial gatekeepers might need to be more vigilant and resourceful to deal 
with those with harmful consequences for the economy. The 2006 stock options 
backdating scandal involving around a hundred or so large and profitable US listed 
corporations is a case in point. Here, senior executives benefited financially at the 
expense of shareholders because of the lack of transparency over compensation deals.  
This incident additionally demonstrates one again that a minor few highly profitable 
companies may indulge in flawed financial reporting because of the excessive 




Institutions using OBF with proper financial agenda and disclosing this in accordance 
with regulatory disclosure requirements or best accounting practices are unlikely to 
encounter legal problems associated with its use. The case studies illustrated further 
that the proper use of OBF appeared to be associated more with high performing and 
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cash rich businesses, which were not so bothered with its financial window-dressing 
appeal. They focused on its financial savings and liquidity enhancement attractions. 
Using OBF within this contextual framework insulated such businesses from 
compliance risks litigation. 
 
The case study also demonstrated that when OBF was used to hide losses, inflate 
earnings, or understate debts especially in conjunction with other forms of creative 
accounting gimmicks, they are likely to lead to various civil and criminal 
implications. It also showed that the flow of legal actions is not confined merely to the 
corporate directors involved but may also implicate others who could have knowingly 
participated in the financial scams. These included banking and financial institutions 
which provide the source of the OBF; investment banks which provided advice on the 
design or formulations of the OBF schemes; auditors who were negligent in giving 
the affected institutions clean bills of health or who were instrumental in aiding the 
creation of the deceptive OBF devices; and financial regulators who were alleged to 
have looked the other way when they should have been put on more serious enquiries.  
 
This comparative study also showed how and why the legal environment in the US is 
relatively more hospitable to litigations against directors, financial advisors, and 
auditors. This has been attributed partly to litigants having to pay only for their own 
legal expenses irrespective of case outcome. This is in sharp contrast to that in the UK 
where the losers may have to pay substantial part of the successful party’s legal costs, 
which often deterred some claims. More importantly, class action and derivative suits 
are commonly used in the US as devices for solving collective action issues. Class 
actions are not in practice in the UK and procedural rules governing the use of 
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derivative suits are also more difficult and complex in the UK. Finally, unlike the UK, 
the US legal system accommodates plaintiffs’ lawyers as entrepreneurs seeking out 
legal violations and appropriate clientele and rewards them with a percentage of the 
class recovery. 
 
The more robust and aggressive enforcement approach maintained by US financial 
regulators in comparison to those in the UK was reflected also in this study. In part 
this was attributed to the fervent political ambitions of some US financial regulators; 
and in part through the more enhanced political and financial media pressures. The 
case studies also highlighted the effective intervention of state regulatory champions  
and the wider use of plea bargaining and deferred prosecution judgements.  
 
Indeed, apart from inside directors who have committed frauds and punished by hefty 
fines or long imprisonment or both; some independent directors have also been legally 
pursued for conflicts of interest or flawed professional conduct and have settled early 
through their own pockets; something uncommon prior to SOA. The study also 
showed how the more aggressive US financial regulators and prosecutors apply a 
wider range of mechanisms to deal with the more serious corporate miscreants than 
their UK counterparts. 
 
The case study also indicated that though auditing firms and investment banks have 
reduced the cost of financial information for users through the increasing economies 
of scope by diversification into many multiple services, these have created potential 
costs in terms of conflicts of interest. It is a type of moral hazard problem when a 
professional or professional institution has multiple interests or objectives, and as a 
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consequent faces conflicts between these objectives. Indeed, competing interests of 
these services have caused some financial conglomerates or auditing cum consulting 
firms to conceal information or disseminate misleading information. Financial 
regulators in both the US and the UK frowned upon such practices. This is because of 
the fact that conflicts of interests tend to omit or distort vital financial information in 
the capital market and accentuates asymmetric information problems and prevents the 
orderly flow of funds for viable investments. This results in misallocation of resources 
in the economy. This is the primary reason why securities laws in the US and the UK 
are formulated to deal with such wrongdoings on the market.  
 
In this connection, OBF played a significant role in providing the opportunities for 
manipulative financial reporting. This was seen in those cases where the brokerage 
and underwriting divisions of some investment banks dished out different information 
to their different clientele comprising security-issuing firms and security-purchasing 
investors. In other cases, investment banks take advantage of conflicts of interest by 
blocking under-priced IPOs to senior corporate directors in return for future 
businesses. Audit firms selling consulting services are also seen in some of these 
cases to have compromised their professionalism with biased audits for the same 
reasons. Such unprofessional and reckless conduct attracted civil and criminal 
litigations. Liquidators of collapsed businesses strategically looked at auditing firms 
and investment banks as viable sources for financial recovery. Such case findings 
served to reinforce the deep pocket theory associated with selective litigations against 
auditors and bankers. The case study showed the ready willingness of these 
institutions to settle because of the advantage of settling without admission of guilt, 
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the realisation of reputation limit control and the elimination of negative personnel 
moral effect. 
 
Financial regulators normally are shielded from risks of litigation because of the 
general reluctance of the judiciary to second-guess the policy actions of policy-
makers and regulatory enforcements. The UK position showed the willingness of its 
judiciary to hear those situations connected with the public misfeasance of financial 
regulatory agencies. Though the first of such OBF related cases fell apart after a 
lengthy trial process, this did not imply the guarantee of insulation from future 
litigations. For instance on October 12, 2006 the FSA was ordered by the Financial 
Services and Markets Tribunal and subsequently by the judiciary to reimburse the 
legal costs of an individual it had tried to penalise with a £750,000 fine for market 
abuse conduct.[1] 
 
This study also indicated that the legal response thus far to the problems created by 
OBF and other forms of bad creative accounting practices through the tougher SOA 
rules- prescriptive regime in the US or the more principles-based Combined Codes 
have led to mixed consequences. In the case of the former, it has led to prohibitive 
costs for the installation of complex internal risks control systems to cope with the 
onerous disclosure obligations imposed. Corporate directors in the US are now 
reported to have become more risks averse because of the heightened fear of 
regulations compliance risks. This aside, some non-US dual listed corporations have 
                                                 
[1] Paul Davidson & Ashley Tatham v. FSA (FSMT : Dr. A.N. Price (Chair), C.A. Chapman, and J. 
Parsloe) Date of Decision, 16/05/2006; Tait, N., ‘Why the Plumber’s Victory Could Prove Draining for 
FSA’, ‘FSA Says Defeat Will not Halt Enforcement’, Financial Times, 17/10/2006, 3 & 4; Timothy 
Edward Baldwin & WRT Investments Ltd. V FSA (FSMT: Andrew Bartlett QC (Chair), NW Douch & 
TC Carter) Date of Decision, 24/01/2006. In these cases, the Tribunal rejected FSA’s allegation of 
market abuse for lack of rigorous evidence. 
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started to de-list from the US capital markets. New listing aspirants are also observed 
to be migrating to the widely perceived ‘light-touch’ UK capital markets. This 
prompted the US to initiate a review of the SEC’s enforcement procedures under the 
SOA ostensibly for the aim of simplifying compliance procedures but more in reality 
to regain the competitiveness of the US capital market.  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 
Future research could look into OBF practices in the emerging economies, where 
financial governance is known to be relatively less demanding. Useful insights may 
also be generated for a study on the employment of off balance sheet financial 
conduits, which contributed to the sub-prime woes originating from the US but now 





All said, OBF instruments are double-edge financial tools with good and bad  
 
consequences depending on the manner of their applications. As shown in this study,  
 
various litigation liabilities can arise from its bad consequences. Finally, this study 
also demonstrates that OBF can appear innovatively in newer forms to cope with the 
complex and sophisticated needs of businesses; but that it can also mutate to uglier 
forms or put to misguided use. To deter such improper uses of OBF, ethical and 
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                                                          Annex One 




To enable the development of a chain of evidence and facilitate comparative and  
 
cross-case analysis, the case study protocol as developed in chapter one  
 
has been adhered to in the compilation and analysis of case data. Discussions would 
be made on the corporate background, manner of OBF application, and legal 
implications arising thereof for each of the following 12 cases. Case data were 
sourced from primary sources (statutes and judicial case reports); and secondary 
sources (annual corporate reports, annual filings to financial regulators, academic 
journals, professional journals, mainstream newspapers and financial newspapers). 
Data triangulation was conducted through crosschecking within and between both 







Enron emerged as a merged entity in 1985, with Kenneth Lay as its chairman. The 
corporation prospered quickly within the next sixteen years of deregulation in the  
energy sector.[1] Indeed, by 1998, the corporation became more diversified and was 
ranked within the top ten US elite enterprises.[2] It derived its growth and profits 
through energy trading and recurring asset sales, with the latter accounting for about 
70% of its business.[3] It transpired later that the latter was largely realised through the 
deceptive use of special purpose entities (SPEs).  
                                                 
[1] Prins, N., ‘Other People’s Money: the Corporate Mugging of America’, The New Press: New York, 
2004, 136-142 
[2] The Economist, 26/02/1998 
[3] Rouffihnac, A., ‘Enron Pursues ‘Asset Light’ Strategy’, Electric Light & Power, 9 (2), 01/02/2001 
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Andrew Fastow, the company’s Chief Financial Officer (CFO) devised these SPEs for 
the enhancement of Enron’s credit ratings to prop share prices and to maintain the 
confidence of the company’s financiers. The SPEs were in practical terms used to 
distort the true financial position of Enron, especially the company’s high debt ratio.[4] 
When this acquisitions-driven growth strategy became unsustainable due to lack of 
viable projects in the market for absorption, the hidden losses of the corporation 
surfaced in its 2001 third quarter financial returns. Responding to the SEC’s request 
for more information, Enron filed financial restatements, which reduced the 
company’s equity by about US $3.2 billion. The restatements also revealed Fastow 
and others profiting more than US $42 million from their participation in the 
SPEs.[5]This crashed Enron’s stock price from US $13.90 on October end 2001 to a 
mere US $0.26 by November end 2001.[6] The end came with Enron filing for 
bankruptcy under Chapter 11 in December 2001. 
 
Use of OBF 
 
The saga of Enron is not easy to unravel principally because of the highly complicated  
 
manner in which the corporation shrewdly chose to structure its business. It  
 
took advantage of major regulatory loopholes in accounting, financial trading, and  
 
energy trading. Enron transformed itself into a commodity-trading operation, and at 
 
the same time masked its escalating weaknesses, losses, and debt accumulation.[7] Its 
capacity to engage in various forms of market manipulations and deceptions was 
                                                 
[4] Schwarz, S.L., ‘Enron and the Use and Abuse of SPEs in Corporate Structures’, University of 
Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 70, 2004, 1314 
[5] Filing returns of the company to the SEC, www.sec.com 
[6] Bartley, R. L., ‘Enron: First Apply the Law’, WSJ, 11/02/2002 
[7] supra note 1, 144 
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aided by various Wall Street co-conspirators, but these went largely ignored by the 
financial and other related regulators.[8] 
 
Enron’s demise may be attributed to many causes. Primarily, however, it fell  
 
because of its profit-sapping investments, ‘…in power plants in Brazil and India…in  
 
failing telecom companies, (and) in fiber-optic networks that didn’t have traffic’.[9] It  
 
had to shield these losses and the debts associated with their funding.. Otherwise its 
corporate market image and credit ratings would crumble and destroy its high market 
valuation and weaken financial market support. The company’s management and 
various financial supporters were all rewarded by the benefits generated by these 
financial scams as they indulged in various conflicts of professional interest.[10] 
The deceptive financial charade finally ended through the transmission of information 
to Enron’s internal audit committee, heightened enquiries from the media and 
investigations by the SEC. As Chapter 11 was filed, thousands lost jobs and money.  
Some commentators attributed the fall of Enron to the fraudulent response to a flawed 
business strategy.[11] 
 
The original game plan of Kenneth Lay was to run a vertically integrated energy 
company and in pursuance of this, the company incur huge  investments in pipelines 
across the US. This ‘asset-heavy’ strategy was later substituted by the ‘asset-light’ 
strategy of Jeff Skilling through the trading platform Energy Gas Services (EGS). 
                                                 
[8] ibid, 145 
[9] Berenson, A., ‘The Number: How America’s Balance Sheet Lies Rocked the World’s Financial 
Markets’, Pocket Books: London, 2003, 198 
[10] Wayne, L., ’Before Debacle, Enron Insiders Cashed in More than US$1.1Billion in Shares’, The 
New York Times, 13/01/2002; Norris, F. & Braboza, D., ‘Ex-Chairman’s Finances: Lay Sold Shares 
for US$100 Million’, The New York Times, 16/02/2002 
[11] Chatterjee, S., ‘Enron’s Incremental Descent into Bankruptcy: Strategic and Organisational 
Analysis’, Long Range Planning, 36 2003, 133-149 
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This was a ‘gas bank’ designed to smoothen the supply risk by contracting for 
supplies with large numbers of financially weak producers.[12] 
Unlike the other diversified businesses, EGS performed well as it was able to contract  
 
for cheap gas supplies from depressed producers and reselling them at good prices. 
This asset-light strategy enhanced the profits of many Enron-related energy plants. 
Enron took early advantage of this by disposing them at substantial profits. These 
 
asset sales amounted to two-thirds of the group’s wholesale business, but  were 
recorded as recurring profits with no objections from its external auditor. This became 
Enron’s convenient device to drive its sales from then on.[13]  
 
Unfortunately for Enron, this apparent financial innovativeness developed  
 
fault lines. Encouraged by the favourable reception from the financial community, the  
 
company moved further and further away from its risk and trading expertise into  
 
uncharted territories. This sowed the seeds of its destruction. Primarily, Enron failed 
to adhere to the key success factors underpinning the asset light business framework, 
namely; product homogeneity; seamless national distribution network, and so on.  
Other reasons include the unwise decision to diversify into other unrelated businesses;  
and ; above all the controversial employment of SPEs for financial manipulation to 
cover its true performance and financial position.[14] 
 
The FASB had previously clarified that for SPEs to be created; it requires an external 
independent party to invest a minimum of 3% of total capital (varying according to 
project risk characteristics); its assumption of substantial risks and rewards of 
ownership, and; holding ultimate control over it. Enron, however, chose to comply 
with these rules with serious differences. For instance, Chewco a new partnership 
                                                 
[12] ibid, 139-140 
[13] ibid 
[14] supra note 11, 140-147 
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company led by senior Enron employees was financed by Enron to acquire 3% of 
JEDI, a bona fide Enron created energy project, which was losing money and 
substantially in debt. The obvious aim was to wipe off this debt from Enron’s balance 
sheet. Enron used this SPE mechanism to avoid consolidation of JEDI’s losses and 
debts, which in fact it should given the explicit FASB rules. This process was 
repeated or adapted in various other similar transactions. It became a tool to cover up 




From a legal perspective, the downfall of Enron has been attributed to the company’s 
appalling state of corporate governance and general gatekeepers’ failures. Board and 
financial intermediaries’ failures stemmed primarily from various conflicts of interest. 
Audit failure occurred when professionalism was compromised by lucrative non-
auditing consultancy incomes. Doubts were also raised on the monitoring 
performances of the NYSE and the SEC.  
 
Many external Enron directors were unable to stay independent and free from 
conflicts of interest when they profited through lucrative consulting fees, highly 
profitable business contracts and insider trading of stock options.[16] Details of such 
misalignment of shareholders’ interests were uncovered in the ‘Powers Report’.[17] 
                                                 
[15] Hake, E.R., ‘Financial Illusion: Accounting for Profits in the Enron World’, Journal of Economic 
Issues, Vol. XXXIX No.3, 09/2005, 595-610; Nelken, D., ‘White Collar and Corporate Crime’ in 
Mike, M., Rod, M. & Robert, R. (eds.), ‘The Oxford Handbook of Criminology’, 4th edition,  OUP: 
Oxford, 733-770 
[16] Griffin, S., ‘Corporate Collapse and the Reform of Boardroom Structures—Lessons from America’, 
Insolvency Lawyer, 06/11/2003, 214-225; Campbell, D. & Griffin, S., ‘Enron and the End of Corporate 
Governance’ in Sorcha, M. (ed.), ‘Global Governance and the Quest for Justice: Volume 2 Corporate 
Governance’, Hart Publishing: Portland, 2006, 47-72 
[17] Powers Report (Report of Investigation by the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of the 
Enron Corporation), available at http://news.findlaw.com, 01/02/2002. 
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One example concerned Michael Kopper’s management role in Chewco without 
evidence of approval from its board. Another involved the managerial and investor 
involvement of Fastow in the LJM partnerships.[18] 
 
Enron’s six-member audit committee, which could have exerted a better oversight of 
these contentious issues also failed to carry out their tasks properly. At least 2 
members had their functions tainted by consultancy fees and connected donations. 
The committee’s chairman for instance participated in the controversial disposal of 
stocks in January 2000 and October 2001. This became a subject of a lawsuit relating 
to insider trading.[19] Between January and May of 2001 Lay and Skilling cashed in 
their stock options at the height of the company’s share price in the knowledge that 
the company was already close to financial disaster.[20] 
 
Fastow who turned state witness was eventually found guilty of fraudulent 
misrepresentation and other misfeasance by the court, but only sentenced to six years’ 
jail after agreeing to provide assistance to the prosecution for the other cases. 
Lay and Skilling were found guilty of broadly similar charges but sentenced to more 
than 20 years’ imprisonment. Lay died in August 2006 from a heart attack, whilst 
Skilling lost his court appeal, and has begun to serve his jail term.[21] 
Arthur Anderson, Enron’s auditor tried to deflect the blame of Enron’s controversial 
downfall to other capital market participants.[22] However, its failure to qualify 
                                                 
[18] ibid, 148-172 
[19] Useem, M., ‘Corporate Governance is Directors Making Decisions: Reforming the Outward 
Foundation for Insider Decision Making’, Journal of Management and Governance, Vol. 7 2003, 241-
253 
[20] ibid 
[21] Barden, T., ‘Four Banks Helped Me: Enron’s Fastow Says’, Times Business, 27/09/2006, 47; 
Lozano, J.A., ‘Enron’s Fastow Gets 6-Year Sentence’, AP, 27/09/2006, 1-3 
[22] Berardino, J., ‘Enron: A Wake-UP Call’, The Wall Street Journal, 04/12/2001 
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Enron’s financial statements despite serious reporting flaws became a subject of 
extensive criticisms.[23] Signs of conflicts were evident in the firm’s active 
involvement with Enron’s accounting policies and the structuring of its various 
controversial transactions. Under intense pressure from the SEC, AA admitted the 
shredding of documents connected with Enron.  
 
When Anderson’s lead auditor for the Enron account admitted to obstruction of 
justice, the beginning of the end of Anderson began to take shape.[24] A Houston jury 
shortly thereafter pronounced the firm guilty of obstruction of justice. The conviction 
meant that Anderson was no longer allowed to perform audit work for listed 
corporations under SEC rulings.[25] A year on, the Supreme Court squashed this 
decision a year on grounds that Anderson did not have the intent to obstruct the 
course of justice. This came too late as the global firm had by that time been 
restructured and sold or merged with various third parties.  
 
As the drama in the demise of Enron began to surface, the conflicting roles played by 
various financial institutions in the financing of Enron’s many dubious SPV ventures 
became more apparent. One such sham transaction involved the purchase of Nigerian 
Barges by Merrill Lynch from Enron in 1999, on the understanding that Enron would 
repurchase them from the former at a premium of US $12 million. The SEC later 
charged the four Merrill Lynch senior executives for aiding and abetting Enron to 
manipulate its earnings reports. In the end, the bank dismissed these four executives 
                                                 
[23] Rapoport, M., ‘In the Money: Enron’s Auditor’s Complaints Don’t Wash’, Dow Jones News 
Service, 04/12/2001 
[24] Squires, S. E. et al., ‘Inside Arthur Anderson: Shifting Values, Unexpected Consequences’, Prentice 
Hall: NJ, 2003, chapter 10. 
[25] Eichenwald, K., ‘Anderson Misread Depths of the Government’s Anger’, The New York Times, 
18/03/2002 
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and paid US $80 million in fines to the SEC. ‘…Deutsche, CIBC, Barclays… were all 
found by the (bankruptcy) examiner to have aided Enron officers to breach their 
fiduciary duties by participating in window dressings, SPE-related deals, or asset 
parking’.[26] In many instances, these resulted in out of court settlements involving 
large sums of fines by the SEC.  
 
It was only after the happening of Enron that the FASB responded with Interpretation 
No. 46 to deal with the reporting challenges posed by the SPVs. Blame has also been 
put on the SEC itself for not overseeing effectively the glaring failures emerging from 
big corporations like Enron. Often cited is the failure of the SEC to review Enron’s 
convoluted filings in 1998, 1999, and 2000, in particular Forms 10-k. However, a 
more probable explanation is SEC’s lack of financial resources and slowness in 
recognising the FASB as the accounting standards board. Early recognition of the 
latter would have enabled the FASB to expedite guidelines for reporting standards to 
deter and prevent the abuse of financial reporting obligations.[27]  
 
The courts have also been blamed for sending the wrong signals to financial advisers 
when they dismissed the 2002 lawsuit against WorldCom on grounds of prejudice[28]; 
and much earlier in the 1994 Supreme Court ruling that professional advisers 
knowingly aiding and abetting securities fraud are not liable to victims.[29] These 
decisions probably helped fuel the reckless actions of auditing and investment firms 
as they engaged in intensive competitions. It was only in the aftermath of Enron that 
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the courts began to take a much tougher stand.[30] The severe criminal penalties 
imposed by the court subsequently on key Enron officials and the hefty fines imposed 
in deferred prosecution judgement cases contributed significantly to the return of 






WorldCom grew from its small 1984 base to become by 2001 the second-biggest US 
telecommunications and data communications corporation after sixty fast-tracked 
acquisitions.[32] However, the sector’s over surplus capacity in late 1990s brought 
severe beatings to its share price, which became worse after its abortive merger 
attempt with Sprint its major competitor. Plagued by this; class action lawsuits over 
billings disputes; dismissal of its auditor Arthur Anderson; and more importantly over 
media reports of accounting irregularities, WC’s CEO Ernie Ebbers resigned in April 
2002. Scott Sullivan WC’s Chief Financial Officer followed suit thereafter. The 
situation aggravated shortly thereafter with WorldCom’s financial restatements 
showing cash flow overstatement of some US $3.85 billion.[33] When SEC charged 
WC for defrauding the capital market in late June 2002, the corporation reeled under 
it and had to file for protection from creditors under Chapter 11.[34]  
 
WC resurfaced under the new corporate name of MCI in May 2004 together with a  
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West Sussex 
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reconstituted board. Prior to that, Sullivan conceded to the charges of fraud and 
conspiracy and agreed also to turn prosecution witness against Ebbers who was faced 
with similar charges. Ebbers was found guilty of fraud and conspiracy in March 2005, 
and sentenced to 25 years jail in July 2005.[35] 
 
Use of OBF 
 
WC provided connectivity to more than 100 countries, and owned and managed 75 
data centres across five continents.[36] In the process, the company spent US $60 
billion on 65 acquisitions from 1991 to 1997. These were financed by equities and 
debts of some US $41 billion.[37] The dotcom boom facilitated WC’s growth through 
acquisitions strategy by placing high premiums on the company’s shares. WC’s high 
market valuation won further support from the capital market and it accordingly 
provided it with further financial resources to sustain the expensive acquisitions of 
MFS Communications and MCI Communications.[38] Whilst WC’s growth through 
acquisitions makes great investment stories they became disastrous when not properly 
managed.[39]  
 
The company’s downfall was reflected in the plunging of its stock price from US $72 
to less than US $1 within four years. This has been attributed to mismanagement, 
massive debts, and accounting manipulations. ‘Much of it (the US $37 billion debt) 
was used to pay for legitimate, if overpriced, acquisitions…and some of it was used 
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(as)…slush fund(s)’.[40] The employment of massive debts was accompanied by 
significant use of OBF mechanisms although less than the scale of those in Enron. 
The personal loan of US $341 million to its CEO strained further the company’s 
financial reputation.[41] Such ‘sweetheart loans’ to senior executives were then not 
uncommon in Wall Street.[42] What disappointed the market was that it was the largest 
by far, and undertaken merely to avert further dumping of the CEO’s shares in the 
market. The board’s controversial move and the efforts of whistleblowers attracted 
enquiry from the SEC[43]  
 
With a high debt structure to service and not much to offer by way of performance,  
the company resorted to the use of creative accounting devices to distort its earnings 
and financial performance. In particular, most of its acquisitions were grossly 
underperforming due to surplus capacity in the sector.[44] WC artificially expanded the 
merger expenditure with the cost of the acquired company’s expenses expected in 
future accounting periods. These inflators from post-acquisition reporting can only 
continue to operate with bigger deals to keep them going.  
 
This accounting approach allowed WC to write-off the business goodwill over some  
 
forty years instead of around four years under normal GAAP. It also meant that  
 
earnings in the company would be reduced by much smaller increments. This enabled  
 
                                                 
[40] Supra note 26 
[41] Sandberg, D., ‘Bernie Ebbers Bet the Ranch-Really-on WorldCom Stock’, WSJ, 1404/2002 
[42] Lublin, J. S. & Young, S., ‘WorldCom Loan to CEO of US$341 Million is the Most Generous in 
Recent Memory’, WSJ, 15/03/2002 
[43] Young, S., ‘Big WorldCom Loan May Have Spurred Inquiry’, WSJ, 14/03/2002 
[44] Re WorldCom Security Litigation: Class Action Complaint Filed in the US Southern District of 
New York 2002, www.Findlaw.com, 28 
 297
the company to overstate for instance  its 1997 pre-tax profits by US $209 million. 
Such financial manipulations were magnified upon its abortive merger plans with 
Sprint.[45] 
 
WC in the early 1990’s betted heavily on the potential of the telecommunications  
services market by contracting on long-term lease agreements with various  
 
telecommunications carriers to gain access to their networks. WC under  
 
these arrangements had to service fixed monthly obligations to these carriers  
 
irrespective of actual use of the leased facilities. These line costs were therefore the 
fees that the company incurred with local telephone companies to carry the calls of  
its clientele. Such line expenses had to be capitalised from the latter half of 2002 
onwards with the worsening market conditions for the company’s products in order to 
understate operating expenses and exaggerate earnings. This, however, was against 
GAAP reporting guidelines.[46] 
 
WorldCom employed this form of tactical reporting from the first quarter of 2001 
through to the first quarter of 2002. This exaggerated the company’s earnings, total 
assets and net worth. This clearly violated the accounting standard for treatment of 
line costs.[47] Steven Brabbs, the company’s Director of International Finance and 
Control maintained that Sullivan was aware of this wrongdoing. ‘…What we agreed 
to do was to create a ‘management company’ (Not a legal entity) and post it 
there…but I was making it clear that I did not see it as a journal entry that I could 
support from a legal or US or local accounting perspective.’[48] 
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Via the above scam, WorldCom reported, pre-tax profits of; US $1.6 billion in 2000  
 
(when in fact it was only US $365 million); US $2.4 billion in 2001(as against an 
actual loss of US $662 million), and; US $240 million for the first quarter of 2002 (as 
against an actual loss of a minimum of US $557 million). In short, these accumulated 
massive losses were transformed into earnings adequate to satisfy the expectations of 
the capital market.[49] Over and above these items, WorldCom had also effected other 
improper off balance sheet arrangements involving the sales of certain specific 
receivables to a wholly-owned bankruptcy remote subsidiary. The subsidiary’s 
funding was provided by US $1.5 billion advances generated through a securitisation 
process funded by several banks and financial institutions.[50]  The pressure of Wall 





Whistle-blowing pressures of the above financial irregularities by WC’s internal 
auditor necessitated financial restatements for the company’s 2001 and first quarter 
2002 accounts.[51]Though Anderson denied knowledge of the defective accountings 
prior to June 2002, email records from Brabbs showed that they were informed of 
these adjustments in early April 2000. On the basis of the facts as stated, Magistrate 
Judge James C. Francis IV held that there was probable cause to conclude that a 
criminal conspiracy to commit securities fraud had existed at WC. Accordingly, ‘… 
he signed warrants for the arrest of the alleged co-conspirators, Sullivan and Myers. 
On September 26, 2002 Myers pled guilty to a three-count criminal information 
charging conspiracy, securities fraud, and false filing charges…Sullivan pleaded 
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guilty to fraud and conspiracy in March 2004 and consented to testify against Ebbers 
on similar charges. On July 13, 2005, a New York Judge sentenced Ebbers to 25 years  
…Ebbers filed appeal thereafter’.[52] 
 
The collapse of WC could therefore be attributed to over-aggressive acquisitions 
without proper follow-ups; display of serious conflicts of interest; overcapacity in the 
ICT sector and the manipulative use of OBF. The Thornburgh Report in particular 
cited the disproportionate compensation handed out to Board members.[53] Further, 
‘An unusual ‘retention bonus program was implemented in 2000 including US $10 
million payments to Ebbers and CFO Scott Sullivan’.[54] This was made worse by 
general failure of the audit committee to address or monitor serious financial 
irregularities highlighted by the company’s internal audit division.[55]Similarly, 
Anderson also failed to do likewise.[56] ‘The working papers supporting the 1999, 
2000, and 2001 audits show that Arthur Anderson considered WC to be a ‘maximum 
risk’ client, based on the company’s prior misapplication of GAAP, and its use of 
multiple billing systems.[57] 
 
The SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt Jr. in 1998 described auditors and analysts as  
 
participants in a game of nods and winks.[58] Subsequent events in WC’s  
 
corporate history showed that Anderson had not objected to various accounting  
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irregularities, which contributed to the company’s eventual downfall.[59] Citibank and 
Solomon Smith Barney benefited tremendously from WC’s many acquisitions. Ebbers 
in turn found easy financial support from the Citibank Group for his other private 
businesses. The mutual support displayed strong elements of conflict of interests. For 
example, ‘Since the loan to Ebbers was collateralized by his equity holdings, Ctigroup 
had reason to prop up WC stock. And no one was better than Jack Grubman, Salomon 
Smith Barney’s telecommunication analyst. Grubman first met Bernie Ebbers in early 
1990s…The two hit off socially, and Grubman started hyping the company’.[60] 
 
New York’s Attorney-General, Eliot Spitzer filed proceedings against Bernard Ebbers 
and other senior executives for failing to disclose their respective allocations of ‘hot’ 
IPO shares and the nature of the investment banking relationships; unjustly enriching 
themselves and violated Article 23-A of the General Business Law (‘the Martin Act’) 
and section 63(12) of the executive law. The charge sheet alleged that Smith Solomon 
Barney (SSB) allocated hot IPOs to the defendants through a ‘spinning’ process 
whereby such shares so obtained were subsequently liquidated in the active market 
with huge profits; and SSB in return was allocated lucrative investment banking 
business.[61] 
 
On October 11, 2002, the SEC filed charges against Ebbers and Sullivan for violating  
 
Sections 11 and 15 of the Securities Act; SSB as underwriters for violations of  
 
Section 11 of the Securities Act; Anderson for violations of section 10(b) of  
 
the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5; and SSB and Grubman for violations of section  
 
10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5; and Citigroup and Salomon for  
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violations of section 20(a) of the Exchange Act. 
 
 
For his controversial and conflicting role in the whole episode leading to the downfall  
 
of WC, Jack Grubman was required to resign from his US $20 million a year job, and 
barred from securities transactions for life by the SEC along with a fine of US $15 
million.[62] Citigroup which controlled SSB agreed to compensate WC’s investors’ 
law suit with US $2.575 billion.[63]Anderson agreed to settle out of court for a cash 
sum of US $65 million; 20% of any distribution to any of Anderson’s 1,700 partners; 
and a further confidential protection for the class in the event of a bankruptcy 
proceeding by Anderson.[64]  
 
The total amount recovered for the WorldCom investor class came to about US $6 
billion. Apart from the recovery from various banks and financial institutions, it is 
interesting to note the personal settlements of US $4.5 million from WC’s former 
Chairman Bert Roberts;[65] and other former outside directors.[66] As for Ebbers, he 
was sentenced to 25 years jail on being found guilty of all seven counts of filing false 
documents by the federal court.[67] SEC’s power to distribute WC penalty funds to 
injured investors though challenged by unsecured creditors was upheld by the 
court.[68]  
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SC is involved in the manufacture of durable household consumer items. The 
sustained under-performance of the company in the first half of the 1990s saw the 
appointment of turnaround specialist Albert Dunlap as its CEO in July 1996.  
Upon joining, Dunlap downsized SC’s personnel and product offerings, and wrote-off 
more than US $100 million of inventories. This cost-cutting turnaround strategy 
apparently transformed SC’s loss-making performance of US $2.37 per share in 1996 
to US $0.77 earnings per share in 1997. The market responded favourably resulting in 
the rise of SC’s market capitalisation to about US $50 per share.[69] Dunlap’s initial 
plan to dispose the company after the share price rise found no takers from the market 
owing to weak market sentiments.  
 
Dunlap’s alternative investment play was to project SC’s double-digit growth through 
acquisitions. Done in haste, these became very costly to the company.[70] Dunlap also 
tried to boost higher market valuations through further stories of more acquisitions, 
but this did not work well. He was eventually forced to resign in May 1998 when 
information came through that the impressive earnings in 1997 was the result of 
financial report doctoring. The company had to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection when its equity eroded to a negative US $1.9 billion under a pile of 
massive debts.[71] To enable the company to recover from its financial plight the  
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court provided interim relief for the company to access further finance for its 
domestic businesses.[72] 
 
Use of OBF  
The Centre for Research and Analysis (CFRA) believed that large portions of 1997 
expenses were taken up in 1996, making the financials in 1996 looking far worse than 
it really was, and the reverse picture for 1997. The mechanism employed to engineer 
this appeared to originate from the special restructuring charges created in the fourth 
quarter of 1996. Such items under normal accounting conventions should have been  
capitalised and progressively written-off.[73] 
 
 
The CFRA also found it odd that SC’s huge improvements in net income resulted in a 
deteriorating operating cash flow for the company. Indeed, ‘…As a result the CFFO 
(cash flows from operations) to net income shortfall widened by US $97 million for 
the quarter and by US $103.2 million for the nine months’.[74] CFRA further 
attributed the deterioration in operating cash flow to the sharp rise in accounts 
receivable growth by some 21 days.[75] 
 
SC tried to meet market expectations through various accounting gimmicks.  
When these failed, Dunlap then turned on the reserves created by the company’s US 
$300 million restructuring charge. Such reserves were used to cushion the slip in 
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earnings. Despite this, SC’s earnings failed to fall in line with the market’s 
expectations, and SC’s stocks fell by some 10% to US $37,625.[76] 
 
Analysts became concerned with SC’s trade debts, which grew by 36.42%, and was 
therefore climbing faster then revenue growth of 18.69%.[77] Notes to SC’s 1997 
Annual Report on two key items, provided some clarifications of this apparent 
inconsistency. In respect of revenue recognition, the company explained that its ‘bill 
and hold policy’ had contributed about 3% of its consolidated revenue. The other 
pertained to SC’s real growth in debtors, which had been understated by the level of 
trade receivables sold to its wholly owned subsidiary at the end of 1997.[78] 
 
Pressures mounted much stronger in the second quarter of 1998, when the company’s 
internal audit team raised alarms over the company’s accounting policies. The 
pressure piled further when SC’s public relations manager resigned on the day of 
SC’s planned release of its financials.[79] 
 
The above inconsistencies and other accounting matters forced SC to submit financial 
restatements for fiscal 1996, 1997 and the first quarter of 1998. [80] The restated 
earnings filed to the SEC showed significantly higher losses than reported earlier. 
Sunbeam’s stock price, which had hit a high of US $52 fell over 9% on March 9 when 
profit warnings were issued. Subsequent profit warnings and news of accounting 
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inconsistencies and SEC’s investigations plunged the stock to US $6. The company 
was eventually de-listed by the NYSE in 2001. 
 
The company turned to the use of OBF securitisation and factoring facilities when its 
earlier cost-cutting turnaround tactics and ‘bill and hold’ policy lost their usefulness. 
All these financial window-dressing efforts were undertaken to support the upbeat 
story fed to the market by the CEO. His actions were driven by the need to shore up 
the company’s market capitalisation to justify further funding support. In the end, the 
company collapsed under a pile of heavy debts, when both the company’s core 
business and acquisitions failed to perform. Whistle blowing of the company’s 
controversial accounting policies and eventual SEC investigation contributed to the 
acceleration of the demise of SC. 
 
Legal Implications 
The SEC in the face of mounting criticisms and evidence of financial irregularities at  
 
SC pursued litigations against Albert Dunlap, Russell Kersh and other senior  
 
executives of SC, and an Arthur Anderson audit partner. The SEC maintained that, 
‘The illegal conduct began at year-end 1996 with the creation by Kersh and others of 
inappropriate accounting reserves, which increased Sunbeam’s reported loss for 1996. 
These ‘cookie-jar’ reserves were then used to inflate income in 1997, thus 
contributing to the false picture of a rapid turnaround in Sunbeam’s financial 
performance... Dunlap, Kersh and others caused the Company to recognize revenue 
for sales, including ‘bill and hold sales’ that did not meet applicable accounting rules. 
As a result, for fiscal 1997, at least US $60 million of Sunbeam’s reported US $189 
million in earnings from continuing operations before income taxes came from 
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accounting fraud.’[81] They had therefore misrepresented or caused the company to 
misrepresent its performance and future prospects in its Form 10-Q filings; its bond 
offering disclosure materials; its press releases; and in its communications with 
analysts’[82] 
 
The consent judgement barred Dunlap and Kersh permanently from serving as 
officers and directors of public corporations. It also required Dunlap and Kersh to pay 
respective civil penalties of US $500,000 and US $200,000.[83]                         
 SC’s Vice-President of Sale, Lee Griffith was similarly required to pay a civil penalty 
of US $75,000.[84] 
 
Phillip E. Harlow, a partner at Arthur Anderson was prosecuted for authorizing 
unqualified audit opinions.[85] Arthur Anderson for its part agreed to pay US $110 
million in April 2001 as settlement for the litigation.[86] Meanwhile, Ronald Perelman 
mounted a separate but related suit against Morgan Stanley for faulty advice on the 
SC merger deal. The Florida jury in May 18 ordered the investment bank to 
compensate Perelman US $1.45 billion.[87] Morgan Stanley’s case was weakened by 
its failure to provide all relevant documents to the court and explanations for its 
changed of counsellors.[88] 
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BC has been described to be the most successful in transforming a ‘larger societal 
trend into a practical business concept’.[89] George Nadaff and two other former 
Blockbuster Video executives took over BC in 1988 and grew it to 35 outlets in the 
North Eastern region by 1992 through a strategy of market dominance and fast 
growth.[90] To help fund its rapid expansion, it entered the capital market through an 
IPO in 1993. Its share price then climbed steadily on account of the company’s fast 
growth and the high profile activities of its CEO.[91] 
 
The main driver for BC’s rapid growth was attributed to its ‘Franchise Area  
 
Developers ’ (FAD) model. This involved the linking up with area franchisees with 
the capacity to manage at least ten outlets each. These FADs were assisted in the 
funding of their operations of up to 75% of their capital needs by BC. In turn, BC 
tapped on market funds to finance these FADs. 
 
Though BC had management controls over these FAD operations, their impact on BC 
was unaccounted for [92] In effect, the FADs became BC’s SPVs for the hiding of 
debts and losses. Nonetheless, when some US $754 million of loans to FADs became 
irrecoverable, BC owned up to this by converting them into company-owned 
locations. This spelt the beginning of the downfall of BC. 
 
                                                 
[89] Chun, J., ‘Spunky Chicken: Lessons from Boston Chicken Could Help Your Franchise to Take 
Wing—Includes Information on Gourmet to Go—Company profile’, Entrepreneur, August 1996, 1 
[90] ibid, 2 
[91] Fisher College of Business, ‘George Nadaff: Professional Biography’, Center (Centre) for 
Entrepreneurship, available at http://www.entrepeneurship.osu.edu, viewed on 01/04/2005 
[92] Helin, K., ‘Broken Wing—Boston Chicken—Company profile’, Entrepreneur, February 1999,1 
 308
With reporting of huge losses, BC’s shares nosedived from its IPO entry price of US 
$40 in 1993 to US $3.02 in 1998.[93] When matters got worse, BC filed for Chapter 11 
reorganisation and closed 178 locations thereafter.[94] McDonald’s acquired the 
majority of BC’s assets for a consideration of US $173.5 million.[95] 
 
Use of OBF  
 
In the initial phase, the fast growth achieved by BC through the FADs attracted 
financial support from the financial community and also helped to boost it share price. 
The FAD concept collapsed, when ‘…Boston Chicken’s finance department failed to 
keep a sharp eye on the profitability of the restaurants, whilst its strategists failed to 
preserve the unique focus of the concept’.[96] Despite some prior concerns, various 
financial intermediaries and analysts continued to rate BC positively.  
 
Not all participants were, however, oblivious to BC’s pressing problems. Restaurants  
 
experts, short-sellers and national publications such as Fortune and Business Week  
 
had already been troubled by BC’s aggressive accounting techniques for the greater 
part of 1997. Their main concerns were targeted at BC’s accounting policy for not  
factoring in shortfalls at the franchises when determining profits. ‘The company’s 
financial structure is designed to decouple reported earnings from reality’.[97]  
BC publicly conceded facing market competition problems, but these had nothing to 
do with accounting.[98] As it turned out later, much of BC’s problems had everything 
to do with its misplaced aggressive accounting policy.[99] 
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BC’s massive losses, the FAD loans, and increasing capital and working capital 
expenditures were all funded by equity and debts from Wall Street. ‘The company 
was basically re-circulating money raised from public shareholders and debt-holders 
and claiming it as profit while the underlying stores operated at a loss well off the 
company’s balance sheet’.[100] The BC franchising format had transformed it into a 
credit institution, which needed other core skills BC did not have. These were 
compounded by serious operational problems.[101]  
 
On February 9, 1998 the company made special charges of between US $250 and US 
$350 million against fiscal 1997. The company explained that these charges were 
related to bad loans to franchisees and write-downs connected with its strategic 
business shift. The former involved some US $700 million in loans considered to be 
potentially irrecoverable, whilst the latter involved the taking over of  
those 743 franchised stores failing to pay its debts to BC.[102]  
 
 
Reporting pressures on BC increased after a whistleblower informed the SEC of its 
accounting irregularities. For instance, under accounting guidance BC was required to 
review its loans portfolio and to make adequate provisions for doubtful accounts. No 
loans were ever considered to be in doubts by the company in its correspondence with 
the SEC. [103]  
 
From mid-1996 thereon, BC began disclosing the total losses incurred by the  
 
                                                                                                                                            
[99] Corrigan, L., ‘Fool.Com: A Boston Chicken Autopsy’, available at http://www.fool.com, 
07/10/1998,1 
[100] supra note 99, 2 
[101] ibid 
[102] Victoria, G., ‘Bad Loan Charge at Boston Chicken’, Financial Times, 10/02/1998, 18 
[103] Richards, B. & Thurm, S., ‘Boston Chicken Case Mirrors Enron Failure’, WSJ, 13/03/2002, C1 
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franchisees, which for each year exceeded BC’s own net profits. The new auditors, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, concluded that the company should have recognised no less 
than US $630 million as delinquent loans at the end of 1997. The earlier contention by 
Anderson that such loans were okay had excluded rent and advertising expenditures in 
its assessment of the franchisees’ profitability[104]. Despite the strains posed by BC’s 
losses and those of the FADs, the company’s annual filings of its financials from 1993 




From an accounting perspective, the FADs were merely BC’s investments as it has 
equity interests of up to 20% in most cases. In all cases, however, BC had the right to 
convert its loans into equity, and these usually were set beyond 50% of each FAD’s 
shareholdings.[105] Despite this and BC’s control over their management, the company 
chose not to reflect these FADs’ financial effects on its financial statements.[106] 
Instead, BC argued that as it held less than 20% equity in these FADs, it was not 
necessary for it to use the equity method.[107]  
 
BC largely faded away with the sale of its Boston Market chains in 2000, other than 
the continuing lawsuits mounted by the company’s bankruptcy trustees. This included 
their case against Anderson for creating ‘a façade of corporate solvency’ by not 
disclosing the losses amassed by the FADs. The trustees argued that these FADs were 
                                                 
[104] supra note 99 
[105] ibid 
[106] Bedipo-Memba, A., ‘Is There an Epidemic of Under-Auditing’, Journal of Corporate Accounting 
and Finance’, Fall 1998, 25-35 
[107] Accounting and Principles Board (APB) Opinion No.18: Statement of Financial Accounting 
Standards No. 115 as issued in 1993 the year of BC’s IPO 
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only nominally independent and were in reality predominantly controlled by BC to 
manipulate its consolidated accounts. In February 26, 2002, Arthur Anderson (AA) 
paid US $10 million to former shareholders of BC.  
 
The bankruptcy trustee also sued key officers and executive directors of BC as well as 
the underwriters for BC’s IPO. The suits were based on, ’…the claim that the  
defendants violated federal securities laws by issuing false and misleading public 
statements relating to BC’s business position and future prospects’.[108] Most of these 
suits were settled out of court by hefty compensations to the bankruptcy trustees and 
BC’s shareholders. 
 
This case shows that when financial window-dressing is pressed to the limits, it tends 
to degenerate into various forms of financial manipulation capable of breaching 
securities laws or other types of soft laws to attract civil and criminal sanctions. Direct 
and indirect participants of such defective financial reporting are implicated, albeit to 
varying degrees of culpability. 
 




The history of MC began with an initial contract with Micro Instrumentation and 
Telemetry Systems (MITS) in 1975 [109] Thereafter, the company grew phenomenally 
                                                 
[108] Boston Chicken Lawyer Lawsuit, ‘Former Boston Chicken Stockholders Recover US $19.4 
Million’, Case ID:1491, available at http://www.lawcash.com/attorney/1491/boston-chicken-
lawsuit.asp, 08/04/2004,1 
[109] Mirick, J., ‘Bill Gates: Before Microsoft’, available at 
http:://www.ei.cs.vt.edu/~history/Gates.Mirick.html, 1996, 2-3 
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to be the world’s dominant software development giant and in the process made Bill 
Gates, the world’s richest man.[110] 
 
MC’s sales reached US $140 million within a decade of its operations, resulting in net 
income of US $24 million. Sales soared over the next decade to US $6,075 billion in 
1995. This culminated with a net income of US $1,453 billion.[111] MC’s revenue 
reached a spectacular US $39,788 billion in fiscal 2005 resulting in a net income of 
US $12,254 billion. All these looked deceptively easy under the founder’s 
stewardship. In reality, the tasks were formidable considering that during the three 
decades of its existence, the company had to face two very serious anticompetitive 
charges, which nearly saw the split of the company into two businesses.[112] 
 
Unlike other corporations which reported high revenues and high net incomes amidst  
 
a background of general illiquidity, MC is totally and distinctively different in view of  
 
its spectacularly high cash reserve strength. For instance, its current ratio for fiscal  
 
2005 stands at more than three is to one, with liquid or quick assets representing close  
 
to 80% of its total current assets. The company’s long-term debt equity ratio at less 
 
than 0.1:1 is hardly noticeable.[113] 
 
 
The main threats to MC’s dominance in the market appear to emanate from its 
brushes with the law over anti-competitive or anti-trust issues.[114] It may also have to 
                                                 
[110] Financial Times, ‘Top 25 Billionaires’, Issue No. 126, 08/10/2005 
[111] Microsoft Home Page, available at http://www.microsoft.com, viewed on 08/08/2005 
[112] ibid 
[113] ibid, The ratios were calculated from the company’s audited statements 
[114] The Times, ‘Microsoft Agrees to Pay US $761 (£ 435.8) Million to Settle with Rivals’, 
12/10/2005. Microsoft over the past few years have settled some US $3 billion with IBM, Sun 
Microsystems, Time Warner and others over its anti-competitive behaviour.  
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address the competitive challenges posed by Google and others who are now nibbling 
at its various market segments at rapid pace. 
 
To neutralise its domineering image, MC has now initiated steps to allow 
shareholders to have greater influence in the appointment of directors. Gates has also 
announced retirement within the next two years to allow for orderly and early 
succession in the giant corporation.  
 
Use of OBF  
 
MC courted some minor controversies over its substantial use of employees’ stock  
option plans (ESOP’s), especially at the early formative stage of its corporate history. 
In the early cycle of the Silicon Valley phenomenon in the late 1970s, it was common 
practice for many high-tech and internet-related companies to provide stock option 
schemes as a form of fiscal incentive to lure highly talented executives to work with 
low pay for substantial future rewards.  
 
The controversy surrounding ESOP’s concerns the way it is treated in the company’s  
 
accounts. Though mainstream accounting practices would treat such stock-based 
compensations as expense items, the majority of US-based listed corporations ignored 
this convention.[115] This approach was highly criticised by financial analysts as an 
off-balance sheet mechanism to inflate current profit reporting.  
 
ESOP supporters argued that stock options do not entail cash outlay.  
                                                 
[115] SFAS No. 123, paragraph 11 issued in 1995 allows a choice of accounting methods, with one using 
ASB Opinion No. 25 where the compensation expense is only disclosed as a footnote at its fair value, 
and; the other involving the measuring of the fair value of the stock option at grant date and treating 
this as an expense item. 
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Its deductions will therefore unfairly understate earnings. Additionally, the reductions 
of earnings through such subtractions will drive share prices down; reduce the use of 
such fiscal incentives for attracting talents to high-techs and hurt entrepreneurship in 
the process. Opponents argued that the expensing of such grants will reduce the 
incentives for key executives to manoeuvre short-term earnings report to push up 
share prices to realise their option gains.[116]  
 
Some even argued that corporate profits could have been overstated by as much as 
10% because of this reporting practice.[117] In 2001, Microsoft practically gave away 
one quarter of its net income in options to its employees. In 2002, the company gave 
option grants that can be converted into 41 million shares. Bear Sterns estimated that 
overall, S & P 500 companies gave away US $47 billion of their net income in 
options in 2001. The link between options windfalls and financial reporting 
manipulation had also become very real.  
 
The financial excesses of the late 1990s especially the huge financial frauds  
 
perpetuated in Enron, WorldCom and others where ESOP’s were managed  
 
improperly led to massive calls for the reinstatement of stock options as an expense 
item rather than as a footnote item in financial statements. The former Fed Chairman 
Alan Greenspan asserted that ‘In principle, stock-option grants, properly constructed 
can be highly effective in aligning corporate officers’ incentives with those of 
shareholders. Regrettably, the current accounting for options has created some 
perverse effects on the quality of corporate disclosures that arguably is further 
                                                 
[116] Borrus, A. et al., ‘To Expense or Not to Expense’, Business Week, 29/07/2002 
[117] Berenson, A., ‘The Number: How America’s Balance Sheet Lies Rocked the World’s Financial 
Markets’, Pocket Books: London, 2003, 107-110 
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complicating the evaluation of earnings and hence diminishing the effectiveness of 
published income statements in supporting good corporate governance’.[118] 
 
The Council of Institutional Investors supported his position, when it called for  
 
changes to avoid companies turning this into Ponzi Schemes.[119] Standard & Poor’s 
also introduced a new definition of operating earnings, which it termed core earnings  
wherein stock options would have to be expensed automatically.[120] With the writing  
 
on the wall, nearly 500 major quoted corporations by 2003 began to expense stock 
options voluntarily to comply with best accounting practice. 
 
MC responded with a proposal for new restricted stock grants which would give the 
company’s employees a more balanced range of returns than holding stock options.  
‘One source of particular anguish for many technology workers has been the 
requirement to pay tax when they exercise the options, even if they do not sell the 
stock. For workers who chose to hold their stock, only to see the market collapse, the 
tax payments became a painful cash drain’.[121] 
 
Critics have argued that had Microsoft displayed stock options as an expense in its 
accounts in 2002 and earlier, ‘…employee costs paid in the form of options at 
Microsoft would have amounted to US $11 billions or so in the year to end-June 
2000. On that basis, employee costs would have absorbed 77 per cent of the published 
                                                 
[118] Greenspan, A., ‘Corporate Governance’, Public Lecture at the Stern School of Business, New York 
University, 26/03/2002 
[119] Hitt, G. & Schlesinger, J. M., ‘Stock Options Come Under Fire in the Wake of Enron’s Collapse’, 
WSJ, 26/03/2002 
[120] Blitzer, D. M., Friedman, R .E. & Silverblatt, H.J., ‘Measures of Corporate Earnings’, Standard & 
Poor’s , first released in 07/11/2001 and updated on 14/05/2002, 5 
[121] Waters, R., ‘Microsoft Ends Era of Worker Angst: Richard Waters on Why the Software Company 
Has Put Paid to Stock Option Volatility’, Financial Times, 10/07/2003, 25; Taylor, P., ‘Stock Options: 
There Could be Dire Consequences for Investors in the High-Tech Companies That Delay Accounting 
for Stock Options’, Financial Times, 19/07/2003, 13: Michaels, A. & Waters, R., ‘Blow to Battle Over 
Options ’, Financial Times, 16/06/2004, 1 
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pre-tax profit. The comparable figure for the whole technology information sector was 
73%. This compared with a figure of just under (fewer than) 20 per cent for the 
survey sample of 325 of the largest US listed companies’.[122] 
 
MC broke ranks with other high-tech firms by putting an end to its stock options  
 
schemes in July 2003 by offering its employees direct stock grants henceforth, which  
 
it will duly treat as expense items.[123] In April 2005, the SEC announced that  
 
SFAS No.123 (R) will be effective for annual reporting periods beginning on or after  
 
June 15, 2005. As MC had adopted fair value recognition July 1, 2003 and had 
restated previous periods at the time for all awards granted to employees after July, 1, 
1995, the new accounting ruling did not have material impact on MC’s accounts. 
 
MC disclosed in its 2005 financials that where its other primary off-balance sheet  
 
arrangements were concerned, the company had furnished a guarantee of US $51 
million for the repayment of yen denominated bank loans of Jupiter 
Telecommunication Ltd., a Japanese Cable Company. Though MC has provided 
indemnifications of varying scope and amount to specified customers against claims 
of intellectual property infringement made by third parties arising from the use of its 
products, it has not encountered material liabilities as a result of such obligations and 
has accordingly not accrued any liabilities to such indemnifications.[124] 
 
For derivative instruments designated as hedges, hedge ineffectiveness was deemed 
  
not to have material impact on the company’s earnings for financial years 2003, 2004,  
 
                                                 
[122] Pender, J., ‘Shareholders’ Glory Days May be Numbered: Going off the Rails’, 29/01/2003, 11. 
This was the findings of London-based research firm of Smithers & Company. According to the firm’s 
recalculations of the profits of 100 of the largest US listed corporations, the latter’s profits should have 
been 30% lower than reported in 1995 and 36% lower in 1996 
[123] Wells, D., ‘Options Deal for Microsoft Staff’, 12/12/2003, 30 
[124] SFAS No.5, ‘Accounting for Contingencies’ 
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and 2005.[125] MC’s internal control system received unqualified opinion from its  
 
auditors, Deloitte & Touche. Where lease accounting was concerned, the company 
has properly followed the accounting conventions for its capital and operating leases. 
 
MC’s excellent growth and financial performance have given it the strength to refrain  
 
from excessive financial window-dressing. Its early ESOP reporting approach has 
now been purged in favour of restricted options grants. The company has generally 
employed OBF instruments in a responsible manner and usually for business strategic 




In the second half of 2005, the SEC started to investigate irregularities pertaining to  
 
the execution and recording of option grants in Silicon-based firms upon promptings  
 
by an academic study on 2000 top S & P companies. Findings from this study suggest  
 
that, ‘It was impossible for market insiders to predict share price movement ahead of 
time—so some of it must have been backdating’. It seems that some 29% of 
companies that granted options to top executives between 1996 and 2005 had 
manipulated such options in some way. [127]  
 
SEC’s preliminary investigations led to charges against a few firms and their senior  
employees for possible improper backdating of executive stock option grants. Some  
 
further 100 odd companies are currently under SEC’s investigation. Apple Computer  
 
represented one example of this, and the company is in fact still reviewing the extent  
 
                                                 
[125] SFAS No. 133 
[126] Judge, E., ‘Yahoo! And Microsoft See Instant Appeal for Partnership’, The Times, 13/10/2005, 57 
[127] Grant, J, ‘Academic Who Shook Up Wall Street ’, Financial Times, 11/09/2006, 12.  
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of the financial impact of such stock option-related charges.[128] MC is, however, for 
the moment unlikely to face the challenge, which others are facing in the Silicon 
Valley, as it had withdrawn from the use of stock options grants and replaced these 






Sam Walton launched WM as a discount general retailer in Arkansas in 1962 but took 
it to the NYSE in 1972 for its expansion plans. By the end of the 1970s, the company 
grew to 276 stores in eleven states. Sam’s successful formula was won by WM  
giving customers, what they expect from WM stores. This meant making available 
extensive range of good quality products at lowest possible prices and so on.[129] 
 
The next phase of WM’s spectacular growth was achieved at the end of the  
 
1980’s when its 1,400 stores achieved turnover of US $26 billion. The first warehouse  
Club, namely SAM’s Club was opened in 1983. The opening of ‘Supercenter’ in 
 
Missouri 1988 accelerated this growth momentum further. 
 
 
Having achieved the status of being the biggest retailer in the US in 1990, MC then  
 
turn on its international market ambitions. Its initial foray in Mexico was followed 
thereafter by investments in Canada, China, the UK and Puerto Rico.[130] 
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The WM group is managed through five major retail formats with three retail 
divisions. [131] WM’s business objectives are not just about mergers and  
acquisitions albeit an important prong of its competitive strategy. They are more 
about keeping the company’s customers happy with the right sort of products at 
competitive prices and an unbeatable WM shopping experience. It is primarily 
through the consistent application of the founder’s beliefs and vision that the WM 
continues to enjoy such global success.[132]  
 
By 1997, its turnover had surpassed the US $100 billion mark and by 1999 its 
employees numbered 1,140,000 making it the largest private employer in the world.  
The world’s number one retailing giant went on to achieve a turnover of US $285.2 
billion in 2005. By now the company employs some 1.3 million workers in the US 
and some 410,000 overseas.[133] Despite its spectacular business success, WM has 
received criticisms for some of its controversial business practices. For the moment, 
however, and probably in the immediate future, WM’s business operations will not be 
threatened unduly.  
 
Use of OBF 
  
Despite being the global leader in retailing, WM still has to leverage regularly on its  
 
competitive advantages as other global players, like TESCO, Carrefour, and Ahold 
are constantly at its heels. The intense competitive pressures have compelled WM to 
continue to seek growth internally through its own stores and externally via 
acquisitions and mergers. WM’s operating performance thus far shows that the 
                                                 
[131] ibid 
[132] Wit, B. D. & Meyer, R., ‘Strategy Synthesis’, Thomson Learning: London, 2005, 236-239 
[133] WM Stores, ‘The Story of WM’, available at www.wlamartstores.com:800, viewed on 09/07/2005 
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company has responded effectively in most instances other than isolated pockets of 
failures like its 1998 unsuccessful foray into the German market.[134].  
 
Of particular interest for WM is that its operating profit growth is expanding faster 
than its sales growth, and its inventory growth is less than its sales growth. The 
cumulative effects of these resulted in the company achieving return on assets of at 
least 8% annually since 2002 despite its high asset base. Earnings per share have also 
increased from US $1.47 in 2002 to no less than US $2 in 2004 and 2005.[135] 
As a result operating cash flows from continuing operations have continued to  
 
maintain their annual growth trends.  
 
 
This stable and impressive financial performance has provided WM with the 
confidence to disclose its OBF applications in accordance with best reporting practice. 
For instance, it has recorded two separate issues of US $500 million debts with 
embedded options within the current liability of its consolidated balance sheets. The 
company has also disclosed the use of financial instruments for hedging and non-
trading purposes; and the risk mitigation measures it has taken in respect of these 
instruments.[136] 
 
Where the use of leasing instruments are concerned, the company has capitalised  
 
and disclosed its non-cancellable operating leases as part of its long term debts  
 
together with the long term portion of its capital lease obligations. Details on  
 
guarantees and other financial commitments provided by the company for  
 
transactions with third parties were also disclosed by the company.  
 
                                                 
[134] Kotler, P., et al., ‘Principles of Marketing: European Edition’, Pearson Education Ltd: Essex, 2005, 
774-775 
[135] Developed and calculated from WM’s 10b-k SEC Filings 
[136] supra note 135 
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Other than the above, WM has also complied with other OBF related reporting 
guidelines issued by FASB. These include, among others;[137] 
 
(a) FASB Interpretation No. 46, ‘Consolidation of Variable Interest Entities (SPVs)’. 
 
WM has explained that as the net sales and total assets of entities affected by this  
 
ruling is less than 1% of the company’s net sales and total assets, its adoption will  
 
have no material impact on the company’s financial instruments; 
 
(b) FAS No.123, ‘Accounting and Disclosure of Stock-Based Compensation’.  
Its adoption by the company since 2002 has resulted only in a reduction of profits of 
around US $100 million. 
 
WM does not make extensive use of OBF instruments. Its use of OBF mechanisms 
like leasing, stock options, and SPVs are principally made in pursuit of fiscal 
advantage and other strategic business considerations like financial support for its 
local suppliers in emerging economies to secure their supply lines. The company’s 
restatements in 2004 and 2005 to account for the impact of ESOP have also not 
caused material damage to its financials or its reputation. 
 
Legal implications 
WM’s rationale and manner of OBF applications clearly demonstrated the company’s 
appreciation of the risks and benefits associated with their usage. The company has 
used them in limited ways and adhered to their proper disclosure rules. More 
importantly, the company has exercised great financial discipline by not using them 
excessively to leverage on their earnings as some other corporations have done. This 
indirectly reflects on the corporation’s responsible behaviour towards risk 
                                                 
[137] ibid, 23 
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management. By using and reporting on the use of OBF and other related instruments 
in its current manner, any legal implications arising from their employment are likely 








BCCI’s non-bank holding company in Luxenbourgh owned the two separate financial 
networks incorporated in Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands, despite its huge 
London presence. Events unfolding later strongly suggest that this was undertaken 
deliberately to cause maximum confusion about the way the bank conducted its 
business across the world. As the holding company was not regulated, consolidated 
supervision of BCC by the financial regulators was difficult to achieve. [138]  
 
Under the leadership of its founder Agha Hassan Abedi, BCCI achieved phenomenal 
growth as it ventured into lucrative but high risks lending and shady deals with drug 
barons and other money-launderers across the world. Its controversial activities 
attracted the attention of financial regulators. Against compelling evidence from 
dictator Manuel Antonio Noriega, BCCI conceded to money-laundering charges in 
the US in early 1990. The bank was put under probation for five years and fined US 
$14 million. In the second half of 1990, the federal jury found five BCCI officials 
guilty of money laundering, and in the third quarter following this, Abedi was forced 
to resign from BCCI.[139]  
                                                 
[138] (a) Howells, P. & Bain K., ‘The Economics of Money, Banking and Finance’, Pearson Education 
Limited: Essex, 2005; (b) Truell, P. & Gurwin, L., ‘BCCI: The Inside Story of the World’s Most 
Corrupt Financial Empire’, Bloomsbury Publishing Ltd.: London, 1992, 439-454 
[139] Wearing, R., ‘Cases in Corporate Governance’, Sage Publications: London, 2005; The whistle-
blower was Jack Blum the attorney who served on John Kerry’s Committee on Drugs and Terrorism 
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The 1991 Price Waterhouse report to the Bank of England (BE) alleged extensive  
 
fraudulent activities at BCCI. The UK government thereafter ordered a public  
inquiry under Lord Bingham into the affairs of the bank. Subsequently, Sheikh Zayed,  
 
BCCI’s de facto controlling shareholder was requested to inject further equities to 
safeguard the interest of depositors. When this did not come about, BE executed the 
shutting down of BCCI’s operations on July 5 1991 in a well-coordinated operation 
across multiple economies to avoid and prevent further illegal erosion of the  
bank’s remaining assets. In reply to criticisms over its delayed response, BE argued 
that it, ‘…needed some objective proof before it (the BCCI) could be closed’.[140] In 
the end, the shut down of BCCI was achieved with minimum financial disruptions to 
key financial centres across the world.  
 
Use of OBF 
 
Where banking institutions are concerned, off-balance sheet transactions are  
 
contingencies extended and received. Banks make money through the provisions of 
such obligations in the form of upfront or periodic fees. Such contingencies extended 
by the bank do not carry with them immediate exposures, as there are no funds 
outflows at origination points; but they do generate credit risks in view of the possible 
future applications of the contingencies given. Outflows take place conditionally on 
the fate of the counterparty. Also where customers begin to employ unused credit 
facilities, the off-balance sheet items become an on-balance sheet loan. As discussed 
previously, derivatives in the form of swaps, futures contracts, and options now form 
an important component of banks’ off-balance sheet instruments.[141] 
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BCCI’s financial problems began in the late-1970s when it had to reluctantly respond 
to the financial difficulties of a major customer, namely the Gulf Group shipping 
corporation. The losses from this and other delinquent loans were covered through 
various financial scams. In fact, senior internal executives were perpetuating 
fraudulent undertakings involving falsification and fabrication of accounting entries 
and financial reports. These managed to hide otherwise huge losses away from the 
views of the creditors, and other capital market participants. This allowed BCCI to 
continue receive support from depositors and the financial markets to enable it to 
carry on with its charade longer than justified.[142] 
 
BCCI’s downfall was precipitated by various circumstances and events. These have 
been attributed to the excessive falsification of accounts; revelations by whistle-
blowers from within and without; dogged pursuit by a couple of US law enforcement 
officials; and the pressures on the auditors and the BE to finally act upon discovery of 




The downfall of BCCI brought major changes to banking regulations and supervision. 
In the US, this led to the International Banking Act (IBA) of 1991, which 
was’…aimed at strengthening federal supervision and examination of foreign bank 
operations in the US’.[143] In the UK, the Banking Act was amended, ‘…to give the 
BE the right to close down the UK operations of an international bank if it feels the 
overseas operations of the bank are not being conducted properly’. At the 
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international level, the Basel Committee issued a subsequent set of minimum 
standards for supervision of international banks in response to the BCCI scandal.[144] 
 
Price Waterhouse, BCCI’s auditor displayed various weaknesses in its gate-keeping 
role. It, however, became more proactive when key officials of BCCI were  
indicted in the US in 1988 for securities breaching activities. The case prompted the 
auditor to express its concern to the BE over the bank’s future especially in the 
context of alleged financial distortions in the latter’s 1990 accounts.[145] The BE 
apparently could not respond immediately with specific actions without solid 
evidence as it could not risk a run on the bank.[146]  
 
Meanwhile, the consultancy division of Price Waterhouse proposed a rescue operation 
with injection of further equity funds from the Abu Dhabi shareholders. Whilst 
awaiting this, the auditor had to furnish details of fraudulent activities at BCCI to the 
BE in mid-1991. By then, the matter had reached beyond crisis proportions. With this 
overwhelming evidence and the transmission of further damning information on 
BCCI and its senior officials from the US, the BE decided to act more swiftly. Despite 
arguments by the consulting auditor that BCCI could be restructured to a more viable 
footing, the BE shut down BCCI’s entire operations in conjunction with other 
regulators where the bank had strong presence.[147] 
 
Both the BE and Price Waterhouse were severely criticised by the 1992 Bingham  
 
Report. The former was criticised for failing to act after receiving a series of  
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warnings of financial improprieties at BCCI. The latter was criticised for failing to 
fully brief the BE about the extent of the fraud it had found in early 1991. The US 
Kerry Report also criticised the two for their delayed response and lack of cooperation 
with US financial regulators.[148] Additionally, Price Waterhouse (UK) was criticised 
for not informing its US counterpart about the unusual facilities extended by BCCI to 
the parent company of First American Bank. It was claimed that this could have 
resulted in earlier remedial actions.[149] 
 
The Treasury and Civil Service Committee (TCSC) concluded after weighing the 
Bingham Report that, ‘…it is incumbent on the BE to accept responsibility for its 
failure as the supervisor of BCCI, as demonstrated so clearly in the Bingham Report. 
Furthermore, we regard the absence of any disciplinary action of any kind against  
any of the individuals involved as undermining the future effectiveness of the bank,  
 
because it may lead staff to conclude that failure to carry their responsibilities  
 
effectively carries no adverse consequences for them as individuals’.[150] Nonetheless, 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer and in particular the Bingham Report stressed that 
the ‘…prime responsibility of course rests with those who devised, directed and 
implemented the frauds which were practised’.[151]  
 
The TCSC, however, felt that the Bingham Report  ‘…unlike that of the Treasury—
does not exclude the possibility of some responsibility being attributable to others 
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such as the auditors or the United Kingdom authorities’.[152] The TCSC also made the 
further conclusion that, ‘…the 
Bingham Report demonstrates conclusively that the BE ‘failed to discharge its 
supervisory duties in respect of BCCI ‘.[153]  
 
Encouraged by these findings, the liquidator of BCCI mounted a compensation suit  
 
against the BE on the grounds of public misfeasance. The court trial collapsed  
 
in November 2005 as events unfolding were turning very much against the plaintiffs. 
 
Nonetheless, the House of Lords’ decision to allow the case to be heard on claims of 
public misfeasance suggests that legal risks still exist for regulators for failure to 
act.[154] The US justice Department indicted BCCI, Abedi, and others in late  
1991 for engaging in racketeering and conspiracy pertaining to the illegal ownership 
 
of US banking institutions.[155] 
 
 




BB began operations in London in 1762. It prides itself as an international investment 
bank with good knowledge of emerging economies. In fact, 1/3 of its employees were 
based in Asia and another half outside the UK. However, ‘Just as exposure in Latin 
America had led to its near ruin in 1890, so exposure in the Far East was the cause of 
Baring’s downfall in 1995’.[156] 
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Unbeknown to the top echelon in the bank, its corporate culture was split between the 
new fast-moving Barings Securities (BS), and the other slower-paced traditional 
investment-banking arm. The clash of business cultures between the two divisions 
contributed significantly to the poor understanding of the derivatives business and in 
particular the kind of huge losses the latter is capable of inflicting upon the bank.  
The fall of BB has been attributed mainly to the reckless undertaking of highly 
speculative derivatives trading by BB’s Singapore operations manager, Nick Leeson 
nicknamed ‘the rogue trader’ by the BE. Nick Leeson was promoted to head Barings 
Futures Singapore (BFS) in 1992 after a successful supervisory stint in Jakarta.[157]  
 
Being in charge of both trading and backroom activities, Leeson became able to 
engage in illegal trading activities without direct monitoring. Cash support from 
London to BFS had accumulated to some £742 million in February 1994, almost two 
times the then stated capital of the entire Barings Group.[158] Concerns expressed by 
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basle and the CEO of Salomon 
Brothers Hong Kong over rumours of derivatives problems at BB were flatly denied 
by BB.[159] Part of the problem was that none of the bank’s senior figures understood 
derivatives or derivative trading sufficiently. 
 
Leeson’s illegal trading losses of some £800 million wiped up BB’s equity funds of 
around £200 million. The UK government was unwilling to bail out the bank and the 
initial interests showed by some white knights had also evaporated upon learning of 
the massive losses. The collapse of the bank led to an investigation by the Board of 
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[159] Gapper, J. & Denton, N., ‘All That Glitters: The Fall of Barings’, Hamish Hamilton: London, 
1996, 174-175 
 329
Banking Supervision of BE. The outcome of the investigation in July 1995 placed the 
blame primarily on Leeson, ‘the rogue trader’. Other causes identified were the 
internal control weaknesses in the bank; and the failure of its auditors to spot Leeson’s 
fraudulent activities.  
 
Use of OBF  
 
The new capital requirements introduced by Basel 1 significantly increased the 
regulatory costs of bank intermediation and help tilt banks like BB more towards off-
balance sheet banking techniques such as securitisation and the highly profitable but 
also highly risky derivative trade. Such off-balance sheet undertakings involved the 
use of financial instruments to generate income from fees and loan sales. This 
provided BB with attractive profits but yet do not have to be visible on its balance 
sheet. Income as a percentage of assets from the conduct of such undertakings had 
doubled from 1979 to the early 1990s.[160] It was difficult for BB to resist the 
temptation from expanding in such profitable ventures. The issue was really about the 
balance between profits and risks taking, and in this regard BB failed miserably 
because of the board’s general ignorance of the scale of risks involved and their 
preoccupation for personal windfall gains. 
 
The fall of BB was the consequence of unlimited exposures in the derivative trade,  
but it has been contended that there was nothing complex about such derivatives.  
 
Leeson was an arbitrageur, and as such was incumbent upon him to be able to identify 
the differences in the prices of futures contracts and achieved profits by buying 
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futures in one market and simultaneously selling them on to another. ‘Mr. Leeson was 
supposed to have been trying to profit by spotting differences in the prices of the 
Nikkei-225 futures contracts listed on the Osaka Securities Exchange (OSE) and the 
Singapore Monetary Exchange (SIMEX)…rather than hedging his positions, Leeson 
seems to have decided to bet on the future direction of the Nikkei index. By 23 
February, when his actions came to light, Leeson had purchased US $7 billion in 
stock index futures and sold 20 billion worth of bond and interests rate futures 
contracts. Most of the losses came from the stock index futures’.[161] Under pressure 
by his superiors to show a good profit picture for the last week of February, Leeson 
had by that time betted the fate of the bank with further purchases of futures.[162] 
 
Asymmetric information analysis of the principal-agent problem probably provides a  
better explanation of Leeson’s reckless behaviour and BB’s risk management lapse. 
‘By letting Leeson control both his own trades and the back room, it increased  
asymmetric information because it reduced the principal’s (Baring’s) knowledge  
 
about Leeson’s trading activities. This lapse increased the moral hazard incentive for  
 
him to take the risks at the bank’s expense, as he was now less likely to be caught.  
 
Furthermore, once he had experienced large losses, he had even greater incentives to  
 
take on even higher risks because if his bets worked out, he could reverse his losses  
 
and keep in good standing with the company, whereas if his bets soured, he had little  
 
to lose since he was out of job any way’.[163] 
 
 
At the end of it all, going big into the derivative trade was not the sole action of  
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Leeson. Despite the generally held belief of the rogue trader theory, Leeson  
 
could not have gone the distance without the lapse of supervisory attention and 
controls. His superiors were all chasing big profits for the bank and for personal gains.  
Leeson had shown them the way through the enhanced use of derivatives albeit under  
 





The bank’s lapse of management attention and lack of proper internal control  
 
procedures suggest an absence of responsible board behaviour. Also, account 88888 
may be treated as a type of special purpose vehicle manipulated by Leeson to hide  
losses and unauthorised trading. It remained arguable whether senior management of 
BB was completely ignorant of the presence and conduct of account 88888. 
From various circumstantial events, it would appear that despite some signs of  
 
weaknesses in BB’s internal control system, the appropriate response was not put in  
 
place by senior management of the bank, and not sufficiently insisted upon by the  
 
external and internal auditors.[164] 
 
 
The Bank’s Group Treasury and Risk division set up in late 1994, had also failed to  
 
highlight the absence of gross position limits on proprietary trading conditions in  
 
Singapore.[165] This was despite concerns raised in the industry and in particular the 
 
BIS. The BE may also have contributed to the ease with which Leeson was able to 
carry out his reckless speculative endeavours. Under existing EU regulations, UK 
banks need BE’s approval if more than 25% of their shareholders’ funds are placed 
into a single investment or transferred out of the UK. This was clearly the case for 
BB. Indeed, throughout 1993 and 1994 other than the April-June 1994 quarter, the 
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bank’s exposure to the SIMEX and Japanese markets exceeded 25% of its 
shareholders’ funds.  
 
George Maclean, BB’s Head of Banking Group, had highlighted this drawback to 
Geoffrey Barnett, the CEO of Barings Investment Bank.[166] Maclean later reported 
that Thomson (a BE supervisory official) had advised him that the matter was buried 
reasonably deep in his in-tray, and that he was, ‘…happy with Barings having 
reported the situation and that we should continue to exceed 25% of our capital base 
from time to time’.[167] The ‘slip’ may probably explained why, ‘The granting of the 
BE’s nod and wink of approval was never documented’.[168] The BE concluded in its 
report, ‘…(a) that the losses were incurred by reason of unauthorised and concealed 
trading activities within BFS; (b) the true positions were not noticed earlier by reason 
of failure of controls and managerial confusion with Barings; (and) the true position 
had not been detected prior to the collapse by the external auditor, supervisors or 
regulators of Barings’.[169] 
 
The auditor Cooper and Lybrand despite criticisms was only required to pay damages 
of £1.5 million as a consequence of negligence on relatively technical matters. The 
UK High Court attributed the failure to detect fraudulent trading by Leeson to 
management failure at BB. The BE came under severe criticisms by the TCSSC over 
various financial regulatory weaknesses, and was urged, ‘…to ensure that the type of 
laxity of management illustrated at Barings could not still go undetected under the 
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new regime’.[170] In 2000, regulatory powers on banking and financial institutions 
were removed from the BE and placed under the purview of the Financial Services 
Authority (FSA). 
 
BB’s Executive Board members were found guilty of negligence over the 
management of the bank’s affairs and were duly disqualified as directors for various 
defined periods, on being found to be unfit for the office of directors.[171] As for 
Leeson, he was found guilty of criminal charges and sentenced to six and half years’ 
jail in Singapore.  
 




Robert Maxwell was a self-made publishing entrepreneur with tremendous 
networking skills. Despite reputation damage arising from the abortive 1969 Leaseco 
Data Processing (LDP) merger with Pergamon Press (PP) because of a $2 million 
profit overstatement in the latter; Maxwell recovered through the impressive 
performances in PP and Maxwell Communications Corporation (MCC) for much of 
the 1970s and 1980s.[172] Maxwell also became very adept in raising funds from the 
capital and financial markets.[173] He had additionally acquired the art of supporting 
shares at high prices through the assistance of friendly financial analysts and 
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connected financial institutions as well as inflated reports of quoted corporations 
under his control.[174] 
 
Nonetheless, squeezed to the corner by the massive funding needs of his huge 
  
complex business structure, Maxwell was compelled to resort to illegitimate means to 
contain the crisis. This was reflected in one incident disclosed by a Maxwell 
 
employee where he had to engage in loading dummy stocks.[175] Falsification of 
financial reports could only temporarily prevent withdrawal of finance and support of 
stock prices. They cannot provide the fresh funds needed to sustain his many 
operations. Inevitably out of desperation, Maxell started to raid on the larger pension 
funds from listed corporations under his control. However, when things did not 
improve fast enough, financial market support began to wither away through forced 
selling of his collateralised stocks. Maxwell’s business empire crumbled under the 
weight of massive debts and losses. Shortly thereafter, he died under mysterious 
circumstances. 
 
Use of OBF  
 
The financial irregularities in PP’ which were uncovered by three DTI reports in  
 
1971 to 1973 demonstrated Maxwell’s willingness to engage in financial reporting 
manipulation for business gains. When these reports described him to be ‘unfit for  
stewardship of listed corporations in the UK’,  Maxwell responded through hard work 
and clever manipulation of his political networks to regain the trust and confidence of 
the business communities. Still, Maxwell shielded his business interests from public 
scrutiny by integrating the ultimate ownership of PP and MCC in Maxwell 
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Foundation, a Liechtenstein entity he secretly controlled through a Swiss front 
man.[176] 
 
Maxwell’s personal feud with Rupert Murdock his main business rival led him to 
expensive acquisitions’ which weakened his financial resources terribly. Commencing 
mid 1985, Maxwell began to make unauthorised use of pensions funds under his 
indirect control via the employment of connected authorised investment management. 
It was alleged later that Coopers and Lybrand Deloitte, the external auditor and 
consultants to most of Maxwell’s business interests were privy to such activities.[177] 
 
The connections between his businesses and the pension funds were opaque in nature  
 
and never provided information that these transactions were often made against the  
 
interests of the latter. Lending from the pension funds to his private business was 
usually window-dressed at fiscal year-ends. Beneficial ownerships of shares were also 
purposefully delayed in order to cause maximum confusion. In short, the use of off-
balance sheet financing mechanisms by Maxwell originated in the mid 1980s.  
 
Financial pressures began to mount in the latter part of the 1980s when his private  
 
interests had to take up the rights portion of MCC’s flotation in 1987 through a £300  
 
million loan. This rose to £1 billion in 1989 because of further expensive  
 
acquisitions made by Maxwell. This debt was secured against MCC shares. MCC  
 
itself because of further expensive acquisitions had to assume an enlarged debt of US 
$3 billion. Maxwell switched funds deceptively from one company to another, and 
between the listed and private side of his business. This made it difficult for analysts, 
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investors, and creditors to appreciate fully the financial health of the quoted 
corporations linked to him directly or indirectly.[178] 
 
The summer of 1990 was particularly difficult for Maxwell, as he had to juggle 
  
financial pressures affecting both the private and listed sides, and in particular MCC.  
On some occasions, Maxwell had to sell some assets belonging to the pension funds  
and used the proceeds to meet the needs of his various businesses. His attempts to  
 
sustain the price of MCC included secret purchases not disclosed to the stock  
 
exchange. Unable to stabilise his liquidity problems much longer, Maxwell had to  
resort to the flotation of the Mirror Group Newspapers (MGN) in April 1991. 
 
With this underlying objective behind the flotation exercise, it became increasingly  
 
apparent that assets and funds in MGN continued to be used by Maxell to support his  
 
various business interests. His problem was compounded by the fact that he had to  
 
continue to buy both MCC and MGN shares in order to support their prices. This was  
 





Despite the flotation of MGN, and the abusive use of its assets and those of  
 
MCC, Maxwell was still unable to contain the financial squeeze impacting on most of  
 
his operations. Hence, when Goldman Sachs and Citibank dumped MCC’s shares  
 
because of servicing failure, its price plunged disastrously. Matters were coming to a 
head when Maxwell suddenly died under mysterious circumstances in November 5, 
1991. Upon his death, his business empire fell apart completely, reflecting a 
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conglomerate built on debts and financial deceptions. Some £450 million was also 




The Maxwell financial scandal was highly criticised for its lack of punishment for    
 
key participants involved. Maxwell’s sons, Kevin and Ian were exonerated in the 
court trials which followed. There were some criticisms in the City for the absence of 
some kind of disciplinary actions on various financial institutions and individuals said 
to be closely involved with the Maxwell saga.[180]  
 
The stock market regulators were also criticised for allowing MGN to be floated  
despite prior warnings about Maxwell’s personal integrity and trustworthiness .  
 
‘MGN should never been allowed to float as the prospectus (prepared by Coopers & 
Lybrand Deloitte (CLD)) was materially inaccurate and misleading’.[181] In fact, it has 
been argued that CLD’s ‘…annual audit (of Maxwell’s businesses) was the loss leader 
to sell their more profitable consultancy services’.[182] 
 
The investment bankers’ roles in the whole Maxwell saga have also received critical  
comments. ‘Goldman Sachs, Wall Street’s top investment banker, organised  
 
Maxwell’s manipulation of his companies’ share prices until he assumed significant 
majority control of the shares. It tried to maintain that Maxwell lied to them, but the 
DTI inspectors clearly thought the bank was lying…Senior management must have 
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known that Maxwell was behind the overseas buying by Liechtenstein trusts (where 
Maxwell’s private companies were registered) but did not tell the regulator, the (DTI) 
report said’[183]. 
 
MGN’s merchant bank, Simon Montagu was also not spared from criticism for its role  
 
in preparing the flotation of MGN. The bank, ‘…did not ask the right questions. If 
they had, the flotation would have to be abandoned’.[184]The corporate lawyers were 
also criticised for not carrying out proper checks and the directors and trustees in the 
Maxwell business empire were unfavourably commented upon for not acting with 
sufficient independence and for condoning Maxwell’s controversial activities. Despite 
such failings, no board members or trustees had to answer for their flawed corporate 
behaviour. 
 
On balance, the Maxwell episode did lead to substantial changes in corporate  
 
governance practices through the recommendations of the Cadbury Committee in  
 
1992 as well changes in financial reporting practices thought the setting up of the  
 
ASB. Where the use of OBF is concerned, the case showed clearly the dishonourable 
intentions behind their use.  Large numbers of Maxwell corporations were used more 
like ‘special purpose vehicles’ for the illicit transmission of funds between related 
listed corporations and Maxwell’s private businesses. Unfortunately, because of the 
untimely death of Maxwell, it was not possible to pinpoint more precisely the extent 
of violation of corporate and securities laws.  
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Poly Peck International Plc (PPI) 
Background 
 
PPI, a small modestly profitable listed textile corporation came under the  
 
control of Asil Nadir, a London-based entrepreneur of Cypriot Turkish  
 
origin in 1980. Nadir was able to transform this modest acquisition of less than 
£300,000 into an investment worth some £1 billion by 1990, primarily by fascinating 
the stock market with his Cyprus political connections and the prospects of lucrative 
financial deals from large international acquisitions undertaken by him.[185]  
 
Capital market preferences motivated him to seek high and rapid growth corporate 
acquisitions. So in 1989, he expanded PPI through hefty acquisitions, which enhanced 
the group’s market capitalisation to over £731 million.[186] In fact by July 1989, PPI’s 
market capitalisation exceeded £2 billion.[187 ]On the other hand, such acquisitions 
also piled up the company’s debts to perilous levels. To contain the increasing 
financial pressure and the excuse that PPI’s valuation was held down by biased media 
reports of his Greek Cypriot problems, Nadir announced his intention to take PPI 
private in August 1990.[187]  When he retracted five days later, some £0.6 billion of 
PPI’s market valuation was wiped off on the back of market rumours that the real 
reason was his inability to secure funding for the exercise.[188] 
 
Two subsequent events caused the LSE to suspend PPI’s shares in September 20 of 
the same year. One pertained to the news that the SFO had raided a company owned 
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by a Nadir family trust and that Nadir himself had been interviewed by the serious 
fraud enforcement agency for alleged impropriety in the dealing of PPI shares. The 
other was in connection with the dumping of the company’s collateralised stocks by 
PPI’s main bankers, and in particular Citicorp Investment Bank (Switzerland) with its 
disposal of some 7.9 million shares.[189]  The company then sought the help of senior 
politicians to demand an inquiry by the DTI over the actions of the financial 
regulators. This was turned down.[190] 
 
To aggravate matters, suspicions were also raised on the possibility that Nadir was 
using PPI’s funds for personal investments and that insider dealing has occurred.  
Also seeds of doubts on Nadir’s personal financial position began to worry many 
bakers having business relationship with the company or Nadir personally. More 
importantly, doubts are now raised over the financial health of PPI itself due to the 
persistent rise in debt levels despite the reporting of continued profits and the disposal 
of various corporate assets.[191]  
 
However, by then the PPI group was by now heading towards financial collapse. 
‘According to one banker, PPI’s problems were largely attributed to the structure of 
the group’s debts. PPI had historically relied extensively on borrowings, a large 
proportion of which (in excess of £100 million) was short-term revolving lines of 
credit, which lenders could renew at their discretion. The remaining portion of PPI’s 
debts consisted of long-term loans for which Nadir had offered Polly Peck’s shares as 
collateral. As the stock market declined, the value of these shares fell to less than one-
fourth of the related outstanding debt. In response to the uncertainty regarding PPI’s 





ability to renew its existing lines of credit, Moody’s Investor Service…downgraded 
PPI’s short and medium-term debt from Ba1 to Ba3 (and) from Ba2 to Ba3’. [192] In 
the end, it was the combined actions of the rating agency and PPI’s bankers, which 
helped to push the company into administration in October 1990.[193] 
 
Use of OBF  
 
The use of OBF by PPI was carried out through a special purpose vehicle called Polly  
 
Peck International Finance (PPIF) set up in the Cayman Islands in 1987. The initial  
 
idea behind this was to raise funds through bonds issue and other financial products  
 
to on-loan to PPI. All borrowings raised by PPIF on this basis would be serviced and 
guaranteed by PPI, and reported only in contingent guarantee liability notes.[194]  
With access to such competitively priced loans, PPI went on an acquisition spree.[195]  
 
It was also reported that a major contributor to PPI’s spectacular growth was from 
three cash-rich subsidiaries in Turkey and northern Cyprus. The Joint administrators 
appointed later found that over £700 million due from them had disappeared and were 
wholly irrecoverable. It was further alleged that Nadir stole a large amount of this 
money via a bank account in Jersey. Thus PPI, which had reported net assets of £933 
million at 30 June 1990, was found with a creditors’ deficiency of £551 million the 
following year.[196]  
 
The use of special purpose vehicles to secure the benefits of lower cost  
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funding is not uncommon in corporate circles. Indeed, the separation of PPIF and PPI 
as legitimate separate legal entities was recognised by the courts, which held that ‘The 
common commercial use of corporate structures to limit liability or simply organise 
corporate affairs or enable funds to be raised thus does not constitute a façade’.[197] 
Special purpose vehicles such as PPIF therefore can be created legitimately. In PPI’s 
case, however, it was probable that Nadir may have intended to misappropriate the 
funds raised through OBF for the short term to finance the losses at PPI and his own 
business interests but in the end he could not reversed the situation when his acquired 
businesses continued to suffer huge losses. This probably led subsequently to the 




A week after PPI was put under administration, the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) with 
police support searched PPI’s head office in London and came out with the 
conclusion that the company had piled up debts of more than £1.3 billion and that 
much of its financial reporting was highly irregular. This resulted in the arrest of 
Nadir in December 1990 for financial theft and reporting deception. Naidr was in fact 
made bankrupt a month prior to this event.   
 
In the meantime, Nadir got frustrated over the protracted delays in court proceedings. 
He broke his bail conditions and fled to Northern Cyprus in May 1993, and from 
where he initially launched vigorous campaigns against the SFO for alleged abuse of 
process. Through his solicitors, Nadir also vowed to return to the UK to clear his good 
name. Nonetheless, till today, he never bothered to return. As for the three auditors 
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who were involved in the auditing of PPI’s main operations in Cyprus and Turkey, 
they were fined a mere £10,600 by their regulatory bodies after pleading financial 
hardship.[198] 
 




The commercialisation of new superstores in the recessionary period of the 1990s and  
 
the entry of continental discounters like Aldi and Netto resulted in the overcapacity of  
 
the food retailing industry in the UK.[199] Under Terry Leahy’s stewardship, TC 
proceeded from its earlier successful 1992 market transformation process to embark 
on an ambitious expansion phase through a four-point strategy, ‘…to continue to 
grow in the UK; to push more strongly into non-food; to diversify into services; and 
to expand overseas’.[200] 
 
Following this, additional retailing space was added. Expansion in the non-food 
segment closely followed with TC’s increased involvement in personal care products, 
home entertainment and apparels. As a result non-food retailing space exceeded 
36.3% of the company’s total retailing space as it headed towards year 2000. TC’s 
entry into the financial service sector commenced with its partnership with the Royal 
Bank of Scotland in 1997 and by 2001 the venture reported pre-tax profits of around 
£40 million from credit cards and motor insurance policies. TC successfully entered 
the emerging markets of Eastern Europe and Asia by collaborating with indigenous 
hypermarkets. The 174 stores operated in these targeted economies accounted for 
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about 42% of TC’s total retailing space by 2002 and are envisaged to rise with 
additional acquisitions.[201] 
 
TC thereon continued to pay close attention to the UK market, which  
 
became its most important profit contributor. TC’s strategy was to sustain its   
 
dominant position in the home market through continuous innovations, as the  
management believed that, ‘…unique differentiation is a prize that can only be won  
 
by continually being first’.[202] Thus, much of the successful redirection of the  
 
company on this and other matters from the mid 1990s onwards could be attributed to  
 
Leahy’s skilful positioning of the company in the ever-competitive industry as well as  
 
the careful use of its distinctive capabilities.[203] 
 
 
Recognising that the one size fits all standardisation approach, pioneered by earlier  
 
global branders may not work for its type of industry; TC took the ‘think global, act  
 
local’ strategy to a new level. ‘Its approach—call it ‘’glocalization’’—hinges on  
 
deep understanding of and responsiveness to the cultural vagaries and habits of  
 
foreign customers. Wal-Mart has made modest concessions to European  
 
customers…But no one tries harder to adapt to local conditions than Tesco does’.[204]  
The highly competitive corporate culture, which sustained the company’s dominant 
market position was inspired by the ‘Balanced Scorecard’ (BS) strategy.[205] 
For now, the company managed 1,779 stores in the UK and 586 outside. Its total 
 
market capitalisation on August 31, 2005 was £25.3 billion, the largest outside of the  
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World, One Market at a Time’, Strategy + Business, Issue 55, 2005, 47-48 
[205] Balanced Scorecard Institute, ‘What is the Balanced Scorecard?’, available at http://www.balanced, 
The Balanced Scorecard suggests that corporations should retrieve and analyse data from the learning 
and growth, business process, customer, and financial perspectives. 
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US.[206] It is set to grow further internationally, as it downplays its 30% dominant 
position in the UK. As Leahy puts it, ‘…Tesco was only about 20% into its 
international expansion plans, which last year (2004) generated £370m profit on £7.6 
billion of sale’.[207] 
 
Use of OBF 
 
Though it enjoyed an excellent reputation as a global retailer of some means, TC 
 
knew from past experience that environmental changes can cause it to lose its lead 
position in the UK market and its competitiveness in the overseas market territories.  
It was therefore of strategic sense for it to have access to sufficient liquid resources to 
enable it to respond quickly to changes in its external environment. 
 
Given this premise, it would be financially prudent for the company not to rely  
 
excessively either on equity funds or borrowings. Conscious of this limitation, 
 
the company decided to use OBF instruments to enhance its liquidity strength.  
 
One of TC’s earlier use of OBF was brought about by its joint-venture with British  
 
Land in 1996. Under the arrangement, the joint venture was injected with equity 
 
contributions of £35 millions from both partners. The joint venture then entered into a 
sales and leaseback arrangement with TC. This provided the group with liquidity and 
continued use of retail space.[208]  Aside from this, TC did not have to consolidate the 
borrowings assumed by the joint-venture entity. The financial arrangement 
consequently did not affect TC’s debt carrying capacity.  
 
The company’s treasury strategy is to fund it operations, ‘by a combination of  
                                                 
[206] Harding, J., ‘Tesco Proves its World-Class Credentials’, The Times, 04/10/2006, 55 
[207] Rigby, E., ‘Tesco Places Focus on Global Ambitions’, Financial Times, 19/09/2005, 22; Butler, S., 
‘Tesco Steps Up Its Plans to Expand in Asia and the US’, The Times, 04/10/2006, 59 
[208] Hollinger, P., ‘Tesco’s £17.5 Million Joint Venture’, Financial Times, 29/11/1996, 22 
 346
retained profits, long and medium debt capital market issues, commercial paper, bank  
 
borrowings and leases, with the objective of ensuring continuity of funding… and to  
 
maintain sufficient un-drawn committed bank facilities so that maturing debt may be  
 
refinanced as it falls due’.[209] With gearing of less than 0.6:1 and over £13.191 billion 
in fixed assets TC has further scope to undertake further sales and leaseback 
arrangements to for funding future growth activities.[210] This does not include the 




TC’s use of OBF at this stage is kept to a minimum because of its impressive  
 
operational and financial results. It is used primarily to unlock the use of idle fixed  
 
assets for more productive applications like the funding of expansion and growth in 
the domestic as well overseas markets at competitive costs. Whenever they are used, 
proper accounting standards and disclosures rules have been followed without 
compromise. In view of this, TC is unlikely to face any legal financial disclosure 
compliance risks, or for that matter any operational financial risks over the use of 
OBF instruments. 
 




Using its listing advantage in 1969, RI expanded on its core business to become UK’s 
largest pest control contract specialist. It also diversified into many unrelated 
businesses and expanded internationally. Under the stewardship of Sir Clive 
Thompson, RI grew at an annual rate of 20% in the 1980s and early 1990s through the 
                                                 
[209] This was reported under the Funding Section of its Home Page, available at http://www.tesco.uk.co   
[210] Calculations derived from financial data in TC’s Home Page, available at http://www.tesco.uk.co.  
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employment of the dual strategy of dominance in its traditional core business and 
acquisitions of very high growth businesses.[211] 
 
The acquisitions of strong brand names resulted in the need to write-off of high levels 
of goodwill. This together with its traditional high dividend payout policy turned its 
equity funds negative. The company had to restructure its capitalisation to enable it to 
sustain its traditional high dividend policy due to current EU Directive, which 
requires EU-based corporations to pay dividends only from earnings and a positive 
equity base.[212] 
 
RI’s growth through acquisitions strategy was faltering from the late 1990 onwards 
when its earlier acquisitions and its own core business both began to under-
perform.[213] Under pressure, the company responded with key changes at the 
company’s top management structure. The controversies surrounding various setbacks 
induced an abortive takeover attempt in the third quarter of 2005.[214] To respond to 
this and future challenges the company formulated new business plans to put its 
businesses back on track for further growth and profitability. To-date, RI continues to 
make decent earnings but is still unable to replicate its 1990s high growth high 
earnings record and consequently continues to fall below market expectations. 
 
Use of OBF 
 
RI’s current earnings and the general service-nature of its business provided it with 
strong cash flows to support its traditional high dividend payout policy without having 
                                                 
[211] RI, ‘Investor Care’, available at http://www.rentokil-initial.com, viewed on 25/11/2005 
[212] ibid 
[213] RI Internal Management Survey, Spring 2005 
[214] Davoudi, S., ‘Robinson in Rentokil Retreat’, Financial Times, 22/10/2005 
 348
to make serious use of capital market funds. The market was also familiar with the 
reasons for its negative equity structure before its 2000 capitalisation restructuring. 
Consequently, RI has very little need for financial window-dressing particularly in 
view of its low debt levels and high cash generation. 
 
For the moment therefore, the company is more concerned with the perking up of its 
market capitalisation through significant improvements in growth and earnings rather 
than financial window-dressing. In fact, its current acquisitions disposal programmes 
have further enhanced its cash reserves. Accordingly, it only used OBF instruments 
sparingly for tax advantage and some fiscal savings. This is reflected by its finance 
lease obligations of only £3 million in 2000. Its operating lease expensed out also 
amounted to only £36 million. By way of comparison, its un-drawn borrowing 
facilities then amounted to £578.7 million. RI also complied fully with the reporting 
requirements for lease applications.[215] The Finance Director’s Review since 2000 
continued to maintain that the company used derivatives for hedging purposes 
only.[216] 
 
Despite displaying double-digit growth for much of the 1990s, the company had been 
a subject of regulatory scrutiny; in 1988 from the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) for 
displaying monopolistic business behaviour, and; in 2001 by the FSA for its 
controversial 14.8 million shares buy-back a day before it reported increased sales and 
profits. It was released for its undertaking for enhanced transparencies on the former 
matter by the OFT in March 2, 2003 with evidence of more competition in the pest 
                                                 
[215] Derived from RI’s 2000 Annual Report 
[216] ibid, Finance Director’s Review 
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control industry.[217] The latter issue represented RI’s new financial strategy of 
enhancing market price through shares buy-back. This was in sharp contrast to its 
previous fast earnings strategy in the 1990s. This was embarked upon in view of the 
more difficult market conditions in the 2000s. The company survived the FSA 
enquiry.[218] 
 
The company continued to court controversy with high executive compensation in the 
 
face of falling earnings and share prices. The company attributed the higher executive 
 
compensation to the  inclusion of payments to the ousted Chairman and CEO.[219] The  
 
2005 abortive bid was ergo mounted within a scenario of frustration in the capital  
 
market brought about by board tussles and uncertainty over the future direction of RI 
in the first quarter of 2005.[220] After the unsuccessful bid, RI’s management began to 
settle down to focus on corporate turnaround. 
 
Despite the beginning of the decline in sales since 2000, the company was quick to  
 
emphasise that the goodwill of £2.4 billion previously written off had helped to  
 
generate very high returns on operating assets of over 233%; provided interest cover 
of seven times, and; strong statutory free cash flow exceeding £226.2 million in 2001.  
The company, however, acknowledged that its low level of operating assets was  
 
reflective of the nature of its service-based business.[221] 
 
 
This is not unusual in support service industries where the focus of analysis is on cash  
 
                                                 
[217] Letter from John Vickers, Director-General of Fair Trading to Secretary of State of Trade and 
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[218] Andrea, F., ‘FSA Questions Rentokil Move’, Financial Times, 20/06/2001, 22 
[219] Orr, R., ‘Research Finds Share Price and Pay Out of Step’, Financial Times, 20/07/2005, 2 
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flows rather than capitalisation structure. This perhaps helps explain why the  
 
company is not using OBF more enthusiastically even when confronted with pressure  
 




The adoption of IFRS and the new European legislation in the UK requiring the  
 
availability of distributable reserves for dividend payments compelled RI to  
 
undertake a major corporate restructuring scheme. This involved the creation of a  
 
new holding company with reduced capital but sizeable available reserves for  
 
distribution of dividends. This is important to RI’s traditional high dividend payout  
 
policy; which incidentally is the key attractive feature of its shares.  
 
 
The company’s existing distributable reserves had already been exhausted by  
 
its £1.9 billion shares buy-back exercise, made worse by the recognition of its pension  
deficit of some £285.6 million under IFRS requirements in 2005.[222] The formation of  
 
the new holding company was successfully completed in June 2005, and in the  
 
process raised its distributable reserve to around £1.8 billion.[223] RI’s restructured 
equity position and the high cash nature of its business will probably  
enable the company to continue to employ OBF only for the purpose of financial  





Despite the current downturn in its main business sector, RI is still the dominant pest 
control business in the UK, with strong international presence. More importantly it is 
still making profits though not at the rate it enjoyed in the 1980s through to the early 
1990s. It is also able to maintain its high dividend policy because of this and the 
                                                 
[222] RI, ‘Notice of EGM and the Court Meeting: Recommended Proposals for the Formation of a New 
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service nature of its business, which does not require massive investments in fixed 
assets. RI has also shown that it only uses OBF sparingly for financial savings and not 
for the sake of liquidity enhancement or financial window-dressing. This probably 
explained why it has no problems in disclosing its use in accordance with standard 
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